God's Transcendental Attributes of Being: Absolute Perfection and Infinity
God is absolutely perfect and actually infinite — both de fide (Vatican Council, Session III). As the self-existent Being He is autoteles (originally perfect in Himself), panteles (all-perfect, containing every possible perfection), and hyperteles (more-than-perfect, the measure of all other perfections). Pure perfections are in God formally; mixed perfections virtually and eminently. God is actually infinite (infinitum categorematicum), not merely potentially so, because any limit in an ens a se would be a contradiction. Scripture (Psalm 144:3; Sirach 43:29), the Fathers (Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary), and Scholastic reasoning from the actus purus all converge on these conclusions. Pantheism's objection that 'God plus the universe' is more perfect than God alone is refuted by showing that divine and creatural being are incommensurable and cannot be added.
Part III: The Divine Properties or Attributes
In our imperfect human way of thinking we are led to conceive the divine properties or attributes as forms enveloping the already constituted essence after the manner of qualities. But our judgment proceeds to correct this inadequate conception by insisting on the absolute identity of God’s attributes with His Essence.1 The Fathers speak of the divine attributes as proprietates (ἰδιώματα) or ea circa Deum (τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ), as dignitates (ἀξίαι, ἀξιώματα), or rationes (νοήματα, ἐπιλογισμοί), or as virtutes (ἀρεταί) or mores (ἐπιτηδεύματα).
More important than this nomenclature is the question how these attributes are to be divided. The most common classifications are: First, negative attributes (attributa negativa, ἀφαιρετικά, ἀποφατικά) and affirmative attributes (attributa affirmativa s. positiva, καταφατικά). This division is based on the different modes in which we acquire a knowledge of these attributes, some being conceived by the negative method,2 others by the positive method or that of supereminence.3 This classification has its roots deep down in our creatural knowledge of God, and must therefore be considered fundamental.
There is a second classification, viz.: into incommunicable (attributa incommunicabilia) and communicable attributes (attributa communicabilia). This coincides materially with the first, inasmuch as the negative qualities of God, expressing as they do a fundamental contrast between Him and His creatures, cannot be communicated to any being outside of God; while in His affirmative perfections (both in the order of nature and of grace), creatures may be allowed to share. Since, however, it is more difficult to draw a hard and fast line between communicability and incommunicability, than between affirmation and negation (even certain negative attributes, as, e.g., unchangeableness, are communicable, in a degree, by grace; the only really and absolutely incommunicable attribute is aseity), we do not consider it advisable to classify the divine attributes according to this principle of division.
A favorite division is that into quiescent (attributa quiescentia, ἡρεμητικά) and operative attributes (attributa operativa, ἐνεργητικά), according as we conceive God in His being or in His operation (nature). In making this distinction, however, we must never forget that God’s Essence is pure actuality and His actuality is pure being.4 As this classification brings out the two aspects of aseity already referred to, viz.: the static and the dynamic, we consider it better adapted than any other to facilitate a scientific study of the divine attributes. We therefore divide the divine attributes into attributes of being and attributes of operation.
All being may be reduced partly to the five transcendental categories, viz.: ens, unum, verum, bonum, pulchrum; partly to the ten predicaments: substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, posture, habiliment, action and passion.5 Accordingly we shall divide the divine attributes into transcendental, and categorical or predicamental.
Chapter I: God’s Transcendental Attributes of Being
Section 1: Absolute Perfection and Infinity
The term being (ens) includes in its signification both existence (existere) and essence (esse, essentia). We have treated of the existence of God in the first part of this volume. Here we are considering the Divine Ens in its essence. God’s proper essence (essentia metaphysica), as we have seen, consists in aseity (αὐτουσία) or self-existence. Therefore there remain to be considered only perfection and infinity, as special attributes flowing from the divine ens.
Article 1: God’s Perfection
1. Preliminary Observations. — “Perfect” etymologically means that which is finished, to which nothing can be added (τέλειον, from τέλος = an end accomplished). In this sense perfection connotes fieri, development. More specifically, perfection signifies the accomplished end or state itself (τελείωσις), as the possession and enjoyment of goods obtained. It is in this narrower sense that we apply the term to God.6 But even within these circumscribed limits the concept of perfection admits of degrees. In the first place all being, considered as being, is necessarily perfect. The degree of a thing’s being is also the measure of its perfection, while, conversely, not-being furnishes the measure of imperfection.7 In a higher sense, however, perfection denotes the sum total of all those excellences which a being ought to have in consideration of its nature and end. The absence of even one of these (essential or integral) excellences constitutes a privation (privatio, στέρησις), a concept which coincides with that of evil (e.g., blindness, eternal damnation). In its highest sense, lastly, perfection means the possession and fruition of all the aforementioned excellences, not only in a large, but in an extraordinary measure. Thus supernatural or eternal bliss means, for man, the state of highest consummation or achievement, and Mary, the Mother of God, is the beau ideal of a human being, surpassed only by Christ Himself (in His human nature).
It goes without saying that between divine and created perfection — even taking the latter in its highest sense — there yawns a chasm as immense as that which separates the ens a se from the ens ab alio. For, while the creature acquires all its perfections through creation and development, God possesses His own of, from, and through Himself. He is αὐτοτελής, essentially and originally perfect. Again, while creaturely perfection is limited to certain well-defined categories, God, on the other hand — as παντελής, all-perfect — unites within Himself every existing and every conceivable perfection. Finally, while the measure and end of creaturely perfection is outside of and above the creature, God carries the measure and end of His perfections within His own Essence, as a centre from which He communicates excellencies to His creatures; in other words, He is ὑπερτελής, more-than-perfect.
2. The Dogmatic Proof. — That God is originally perfect, all-perfect, and more-than-perfect, is an article of faith. “Deum … intellectu, ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum — Infinite in intelligence, in will, and in all perfection.”8
a) We find all three of the characteristic modes of perfection attributed to the Deity in Sacred Scripture. That God is original or archetypal perfection, follows not only from the name יהוה which He Himself has revealed as signifying His essence,9 but is expressly taught in the Gospel of St. Matthew: “Ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι, ὥσπερ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν — Be ye therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect,” which the Fourth Lateran Council interprets as follows: “Estote perfecti perfectione gratiae, sicut Pater vester coelestis perfectus est perfectione naturae.”10 Note also those passages of Holy Writ which emphasize the divine self-sufficiency, as, e.g., Rom. XI, 35: “Quis prior dedit illi et retribuetur ei? — Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?”11 — Being all-perfect, God is the exemplar and the cause of all created perfections, which He comprises within Himself in their highest purity. Ecclus. XLIII, 29: “τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν αὐτός — The sum of our words is: He is all.” Rom. XI, 36: “Ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα — For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things.” Out of His inexhaustible fund of being, therefore, God draws the concepts of created things and bestows upon them all the perfections of their being. Ps. XCIII, 9: “Qui plantavit aurem non audiet, aut qui finxit oculum non considerat? — He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? or he that formed the eye, doth he not consider?”12 The superabundance of divine perfection, finally, so glowingly described in Ecclus. XLIII, 29 sqq., is apt to inspire rational creatures with fear: “Terribilis Dominus et magnus vehementer et mirabilis potentia ipsius — The Lord is terrible, and exceeding great, and his power is admirable.” Here no univocal comparison between the Creator and the creature is possible, because we have no common standard by which to measure their respective perfections. Cfr. Is. XL, 17: “All nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity.”
b) The Fathers resolved divine perfection into its various momenta, and found that it contains all creatural perfections in their most highly sublimated form. Hence the golden rule formulated by St. Ambrose:13 “Quidquid religiosius sentiri potest, quidquid praestantius ad decorem, quidquid sublimius ad potestatem, hoc intelligas Deo convenire.” St. Bernard has the following beautiful passage:14 “Non quod longe ab unoquoque sit, qui esse omnium est, sine quo omnia nihil. Sane esse omnium dixerim, non quia illa sunt quod ille, sed quia ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia.”
The philosophical proof for God’s perfection rests partly on aseity as the taproot of all divine perfections, and partly on the arguments for God’s existence. Among these the profound argumentum ex gradibus perfectionum, unfortunately too much neglected nowadays,15 shows God to be the ens perfectissimum. St. Thomas16 proves this as follows: “Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat… . Secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent, unde sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit.”17
3. How the Created Perfections are Contained in God. — All creaturely perfections must be somehow contained in God, because He is the all-perfect and more-than-perfect Being. But how are they contained in the Divine Essence? It is quite plain that finite perfections cannot be attributed to God until they have been put through a refining process.
Since the time of St. Anselm,18 theologians have been wont to distinguish two classes of divine perfections — viz.: pure or simple, and mixed perfections (perfectiones simplices — perfectiones mixtae s. secundum quid). The former in their form and concept exclude all imperfection, so that they contain nothing but “pure” perfection (as, e.g., spirituality, wisdom); while the latter are perfections with an admixture of imperfection (as, e.g., matter, the faculty of drawing conclusions). St. Anselm appropriately defines a pure perfection as “melius ipsum quam non ipsum,” a mixed perfection as “melius non ipsum quam ipsum.” Thus, measured by the absolute standard, spirit is better than non-spirit or body; while, conversely, corporeity is “not-better” than, i.e., inferior to, spirituality.
a) These considerations furnish the key to the question how both kinds of perfection are contained in the Divine Essence. The pure perfections, inasmuch as they can be notionally intensified to an infinite degree, are contained in God formally; the mixed perfections, on the other hand, are in Him virtually and eminently only.19
It is easy to see the reason for this. For, as the formal attribution of the pure perfections is founded in the circumstance that they signify nothing but perfection, so the concept of a mixed perfection postulates that it be first put through a process of logical refinement (which takes place by means of negation) before it can be applied to God. E.g., if there were such a thing as infinite contrition, we should not be justified in predicating it formaliter of God, because the very concept of contrition implies sin, which is an imperfection.
b) It remains to be determined how one thing may be virtually and eminently contained in another. God contains all mixed perfections virtually or equivalently (virtus = valor), inasmuch as He is their ideal or exemplar (causa exemplaris). But He also contains the mixed perfections after the manner of a cause containing its effects, inasmuch as He creates them, or is able to create them, out of nothing (virtus = potentia activa). Thus material light is contained in God virtually, because He is both its exemplary and its creative cause. Eminent containment involves three elements: first, the necessity of previous purification by means of negation; second, elevation to a different and higher mode of being; and third, absolute identification of one perfection with all the others. A mixed perfection cannot be formally predicated of God, unless it has been properly refined by negation (e.g., God is incorporeal). But even after it has been so purified, a form cannot exist in God in its creatural mode (e.g., as filling space); but must be elevated to a higher mode of existence (e.g., omnipresence). Since, however, this divine attribute is not to be conceived as an accident, but as a substance, it must in the last analysis be identical not only with God’s essence, but with all His other perfections, the pure as well as the mixed. — It is easy to see that there is an intrinsic connexion between the two modes of presence, the virtual and the eminent. They partly complement and partly condition each other. Eminent presence is no doubt the more comprehensive of the two, wherefore some theologians20 confine themselves to the thesis: “The mixed perfections are contained in God eminenter.” It is in this sense that we must interpret the following curious proposition taught by Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa: “Deus est complicatio omnium” (namely, non formaliter, sed eminenter).
c) The proposition that the mixed perfections are in God virtualiter et eminenter only, must not, however, be taken to mean that the pure perfections are not so contained in Him. In matter of fact the pure perfections no less than the mixed, are virtually and eminently in Him, the only difference being that the former are formally attributable, while the latter are not. But even this is not true without some limitation. For inasmuch as the perfectio simplex, too, is invariably an abstractive and analogical conception derived from created things, it is congenitally affected by a creatural mode involving imperfection. This can be removed only by way of negation or intensification.21 On the other hand, it would be a serious mistake were we to rely for our knowledge of God solely upon an analysis of the simple or pure perfections, neglecting the perfectiones mixtae. The mixed perfections are equally helpful to a true knowledge of God, first, because they are ektypa or likenesses, and secondly, because they are effects (effectus) of God. As ektypa or likenesses they suggest a corresponding archetype (causa exemplaris), while as effects they point to an efficient cause. It is in intimate connexion with these truths that the Schoolmen teach, that all creatures bear the stamp of God’s likeness; though not, of course, in the same manner or to the same extent. The irrational creatures are as it were God’s footprints (vestigia), while those endowed with reason are true images of Him.22
4. A Pantheistic Objection. — Against the doctrine set forth above Pantheists object that “God plus the universe” must obviously be more perfect than “God minus the universe.”
If this objection means that God and the universe are two separate and distinct beings (plura entia), Pantheism simply reverses itself. If, contrariwise, it means that from an addition of creaturely perfections and divine perfections there results a higher degree of being (plus entis), the Pantheists forget that God and the universe cannot be added together, because divine Being belongs to an altogether different order than creatural being. It is only homogeneous things, objects of the same kind, that admit of addition. Now, the concept of being applies to God in its proper sense, to creatures only analogously. Therefore, “God plus the universe” is a sum that cannot be added. Besides, all creatural perfections, both pure and mixed, are in matter of fact already present in God, either formaliter or virtualiter et eminenter, in a plenitude which is infinite, and with a reality concentrated in the highest degree. Were we to attempt, e.g., to blend the corporeal perfections of the material world with the immanent perfections of God, in order to obtain a third being superior to God Himself, the attempt would not result in a higher form of perfection, just as little as if we should try to “improve” human reason by amalgamating it, by some intrinsic process, with what is wrongly called animal intelligence. In either case we should simply deteriorate the grade of perfection. As little as “Dante plus the Divina Commedia,” or “Michelangelo plus The Last Judgment,” constitute a higher perfection than either Dante or Michelangelo alone — a work of art obviously derives all its merits from the artist — just so little, and even less, can “God plus the universe” be said to constitute a higher degree of being than God alone minus the world of creatures.23
Readings: — *Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 71 (summarized in Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, pp. 177–179). — Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. I, § 163. — *Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 163 sqq. — S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 4. — Idem, Contra Gentiles, I, 28, 29 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 22 sq.). — Petavius, De Deo, VI, 7. — W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 74 sqq., London 1897. — F. Aveling, The God of Philosophy, pp. 101 sqq., London 1906.
Article 2: God’s Infinity
1. The Notion of Infinity. — “Finite” we call that which has limits or an end (finis, πέρας); “infinite” (infinitum, ἄπειρον) is that which is unlimited or endless.
a) A being can be infinite in one of two ways; either potentially (infinitum potentiale) or actually (infinitum actuale). The latter is called infinitum categorematicum, the former, infinitum syncategorematicum. Infinity of the last-mentioned kind is merely the susceptibility of being multiplied or increased indefinitely (indefinitum). What is indefinite, is not therefore infinite, but merely, in the phrase of the Schoolmen, “sine fine finitum.” That which is actually infinite (infinitum categorematicum), on the other hand, is absolutely limitless; it is really infinite in the proper sense of the term. Leaving aside the vagaries of Hegel,24 we must say that, although the actually infinite (infinitum categorematicum) is the only real infinite, the potentially infinite (infinitum syncategorematicum s. indefinitum) is not a mere figment, but a real, objective concept. Aristotle and the Schoolmen attributed a true (though potential) infinity to primordial matter (materia prima, ὕλη πρώτη), because its determinability is unlimited.25 Similarly they conceived the created intellect as potentially infinite, because of its unlimited capacity for knowledge.26 At the same time, however, they held that no created intellect can actually know all things knowable. And even the few things that the human mind does know, it knows not like God, of and in itself, but either by means of infused forms (as the angels), or (as man) by a process of abstraction from material things.
b) We must furthermore draw a sharp line between quantitative infinity (infinitum quantitate) and infinity of being (infinitum perfectione s. essentia). Quantitative infinity belongs to mathematics; infinity of being or perfection, to theology.
The mathematician reckons with “infinitely large” and “infinitely small” quantities, leaving it to philosophy to determine whether these magnitudes are actually infinite or only potentially so.27 Even if the quantities with which mathematics deals were actually infinite, they would yet retain their character of accidents, and could not, therefore, form a connecting link with God, Who is infinitely perfect. In the domain of the finite we should have at most an actu infinitum secundum quid, never an actu infinitum simpliciter. The term infinite in the strict sense always denotes infinity of being and substance, and therefore must be objectively identical with the absolutely perfect, though formally there may be drawn between them a threefold distinction: first, because absolute perfection is an affirmative, while infinity is a negative attribute of God; secondly, because absolute perfection is related to infinity in the same manner in which the universal is related to the particular, or the whole to any one of its parts; and thirdly, because absolute perfection emphasizes God’s intrinsic plenitude of being, while infinity rather accentuates the extrinsic magnitude of His being and attributes.
2. The Dogma. — The Church has repeatedly defined infinity to be an attribute of God. The first definition of this dogma was uttered by the Second Council of Nicaea (A.D. 787);28 the last by the Vatican Council.29
a) In order to prove the dogma from Sacred Scripture, we will not repeat the texts already quoted in establishing the attribute of divine perfection,30 but confine ourselves to such passages as bear directly on the infinity of the Divine Substance. Ps. CXLIV, 3: “Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis et magnitudinis eius non est finis — Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised: and of his greatness there is no end.” Inasmuch as there can be no accidents in God (quantity is an accident), “magnitude” in the foregoing passage must refer to the Divine Substance. Nor can the infinity which the Psalmist ascribes to God’s magnitude, be an infinitum potentiale, because potentiality in an ens a se would involve contradiction. Manifestly the meaning of the passage is that God is actually infinite. There are other texts which ascribe infinity to the one or other of God’s attributes. For instance, Ps. CXLVI, 5: “Magnus Dominus noster et magna virtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus — Great is our Lord, and great is his power, and of his wisdom there is no number.” All such passages prove the infinity of the divine Essence, which is identical with each divine attribute. The infinity of the divine Essence is furthermore taken for granted in all those Scriptural texts which contrast God as the absolute Being (ὁ ὤν, יהוה) with His creatures, which are often described as mere shadows or zeroes (מְאָיִן). Also whenever the Bible distinguishes God in an especial manner by superlative predicates.31
b) It is hardly necessary to develop the argument from Tradition. The Fathers of the Church invariably postulate God’s infinity whenever they discuss His incomprehensibility. Gregory of Nyssa expressly excludes from God potential infinity when he says: “He becomes neither larger nor smaller by addition or subtraction, because in the Infinite there can be no such addition as takes place in creatures, when they grow larger.”32 St. Hilary gives a beautiful description of God’s infinity in his commentary on the 144th Psalm: “Haec Dei prima et praecipua laudatio est, quod nihil in se mediocre, nihil circumscriptum, nihil emensum et magnitudinis suae habeat et laudis… . Finem magnificentia eius nescit.”33
c) Scholastic theology deduces God’s infinity directly from the concept of His self-existence. It is in this sense that St. Bonaventure writes: “Ipsum esse purissimum non occurrit nisi in plena fuga τοῦ non esse.”34 St. Thomas Aquinas argues trenchantly in this fashion: “Secundum modum, quo res habet esse, est suus modus in nobilitate… . Igitur si aliquid est, cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitas deesse potest, quae alicui rei conveniat. Deus autem sicut habet esse totaliter, ita ab eo totaliter absistit τὸ non esse.”35
Readings: — S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 7. — Contra Gent., I, 43 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 30 sqq.). — Suarez, De Deo, II, 1. — Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselm., disp. 32. — Gutberlet, Das Unendliche, pp. 130 sqq., Mainz 1878. — Lepicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 263 sqq., Parisiis 1902. — Boedder, S.J., Natural Theology, pp. 100 sqq. — Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, p. 185.
Footnotes
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V. supra, Part II, Ch. II, § 2. ↩
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V. supra, p. 70. ↩
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V. supra, p. 69 sqq. ↩
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V. supra, p. 170. ↩
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Cfr. any text-book on Ontology. ↩
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Cfr. S. Thom., Contra Gent., I, 28. ↩
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Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 5, art. 1: “In tantum est perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu.” ↩
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Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, De Fide, cap. 1. ↩
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Cfr. our remarks on His aseity, supra. ↩
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Conc. Lateran. IV, cap. “Damnamus.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 432.) ↩
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Cfr. Is. XL, 13; Ps. XV, 2; Acts XVII, 25. ↩
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Cfr. Is. LXVI, 9. ↩
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De Fide, I, 16. ↩
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Serm. in Cant., 4. ↩
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Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 3, art. 3: “Quarta via;” Contra Gent. II, 15. ↩
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S. Theol., Ia, qu. 4, art. 2. ↩
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Cfr. S. Schiffini, S.J., Disput. Metaphys. Spec., Vol. I, disp. 2, sect. 1, August. Taur. 1888. ↩
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Cfr. Monol., c. 14; Proslog., c. 5. ↩
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Hence the theological axiom: “Perfectiones simplices sunt in Deo formaliter, mixtae autem tantum virtualiter et eminenter.” ↩
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Among them Lessius and Kleutgen. ↩
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V. supra, p. 70. ↩
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Cfr. S. Theol., Ia, qu. 93; and Janssens’ commentary, De Deo Uno, tom. I, p. 250, Friburgi, 1900. On “The Vestiges of God in Creation,” see M. Ronayne, S.J., God Knowable and Known, Chap. IV, 2nd ed., New York 1902. ↩
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Cfr. Suarez, Metaphys. Disput., 28, sect. 3; J. Uhlmann, Die Persönlichkeit Gottes und ihre modernen Gegner, pp. 56 sqq., Freiburg 1905. ↩
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Cfr. Enzyklopädie, pp. 90 sqq. ↩
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“Materia prima est potentia omnia.” ↩
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“Intellectus fit quodammodo omnia.” ↩
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Cfr. Pohle, “Das Problem des Unendlichen,” in the Katholik, Mainz, 1880; Idem, “Das unendlich Kleine,” in the Philosoph. Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft, 1888, 1893. ↩
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Θεὸς ἀνεπίγραπτος. ↩
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“Omnique perfectione infinitum.” ↩
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Supra, pp. 182 sq. ↩
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Cfr. Is. XL, 17; Ecclus. XLIII, 32. ↩
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Contr. Eunom., l. 12. ↩
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Tract. in Ps. 144, n. 66. For other Patristic testimonies, cfr. Aguirre, Theol. S. Anselmi, disp. 32. ↩
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Itin. Mentis, c. 5. ↩
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Contr. Gent., I, 28. Cfr. also Toletus, Comment. in S. Th., I, qu. 7. The philosophical arguments are developed systematically by Gutberlet, Das Unendliche, Mainz 1878. ↩