The Metaphysical Essence of God

Chapter III: The Metaphysical Essence of God

In order to come at the metaphysical essence of God, we must try to find among His many attributes one which fulfils four distinct requirements: 1. It must be the first to be perceived (primum in cognitione). 2. It must signify God’s very being, not merely the status or mode of His being. 3. It must present a clear-cut distinction, after the analogy of an ultimate or specific difference, between God and everything that is not God. 4. It must be the taproot or a priori source of all the other divine attributes. As the Church has never defined in what the metaphysical essence of God consists, differences of opinion are permissible — a right of which philosophers and theologians have liberally availed themselves.

Section 1: Untenable Theories

1. Survey of the Field. — Leaving aside for the moment aseity or self-existence, we find that three theories have been elaborated to solve the problem of defining the Divine Essence.

a) The Nominalists held that the Essence of God was simply “the sum of His perfections” (cumulus omnium perfectionum), that is, the sum of all His attributes and perfections, whether known or unknown, quiescent or active, transcendental or predicamental, whether qualities of the intellect or of the will. They excluded only the divine Relations and Hypostases and argued that, inasmuch as there are in God no accidents (συμβεβηκότα), His attributes being strictly identical with His Essence,¹ whatever is divine must eo ipso be part of the Divine Essence.

b) The Scotists pitched upon God’s infinity as that one among His attributes from which all others flow. They argued that since no attribute can be a truly divine perfection unless it is stamped as it were with the seal of infinity, infinity must be the one attribute in which all others are contained. By positing a radical instead of a formal infinity, several writers of this school managed to bring their theory into substantial accord with that which makes self-existence (aseitas) the fundamental attribute of God.²

c) A considerable number of theologians of the Thomist school assigned intellectuality as the metaphysical Essence of God, some conceiving this attribute as “absolute spirituality” (esse spiritum), others as formal intellectual activity (intellectio subsistens). It must be said in favor of this view that we can hardly imagine a more serviceable principle of distinction than absolute reason, inasmuch as this attribute neatly marks off the Divine Essence from matter and from created reason, and is at the same time the root from which all other vital attributes logically grow.

2. Criticism of these Theories. — Nevertheless these theories must all be rejected, either because they do not meet the question squarely, or because they assume as God’s fundamental attribute some property which is not really the basic principle of His Divine Essence, but points to another still more fundamental.

a) The Nominalist solution does not solve the problem at all. The “sum of all divine perfections” merely constitutes God’s physical essence. The question to be solved is, Which of the many qualities that make up God’s physical essence is the foundation or root of all the rest? Those writers of the Thomist school who take God’s metaphysical essence to be absolute spirituality, likewise evade the question, because absolute spirituality (including cognition and volition) formally constitute God’s Nature rather than His Essence. The essence of any thing is prior to its nature, nature being merely another name for essence viewed as the principle of operation.

b) The remaining theories fail to comply with one or other of the four conditions laid down in the introductory paragraph of this Chapter.

α) The Scotistic theory, which regards infinity as God’s fundamental attribute, conforms to several of these conditions, but not to all. For infinity is neither the fundamental attribute of God, nor is it the one which our mind perceives first (primum in cognitione). It is not the fundamental attribute, because aseity builds the logical bridge to infinity; and it is not the primum in cognitione, because infinity has its source elsewhere, namely, in the notion of aseity, αὐτουσία = actus purus. True, aseity can be logically deduced from infinity, but only by an a posteriori argument, concluding from the consequent to the antecedent, rather than vice versa. Now, it is plain that any attribute which must be conceived as the sequela rather than the source of other divine attributes, cannot claim to be the root principle of all others.

β) There remains the theory of those Thomists³ who define the metaphysical Essence of God as the activity or operation of the Divine Intellect (intellectio subsistens). It cannot be denied that God differs radically from all created beings by His absolute act of cognition. But He differs from them just as radically by several other absolute attributes, e.g., His eternity, immutability, immensity. Yet none of these can be said to constitute His metaphysical Essence. Hence underlying all these attributes there must manifestly be still another, from which the whole series derive their incommunicability. Besides it is an error to look upon intellectio subsistens as the basic attribute of God from which all others spring. For while it may be possible to derive from it a priori a whole group of new properties, such as omniscience, wisdom, etc.; yet there are other necessary attributes of the divine Essence that cannot be derived from intellectio subsistens, and which in turn must therefore be conceived as the fruit of a most comprehensive perfection of being (viz.: the actus purus), rather than as the fount and origin of all other attributes. The intelligere subsistens necessarily presupposes the esse subsistens as its ontological and logical principle.⁴

Section 2: Aseity the Fundamental Attribute of God

1. The Notion of Aseity. — Aseity (aseitas, from ens a se) is that divine attribute in virtue of which God exists by Himself, in Himself, and through Himself. In English it is generally called “self-existence.”⁵ Opposed to the ens a se as its contrary is the ens ab alio, i.e., a being which has the reason for its existence and essence not in itself, but in another, extraneous being. Since the created universe, as a whole and in all its parts, is thus conditioned, we might, if we were allowed to coin a new word, designate as its fundamental quality “abaliety” — that notion of created being which is most directly contrary to the metaphysical Essence of God the Creator.⁶

a) In its purely etymological sense, aseity denominates not the divine Essence, but its mode or status, viz.: that it has no cause (ens a se = ens non ab alio). But we need only to analyze the concept of aseity or self-existence to find that besides this negative it also contains a positive note, in virtue of which aseity expands and develops into the notion of being pure and simple (esse simpliciter, esse subsistens, ipsum esse) or pure actuality (actus purissimus) — all synonymous terms, denoting the absoluteness of the divine being. Thus aseity becomes αὐτουσία pure and simple, i.e., identity of existence and essence. For in Him who does not derive His being from another but possesses it of Himself, existence and essence must coincide.⁷

Here the enormous difference between Divine Being and created being again becomes manifest. God is being, the creature has being — either this or that, such or another. God is pure transcendent being; the creature is limited to the one or other category of being. If we hold them together, they are not only not commensurable, but, strictly speaking, cannot even be compared, inasmuch as the notion of being is predicated of God in an entirely different sense than of His creatures. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) defines: “Inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior dissimilitudo sit notanda.”⁸ Hence being does not represent a common genus in which God and creatures coincide. The concept of being in its proper sense (proprie et principaliter) applies to God alone; to the creatures only improperly and analogically (improprie et analogice) — a relation which finds its most pregnant expression in the Biblical designation of the creature as “something which is not” or “non-being” (μὴ ὄν).⁹

b) In order to gain a deeper understanding of aseity, it is necessary to avoid two serious misconceptions into which even a trained thinker is liable to fall, viz.: confounding self-existence with self-realization on the one hand; and, on the other, absolute being with abstract being.

α) It is a mistake to take aseity or αὐτουσία to mean self-realization.¹⁰ This misconception was probably occasioned by the Scholastic use of the phrase “causa sui,” as synonymous with “ens a se.” The phrase was ill chosen. The Schoolmen do not mean that God causes Himself (causa sui efficiens), but, on the contrary, they use the term causa sui precisely for the purpose of denying that the first cause is in need, or capable, of being caused by some other, ulterior cause, extrinsic or intrinsic (causa sui formalis). St. Jerome says: “Deus ipse sui origo est suaeque causa substantiae,”¹¹ but he speaks metaphorically, as does St. Anselm when he declares: “Quomodo ergo tandem esse intelligenda est per se et ex se [divina substantia], si nec ipsa se fecit nec ipsa sibi materia extitit nec ipsa se quolibet modo, ut quod non erat esset, adiuvit, nisi forte eo modo intelligendum videtur, quo dicitur, quia lux lucet per seipsam et ex seipsa?”¹² The theory here under consideration runs counter to both the law of causality and the principle of contradiction. The law of causality, far from demanding that it be applied to God, halts before the causa prima incausata. He Who carries the reason for (not the cause of) His existence within Himself, neither requires an extrinsic cause, nor does he produce Himself; for either the one or the other would presuppose a potentiality towards a reality not yet (logically) existing, which would contradict the notion of aseity.¹³ The notion that God causes Himself is likewise repugnant to the principle of contradiction. For, in order to cause itself a being would have to be conceived as being in order to be able to posit itself; that is to say, it would exist before it had caused itself; in other words, it would exist before it came into existence, which is absurd.¹⁴

β) A second error, far worse than the first, is to confuse absolute being (ens a se) with abstract being (ens universale), to which the philosophers sometimes apply the name of “pure being.” According to Hegel, “pure being” is that which, as yet absolutely vacuous and undetermined, awaits its realization; it is only when the dialectical process reaches its apex that nothing develops into the plenitude of being. Now, the pure being of God must not be confounded either with Hegel’s “pure being” or with the abstract being which forms the subject-matter of ontology. A comparison will bring out the difference between them. Pure being in God, and abstract being as a metaphysical conception, are logically distinct both in comprehension and extension. Absolute Being, though the smallest in extension, has the widest and fullest comprehension. Abstract being has no comprehension at all outside of the nude note of abstract being (esse), and for this reason the term is exceedingly wide in extension, as it can be predicated of every sort of possible and real being.

The two notions differ also with regard to the manner of their origin. While the concept of abstract being is formed by simple abstraction, that of Divine Being is the result of a syllogistic process. They differ thirdly in their mode of existence. Divine Being is concrete, individual, personal; while abstract being has no formal existence except in the abstracting mind; in the things themselves it exists only fundamentally, and hence it is no real being at all, still less a personality. They differ finally in their properties. True, “simplicity” and “transcendence” are predicated of both, but in an essentially different sense. Abstract being, like a mathematical point, is simple only by virtue of its vacuity and logical incompositeness; while Absolute Being is called simple, because, though possessed of an infinite plenitude of being, it is ontologically indivisible. Again, abstract being is merely a transcendental concept, while God is a transcendental being, i.e., a substance existing far above all genera, species, and individuals.¹⁵

c) To prepare the ground for a scientific division of the divine attributes, to be made later, it will be useful to turn our attention to the twofold aspect presented by aseity in its full signification of αὐτουσία or actus purus. We distinguish in it a static and a dynamic side, each of which can be taken as the source of a number of divine attributes. As ens a se, God is not only pure being, but also pure activity; not only profound repose, but also sheer motion. Both these momenta mysteriously coincide in the concept of actus purissimus, and our mind is led up to them spontaneously by the same logical process by which it ascends to a knowledge of the existence of God from the contemplation of nature. The argument from the contingency of the cosmos and that called argumentum ex gradibus point mainly to the absolute being, while the argument from motion, that from causality, and that called teleological, accentuate rather the absolute life of the First Cause. It is in these two aspects of aseity that we have the underlying foundation for two classes of divine attributes, viz.: attributes of being and attributes of life.

2. Aseity a True Attribute of God. — Both Holy Scripture and Tradition teach that aseity is an attribute proper to God, and to God alone.¹⁶

a) The argument from Sacred Scripture is based upon the revealed name of God, Yahwe. Ex. III, 14 sqq.: “Ego sum qui sum… . Sic dices filiis Israel: Qui est (ὁ ὤν) misit me ad vos… . Dominus יהוה, Deus patrum vestrorum … misit me ad vos: hoc nomen mihi est in aeternum — I am who am… . Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you… . The Lord God of your fathers … hath sent me to you: This is my name for ever.”¹⁷ Modern exegetes take יהוה as merely expressing God’s fidelity in keeping His promises. But this view is contradicted by Jehovah’s own interpretation of His name, and runs counter to the whole Jewish and Christian Tradition. Of course, fidelity necessarily follows from self-existence. But God is not called יהוה because He is faithful; He is faithful because He is ens a se.¹⁸

Numerous paraphrases of aseity are found in the Apocalypse. Cfr., e.g., XXII, 13: “Ego sum α et ω, primus et novissimus, principium et finis (ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ἔσχατος, ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος) — I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.”¹⁹

b) Tradition elucidates and confirms the above-quoted texts from Holy Scripture. Gregory of Nazianzus explains the appellation ὁ ὤν as follows: “Quia totum esse (ὅλον τὸ εἶναι) in ipso collocandum est, a quo cetera habent, ut sint — The totality of Being must be embodied in Him from Whom everything else derives its being.” Gregory’s famous description of aseity as “an immense ocean of being”²⁰ was taken over literally by St. John of Damascus into his treatise De Fide Orthodoxa.²¹ Hilary gives us a beautiful paraphrase of αὐτουσία, when he says: “Ipse est, qui quod est non aliunde est, in sese est, secum est, ad se est, sibi est.”²²

3. Aseity the Fundamental Attribute of God. — The more general and more ancient opinion among theologians favors the view that aseity constitutes the metaphysical essence of God. Hence we shall act prudently in adopting this theory, especially since it is well founded in Holy Scripture and Tradition, and can be defended with solid philosophical arguments.

a) Sacred Scripture defines יהוה as ὁ ὤν and it would seem, therefore, that this definition is entitled to universal acceptance. Now, God Himself (Ex. III, 14) interprets His proper name יהוה as “Sum qui sum — ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν,” that is, I am He who is, i.e., I am Being itself.²³ Consequently being, αὐτουσία, self-existence, is the signature of the Divine Essence. This interpretation, based as it is upon the literal meaning of יהוה, explains not only the ineffability of the Tetragrammaton,²⁴ but likewise its absolute incommunicability to creatures, inasmuch as the essential proper name of a person is of its very nature incommunicable. Hence aseity denotes the very essence of the Godhead and differentiates it sharply from everything that is not divine.²⁵

The Old Testament definition of יהוה also proves that the aseity of God must not be conceived as inert or dead being, but as living, personal activity. For God does not say: τὸ ὄν, but ὁ ὤν = “He Who is,” not “That which is.” The Hebrew text brings out the idea still more vividly. After explaining His Essence and His name by declaring: “Ego sum qui sum” (אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה), He commands Moses to tell the children of Israel, not: “He who is (Sept., ὁ ὤν; Vulg., qui est) has sent me to you,” but far more trenchantly: “The ‘I am’ (the אֶהְיֶה) has sent me to you.”²⁶ “It is perfectly proper and quite correct,” observes Oswald,²⁷ “to designate God’s essence as τὸ ὄν or τὸ ὄντως ὄν, but it is more appropriate to call Him ὁ ὤν, because by this term He is described as a personal and intellectual being; besides, ὁ ὤν gives the best and most complete answer to the question: What is God?”

b) The Fathers, too, treated aseity, or self-existence, as a real and fundamental attribute of the Divine Essence. Contemplating the profundity of the name Yahweh, Hilary exclaims: “Admiratus sum plane tam absolutam de Deo significationem… . Non enim aliud proprium magis Deo quam esse intelligitur.”²⁸ Gregory of Nyssa, arguing against Eunomius, insists upon αὐτουσία as a divinely revealed note of God’s essence (in contradistinction to ἀγεννησία): “If Moses has incorporated in the Law an essential note of true Divinity, it is to know of God that He is Being; as is proved by the effatum: I am who am.”²⁹ St. Jerome succinctly declares: “Deus solus essentiae vere nomen tenet … ego sum qui sum.”³⁰ Profoundly as is his wont, St. Augustine observes: “Non est ibi nisi est… . Ego sum qui sum. Tu diceres: Ego sum, quis? Caius. Alius, Lucius… . Ego [Deus] sum. Quis? qui sum. Hoc est nomen tuum, hoc est totum quod vocaris.”³¹ No one has described the fundamental attribute of God more graphically than St. Bernard: “Quid est Deus? Non sane occurrit melius quam qui est. Hoc ipse de se voluit respondere: qui est, misit me ad vos. Merito quidem… . Si bonum, si magnum, si beatum, si sapientem vel quidquid tale de Deo dixeris, in hoc verbo instauratur, quod est Est.”³²

c) Philosophy supports the Scriptural and Traditional argument by demonstrating that aseity alone among all of God’s attributes complies with the four conditions enumerated above.³³ To begin with, aseity or self-existence, as theodicy shows, is the first of the divine attributes to be perceived by the thinking mind. Secondly, taken in its full comprehension as αὐτουσία, aseity reveals to us not only the mode or state of God’s Essence, but that Essence itself. “Cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius essentia,” observed Aquinas,³⁴ “manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc [scil.: qui est] maxime proprie nominat Deum.” In the third place, unlike the so-called communicable attributes, aseity differentiates God primarily and essentially from everything that is not-God, while the other incommunicable attributes are incommunicable to creatures precisely because they are rooted in aseity. Finally, aseity is the fount and origin of all the other divine attributes. St. Thomas deduces all divine perfections from the concept of the actus purus.³⁵

4. Attributes Derived Immediately from God’s Aseity are all those divine perfections which refer to God’s mode of existence and His knowability.

a) God’s inoriginateness, independence, and necessity, are merely different names for His aseity or self-existence. The first-mentioned perfection (not to be confounded with the innascibilitas of the Father as the first Person of the Blessed Trinity) results from the fact that God, in virtue of His self-existence, has no efficient cause outside Himself (ens non ab alio). In this same fact are also rooted His independence (independentia) from all extrinsic factors, and His necessity (necessitas), which flows from aseity in so far as a Being that exists by virtue of its own essence, exists necessarily (non potest non esse).

b) The three attributes of invisibility (invisibilitas), incomprehensibility (incomprehensibilitas), and ineffability (ineffabilitas), which have reference to the knowableness of God, are likewise founded upon His aseity or αὐτουσία. Scheeben says: “Precisely because the notion of essential being penetrates to the very depth of the Godhead, its mode of expression is the most imperfect, and its content, more than that of any other human concept, remains ἄρρητος, ineffabilis, unutterable. Hence the holy dread which surrounded the name Jehova among the Jews and kept them from employing it or giving it utterance.”³⁶ For the same reason the Fathers referred to God not only as the αὐτουσία and the ὑπερούσιος, but likewise as the ἀνούσιος or essence-less one.

Readings: — S. Thom., S. Theol., Ia, qu. 13, art. 11. — Idem, Contra Gentiles, I, 21–24 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 16 sqq. London 1905). — Thomassin, De Deo, l. III, cap. 21–24. — Petavius, De Deo, l. III, cap. 6. — D’Aguirre, Theologia S. Anselmi, disp. 24. — Kleutgen, Philosophie der Vorzeit, Bd. I, Abh. 5, Bd. II, Abh. 9. — Idem, Theologie der Vorzeit, T. 1, Abh. 2, Hpst. 6. — *Gillius, De Essentia atque Unitate Dei, Lugduni 1610. — D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino, pp. 106 sqq., Dublinii 1909. — W. Humphrey, S.J., “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 59 sqq., London 1897.