Dogmatic Anthropology §3: Man's Defection from the Supernatural Order — Original Sin

§3: Man’s Defection from the Supernatural Order — Original Sin

SECTION 3 man’s defection from the supernatural order, or the doctrine of original sin We shall treat the subject-matter of this Section in five Articles, considering (i) The sin of Adam as the first sin and its effects on our protoparents; (2) The sin of Adam as original sin in the technical sense of the term, i. e., in so far as it affects the whole human race; (3) The nature of original sin; (4) Its mode of propagation; and (5) Its effects in Adam’s descendants. j The doctrine of original sin is a fundamental / dogma of Christianity, because on it is based the necessity of the Redemption. General Readings: — *St. Thomas, S. Theol., ia 2ae, qu. 81 sqq. — Billuart, De Peccatis, diss. 6. — Suarez, De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 9. The principal Scholastic treatise on the subject is *De Rubeis, De Peccato Originali, Venetiis 1757, nov. ed. Herbipoli 1857. Of later authors the student may profitably consult the following: Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 197 sqq., Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scanneirs Manual, Vol. II, pp. 20 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1901). — Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, thes. 65-81, Rome 1878. — *Oswald, Religiose Urgeschichte der Menschheit, Part II, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887. — Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 616 sqq., Munster 1872. — Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 5, Rome 1880. — Heinrich, Dogmatische The232 ologie, Vol. VI, Mainz 1887. — Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. Ill, 3rd ed., pp. 121 sqq., Freiburg 1908. — G. B. Tepe, Instit. TheoL, t. II, pp. 551 sqq., Paris 1895. — 1>. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino et de Deo Creatore, pp. 599 sqq., Dublinii 1909. — S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 394 sqq., London 1894. — Le Bachelet, Le PSche Originel, Paris 1900. — P. J. Toner, Dissertatio Historico-Theologica de Lapsu et Peccato Originali, Dublin 1904. — Chan villard, Le PechS Originel, Paris 1910.

Article 1: The Sin of Adam Considered as the First Sin, and its Effects on Our Protoparents

THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED AS THE FIRST SIN, AND I ITS EFFECTS ON OUR PROTO-PARENTS All men are born in the state of original sin. This state necessarily supposes as its cause a sinful act of the free will; for the assumption that original sin is not incurred through actual guilt would logically lead to the jflanichaean/ heresy of the existence of an essentially evil principle. The sin of Adam is original sin in a twofold sense: (1) As a sinful personal act (peccatum originate originans), and (2) as a sinful state (peccatum originale originatum). It is the state not the act that is transmitted to Adam’s descendants. In the present Article we shall consider the sin of Adam as a personal act, (1) in its historic aspects and (2) in the immediate consequences which it entailed upon our first parents. Thesis I: Our first parents, seduced by Satan, committed a grave (mortal) sin by transgressing the precept of probation. This thesis embodies an article of faith.1 Proof. The Fall of our first parents, as every 1 Cone. Trident., Sess. V, can. 1-3. Catholic knows from his catechism, is an important historical fact, not a mere myth, as alleged by the Rationalists. a) The Bible relates that God gave Adam and Eve a probationary precept by forbidding them to eat of the fruit of a certain tree in the Garden, called ” the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.” This command bound them under pain of mortal sin — not because of its intrinsic importance, but on account of the attendant circumstances. We all know how Satan approached Eve in the form of a serpent and persuaded her to transgress the divine command, — how ” She took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband, who did eat.” 2 This simple account is plainly meant to be historical and is treated as such throughout the Bible. Cf r. Ecclus. XXV, 33: ” A muliere initium factum est peccati, et per Warn omnes morimur — From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die.” 1 Tim. II, 14: “Adam non est seductus [a serpente], mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit — Adam was not seduced [by the serpent]; but thg. woman being seduced, was in the transgression.” ^Ecclesiastical Tradition, too, has always maintained the historic character of the FallTj St. Augustine 8 thus explains the gravity of the first sin: ” There is in it pride, because man chose to be under his own dominion rather than under the dominion of God; and sacrilege, because he did not 2 Gen. Ill, 6. 8 ” Nam super bia est illic, quia homo in sua potius esse quam in Dei potestate dilexit; et sacrilegium, quia Deo non credidit; et homicidium, quia se praecipitavit in mortem; et fornicatio spirit alis, quia integritas mentis humanae serpen* tina suasions corrupt a est; et furtum, quia cibus prohibitus usurpatus est; et avaritia, quia plus quam illi sufficere debuit, oppetivit, et si quid aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti consideration inveniri potest.” {Enchiridion, c. 45.) DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 235 believe God; and murder, for he brought death upon himself; and spiritual fornication, because the purity of the human mind was corrupted by the seducing blandishments of the serpent; and theft, for man turned to his own use the food he had been forbidden to touch; and avarice, for he had a craving for more than should have been sufficient for him; and whatever other sin can be discovered on careful reflection to be involved in this oge admitted sin.” 4 b) Differences of opinion are permissible with regard to certain questions of detail, provided only that original sin be acknowledged as a historical f act. ^ The ” tree of knowledge ” is as mysterious as the ” tree of life.” Cajetan held that the story of the serpent merely symbolizes inward temptation. But this audacious hypothesis never found much support among Catholic theologians. The divine curse6 is intelligible only on the assumption that the serpent was a real animal, employed by Satan for the purpose of seduction. Cfr. Apocalypse XII, 9: ” Et proiectus est draco Hie magnus, serpens antiquus* qui vocatur diabolus et satanas — And that great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, who is called the devil and Satan.” 2 Cor. XI, 3: ” Timeo ne sicut serpens Hevam seduxit astutid sua, ita corrumpantur sensus vestri — I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his st^tility, so your minds should be corrupted.” \The holy Fathers and theologians generally hold that intellectual pride was the motive of the FatD Cfr. Ecclus. X, 15: * Initium omnis peccati superbia — Pride is the beginning of all sin.* Considered in itself, 4 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 2a, peccatum mortale und veniale. 2ae, qu. 163, and H. Gerigk, Wesen Breslau 1903. und Voraussetzungen der Totsunde, 5 Gen. Ill, 14. Untersuchung der Frage nach dem 6 6 d*0ts 6 dpxalos, Wesexsunterschiede zwischen dem the sin of our first parents, according to St. Paul’s teaching, was an act of grave disobedience, — which disposes of the strange hypothesis that the Fall was due to the natural use of marriage.7 fjt is not so easy to decide whether the transgression of the law of probation constituted the first mortal sin committed by Adam and Eve, or whether they had previously been guilty of other grievous offenses^ Alexander of Hales held that previous mortal sins on the part of our first parents had smoothed the way for their transgression of the decisive precept of probation, which involved the fate of Adam and all his progeny. Among modern theologians this view has been adopted by Schell.8 Though not exactly untenable, it lacks probability. The majority of Catholic divines hold that original sin was the first mortal sin committed by our first parents, because every mortal sin entails the loss of sanctifying grace. I Thesis II: By transgressing the law of probation I Adam forfeited sanctifying grace and merited eternal damnation; he became subject to bodily death and the dominion of Satan, and suffered a deterioration in body and soul. This is de fide.9 Proof. Every grievous sin entails the loss of sanctifying grace and provokes the anger of God. The very grievous nature of the sin committed by our first parents may be inferred from 7 Cfr. St. Paul’s Epistle to the dience of one man, many were made Romans, V. 19: Per inobedien- sinners. tiam unius hominis peccatores con- 8 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 308. stituti sunt tnulti — By the disobe- © Cone. Trident,, Sess. V, can. 7. the punishment with which God had threatened them. After the Fall He appears to Adam as the angry judge. The relation of sonship was turned into enmity, which spelled eternal damnation. Death, which had been the sanction of the law of probation,10 was actually inflicted on our first parents as a punishment.11 Invidia diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum — By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. 12 Incidental to it was the dominion of Satan, which is intimated in the so-called Protevangelium (Gen. Ill, 15), and explicitly taught in the New Testament.13 The deterioration which human nature suffered through the Fall, manifested itself in the sudden awakening of concupiscence, which had till then been duly subject; the flesh rebelled against the spirit, the intellect was darkened and the will enfeebled.14 The corruption of nature caused by original sin must have been far greater in Adam than it is in his descendants, and for two reasons: — first, because of the singularly privileged status of our progenitor, and secondly, because the first or original sin, which St. Augustine calls ” peccatum ineffabUiter grande” was a voluntary personal transgression, deserving of far severer punishment than a merely inherited state. In Adam’s descendants original sin exists merely as habitual sin, in 10 Gen. II, 17. 11 Gen. Ill, 19. i2Wisd. II, 24. i3Cfr. John XII, 31; XIV, 30; 2 Cor. IV, 4; 2 Pet. II, 19. 14 Cfr. supra, Section 2, Art. 2 and 3. which the personal will of the individual has no share. As for Adam and Eve, the Church piously believes that they repented and were ultimately saved.15 St. Irenaeus 16 defends this belief against Tatian. Rupert of Deutz’s assertion that our first parents were damned cannot be made to square with the fact that their names figure in the calendar of Saints (December 24th). Besides, the promulgation of the Protoevangelium in Paradise would seem to indicate that they were saved. Readings: — Reinke, Beitrdge zur Erkl’drung des Alt en Testaments, Vol. II, pp. 210 sqq., Minister 1855. — *P. Scholz, Theologie des Alten Bundes, Vol. II, pp. 90 sqq. — Patrizi, De Interpret. Scriptur., 1. II, qu. 3, Rome 1876. — Schopfer, Geschichte des Alten Testamentes, 3rd ed., pp. 40 sqq., Brixen 1907. — J. F. Driscoll, art “Adam” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol I.

Article 2: The Sin of Adam Considered as Original Sin in the Technical Sense of the Term

THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED AS ORIGINAL SIN IN THE TECHNICAL SENSE OF THE TERM i. Heretical Theories and their by the Church. — Theologically as well as historically the different heresies that have arisen in regard to original sin may be reduced to three main heads. ( 1 ) Manichaeism, Priscillianism, and Pre-existentism hold that there is a sin of nature (peccatum naturale),1 15 Cfr. Wisd. X, i sqq. 16 Adv. Haeres., Ill, 23. 1 ” The sin of the first man, from whom, according to the doctrine of faith, all other men are descended, was at once a personal sin, inasmuch as it deprived that first man of his own private good, and also a sin of nature {peccatum naturale), inasmuch as it took away from that ORIGINAL SIN 239 but no original sin in the technical sense of the word. U2) Pelagianism teaches that there is a primevaT^in, but no sin of nature and no original sin. J ((3) Protestantism and Jansenism contend that there is a sin of nature which is at the same time original sin, but that original sin is identical with concupiscence and destroys free-will, thereby seriously impairing human naa) The earlier heresies concerning original sin all revolve around the problem of evil. The Manichaeans and Priscillianists admitted the existence of a sin of nature, but attributed it to an absolutely evil principle, which they called hyle (flesh), and which, they declared, necessarily contaminates the spirit on coming in contact with it. The Pre-existentists, or Origenists, conceived natural sin as the result of a moral catastrophe in the realm of pure spirits, antedating the existence of matter. All of these writers to a greater or less extent deny the doctrine of original sin.2 r b) A far more radical heresy was that of the Pelagians. \They admitted that Adam sinned, but denied that his sin is transmitted to his descendants. 5 Pelagius himself and Coelestius 8 maintained the following errors: (1) Man, as now terity, a benefit conferred upon the of these errors cfr. supra, pp. 20 whole of human nature.” (St. sqq.; pp. 161 sqq.; also K. Kunstle, Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52; Rick- Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 1905. aby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 3 After A. D. 411. man, and consequently from his pos2 On the Church’s 381.) 240 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY constituted, does not differ essentially in endowment from Adam before the Fall. The only difference (an accidental one) is that personal sins are committed in the present order.4 (2) Newborn infants do not bring original sin with them into the world; they are baptized not “for the forgiveness of sins,” but merely that they may be enabled to attain to the regnum coelorum, which, in the mind of these heretics, is something quite different from eternal life. (3) The sin which Adam committed in Paradise injured him, but not his descendants, except in so far as their willpower is weakened by his bad example. (4) Since Adam’s sin is not transmitted to his descendants, they cannot be punished for it. Death is not a punishment for sin, but a necessity of nature (necessitas naturae), and concupiscence is merely nature’s way of asserting itself (vigor naturae). Few heresies were so vigorously combated from their very birth, and condemned by so many councils, as Pelagianism. During the short period from A. D. 412 (or 411) to 431 no less than twenty-four councils, in the East and in, the West, denounced the new sect. Prominent among them is the Second Council of Mileve (416); its canons were taken over by a plenary council held at Carthage in 418, and approved 4 Supra, pp. 26 sqq. ORIGINAL SIN 241 and promulgated by Pope Zosimus in his Epistola Tractoria. Pelagianism was cut to the quick by the second canon of this council, which reads as follows: “Quicumque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerations lavacro expietur, unde sit consequens, ut in eis forma baptismatis ‘in remissionem peccatorum’ non vere sed false intelligatur, anathema sit — Whoever denies that new-born infants should be baptized immediately after birth, or asserts that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins, but do not contract from Adam original sin, which must be expiated in the waters of regeneration, and that consequently the baptismal form ‘f or the remission of sins’ applies to them not truly, but falsely; let him be anathema.” The Council bases this definition on Rom. V, 12 sqq., and on ecclesiastical Tradition, and concludes: (t Propter hanc enim regulam fidei etiam parvuli, qui nihil peccatorum in semetipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo in peccatorum remissionem veraciter baptizantur, ut in eis regeneratione mundetur, quod generatione traxerunt — According to this rule of faith little children, who are as yet unable to commit actual sin, are therefore truly baptized for the remission of sins, in order that by regen243 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY eration they may be cleansed of that which they have contracted by generation.” 5 The Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431) imposed this teaching on all clerics under pain of deposition, and the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529) dealt Pelagianism a further blow by defining: “Si quis soli Adae praevaricationem suam, non et eius propagini asserit nocuisse, aut certe mortem tantum corporis, quae poena peccati est, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animae, per unum hominem in omne genus humanum transiisse testatur, iniustitiam Deo dabit contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Per unum hominem, etc. — If any one asserts that the prevarication of Adam injured himself only and not his progeny, or alleges that bodily death, which is the penalty of sin, but not sin, which is the death of the soul, was brought by one man upon the entire human race, he attributes an injustice to God and contradicts the Apostle, who says: ‘By one man, etc/ ” I c)£ln more modern times we meet with two great heresies which misrepresented the nature of original sin by describing it as an intrinsic and radical corruption of nature^ The two heresies in question are Protestantism and Jansenism. They denied free-will 6 and asserted that 5 Synod. Milevit. 77, can. 2, apud vln, Instit., IV, 18; Zwfngli. Dt Denzinger-Bannwart n. 102. Providentia, c. 6. 6 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio; CalORIGINAL SIN 243 concupiscence is the formal element of original sin. Zwingli flatly denied that original sin involves real guilt, and thus reverted to the teaching of Pelagius, from whom, however, he differed by entirely rejecting the doctrine of free-will. Jansenism (Baius, Jansenius, Quesnel) held that original sin formally consists in concupiscence, and that every act performed without grace is sinful.7 The Protestant conception of original sin was solemnly condemned by the Tridentine Council in its supremely important Decretum de Peccato Originali.* (The first of the five canons of this decree describes the sin of Adam and the ^^consequences which it entailed upon himself,9 (jCanon II defines how “sin, which is the death of the soul/’. 10 i$ transmitted from Adam to his descendants.11 Canon III defines original sin as one in its origin, and being transfused into all by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one as his own. Canon IV substantially repeats the second canon of theCCouncil of Mileve,12 on the effect of infant baptism as the ordinary means 7 Cfr. Baius’ condemned proposition: * Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum vtrtutes sunt vitia.* For further information on this subject we must refer the reader to our treatise on Grace. BSess. V. Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nn. 787 sqq. 0 Cfr. supra, pp. 233 sqq. 10 * Peccotum, quod est mors animae* 11 This canon employs almost the exact phraseology of the Second Council of Orange, cited above, p. 242. 12 Supra, p. 241* 244 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY of purging the soul from guilt. Canon V defines the effect of Baptism to be an actual remission of sin, and reduces the influence of concupiscence to its true bounds. We reproduce this canon in full because of its dogmatic importance: “Si quis per Iesu Christi gratiam, quae in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat; aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet, sed Mud dicit tantum radi aut non imputari, anathema sit — If any one denies that, \ by the grace of Jesus Christ, which is conferred by baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only erased or not imputed, let him be anathema.” ^Consequently it is an article of faith that original sin is real sin, and that its entire guilt is blotted out by Baptism?^ * In renatis enim nihil odit Deus* the Tridentine Fathers add, “quia nihil est damnationis Us, qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christ o per baptisma in mortem — fin those who are born again, there is nothing that God hates, because there is no to those who are truly buried together with Christ by Baptism into death.” As for the innate predisposition to sin, the fomes peccati or concupiscence which remains ORIGINAL SIN 245 in man after Baptism, the Council solemnly declares: “Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit, anathema sit — This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood it to be called sin, as being truly and properly sin in those born again, but because it is of sin and inclines to sin. And if any one is of a contrary sentiment, let him be anathema.” Hence it is also an article of faith that concupiscence as such is not really sin, but is merely so called by metonymy, because “it is of sin and inclines to sin.” The Jansenist teaching on original sin was condemned as heretical by Popes Pius V, Innocent X, Clement XI, and Pius VI. 2. Scriptural JProof for the Existence of Original SiN.-^-The dogma of original sin implies, first, the existence of habitual sin in man from birth, and, secondly, its connexion with the sin of Adam., Adam’s sin, in as far as it was personal, could not fall on his descendants. Like his death, it was by its very nature incommunicable. Original sin is consequently not a personal sin but a sin of nature, which inheres in all human individuals as guilt, and is a true sin only in its logical connexion with Adam’s voluntary transgression of the divine command in Paradise. a) The nature of original sin is far less sharply defined in the Old than in the New Testament. The oftquoted text Ps. L, 7: ” Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in peccatis concepit me mater mea — Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me,” seems from the context to refer rather to concupiscence, i. e., the inclination which draws all men to evil, and which the Psalmist mentions in extenuation of his own unrighteousness. Some of the Fathers of the Church, it is true, quote this passage against the Pelagians,18 but in doing so their main object is to demonstrate that Adam’s sin injuriously affected his descendants. That the injury which it inflicted is identical with original sin can hardly be proved from this text, unless it be interpreted in the light of the New Testament. A somewhat more conclusive text is Job XIV, 1 sqq., which was cited already by the Fathers as an argument for the existence of original sin. The passage runs as follows: ” Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries… . Who can make him clean that is unclean? Not one.” This is a literal translation of the Hebrew text. The Vulgate brings out the sense of the passage more clearly thus: ” Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? Nonne tu qui solus es? — Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only is Cfr. e. g., St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 50, n. 10. ORIGINAL SIN 247 art?” The meaning plainly is: No one but God can sanctify a man conceived in ethical uncleanness, i. e., in sin. There is no question here of Levitical uncleanness. The Sacred Writer plainly means that every man is conceived in original sin, though he does not explicitly mention the relation of man’s guilt to the sin of Adam, — a relation which not even St. Paul himself emphasized on all occasions. Cfr. Eph. II, 3: ” Nos … eramus natura (AAof) and the “one” who, under one aspect, is the first Adam as the author of sin and death, and under another, the second Adam (i. e., Christ) as the Father of grace and salvation. The passage may be divided into three sections, all of which clearly bring out the doctrine of original sin.

peccatum (rf afiapria) St. Paul evidently means a real sin, in the strict sense of the term, not mere concupiscence, or death as the penalty of sin. If peccatum spelled death, the text would contain a tautology: ” By one man death entered into this world, and by death, death.” If it meant concupiscence (which, it is true, St. Paul in Rom. VII, 17, also calls peccatum, but only by metonymy), the sense would be: ” By one man concupiscence entered into this world, and by concupiscence, death.” But concupiscence is not per se sinful, much less a sin by which ” all men sinned.” We must also take into consideration that Adam was not punished with death on account of his concupiscence, but for his disobedience, which was a grievous sin. The Apostle expressly says: ” Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccotores constituti sunt multi — By the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners.” 14 It is quite obvious that the ” sin ” which, together with death, was by ” one man ” transmitted to all others, cannot be identical with the personal transgression of Adam. Like the death of Adam, this sin was not communicable to others, and moreover the Apostle never calls it a/mprla, but sometimes 7rapa(Saous (praevaricatio), occasionally irapairTmyja. (delictum), or irapaKorj (inobedientia) . ^Consequently it can only be the habitual sin of Adam (habitus peccati) which ” entered into this world ” through him, i. e., was by him transmitted to all his progeny.— The anacoluthic clause, €’

ORIGINAL SIN 249 sinned.” This may be said to embody the traditional view, since it has been the constant belief of Christians that all men sinned in Adam. Nor is there anything in the Greek text of Rom. V, 12 to disprove this construction. In New Testament Greek hri is sometimes used interchangeably with iv, e. g., «r’ ovofmn for cv ovo/«m. Since Erasmus, however, many Catholic exegetes prefer to take l9 & causally for on {hfi tovtv on, eo quod, quia, which may be a Hebraism from *N5to). It must be admitted that this interpretation is more in conformity with the Greek idiom than the phrase afmpravuv cVt (for iv) tivi. Nor does it in any way impair the dogmatic bearing of the text. If i

peccatum erat in mundo; peccatum autem non imputabatur, quutn lex non esset. Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eosx qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri — For until the law sin was in the world; but sin was not imputed, when the law was not. But death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them also who have not sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam, who is a figure of him who was to come.* Though St. Paul in this passage refers to the personal transgressions of men * from Adam unto Moses ” rather than to the habitual sin of our progenitor, the context shows that peccatum here again is used in the sense of moral transgression. The Apostle notes that ” until the law,” that is, up to the time when the Mosaic code took effect, personal crimes were “not imputed,” i. e., not punished by death, and that nevertheless death reigned ” even over them who have not (fir]) sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam,” i. e., in the manner in which Adam sinned. The negative particle yJq (not) is absent from some codices and Patristic citations of the passage; but modern textual criticism has fully established its authenticity. It occurs in the majority of extant MSS. as well as in the Itala, the Vulgate, and the Peshitta, and the rhetorical figure which the Apostle employs in this passage (auxesis) clearly demands it. St. Paul evidently wishes to meet an objection which might arise from his expression “™vt€s i ORIGINAL SIN 251 rjfuipTov — all have sinned.” “All men have sinned personally,” it might be argued, “and therefore all men must die.” True, replies the Apostle, the men who lived “from Adam unto Moses” did commit many personal sins. But it was not on this account they had to die. For there was not then any positive law which punished personal sins by death, as was the case later under the Mosaic code. Yet “death reigned from Adam unto Moses,” even over those who (such as infants) were not guilty of personal sin. Consequently, death was not a punishment for personal sin, but for that particular afiapria which “entered into this world” through the fault of Adam, i. e., original sin. y) An additional argument for the existence of original sin is contained in Rom. V, 18 sq.: “Igitur sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius [scil. Christi] iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae. Sicut enim per inobedientiam unius hominis [scil. Adae] pec cat ores constituti sunt multi (afiapTtoXol KaT€(rrdOrj

DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY obedience of one, many shall be made just.” The Apostle’s reasoning is quite transparent. He develops the parallel between Adam and Christ, which he had begun in verse 12. The reader will note the sharp antithesis between constituti peccatores by the disobedience of Adam, and^wstituti iustos by the obedience of Christ. [The human race (wwro avdpwiroi, ol iroAW) has by the sin of Adam become a race of sinners, precisely as, by the “justification of life” through Christ, \ it has recovered justice^ (Now, justification is J effected by the grace ot being “born again of \ / water and ;” 16 consequently, the / sin of Adam inheres in man from birth, — it is ^’ really and truly inherited^ It may be objected that, since “many* but not all were justified by and in Christ, so a pari * many,” but not all men were tainted by the sin of Adam, namely those who imitated Adam’s sinful conduct. But St. Paul expressly rejects this construction. Moreover, there is a perfect parity between “being born” and “being born again;” for as no man contracts original sin except by descent from Adam, so no man is justified except he be born again of the Holy Ghost. That the number of individuals in the two contrasted groups is unequal, is due to the fact that descent from Adam is inevitable, while spiritual regeneration depends upon a voluntary act, i. 0., the reception of the Sacrament of Baptism.17 16 John III, s. Schafer, Erklarung des Brief es 17 On the whole subject cfr. Al. Pauli an die Romer, Munster 1891, ORIGINAL SIN 253 3. The Argument from TRADiTi0N.4-Belief in the existence of original sin dates back to Apostolic times.^ This can be shown: (a) from the constant practice of infant Baptism, and (b) from ^the verbal teaching of the Fathers. a) V£he necessity of infant Baptism (paedobaptismus) has always been regarded as a conclusive argument for the existence of original sin. Baptism of its very nature is a sacrament instituted “for the forgiveness of sins.” If, therefore, new-born infants must be baptized “for the forgiveness of sins,” and their sin, unlike that of adults, cannot be personal sin, then it must be original sin. This argument, which St. Augustine effectively employed against Bishop Julian of Eclanum,19 was extremely repugnant to the Pelagians.20 Origen testifies to the early practice of baptizing infants in order that they might obtain forgiveness of their sins.21 St. Cyprian says: “Si a baptismo atque gratia nemo prohibetur, 18 ” In remissionem peccatorum.” (Symb. Nicaen.-Constantinop.) 19 ” Non est,” he says on one occasion, ” cur provoces ad Orientis antistites… . Nam peccatum originate, quacumque aetate sis baptizotus, aut ipsum [solum] tibi remissum aut et ipsum [i. e., simul cum actualibus], Sed si verum est, quod audivimus, te infantulum baptieatum, etiam tu, quamvis a tuis propriis peccatis innocens, tatnen quia ex Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate traxisti, et in inxquitate conceptus es, profecto exorcisatus et exsufflatus es, ut a potestate erutus tenebrarum transferrers in regnum Christi.” (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., I, 4.) 20 Cfr. St. Jerome, Dial., 3, n. 17. 21 Horn, in Luc, 14. quanto magis prohiberi non debet infans, qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contraxit — Since nobody is denied baptism and grace, how much more ought an infant not to be denied [these benefits], who being but just born has done no sin, except that, by being descended from Adam in the flesh, he has contracted by birth the contagion of the ancient death.” 22 b) In examining the positive teaching of the Fathers, it will be well to consider (

ORIGINAL SIN 255 catholica fides credit antiquitus; sed tu [Iuliane], qui negas, sine dubio es novus haereticus — It was not I who devised the original sin, which the Catholic faith holds from ancient times; but you [he is addressing Julian], who deny it, are undoubtedly an innovating heretic.” 24 Vincent of Lerins wonderingly enquires who before the time of Ccelestius ever dreamt of denying the doctrine of original sin.25 Among the most ancient testimonies is that of Tertullian, who in his favorite legal phraseology writes: ” Omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donee in Christo recenseatur; peccatrix autem immunda recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate” 26 P) The belief of the Oriental Christians could not be substantially different from that of their western brethren, because the churches of the East and West at that time conjointly constituted the one true Church of Christ. In matter of fact,” Irenaeus, who belonged to the East both with regard to birth and training, gives expression to the primitive faith when he writes: ” Deum in primo quidem Adam offendimus {irpoutKo^afia>), non facientes eius praeceptum; in secundo autem Adam reconciliati sumus… . Neque enim alteri cuidam eramus debitores, cuius praeceptum transgressi fueramus ab initio {mrepip-qyuev air* apxq?) — In the first Adam we propagatione traiectum. Etenim huius mali reatus baptismatis sanetificaiione remittitur. • . . Propter quam catholicam veritatem sancti ac beati et in divinorum eloquiorum pertractatione clarissimi sacerdotes Irenaus, Cyprianus, Reticius, Olymplus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius \Nas.]t Innocentius, Joannes [Chrysost.], Basilius, quibus adde presbyterum, nolis velis, Hieronymum, ut o mitt am eos, qui nondum dormierunt, adversus vos proferunt de omnium hominum peccato ortgxnali obnoxia successione sententiam.* {Contra lulianum Pelag., II, 10. 33). 24 De Nupt. et Concup., II, 12, 2$. 25 Commonit., 35: * Quis ante Coelestium reatu praevaricatxonis Adae omne genus humanum denegavit adstrictumf ” 26 De Testim. Anim,t 40. offended God by disobeying His command; but in the second Adam we were reconciled… . For to no one else were we indebted for having transgressed His precept in the beginning.” 27 St. Athanasius tersely declares: ” In that Adam sinned, death entered the world.” 28 And St. Basil 29: ” Because we did not abstain, we were expelled from Paradise.” 80 The Pelagians made desperate efforts to claim at least one of the Greek Fathers in favor of their view. Bishop Julian of Eclanum repeatedly appeals to the authority of the ” great John of Constantinople.” 31 Did St. Chrysostom ignore, nay even oppose, the doctrine of original sin ? 82 St. Augustine triumphantly defended him against this charge. In descanting on the effects of Baptism St. Chrysostom says: * In the laver of regeneration grace touches the soul and eradicates the sin which has taken root in it.* 83 But what does he mean when he writes in another of his works: * Ideo etiam infantes (ra ira&ia) baptizamus, licet peccata** non habeant (kcutoi afmpTrjfjLara ovk Zx0VTa)* — Therefore do we also baptize little children, although they have no sins.” Augustine rightly explains that Chrysostom meant actual sins: u Intellige propria [scil. peccata] et nulla contentio est. At inquies: Cur non ipse addidit propria? Cur, putamus, nisi quia disputans in catholica ecclesia non se aliter intelligi arbitrabatur? Tali quaestione nul27 Adv. Haeres., V, 16, 3. 28 Contr. Arian., Or. 1, 51. 20 Or. de Jeiunio, 1. 30 A large number of other equally pertinent Patristic texts is cited by Heinrich, Dogtnatische Theologie, Vol. VI, pp. 736 sqq., Mainz 1887. For the development of the dogma up to the time of St. Augustine, cfr. F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, pp. 273 sqq., Cambridge 1903. 31 Cfr. Jos. Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 457 sqq. 82 This thesis is defended by two Protestant writers on the history of dogmas, Wigger and Munscher. 83 Horn, in 1 Cor., 40. 34 Not peccatum. ORIGINAL SIN 257 lius pulsabatur, vobis nondum Utigantibus securius loquebatur” 85 Elsewhere Chrysostom positively asserts the existence of original sin. Thus he says in his homilies on the Book of Genesis: ” Christ appeared only once; he found our paternal note of indebtedness, which Adam had written (evpev ^ x€LP°‘YPa

in addressing Julian in such harsh words as these: ” Itane ista verba S. Ioannis Episcopi audes tamquam e contrario tot taliumque sententiis collegarum eius opponere, eumque ab illorum concordissima societate seiungere et eis adversarium constituere? Absit, absit hoc malum de tanto viro credere aut dicer e. Absit, inquam, ut Constantinopolitanus Ioannes de baptismate parvulorum eorumque a paterno chirographo liberatione per Christum tot ac tantis coepiscopis suis, maximeque Romano Innocentio, Carthaginiensi Cypriano, Cappadoci Basilio, Nazianzeno Gregorio, Gallo Hilario, Mediolanensi resistat Ambrosio… . Hoc [dogma] sensit, hoc credidit, hoc docuit et Ioannes/’ 89 It must be admitted, however, that St. Chrysostom’s interpretation ” does not coincide exactly with the ideas of Augustine on the nature of original sin. He frequently repeats that the consequences or penalties of the first sin affected not only our first parents, but also their descendants, but he does not say that the sin itself was inherited by their posterity and is inherent in their nature. In general, to appreciate the homiletic teaching of Chrysostom apropos of sin it is well to remember that he had in mind Manichaean adversaries with their denial of free-will and their doctrine of physically irresistible concupiscence, an error that cut away the foundations of all morality, and one which he opposed with all his might.” 40 Readings: — Greg, de Valentia, Controv. de Peccato Originali. — *Bellarmine, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, 1. 3 sqq. — Mariano a Novana, O. Cap., De Originaria Lapsi Hominis Con89 Contr. Julian. Pelag., I, 6, 22. 40 Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, p. 340, Freiburg and St. Louis 1908. On the philosophical aspects of the dogma of original sin cfr. St. Thomas, Contr, Gent., IV, 52 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 380 sqq.). NATURE Of ORIGINAL SIN 254 ditione, Parisi 1882. — Simar, Die Theologie des hi. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 30 sqq., Freiburg 1883. — A. Scher, De Universali Propagatione Originalis Culpae, Romae 1895. — Bossuet, Defense de la Tradition et des Saints Pires, VIII, 2 sqq. — Baur, Das manichaische Religionssystem, Tubingen 1831. — Mandernach, Geschichte des Priscillianismus, Trier 1851. — Klasen, Innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882. — The Anti-Pelagian Works of Saint Augustine, Translated by Peter Holmes et al., Vol. I, Preface, Edinburgh 1872. (The documents which relate to the Pelagian controversy will be found in an appendix to St. Augustine’s works edited by the congregation of St. Maur. For a full bibliography of Pelagianism consult Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 504 sq., Freiburg and St. Louis 1908.) — *M6hler, Symbolism, ch. 2 sqq., 5th English ed., London 1906. — Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, Freiburg 1875. — Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, § 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895. — F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin, Cambridge 1903. — S. Harent, art. ” Original Sin,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XL — MacEvilly, An Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. I, 4th ed., New York 1891.— P. M. Northcote, The Curse of Adam, London 1915. We might fitly preface this Article with the well-known dictum of St. Augustine: ” Antiquo peccato nihil est ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secreIjEhat the sin of Adam indwells as a real and true guilt (reatus culpae) in all his descendants, is most assuredly an impenetrable mystery^ While the Church has never dogmatically defined the nature of original sin, she teaches: (1) that it exists as a real and proper sin in \ every human being in consequence of his descent from \

Article 3: The Nature of Original Sin

THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 1 De Mor. Eccl. I, 22. Adam;2 (2) that Baptism removes whatever is of the nature of sin;8 and (3) that the concupiscence which remains after Baptism does not partake of the nature of guilt.4 It is within these clearly defined limits, therefore, that we must seek for the constitutive elements of original sinj vThe Church tells us in what the essence of original sin does not consist; it remains for scientific theology to ascertain its true nature. In the following series of systematic theses we shall endeavor as far as possible to go to the root of the problem. Thesis I: Original sin does not descend as a substantial form from Adam to his progeny, constituting man an incarnate image of the Devil. This is de fide. Proof. The heretical view opposed to this thesis was held by the Lutheran theologian Mathias Flacius Illyricus (+ 1575), head of the so-called “Substantiarians,” who contended the soul into a sinful substance and an image of Satan, comparing it to wine which turns into vinegar/’ Illyricus was opposed in his own camp by a school called Accidentarians.” Being little more than a revamped Manichaeism, his theory stands and falls with the ancient heresy asserting the absolute nature of evil. “Malum Mud” says St. Augustine, quod quaerebam, Adam intrinsically transformed 2 * Propagatione inest unicuique proprium.” 8 * Tollit to turn id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet, 4 Supra, pp. 243 sqq. unde esset, non est substantia; quia si substantia esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorruptibilis substantia, magnum utique bonum; aut substantia corruptibilis, quae nisi bona esset, corrumpi non posset — That evil, the origin of which I have been so long seeking for, is no substance; for if it were a substance, it would be good. For it would either be an incorruptible substance, a great good indeed; or it would be a corruptible substance, which if it were not good could not be corrupted.” 5 The theory of the Substantiarians has not even the recommendation of novelty, for it substantially agrees with the teaching of the Euchites or Messalians, which was condemned by the Third General Council of Ephesus, A. D. 43 1.6 It is unnecessary to point out the absurd consequences to which this error leads, not only with regard to the doctrine of the Creation, but likewise in Anthropology and Christology.7 Thesis II: Concupiscence as such does not constitute the essence of original sin. Proof. This thesis is also de fide.8 It is & Confess., VII, 12. olic Encyclopedia, Vol. X.) Cfr. 6 The Messalians, or Euchites St. John Damascene, De Haer., n. (. Praying folk), believed that 80. evil was a physical substance and 7 The student will find this matthat the Devil indwelled personally ter exhaustively treated by BellarQwirocrdrm) in every man. mine, De Amiss. Grat., V, 1-3; (Funk, Manual of Church History, Suarez, De Peccato Orig., disp. 9, Eng. trans, by L. Cappadelta, Vol. sect. 2; and De Rubeis, De Pecc. I» P’ »47i London 1910; J. P. Arend- Orig., c. 54. zen, art ” Messalians ” in the Cath- 8 Cone. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5. aimed at the so-called Reformers of the sixteenth century (Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon), and against the Jansenists (particularly Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel), who depicted concupiscence in lurid colors and asserted that it is a formal sin and original sin.9 This theory was condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent.10 The orthodox doctrine on the subject of concupiscence is based upon the Epistles of St. Paul and the teaching of the Fathers, notably St. Augustine. a) St. Paul expressly declares that Baptism obliterates whatever is sinful and deserving of reprobation in man. Rom. VI, 4: “Consepulti sumus cum illo [scil. Christ 0] per baptismum in mortem — We are buried together with him [i. e., Christ] by baptism into death.” Rom. VIII, 1: “Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est 11 Us, qui sunt in Christo Iesu — There is now therefore no to them that are in Christ Jesus.” We know from experience that concupiscence remains in man even after baptism; hence concupiscence cannot be a sin, and least of all original sin. Jansenism can be triumphantly refuted from the writings of St. Augustine, whom it professes 9 Supra, pp. 239 sq. 11 otidkv &pa vvv Kar&Kpipa. 10 Cone. Trident., Sess. V, can, 5, to follow. It is quite true St. Augustine, like St. Paul,12 calls concupiscence sin; but he manifestly does not mean that it is a sin in the strict sense of the term, except by the free consent of the will. “Peccati nomen accepit concupiscentia,” he says quite unmistakably, quod ei consentire peccatum est — Concupiscence has received the name of sin, because it is a sin to consent to it. 18 In fact, St. Augustine anticipated the authentic declaration given by the Tridentine Council, that the reason why St. Paul calls concupiscence sin is because it “is of sin and inclines to sin.” 14 Sic autem, he writes, “vocatur peccatum, quia peccato facta est, quum iam in regeneratis non sit ipsa peccatum; sic vocatur lingua locutio, quam facit lingua, et manus vocatur scriptura, quam facit manus — As arising from sin, it is called sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually sin; and it has this designation applied to it, just as speech which the tongue produces is itself called tongue, and just as the word hand is used in the sense of writing, which the hand produces.” 15 And again: “Restat ergo [in baptizatis] cum came conflictus, quia deleta est iniquitas, sed manet infirmitas — There remains, therefore, a conflict with the flesh [in those who 12 Rom. VII, 17: It is no is De Perfect lust., n. 44. more I that do it, but sin that 14 Supra, p. 245. dwellcth in me. 15 De Nupt. et Concup., I, 23, 25. are baptized], because, while unrighteousness is wiped out, infirmity remains.” 16 We may add the following theological argument. It is possible to conceive a state of pure nature in which concupiscence would be neither a sin nor original sin; consequently, original sin is not identical with concupiscence.17 b) If original sin is not concupiscence, neither is it identical with the hereditary evils brought upon the human race by the misconduct of Adam.18 There can be no original sin without moral guilt. Mere penalties are not sins, they presuppose sin. Some of the earlier Schoolmen19 believed that original sin is a positive quality (morbida qualitas) which is transmitted from the infected body to the soul and asserts itself in the form of concupiscence. A few Scholastic theologians derived this contagious disease from the poisonous juices of the forbidden apple which Adam ate in Paradise, or from the pestilential breath of the serpent which seduced Eve. This untenable theory bears a striking resemblance to that of the Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth century. There is, however, an essential difference between the two. Henry of Ghent, Gregory of Rimini, and the other representatives of this school expressly teach that concupiscence (which they identify with original sin) loses its sinful character in those who are regenerated by Baptism. But this very consideration should have convinced them that concupiscence cannot be identical with original sin even 16 Serin., 6. 17 Supra, pp. 228 sqq. 18 This heresy was taught by Ab&ard and Zwingli. 19 Henry of Ghent, Gregory of Rimini, Driedo, and others. Cfr. Vasquez, Comment, in S. Theol., ia 2ae, disp. 132, c. 4. before justification, because the morbida qualitas remains after Baptism without losing its intrinsic nature.20 Hermes21 gathered up as into a sheaf the various heresies of Luther, Zwingli, and Baius. He held that ” original sin is a disposition common to all natural descendants of Adam and Eve in consequence of their descent from these sinful progenitors, and which, in course of time, produces an inevitable dissonance between reason and the senses.” 22 Thesis III: It is highly improbable that, as certain eminent theologians hold, original sin consists exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the actual sin of Adam conceived as morally enduring. Proof. The theory 23 rejected in this thesis is based upon a peculiar conception of habitual sin. a) Theologians and moral philosophers rightly distinguish between actual sin (peccatum actuate) and habitual sin (peccatum habituate). Actual sin (sin as an act) is the cause of habitual sin (sin as a state), because a sinful action produces a state of enmity with God. Now, while the majority of Catholic divines define habitual sin as a privation of sanctifying grace,24 the writers whose particular theory we are here considering regard the loss of sanctifying grace merely as a punishment for sin, not as a sinful state.25 In this hypothesis 20 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat., V, 15. 21 See his Dogmatik, Part 3, p. 173. 22 Refuted by Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorseit, Vol. II, pp. 616 sqq., Minister 1872. 23 Among its adherents may be mentioned: Ambrosius Catharinus (Opusc. de Lapsu Horn.), Albertus 18 Pighius (Contr. I de Pecc. Orig.), Alphonsus Salmeron (In Ep. ad Rom., disp. 46), Toletus (In Ep. ad Rom., cap. 5), and De Lugo (De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2 and 7). 24 * Peccatum habituate est ipsa privatio gratiae. 25 * Privatio gratiae non est peccatum, sed poena peccati habitualis.* 266 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY the nature of habitual sin cannot consist in the loss of grace. In what, then, does it consist? De Lugo answers: ” Peccatum habitude est ipsum peccatum actuate moraliter perseverans, physice autem praeteritum, in ordine ad reddendum hominem rationabiliter exosum Deo!’ 26 Since original sin is plainly not an actual sin committed by him in whom it indwells, but merely a sinful state traceable to Adam, the same theologian consistently defines it as “ipsum peccatum actuate Adae moraliter perseverans, quamdiu parvulis non condonatur, in ordine ad reddendos eos rationabiliter exosos Deo.” 27 This morally enduring fault and its imputability is the reason why God withholds the jewel of sanctifying grace from every child at the moment of its conception. In other words, privation of grace is not the constitutive element of habitual sin, but merely a penalty due to it. This theory has been defended by a number of subtle arguments, which may be summed up as follows: (i) In the state of pure nature there would be habitual sins which would not entail the loss of sanctifying grace; consequently the privatio gratiae cannot constitute the essence of sin. (2) Habitual sins may be venial sins, and in that case they do not entail the loss of supernatural grace; consequently, and a pari, habitual mortal sin (and therefore also original sin) does not essentially consist in the loss of supernatural grace. (3) It is far more consistent and more satisfactory to consider the loss of grace as a cessation of divine friendship, and therefore as a punishment for sin, rather than as a sin in itself. (4) If the privation of grace constituted the essence of habitual sin, repeated mortal sins would produce but one habitual sin, because sanc26 De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2. 27 Op. cit., sect. 7. tifying grace can be lost only once. In other words, all habitual mortal sins would be specifically equal to, or would constitute, but one sin, — which is absurd. For the solution of these subtle difficulties we refer the student to Palmieri.28 b) The theory which we have just expounded, especially the exaggerated form in which it was championed by Ambrosius Catharinus and Albertus Pighius, is inadmissible: ( 1 ) On account of the dogmatic consequences which it involves, and (2) because it does not fully square with the Tridentine teaching. In its more moderate form, as propounded by Salmeron, Toletus, and especially De Lugo,29 this theory is less objectionable, because these writers make two admissions which insure the orthodoxy of their system even if the Church should one day define it as an article of faith that the privation of grace enters into the formal essence of original sin.80 These admissions are: (1) That the sin of Adam is morally at least a real sin also in his descendants, and (2) that original sin cannot be conceived without a privatio gratiae. Ambrosius Catharinus maintains that original sin consists exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the sin of Adam, and that his descendants, therefore, are not really sinners (ab intrinseco) but are merely so called by a sort of divine imputation, somewhat after the manner in which, 28 De Deo Creante, pp. 566 sqq., Rome 1878. 29 In this form the theory was also espoused by a number of minor writers, e. g., Arriaga, Platel, Kilber, Frassen, and Henno. 30 * Ad rationem peccati originalis pertinere privaiionem gratiae sanctificantis.* Cfr. Schema Propos. Cone. Vatican, in the Collectio Lacensis, t. VII, pp. 517, 549. in the Lutheran view of justification, man does not become internally justified by Baptism, but merely seizes the extrinsic justice of Christ and with it, as with a cloak of grace, covers the sinful nakedness of his soul. It is true that Catharinus refers to the privation of grace as a penalty of original sin; but he fails to establish any organic and necessary connexion between the two. Unlike De Lugo, he omits to accentuate the fact that the loss of sanctifying grace is ex vi notionis an essential consequence of original sin. However, De Lugo’s theory, too, is open to objection. It fails to account for the individual guilt of original sin as an intrinsic (privative) quality, and does not get beyond the extrinsic imputation of the sin of Adam. If original sin in its formal essence were but the actual sin of Adam in so far as it morally continues in his descendants until forgiven by Baptism, it could not strike root in the souls of infants and exist in them as individual, physically inhering sin. The only quality of original sin that inheres in the individual, according to this theory, is the privation of grace, and this De Lugo and his school do not conceive as the substance, but merely as a penalty of original sin. This view can hardly be harmonized with the fundamental conception underlying the Tridentine definition, to wit, that original sin is “transfusum omnibus et inest unicuique propriutn” 31 and that 81 Cone. Trident., Sess. V, can. 3. those affected with it “propriarn iniustitiam contrahunt.” 32 The Council goes even further than that; it adds that unrighteousness follows natural birth in precisely the same manner in which righteousness follows regeneration. This gives rise to the antithesis between nasci and contrahere propriarn iniustitiam on the one hand, and renasci and iustum fieri gratia Christi on the other. Now the essence of justification consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace; and if this be true, then original sin (like habitual sin in general) essentially consists in the privation of sanctifying grace. Thus the theory of De Lugo, and a fortiori that of Catharinus, falls to pieces. Thesis IV: ^Original sin essentially consists in privation of grace, so far as this is voluntary in all men through the will of their progenitor^ \ This proposition embodies a common teaching of Catholic theologians. ^ Proof. We have to show: (i)\that privation of grace (privatio gratiae) constitutes the essence of original sin,/ and (2) (that, through its causal relation to the sin of Adam, it involves^guilt on the part of all who are affected by it.N ’ These two elements, viz., privation of grace and the origin of this privation in voluntary guilt, together constitute original sin. 82 Cone. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 3. i. As regards the first of these elements, it follows from the preceding thesis that the privatio gratiae is not merely a punishment, but original sin itself. Because of the importance of this proposition we shall restate the argument in a somewhat different form. a) (ft is an article of faith that infant Baptism so completely obliterates original sin, qua guilt, that nothing, odious or damnable remains in the regenerate infant.3^ (This effect is produced solely by sanctifying grace, v which Baptism infuses into the soul of the child.) “Nam sicut revera homines, nisi ex semine Adae propagati nascerentur, non nascerentur iniusti, quum ed propagatione … propriam iniustitiam contrahunt: ita nisi in Christo renascerentur, nunquam iustificarentur, quum ed renascentid per meritum passionis tius gratia, qua iusti Aunt, illis tribuatur.34 Consequently original sin, considered as habitual sin, consists essentially in privation of grace, whereby the child becomes an enemy of God, just as he is constituted a friend of God by the sanctifying grace conferred in Baptism. b) Following in the footsteps of the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 528) the Tridentine Fathers teach85 that original sin is ” the death of the soul ” (mors ani~ mae). Now, in the present economy of grace, the only way in which the soul can die is by being deprived of its supernatural life-principle, which is sanctifying grace. Let us put the argument into the form of an equation: privatio gratiae = mors animae — peccatum originate; consequently, peccatum originate est privatio gratiae. 83 Cfr. Cone. Trid., Sess. V, can. 84 Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 3. 5; supra, pp. 243 sq. 8f Sess. V, can. 2; supra, p. 243. c) According to the teaching of St. Paul86 original sin and justification are opposed to each other as contraries; to deny the one is to affirm the other, and vice versa. Now, if sanctifying grace constitutes divine sonship or justice, then the absence of this grace (due to the guilt of Adam) must constitute the state of enmity with God, usually called original sin. d) We arrive at the same result by the method of elimination. / The state of original justice in Paradise comprised thV-f ollowing factors: ( 1 ) Sanctifying grace \ as the primary element of original justice, (2) integrity \ of nature (immunitas a concupiscentia) as its secondary element, and (3) bodily immortality and impassibility as its tertiary element.37 ^By original sin Adam forfeited all these prerogatives ^fbr himself and the whole human race, and they were superseded by their contraries, viz.: privation of grace, concupiscence, mortality, and passibility.J Among these evils death and suffering are assuredly not sins, but merely inherited evils, or, to speak more accurately, penalties of sin. Concupiscence cannot constitute the substance of original sin, because the Church teaches that it remains in the soul after Baptism.88 Consequently privation of grace must be the formal essence of original sin. These convincing arguments have led the majority of theologians to adopt the view formulated in our thesis.89 2. To render privation of grace a sin, another factor must co-operate, namely the ratio volun86 Rom. V, 15 sq. 87 Cfr. supra, pp. 196 sqq. 88 Cfr. supra, pp. 261 sqq. 89 Cfr. St. Anselm, De Concept. Virg., c. 26; St Thomas Aquinas, 5”. TheoL, ia 2ae, qu. 82; De Malo, qu. 4, art. z; Compend. TheoL, c 145; Duns Scotus, Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 29, qu. 2; Dominicus Soto, De Nat. et Grat., I, 9; Bellarmine, De Amiss. Grat., V, 9; Suarez, De Vitiis et Peccatis, disp. 9, sect 2; and most other theologians. tarii, L e., freely incurred guilt. Although sanctifying grace, even in baptized infants, is doubtless more than a mere physical ornament of the soul {viz.: moral righteousness and sanctity, gratia sanctificans, iustificans), its loss involves real guilt only when it is due to a sinful act of voluntary renunciation. For every habitual sin postulates an actual sin, every guilt a moral crime, the death of the soul a sinful act of murder. To deny this fundamental principle of moral philosophy would be equivalent to Manichaeism.40 Consequently, original sin, too, being real guilt, must have for its efficient cause a sinful act. Where are we to look for this t sinful act? ‘In the case of infants it surely cannot be a personal sin, since an infant is guilty of original sin before he is able to commit a sinful personal act. } The sin which causes privation of grace in an infant, therefore, can be none other than the sin of Adam in Paradise, constituting in some way or other a real guilt in the infant as well. This is precisely the teaching of St. Paul. Rom. V, 12: Per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit — By one man sin entered into this world. Rom. V, 19: 40 The Church has condemned the proposition (No. 46) of Baius: “Ad rationetn et definitionem peccati non pertinet voluntarium, nec definitionis quaestio est, sed causae et originis, utrum omne peccatum deb eat esse voluntarium.” Likewise Prop. 47: ” Unde peccatum originis vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla ratione ac respectu ad voluntatem, a qua originem habuit.” NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 273 “Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi — By the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.* This is also the unanimous and firm belief of the Fathers of the Church. In the words of St. Augustine: Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando fuimus ille unusy qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum t^For we were all in that one man, when we Were all [identical with] that one man who through a woman fell into sin.” 41 v 3. To the question, why the sin of Adam inheres as a ~true sin, i. e. as real guilt (reatus culpae) in all his decendants, we can only reply that this is a mystery which theological speculation is unable to explain. The following considerations are commonly adduced to refute certain philosophical objections. It was the will of God that Adam should be physically and juridically the head of the human race, and, as such, should act as its representative. God had given him original justice and its concomitant preternatural prerogatives not only as a personal privilege, but as a heritage which he was to transmit to all his descendants. In other words, original justice was essentially hereditary justice, original sanctity was essentially hereditary grace, and a privilege given to human nature as such.42 Consequently, hereditary grace and human nature were from the first causally related. The nexus existing between them was based neither on metaphysical necessity nor on any legal claim, but was instituted by the free will of God. When Adam voluntarily re41 De Civ. Dei, XIII, 14. 42 Supra, pp. 216 sqq. nounced original justice, he acted not for himself alone, but as the representative of his race, as the moral and juridical head of the whole human family. Thus the loss of original justice was essentially a privation of hereditary justice, and as such tantamount to a voluntary renunciation on the part of human nature of its supernatural heritage. This voluntary renunciation involves an hereditary guilt, which is voluntary on the part of each and every individual human being, because Adam, acting as head and progenitor of the race, rejected sanctifying grace in the name of his entire progeny. Consequently original sin is not a personal sin, but a sin of nature, conditioned upon our generic relation to Adam, who, contrary to the will of God, despoiled human nature of grace and thereby rendered it hostile to its Creator. It will be worth while to support this explanation by theological authorities. St. Anselm of Canterbury, who is called the Father of Scholasticism, writes luminously as follows: ” In Adamo omnes peccavimus, quando ille peccavit, non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi qui nondum eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est necessitas, ut cum essemus peccaremus: quoniam per unius inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi.” 43 St. Thomas Aquinas says with his usual clearness: ” Sicut autem est quoddam bonum, quod respicit naturam, et quoddam quod respicit personam, ita etiam est quaedam culpa naturae et quaedam personae. Unde ad culpam personae requiritur voluntas personae, sicut patet in culpa actuali, quae per actum personae committitur. Ad culpam vero naturae non requiritur nisi voluntas in natura ilia. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod defectus illius 48 Dc Cone. Virg., c. 7. originalis iustitiae, quae homini in sua creatione coll at a est, ex voluntate hominis accidit. Et sicut Mud naturae donum fuit et fuisset in totam naturam propagatum homine in iustitia permanente, ita etiam privatio illius boni in totam naturam perducitur quasi privatio et vitium naturae; ad idem genus privatio et habitus referuntur. Et in quolibet homine rationem culpae habet ex hoc, quod per voluntatem principii naturae, i. e. primi hominis, inductus est talis defectus.” 44 Blessed Odo of Cambrai (+ 1113) graphically describes the difference between personal sin and sin of nature as follows: “Peccatum, quo peccavimus in Adam, mihi quidem naturale est, in Adam vero personate. In Adam gravius, levius in me; nam peccavi in eo non qui sum, sed quod sum. Peccavi in eo non ego, sed hoc quod sum ego; peccavi homo, non Odo; peccavi substantia, non persona. Et quia substantia non est nisi in persona, peccatum substantiae est etiam personae, sed non personate. Peccatum vero personate est, quod facio ego, qui sum, non hoc quod sum; quo pecco Odo, non homo; quo pecco persona, non natura. Sed quia persona non est sine natura, peccatum personae est etiam naturae, sed non naturale.”* The logical and theological possibility of original sin therefore depends upon three separate and distinct conditions: (1) The existence of a supernatural grace which was not due to human nature, and the absence of which entails enmity with God, i. e., a state of sin; (2) The existence of an ontological nexus by which Adam and his descendants constitute a moral unity or monad; (3) The existence of a positive divine law conditioning the preservation or loss of hereditary grace upon the 44 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Cfr. also S. Theol., ia aae, qu. 81, Sent., II, dist. 30, qu. x, art. 2. — art. 1; De Malo, qu. 4, art. 1. 45 De Peccato Originoli, L 2. personal free-will of our progenitor as the head and representative of the whole human family. God cannot be charged with cruelty or injustice on account of original sin, for He denies fallen man nothing to which his nature has a just claim. Adam’s headship was divinely intended for the purpose of transmitting original justice (not original sin) to all his descendants. God did not cause but merely permitted the Fall of man, perhaps with a view of making it the source of still greater blessings, such as the Incarnation, Redemption, grace, etc. O felix culpa, o certe necessarium Adae peccatum!

4. The Contractual and the Alligation Theories. — To facilitate a deeper understanding of the community of nature and will that unites Adam with the members of his family, there have been excogitated two separate and distinct theories, one of which is called the theory of Contract, the other, the theory of Alligation. The contractual theory (sometimes also called ” Federalism”), holds that God made a formal contract with Adam to this effect: If you preserve hereditary justice, it will be transmitted to all your descendants; but if you forfeit it, you will involve yourself and your posterity in misery and sin.46 According to the other theory, God by a decretum alligativum so bound up the will of all of Adam’s descendants with that of their progenitor that the will of Adam became the will of his family, just as under the civil law a free-will act of a guardian is considered equivalent to that of his ward. It seems to us, however, that neither of these theories contributes anything to a profounder appreciation of the nature of original sin. If the causal nexus existing 48 Thus Ambrosius Catharinus and others; cfr. De Rubeis, De Pecc. Orig., c. 61. between Adam and his descendants was a positive ordinance of God, there was no need of a contract or decretum alligativum. If, on the other hand, we deny the existence pf such a causal nexus, the transmission of Adam’s sin by inheritance becomes absolutely unintelligible. A breach of contract might result in an evil of nature, but it could never produce a sin of nature, while the inclusion of the will of Adam’s descendants in that of their progenitor per se can constitute only a nexus conditionis, but never a nexus unitatis. Revelation furnishes no basis whatever for such hypotheses, and Dominicus Soto is right in treating them as ” fictions.” 4T One more important observation and we shall close. We have explained that original sin formally consists in privation of grace and that concupiscence is merely a resulting penalty. St. Thomas and several other eminent theologians regard concupiscence as an integral though secondary constituent of original sin, in fact as its materia (its forma being absence of grace).48 The Angelic Doctor explains this as follows: Every habitual sin embraces two essential elements: (1) A turning away from God (aversio a Deo) and (2) a turning to the creature (conversio ad creaturam). The first is the formal, the second the material element. In the case of original sin, this turning to the creature manifests itself most drastically in concupiscence, and therefore concupiscence enters as an integral constituent into the essence of original sin and is thereby sharply differentiated from other evils such as mortality, suffering, diabolical or external temptation, etc. In matter of 47 For a more detailed treatment ter quidem est concupiscentia, forof these theories cfr. Palmieri, De maliter vero est defectus gratiae Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 584 originalis.” S. Theol., ia 2aef qu. •qq. 83, art. 5. 48” Peccatum originate materials

fact concupiscence, though not in itself sinful, lies very near the line that divides the physical from the moral order; so much so that even its unconscious movements (motus primoprimi) are, materialiter, opposed to the moral law, and escape being sins only by the circumstance that the will withholds its formal consent. It is in this sense we must understand St. Augustine, when he speaks of a reatus concupiscentiae, as for instance in the following passage: “Cuius concupiscentiae reatus in baptismate solvitur, sed infirmitas manet, cui donee sanetur, omnis fidelis, qui bene proficit, studiosissime reluctatur” 49 This view, which was adopted by some of the Schoolmen, must not be confounded with the heretical teaching of the Protestant Reformers, or with that of the Jansenists.80 The Tridentine Council originally intended to defend this Scholastic view against its opponents by adding to its first draft of the Decretum de Peccato Originali the words: ” Non improbare Synodum eorum theologorum assertionem, qui aiunt, manere post baptismum partem materialem peccati originalis [sciL concupiscentiam], non formalem.” This clause was, however, omitted from the final draft of the decree.61 Readings: — *Schlunkes, Wesen der Erbsiinde, Ratisbon 1863.— Hurter, Compend. Theol. Dogtnat., t. II, n. 407 sqq., Oeniponte 1896. (S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II,- pp. 398 sqq.). — G. Pell, Das Dogma von der Sunde und Erlosung im Lichte der Vernunft, Ratisbon 1886.— Scheeben, Mysterien des Christentums, §§ 40 sqq., 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912.— J. H. Busch, Das Wesen der Erbsiinde nach Bellarmin und Suarez, Paderborn 49 Retract., I, 15, 2.— Cfr. St. bo Cfr. Second Thesis, supra, pp. Thomas, S, Theol., ia aae, qu. 82, 261 sqq. art 3. 51 Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist Cone. Trident., VII, 9.

1909.— S. Harent, art. “Original Sin” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI. — C. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schopfung, pp. 360 sqq., Ratisbon 1910. — P. J. Toner, ” Matter and Form of Original Sin,” in the Irish TheoU Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1911), pp. 186-195.

Article 4: How Original Sin is Transmitted

HOW ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED i. The Specific Unity of Original Sin. — Our guiding principle in this Article must be that original sin is specifically one in all men, and that it comes down to us from the first sin of our protoparents in Paradise. By its peculiar mode of transmission original sin is numerically multiplied as many times as there are children of Adam born into the world. Yet in each and every one of these there inheres one and the same specific sin, i. e.j the sin of Adam, with no difference either of essence or degree so far as gravity is concerned. Such is the express teaching of the Church. Hoc Adae peccaturn, says the Tridentine Council, “quod origine unum est, propagation transfusum, omnibus inest unicuique proprium — This sin of Adam, one in its origin, being transfused into all by propagation, is in each one as his own.” 1 It is a controverted question among theologians whether original sin derives solely from Adam or from both Adam and Eve as its efficient cause; or, rather, whether there would be an original sin if Eve alone 1 Cone, Trident., Sess. V, can, 3, 2&> DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY had fallen. Holy Scripture seems to answer this question in the negative; for whenever it refers to original sin, it speaks of it as the ” sin of Adam ” (peccatum Adami) or the ” sin of one man ” (peccatum unius hominis).2 In point of fact Adam alone was qualified to act as the head and representative of the human race. The apparently dissentient text Ecclus. XXV, 33: “A muliere initium factum est peccati et per Mam omnes morimur — From the woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die,* is merely a statement of the historic fact that Eve seduced her husband. Hence, in the words of St. Thomas, * Original sin is not contracted from the mother, but from the father. Accordingly, if Adam had not sinned, even though Eve had, their children would not have contracted original sin; the case would be different if Adam had sinned and Eve had not.” 8 It remains to be explained how original sin is transmitted from Adam to his descendants.

2. The Transmission of Original Sin by Natural Generation. — To solve this problem we must first examine in what way the nature of Adam is transmitted to his descendants. The answer obviously is — by sexual generation. By this same act the child also contracts natural or original sin. The Catholic formula for this truth reads: “Generatione contrahitur peccatum/’ 4 or: ” Adae peccatum propagatione transfusum” 5 which is diametrically opposed to 2E, g., Rom. V, 12 sqq. 5 Cfr. the Council of Trent, Sess. 3 S. Theol., 1 a 2ae, qu. 81, art. 5. V, canon 3. 4 Cfr. the Second Council of Mileve, canon 2, the Pelagian heresy that “sin is transmitted byimitation, not by propagation.” • Original sin can be transmitted only by the natural mode of sexual generation, i. e., the commingling of male with female, because this is the way in which all children of Adam come into being. Hence the frequent occurrence of the phrase ex semine Adae in the various definitions of our dogma.7 If any man, therefore, though a descendant of Adam, were not born ex semine Adae, he would not be subject to original sin. This is the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, who was ” conceived by and born of the Virgin Mary.” 8 Not so His mother, who was miraculously conceived without original sin in view of the merits of her Divine Son.9 When, as in the case of St. John the Baptist, the lack of generative power (regardless of whether it is due to female sterility or male impotency) is miraculously supplied by God, there is sexual generation, and consequently also original sin.

3. Original Sin and Creationism. — The Catholic teaching that original sin is transmitted by sexual generation contains the solution of a great difficulty, which caused St. Augustine to 6 Cfr. supra, p. 243. 7 Cfr. Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 4; supra, p. 270. 8 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, qtt. 15, art 1, ad 2: ” Unde Christus non fuit in Adam secundum seminalem rationem, sed solum secundum corpulentam substantiam. Et ideo Christus non accepii active ab Adam humanam naturam, sed solum materialiter, active vero a 19 Spiritu Sancto… . Et propter hoc Christus non peccavit in Adam, in quo fuit solum secundum materiam.” For a more detailed treatment of this subject we must refer the reader to the dogmatic treatise on the Incarnation. 0 The dogma of the Immaculate Conception belongs to Mariology, to which we shall devote volume VI of this series of dogmatic text-books. waver between Creationism and Generationism.10 The Pelagian argument was substantially this: A spiritual soul cannot originate otherwise than by a creative act of God. But since nothing impure can come from the hands of God, it is absurd to say that the human soul is contaminated by original sin. The solution of the difficulty is as follows: The parents engender the whole child, not merely its body. This is not, of course, to be understood in the sense that they create the spiritual soul. What they do is to produce a material substratum which is determined and disposed by the laws of nature to receive a spiritual soul. This soul, forming a constitutive element of that human nature for which the parents lay the foundation, incurs original sin, not on account of its creation by God, but in consequence of the genesial connexion of the human nature, of which it forms a part, with Adam. Sic ergo originale peccatum est in anima, says St. Thomas, “in quantum pertinet ad humanam naturam. Humana autem natura traducitur a parente in filium per traductionem carnis, cui postmodum anima infunditur, et ex hoc infectionem incurrit.* 11 Bellarmine gives an equally clear explanation in his treatise De Amissione Gratiae: Siquidem anima ut prius intelligitur creari a Deo, nihil habet cum Adamo ac per hoc non communicat eius pec10 Supra, pp, 169 gqq. 11 De Potent., qu. 3, art. 9, ad 6, CONCUPISCENCE cato, sed quum in corpore generato ex Adamo incipit habitare et cum ipso corpore unum supposition facere, tunc peccatum originis trahit.” 12 It follows that original sin in the soul of a new-born babe is produced neither by Almighty God nor by the child’s parents. It is not produced by God, for He merely creates the soul, just as He would do were man in a state of pure nature, and refrains from endowing it with sanctifying grace for the sole reason that it is destined to be the substantial form of a body which is derived by generation from Adam. Nor is original sin produced by the child’s parents, because the parents merely beget a human nature, regardless of whether it is to be constituted in righteousness or sin. The efficient cause of original sin is purely and solely Adam. * Infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationern, says Aquinas.18 This is the reason why even pious and saintly parents beget their children in the state of original sin. For, as St. Augustine observes, “parents, though themselves regenerated, beget not children inasmuch as they are born of God, but inasmuch as they are still children of the world.” 14

4. The Part Played by Concupiscence in the Transmission of Original Sin. — To prevent misunderstanding and to acquire a clearer notion of original sin and the manner of its propagation, we must carefully distinguish (1) be12 De Amiss. GraU, V, 15. l&S. Theol., ia 2ae, qu. 83, art. 1, ad 4. 14 De Nupt. et Concup., I, 18, 20: ” Ii qui generant, si iam regenerati sunt, non ex hoc generant, quod filii Dei sunt, sed ex hoc, quod adhuc filii saeculi.” 284 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY tween actual and habitual concupiscence, (2) between concupiscence in the begetting parents and in the begotten child, and (3) between material and formal concupiscence. a) Whether concupiscence be conceived actually as an evil commotion, or habitually as an evil disposition, the fact that it exists both in the begetting parents and the begotten child furnishes an inductive proof of the actual transmission of original sin by sexual generation. It is an article of faith that the loss of integrity is a penalty of original sin. Had not human nature, through Adam, voluntarily renounced sanctifying grace, and with it all the preternatural prerogatives with which it was originally endowed (including the perfect dominion of reason over the lower passions), neither parents nor children would now be subject to concupiscence. The existence of concupiscence, which is the result of sin, may, therefore, from the standpoint of Catholic dogma, be taken as a certain proof for the existence of original sin, which is its underlying cause. We say, from the standpoint of Catholic dogma, for human reason would be unable to draw this conclusion without the aid of Revelation, because in the state of pure nature, which we know to be possible, concupiscence might exist without being caused by sin. b) Taken in the more limited sense of formal concupiscence of the flesh as manifested in the act of sexual generation, concupiscence is not the proper cause of the transmission of original sin, nay it is not even a necessary condition of such transmission. We know from Divine Revelation that the principal cause of original sin is the transgression of Adam. Sexual generation, whether ac 

CONCUPISCENCE 285 companied by concupiscence or not, is merely instrumental. St. Augustine, instead of regarding concupiscence as a mere mode, or an inevitable concomitant, of sexual generation (in the state of fallen nature), held it to be the instrumental cause of original sin. Such at least seems to be the tenor of a number of passages in his writings; e. g.: “The very embrace which is honorable and permitted, cannot be effected without the ardor of concupiscence… . Now from this concupiscence whatever comes into being by natural birth is tied and bound by original sin.” 15 It was due to the influence of this great Doctor (who, as we have pointed out before, found himself unable to form a definite opinion with regard to the comparative merits of Generationism and Creationism),16 that Peter Lombard and others of the Schoolmen unduly exaggerated the part played by concupiscence in the transmission of original sin.17 Even if a child were miraculously begotten without concupiscence on the part of its parents, it would yet be tainted by original sin, because born of the seed of Adam. Such a child would come into the world precisely like other children, — not in a state of pure nature, nor yet in the state of sanctifying grace, but defiled by original sin; and it would consequently need Baptism just as much as any other child. Consequently the ” ardor of concupiscence ” is not a necessary condition, much less the instrumental cause, of original sin. c) In its material sense, however, i. e., as sexual commerce, or the conjugal embrace, concupiscence is the 15 De Nupt. et Concup., I, 24, 27: ” Ipse Me licitus honestusque concubitus non potest esse sine ardore libidinis… . Ex hac carnis concupiscentia quaecumque nascitur proles, original* est obligata peccato.” 16 Supra, pp. 169 sqq. 17 Cfr. Peter Lombard, Lib. Sent., II, dist. 30, 31. instrumental cause of original sin, because original sin is transmitted by sexual generation. It is in this sense that the Fathers of the Church, and especially St. Augustine, say that where there is no concupiscence of the flesh, there is no original sin. They take absentia concupiscentiae as meaning sine opere viri, or sine amplexu maritali.18 Jesus Christ is the only man who was thus conceived.19 Readings: — *Kilber (Theol. Wirceburg.), De Peccato Originali, cap. 3. — Katschthaler, Theol. Dogmat. Specialis, Vol. II, Ratisbon 1878. — Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 30 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1901.

Article 5: The Penalties of Original Sin

THE PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN Although the penalties of original sin are practically the same for Adam’s descendants as they were for Adam himself, there is a difference in degree. Our first parents deserved a severer punishment for their actual transgression than their unfortunate descendants, who have committed no personal fault but are merely tainted by inherited guilt. The sin of our first parents was a mortal sin, while that with which their descendants are born is merely a sin of nature, and consequently, in point of co-operation, there is less guilt in original sin than even in the smallest venial sin. This is the express teaching of St. Thomas.1 18 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Gen. ad Lit., X, 20; Leo the Great, Serin, de Nativitate Domini, 2. 10 St. Anselm has left us a special treatise on this subject under the title of De Conceptu Virginali et Peccato Originali. l Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 1, ad 2: “Inter omnia peccata minimum est originate, eo quod minimum habet de voluntario. Non enim est voluntarium voluntate istius personae, sed voluntate princiEFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN 287 But why does God, who punishes venial sin only with, pfirgatory, visit original sin with eternal damnation? For the reason that, in the words of Francis Sylvius, original sin by its very nature imports privation of justice, and he who is infected with it lacks that grace by which alone the punishment can be lifted.2 i. The Penalties ^qf Original Sin in the Wayfaring State.-tIii order to gain a clear notion of the effects of original sin, let us consider an unbaptized infant. j He is free from personal guilt, mortal or venial, and tainted solely by the stain of original sin. A consideration of his condition here below and his fate in the next world, should he die before receiving Baptism, will give us a good idea of the nature of original sin and the penalties which it entails. Divine Revelation enables us to reduce the effects of original sin in the status viae to four distinct groups, all of which are penalties until Baptism removes their guilt and together with it their characteristic as a punishment; some of them, pii naturae tantum [scil. Adae], Peccatum enim actuate, etiam veniale, est voluntarium voluntate eius in quo est, et ideo minor poena* debetur originali quam veniali/’ 2 Fr. Sylvius, Comment, in S. Theol., ia 2ae, qu. 87, art. 5. ” Quod originali peccato debeatur poena aeterna, non est simpliciter ratione suae gravitatis, sed est ex conditione peccati et subjecti, quia peccatum illud import at [naturd su&] privationem iustitiae et gratiae, et subiectum eius, nimirum homo, invenitur sine gratia, per quam solum remissio poenae fieri potest” (Sylvius was an eminent Scholastic theologian of the seventeenth century, whose commentary on the Summa of St. Thomas is distinguished by great clarity and completeness. See P. von Loe in the Kirchenlexikon, Vol. XI, 2nd ed., col. 1042 sq.) Cfr. also St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 5, art. 1, ad 9; S, Theol., 3a, qu. 1, art. 4. however, continue as mere consequences of original sin even after Baptism. . a) By far the worst effect of original sin in I the theological order is the privation of sanctifying grace,8 which involves the loss of all its supernatural concomitants, such as adoptive sonship, the theological virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, etc.4 The privation of these strictly supernatural gifts, entailing as it does the loss of all claim to Heaven and of the right to actual graces (these can, however, be regained by Baptism), plainly bears the stamp of a just punishment. But even in the privatio gratiae there is besides the element of guilt also an element of punishment. Privation of grace implies (i) the turning away of man from God (aversio hominis a Deo), which constitutes the nature of original sin as such; (2) a turning away of God from man (aversio Dei ab homine), i. e., the anger and indignation of God against the sinner, which constitutes the punishment for sin, — a punishment that manifests itself in the privation of sanctifying grace. It is in this latter sense that St. Thomas teaches: * Conveniens poena peccati originalis est subtractio gratiae et per consequens visionis divinae.* 5 And again: ” Sub tr actio originalis iustitiae habet rationem poenae” 6, 3 Supra, pp. 269 sqq. published as Volume VII of this 4 For a detailed treatment of series, these prerogatives consult the dog- 5 De Malo, qu. 5, art. 1. matic treatise on Grace, to be 6 5. TheoU, ia 2ae, qu. 85, art. 5. EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN 289 b) ^The most disastrous effect of original sin in the moral order is concupiscence, so touchingly described by St. Paul7 as the law of sin that is in my members. 8 ] Second among the evil effects of original sin~ because most intimately related to concupiscence, is the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Not only does man’s tendency to evil furnish evident proof of the existence of original sin,0 but concupiscence even in its unpremeditated stirrings — including the irascible passions — not only furnishes the occasion for a large number of actual sins, but leads directly to material sins.10 It is for this reason that St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans calls concupiscence sin, and St. Thomas Aquinas treats it as an integral constituent — more specifically as the material component — of original sin. c) In the physical order, death, passibility, the suffering caused by disease, unhappiness, etc., are not mere consequences but also penalties of original sin; and this is as true of every man born in the. state of original sin as it was of Adam himself. Chief among these evils is the death of the body, which in most of the Scriptural texts dealing with the subject is emphasized as the typical penalty of sin in the physical order.11 7 Rom. VII, 14 sqq. 10 Supra, pp. 277 sqq. 8 Lex peccati, lex in membris. 11 Cfr. Rom. V, 12 sqq. » Supra, pp. 283 sqq. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY The Council of Trent describes this whole category of evils by the phrase, “mors et poenae corporis/’ 12 Special mention must be made of the disturbed relation of fallen man to nature, especially to the animal kingdom. In enumerating the prerogatives enjoyed by Adam in Paradise, the Roman Catechism expressly says that he ruled over the brute creation. This teaching is well supported by Gen. I, 26 sqq. Adam forfeited this prerogative both for himself and his descendants, but through the merits of Jesus Christ it was restored in a limited degree and by way of exception to certain of the Saints (St. Francis of Assisi, among others). d) Another, extrinsic, penalty of original sin is the dominion of Satan, under which humanity has groaned ever since the Fall. In casting off the divine law man voluntarily shouldered the galling yoke of the Devil and became his slave. 2 Pet. II, 19: A quo enim quis super atus est, huius et servus est — For by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave. The Fall of our first parents inaugurated the diabolical regimen which caused Christ to describe Satan as “the prince of this world,” 18 while St. Paul went so far as to refer to him as “the god of this world.” 14 With the Fall also began the temptation of man by the Devil, the worship of 12 Cone. Trid., Sess. V, can. 2. 14 2 Cor. IV, 4. 13 John XII, 31; XIV, 30. The dogma of free-will 29* demons, idolatry, the deception practiced by pagan oracles, diabolical possession, etc.15 It is interesting to note that the Tridentine Council refers to the captivitas diaboli as the cause of death, and speaks of the Devil as exercising a ” reign of death.” 16 What are we to understand by this ” reign of death ” ? Surely something more than bodily decay.- It means the power of evil, which is quite as truly a reign of death as the dominion of Jesus Christ is a power unto life. ” The opposition of life and death,” remarks Glossner, ” is personified in Christ on the one hand, and in the Devil on the other. Christ is the author and ruler of life, because He is life itself. The Devil is irretrievably doomed to eternal death by his personal conduct, and is consequently ‘the prince of death/ the ruler of the ’ empire of death.’ ” 17 2. The Dogma of FREE-WiLL.-Clt is an article of faith that even in the state of original sin man retains full liberty of choice between good and evil.j Liberty in general is immunity either ( I ) from external compulsion (libertas a coactione), or (2) from inward necessitation (libertas a necessitate). Freewill embraces both and may therefore be explained as active indifference of doing or not doing a thing (libertas 16 On the Devil’s dominion over the human race as manifested in our own day, cfr. J. Godfrey Raupert, The Supreme Problem, Buffalo 1910, pp. 80 sqq.; on diabolical possession, infra, pp. 346 sqq. 16 Cone. Trid., Sess. V, can. 1: … et cum morte [incurrit Adam] captivitatem sub eius potestate, qui mortis deinde habuit imperium, i. e. diaboli. Cfr. Heb. II, 14. Sec also Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1. 17 Dogmatik, p. 348 sq. For a further treatment of this point see Theoph. Raynaud, De Attribut. Christi, sect. 5, c 15, Lugduni 1665. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY contradictionis sive exercitii), of doing it thus or otherwise (libertas specificationis), of doing what is good or what is evil (libertas contrarietatis). The last-mentioned kind of liberty is not a prerogative, but a defect of free-will. The libertas contradictionis constitutes the complete essence of free-will; for he who is able freely to will or not to will, is eo ipso also able to will this particular thing or that. Hence the term free-will (liberum arbitrium, libertas indifferentiae). The necessity consequent upon a free act does not destroy, but rather includes free-will, and is therefore called necessitas consequens s. consequentiae, in contradistinction to necessitas antecedens s. consequents, which determines the will.18 As soon as the will, by determining itself, has performed a free act, this act becomes a historical fact and cannot be undone. This is what is called historical necessity. There is another kind of necessity, termed hypothetical, which does not destroy the liberty of the will; for to will an end one must needs will those means without which the end cannot be attained. A traveller who insists on visiting a city which can be reached in no other way than by water, must necessarily choose the water route, though he may enjoy untrammeled liberty of choice with regard to his starting point and different lines of steamers. The distinction between physical and ethical freedom of choice does not affect substance but merely extension. Physical liberty extends to morally indifferent actions, such as walking, reading, writing, and so forth, whereas ethical liberty refers solely to such actions as are morally good or bad. The theologian is concerned with ethical liberty 18 Cfr. Pohle-Prcuss, God: His Knotoability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 36s »qq.

THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 293 only, and our thesis is that man enjoys freedom of choice between good and bad even in the state of original sin. a) Luther asserted that ethical liberty was so completely destroyed by original sin that fallen man is compelled to do good or evil according as “God or the Devil rides him.” This teaching has been expressly condemned as heretical. “Si quis liberum hominis arbitrium post Adae peccatum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, … anathema sit — If any one assert that the free will of man was lost and became extinct after the sin of Adam, let him be anathema.” 19 It was on the denial of free-will that Calvin based his terrible doctrine of Predestination. a) The dogmatic teaching of the Church is supported by all those numerous texts of Scripture which describe the human will, even in the condition in which it finds itself after the Fall, as exercising a free choice between good and evil, life and death, the worship of the true God and idolatry, and which expressly ascribe to man the power of governing his passions. To quote only a few passages: Deut. XXX, 19: “Testes invoco hodie coelum et terram, quod proposuerim vobis vitam et mortem, benedictionem et maledictionem; elige ergo vitam — I 19 Cone, Trid., Sess, VI, can. 5 (in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 815)* 294 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY call heaven and earth to witness this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Choose therefore life.” Josue XXIV, 15: “Optio vobis datur; eligite hodie, quod placet, cui servire potissimum debeatis, utrutn diiSj quibus servierunt patres vestri in Mesopotamia, an diis Amorrhaeorum, in quorum terra habit atis: ego autem et domus me a serviemus Domino — You have your choice: choose this day that which pleaseth you, whom you would rather serve, whether the gods which your fathers served in Mesopotamia, or the gods of the Amorrhites, in whose land you dwell: but as for me and my house we will serve the Lord.” Gen. IV, 7: “Sub te erit appetitus eius, et tu dominaberis illius — The lust thereof shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.” There are many other passages in which Holy Scripture postulates liberty of choice by commanding or suggesting something conditioned upon man’s free will. Cfr., e. g.y Matth. XIX, 17: * Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata — If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.* St. Paul freely admits the existence of a moral and religious aptitude even in pagan nations, thereby indirectly teaching the doctrine of free-will.20 20 The references to prove this Theologie des hi, Paulus, 2nd ed., proposition will be found in Simar, pp. 37 sqq., 81 sqq., Freiburg 1883. THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 295 P) As regards the Fathers, Calvin himself admits that they unanimously defend free-will. The Greek Fathers 21 speak of the avre^ovaiov ttJs Ttav avOpuTruv v(rc

tracted from the writings of Jansenius reads: “Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione”25 This proposition was condemned as heretical; hence it is an article of faith that the will, to be entirely free in its actions, must not only be exempt from external compulsion, but must intrinsically determine itself; in other words, it must be absolutely free also from intrinsic necessity.26 «) Sacred Scripture accentuates the sovereignty of the will over its interior actions quite as strongly as the essential dependence of the ethical merit or demerit of our free-will actions on the absence of all manner of intrinsic necessitation. St. Paul says of him who has the choice between the married state and virginity: “Having no necessity, but having power of his own will (m X>v avdyKrjv, c&woxav Bk l^a irtpl rov i8m>v tfcA^/xato*).“27 And in Ecclus. XXXI, 8 sqq., the moral value of human actions is described as necessarily conditioned by free determination: (tBeatus dives, qui inventus est sine macula, et qui post aurum non abiit nec speravit in pecunia et thesauris. Quis est hie? et laudabimus eum; fecit enim mirabilia in vita sua. Qui probatus est in illo et perfectus est, erit Mi gloria aeterna; 25 Den zinger-Bann wart, Bnchiri- 26 Cf r. St Thomas, De Malo, qu. dion, n. 1094. 6. 27 1 Cor. VII, 37. THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 297 qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus, facere mala et non fecit — Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish: and that hath not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures. Who is he, and we will praise him, for he hath done wonderful things in his life. Who hath been tried thereby, and made perfect, he shall have glory everlasting. He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, and could do evil things, and hath not done them.” P) This conception, which is based upon the most elementary moral sentiment, dominates the writings of the Fathers to such an extent that it was only by the most violent sophistry that Jansenius was able to base his heretical teaching on the utterly misunderstood dictum of St. Augustine: “Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est — We must of necessity act according to that which pleases us most.” 28 By delectatio St. Augustine does not mean the unfree impulse which in the impulses called motus primo-primi overpowers the will; but that deliberate delectation which motivates the determination of the will. That a man may repel the attraction of grace as freely as he may resist the incitements of the senses, 28 In Gal at., 49. (Migne, P. L., the student is advised to consult the XXXV, 2141). For a more detailed dogmatic treatise on Grace, discussion of this and kindred topics 20 298 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY Augustine knew from his own experience, for he says in his Confessions: “Non faciebani, quod et incomparabili affectu amplius mihi placebat — I did not do that which pleased me incomparably more.” 29 At no time in his life did this great and holy Doctor ever deny free-will or teach that freedom from external compulsion is sufficient to render a moral action meritorious. God gave free-will to the rational soul which is in man, he says in his treatise against Fortunatus. “Thus man was enabled to have merits: if we are good by our own will, not of necessity. Since, therefore, it behooved man to be good not of necessity, but by his own will, God had to give to the soul free-will.” 80 3. How Nature is “Wounded” by Original Sin. — The Scholastic theory of the vulneratio naturae is based on the ancient teaching of the Church that original sin entailed a serious deterioration of both body and soul,31 and on the doctrine of various councils that it weakened and warped free-will.32 29 Confess., VIII, 8, 20. (Jansenius taught that we necessarily follow the greater indeliberate attraction, whether good or bad.) 80 Contr. Fortunat., disp. 1, 15 (Migne, P. L., XLII, 118): “Animal rational*, quae est in nomine, dedit Deus liberum arbitrium. Sic enim posset habere meritum, si voluntate, non necessitate boni essemus. Cum ergo oporteat non necessitate, sed voluntate bonum esse, oportebat ut Deus animae daret liberum arbitrium/’ For a detailed refutation of the heretical teaching of Jansenius see Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 615 sqq., Romae 1878; cfr. also Pope Leo XIIFs Encyclical letter ” Libertas” of June 20, 1888. 31 Cfr. supra, pp. 218 sqq. 32 Cfr. Arausic. II, can, 2$: THE ” WOUNDS OF NATURE ” 299 a) In attempting to estimate the extent of the injury which human nature suffered through original sin, and to determine the measure of its influence upon the attenuatto et inclinatio liberi arbitrii, St. Thomas Aquinas proceeds from the principle that fallen man — aside from original sin proper, as guilt — could experience a deterioration of his nature only with regard to those psychic faculties which are apt to be the seat of virtues, to wit: reason, will, pars irascibilis, and pars concupiscibilis. By opposing to the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance) the four contrary vices of ignorance, malice, weakness, and cupidity, the Scholastics arrived at what they called the four ” wounds of nature” inflicted by original sin. It is quite obvious that free-will, too, was affected by these four vices, especially by evil concupiscence.88 Man suffers grievously from these wounds 84 even after justification. b) Theologians are not agreed as to whether these ” wounds of nature ” consist in an actual deterioration of ” Liberum arbitrium attenuatum et inclinatutn; ” Cone, Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1: ” Tatnetsi in eis [scil. hominibus lopsis] liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esset, viribus licet attenuatum et inclinotum.” 83Cfr. St. Thomas, S. TkeoL, ia aae, qu. 85, art. 3: “Per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis. Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae, quae possunt esse subiecta virtutum, scil. ratio, in qua est prudentta; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscibilis destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae” 84 On the philosophical aspect of the Fall and the wounds inflicted thereby on both the intellectual and the moral nature of man, see J. Godfrey Raupert, The Supreme Problem, 2nd ed., London and New York 191 1. 3oo DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY the natural faculties of the soul, or merely in the privation of supernatural justice. Of course, neither of the two contending schools dreams of asserting that original sin formally annihilated any natural faculty of the soul. The more moderate school contents itself with saying that fallen nature is merely the state of pure nature into which man was thrown back, while the extreme school insists that original sin seriously impaired the natural faculties of the soul. This difference of opinion accounts for the various interpretations put upon the well-known axiom: * Natura est spoliata gratuitis et vulnerata in naturalibus* 85 The rigorists describe the relation of fallen man to man in a state of pure nature as that of a patient to one in the enjoyment of good health (aegroti ad sanum), while their opponents compare it to the relation of a man who has been stripped of his garments to one who has never had any (nudati ad nudum). A reconciliation of the two opinions is impossible except on the basis of a previous understanding with regard to the true conception of the so-called state of pure nature.88

4. The Effects of Original Sin in the Status Termini, or the Lot of Unbaptized Children. — Since original sin is not actual sin, but merely a sin of nature, the punishment inflicted on those who die while involved in it can85 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Gratia Pritni Hominis, c. 6. 80 Cfr. supra, pp. 228 8qq. The arguments for the rigorist view can be found in Alb. a Bulsano, Theol. Dogmat., ed. Gottefrid. a Graun, t. I, pp. 468 sqq., Oeniponte 1893, and Franc. Schmid, Quae si. Select, ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 297 sqq., Paderbornae 1891. The case for the milder view, which seems to us to be the more probable one, is well stated by Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, th. 78 and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. Ill, 3rd ed., pp. 252 sqq., Friburgi 1908. THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 301 not consist in physical suffering {poena sensus), but simply and solely in their exclusion from the beatific vision of God (poena damni). The hypothesis that they will be punished by fire (poena ignis) must be rejected as cruel and untenable. a) The rigoristic view alluded to in the last sentence had its defenders among the Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers. We mention only Fulgentius,87 Avitus of Vienne,88 and Pope Gregory the Great.89 It was advocated also by a few of the Schoolmen, e. g., St. Anselm,40 Gregory of Rimini41 (who was called by the opprobrious name of “torturer of little children ),” 42 and by Driedo,48 Petavius,44 Fr. Sylvius, and the socalled Augustinians, to whom may be added Bossuet and Natalis Alexander. St. Augustine,45 while admitting that the punishment of unbaptized children is ” the mildest punishment of all,” 46 yet speaks of it as ignis aeternus, so that Faure47 and others have charged him with advocating the more rigorous view.48 In matter of fact his attitude was one of uncertain hesitation. Towards the end of his life he seems to have held that the penalty pronounced in Math. XXV, 41: ” Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,” would not fall upon 87 De Fide ad Petr., c. 27. 88 Carm. ad Fuscin. Soror. 89 Moral., IX, 21. 40 De Concept, Virg., c. 23. 41 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 31, qu. 2. 42 ” Tortor infantium.” 48 De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., tr. 3, c 2. 44 De Deo, IX, 10. 46 Enchirid., c. 93; De Peccat. Mer. et Remiss., I, 16. 46 ” Mitissima omnium poena.” 47 In S. Augustini Enchirid., c. 9348 P. J. Toner goes so far as to say that ” St. Augustine was an innovator, and … sacrificed tradition to the logic of an indefensible private system.” (Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. is). 302 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY unbaptized children, but that, ” as between reward and punishment there may be a neutral sentence of the judge.”49 b) is more clearly apparent from her dogmatic definitions than from either Scripture or Tradition. It is an article of faith that children who die unbaptized must suffer the poena damni, i. e., are deprived of the beatific vision of God. “Amen, amen, I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” 50 The arbitrary assumption, said to have been made by the Pelagians, that unbaptized infants, though deprived of the kingdom of heaven (i. e.} communion with Jesus Christ and the Saints), nevertheless enjoy “eternal life” (i. e., the visio beatiiica), was never admitted by the Fathers nor by the magisterium of the Church.51 “Si quis parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat” says the Tridentine Council, . . aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod 49 De Lib. Arbit., Ill, 23. For a gree of glory (companionship with succinct account of the controversy Christ and the Saints) — is an hiscfr. P. J. Toner, /. c. torical fiction… . Nearly all the eo John III, 5. great theologians who have made 51 Dr. Toner holds (/. c, p. 316) a serious study of the history of that ” the teaching attributed to the question admit that it was only the Pelagians — viz., that they ad- natural happiness for unbaptized mitted unbaptized infants to the children that the Pelagians meant beatific vision and only excluded to defend.” them from a certain accidental deTHE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 303 regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad vitam aeternam consequendam, anathema sit.” 52 But do unbaptized infants also suffer the poena sensus? More specifically, are they condemned to the punishment of fire? The milder and more probable opinion is that they are not. This milder teaching is traceable to the writings of some of the earlier Fathers; 53 but the Church did not emphasize it until a much later period. An important, though not ex-cathedra, decision is the dictum of Innocent III, embodied in the Corpus Iuris Canonici, that Poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei, actualis vero poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae cruciatus 54 The opposition in this passage between original and actual sin on the one hand, and carentia visionis and cruciatus (i. e., poena ignis) on the other, justifies the conclusion that privation of the beatific vision (= poena damni) is the only punishment inflicted on him who has no other guilt than that involved in original sin, while he who is guilty of actual sin has to suffer the eternal torments of hell (= poena sensus). When the Jansenist pseudo-council of Pistoia ventured to ridicule the so-called limbus puerorum as a “Pelagian fiction/’ Pope Pius VI solemnly 62 Cone. Trid., Sess. V, can. 4. 64 Cap. “Maiores” de Bapt. in 68 Cfr., e. g., Gregory of Nazian- Deer., f, III, tit. 42, c. 3. zus, Serm., 40, cap. 30. declared in his dogmatic Bull “Auctorern iidei” (A. D. 1794): “Perinde ac si hoc ipso, quod qui poenam ignis removent, inducerent locum ilium et statum medium expertem culpae et poenae inter regnum Dei et damnationem aeternam, qualem fabulabantur Pelagiani: falsa, temeraria, in scholas catholicas iniuriosa.” But how is this teaching to be reconciled with the definition of the Council of Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, or merely in original sin, at once go down to hell, to be punished unequally ?” 55 What is the meaning of the phrase in infernum? Does it imply that the unbaptized children are condemned to the tortures of hellfire? Impossible. To understand the definition aright we must attend to the expressly defined disparity of punishment quite as carefully as to the descensus in infernum. As there is an essential difference between original and actual sin, the disparitas poenarum held by the Church must be more than a mere difference of degree; it must be specific, which can only mean that unbaptized infants suffer the poena damni, but not the poena sensus. As a matter of fact the pain of hellfire can be inflicted only in punishment of personal sin, because it 65 This definition reads as follows: ” Definimus, illorum animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato moriuntur vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas,” {Deer et. Unionis Cone. Flor., quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.) THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 305 directly affects human nature in its innate faculties and powers, and subjects not merely the supernatural and preternatural gifts a man may have, but his very nature to the punitive justice of God. * Peccato originali non debetur poena sensus,* says St. Thomas, “sed solum poena damni, scil. carentia znsionis divinae. Et hoc videtur rationabile propter tria. Primo quidem quia … peccatum originate est vitium naturae, peccatum autem actuate est vitium personae. Gratia autem et visio divina sunt supra naturam humanam, et ideo privatio gratiae et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui personae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam propter originate. Poena autem sensus opponitur integritati naturae et bonae eius habitudini, et ideo poena sensus non debetur alicui nisi propter peccatum actuale/‘69 c) In connection with the subject just discussed theologians are wont to treat the question (of considerable importance in pastoral theology) whether, in view of the dogma that unbaptized children suffer the poena damni, it is possible to entertain the hypothesis that these infants may enjoy a species of natural beatitude in the world beyond. Cardinal Bellarmine somewhat harshly calls the affirmative view heretical and lays it down as an article of faith that those children who die without the grace of Baptism are absolutely damned and will be forever deprived of supernatural as well as natural beatitude.57 The eminent Cardinal’s thesis 56 De Malo, qu. 5, art. 2. Cfr. Bolgeni’s monograph, Stato dei Bambini Morti senza Battesimo, Rome 1787; J. Didiot, Ungetauft verstorbene Kinder. Dogmatische Trostbriefe, Kempen 1898; P. J. Toner, * Lot of Those Dying in Original Sin,* in the Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 15. 67 De Amiss. Grot., VI, 2: ” Fide catholica tenendum est, parvulos sine baptismo decedentes absolute esse damnatos et non solum coelesti, sed etiam naturali beatitudine perpetuo carituros.” 3o6 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY is true in so far as man in the present economy cannot miss his supernatural without at the same time missing his natural destiny. Now, according to the dogmatic teaching of the Church he who dies in the state of original sin cannot attain to the beatific vision of God, which is his supernatural end, and consequently incurs eternal damnation (poena damni); hence it would be heretical to assume that he could escape damnation and attain to his natural end in the form of a purely natural beatitude corresponding to the status naturae purae. But Cardinal Bellarmine overlooked the fact that between these two extremes (damnation in the strict sense and natural beatitude) there is conceivable a third state, viz.: a condition of relative beatitude materially though not formally identical with natural beatitude properly so called. He who dies in the state of original sin can never formally attain to natural beatitude, because original sin remains in him and will perpetually exclude him from the kingdom of heaven; in other words, as there is no status purae naturae, so there can be for him no beatitudo purae naturae. But materially he may enjoy all those prerogatives which in some other economy would have constituted man’s natural end and happiness, viz.: a clear abstractive knowledge of God combined with a natural love of Him above all things, — such a love is in itself a source of natural beatitude. It may almost be laid down as a theological axiom that original sin, as such, cannot deprive man of those natural prerogatives which in the state of pure nature would constitute his natural end and object; but that it affects only supernatural prerogatives. For this reason St. Thomas does not hesitate to assert that the consciousness of being eternally deprived of the beatific vision of God is not even a source of tormenting pain or ex 

THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 307 ceptional sadness to unbaptized children. ” Omnis homo usum liberi arbitrii habens proportionates est ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quia potest se ad gratiam praeparare, per quant vitam aeternam merebitur; et ideo si ab hoc d&ficiant, maximus erit dolor eis, quia amittunt illud, quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nunquam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc, quod vitam aeternam haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat, nec actus proprios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum consequerentur. Et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia visionis divinae, imo magis gaudebunt de hoc, quod participabunt multum de divina bonitate in perfectionibus naturalibus” ‘58 This opinion of the Angelic Doctor is now shared by so many eminent theologians that it may justly be called sententia communior,59 and so far from being un-Catholic or heretical, may be entertained as highly probable.60 Readings: — St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 5. — *Fr. Schmid, QuaesHones Selectae ex Theologia Dogmatica, pp. 289 sqq., Paderborn 1891. — J. R. Espenberger, Die Elemente der Erbsiinde nach Augustin und der Friihscholastik, Mainz 1905. — Jos. Rickaby, S. J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill), London 1906. 68 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 2. 59 Among those who share it we may mention: Suarez (De Pecc. et Vitiis, disp. 9, sect. 6), and Lessius (De Perfect. Div., XII, 22). Prominent among the comparatively few who oppose it is Cardinal Bellarmine (De Amiss. Grat., VI, 6), and latterly Franz Schmid, Quaest. Selectae ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 278 sqq. 60Cfr. A. Seitz, Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kir c he nach der altchristlichen Literatur bis zur Zeit des hi. Augustinus, pp. 301 sqq., Freiburg 1903.