Dogmatic Anthropology §2: The Supernatural in Man

§2: The Supernatural in Man

SECTION 2 THE SUPERNATURAL IN MAN Man’s whole natural endowment was intended merely as the basis and groundwork of a higher and specifically diff erent one, viz.: that of supernatural grace^ which renders him capable of participating in prerogatives truly divine.1; In order rightly to understand this sublime destination, we need a working theory of the Supernatural. To acquire a correct idea of the Supernatural, and properly to evaluate the prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise,^ critical consideration of such heretical antitheses as Pelagianism, Protestantism^ and Jansenism will prove extremely helpful. Since, however, man’s high estate in Paradise was due solely to Grace, and not to any claim or exigency of pure nature, it follows that per se man could have existed in any other state, and in part did so exist. We shall, therefore, divide this present Section into four Articles: ( i ) Of nature and the | Supernatural in general; (2) Of man’s super1 2 Pet. I, 4: ” Oelas kolvuvoI (pvcrews — partakers qf the divine nature.” i8o DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY natural endowment in Paradise; (3) Of various heresies concerning the Paradisaical state of man and the dogmatic teaching of the Church in regard thereto; and (4) Of the different states of man, particularly the pure state of nature. General Readings: — Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol V, §§ 277-280; Vol VI, §§ 300-311, Mainz 1884-87. — Palmieri, De Or dine Supermturali et de Lapsu Angelorum, Romae 1910. — Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 4 sqq., Romae 1880. — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 158-184 (Wilhelm- Scanners Manual, Vol. I, pp. 428 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899). — *Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. I, 3rd ed., §§ 83 sqq., Freiburg 1899. — Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861. . — Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1905. — P. J. Toner, ” The Supernatural,” in the Irish Theol. Quarterly, 1912, Nos. 27 and 28.

Article 1: Nature and the Supernatural

NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL Neither Revelation nor the dogmatic teaching of the Church supplies us with a ready-made theory of the Supernatural. However, the concrete realization of the Supernatural Order both in humankind and in the angels, is so definitely marked, and the pronouncements of the ecclesiastical teaching office furnish so many positive indications, that a theological theory can be easily construed. Let us, in logical order, consider the concept of the Supernatural (a) in its comprehension, and (b) in its extension. A. Definition of the Supernatural 1. Preliminary Remarks. — To obtain a correct notion of the Supernatural, we must begin by analyzing the concept of Nature, because Nature precedes and supposes the Supernatural. The term Nature, because of its many meanings, may truly be called protean. To escape misunderstanding, which in these matters easily entails heresy, we must study all these various meanings and carefully determine in what sense precisely Nature (^ww) is the antithesis of the Supernatural. a) As a technical term in logic, Nature ” denotes the essence of a thing (jmidditas, to ri cZvat), as expressed in its definition^! It is in this sense that we speak of the nature of God, or the nature of the universe, nay, even of the nature of the Supernatural. 1 Also sin (which is a privation), and the non-ens (which is a negation), possess each a nature or essence by which they are what they are., This definition of Nature takes in the entire domain of actual and logical beings, of being and not-being, of the real and the imaginary, in a word, whatever can be expressed by a definition. In this logical sense Nature is manifestly not opposed to the Supernatural, since the Supernatural, too, has its own peculiar nature, that is, its quiddity or formal essence by which it is what it is. b) In the ontological sphere, which embraces all actually existing things, there are beings that have no nature, though, logically considered, they have an essence of their own. Such are, e. g., evil, blindness, etc. Ontologically considered, ” Nature ” is synonymous with jsubstance (substantia prima, oka irpTrj). In this sense God is the ” Highest Nature,” i. e., the supernatural sub182 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY stance (substantia superessentialis, Wcpovoxos). (In this sense, too, an angel is called a ” spiritual nature/’ while man’s nature is said to be partly spiritual, partly corporeal.) According to the particular antithesis in which we choose to place it, the term Nature, in ontology, may have a variety of meanings, each of which requires to be carefully defined. Thus, despite the objective identity of the two terms, ” Nature ” differs from ” Essence” in that the latter term denotes simple being, while the former describes that being as a principle of action. ” Nature ” must be defined differently according as it is opposed to hypostasis (or person) in the Blessed Trinity,2 or to spirit. Other meanings of the term are indicated by such juxtapositions as Nature and Liberty, Nature and Art, Nature and Morality, God and Nature (i. e., the created universe), Nature and Miracle, etc. With the possible exception of ” Nature and Miracle ” 8 none of these antitheses gives us the exact meaning of the term ” Nature ” when used in contradistinction to ” Supernatural.” In identifying Supernatural with spiritual, unbelieving modern scientists contradict right reason, which justly regards the human spirit to be as truly a part and parcel of Nature as is matter, inanimate and animate. Knoodt erred when he declared the antithesis “creatural — super-creatural ” to be equivalent to “natural — supernatural.” The divine Preservation of the universe, God’s Concurrence with His creatures, and His benign Providence, though supercreatural, emphatically form a part of Nature, because without these operations on the part of God Nature as such could neither exist nor energize. 2 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Diving supernatural, though it cannot be Trinity, pp. 221 sqq. said, conversely, that the supernat8 A miracle is always something ural is always miraculous. For the same reason we must reject the teaching of Vock,4 who defines the Supernatural as that which can be wrought by God alone. c) That which is essentially Supernatural is yet, in theology, sometimes called Natural, though only in a figurative sense. In this connection we must note two meanings of the word ” Nature ” which occur in the writings of the Fathers, and which Baius and Jansenius have abused in their heretical attempts to counterfeit the true ecclesiastical concept of the Supernatural. [‘Some of the Fathers, notably St. Augustine, refer to the incontestably supernatural state of our first parents in Paradise as ” the nature of Adam.” 1 Baius and Jansenius interpret this expression as meaning that the original justice of the first man, with all its preternatural endowments, such as corporeal immortality and freedom from concupiscence, was something essentially natural, that is, demanded by human nature. But Augustine uses the word natura in its purely etymological sense, to designate that which Adam had from the very beginning received^from God as a supernatural complement of his nature.5 ” Natural,” therefore, in the usage of the great Bishop of Hippo, means ” original.” Cf r. Ephes. II, 3: ” Eramus natura [i. e., a nativitate] filii irae — We were by nature [i. e., originally, from our birth] children of wrath.” The supernatural state of grace which Adam enjoyed in Paradise is also called by St. Augustine6 and St. Leo the Great,7 naturalis generis conditio, that is to say, * a state in accordance with nature * (conveniens, consentaneum); for the supernatural ennoble4 Theol. Dogmat., t. II, tract. 4, una cum origine; naturale = on§ 202. gxnale. 5 Natura « nascitura, nativitas = 6 Contr, Faust., XXVI, 3. 7 Serm, de Ieiunio, z. ment and perf ectioning of human nature is neither ” unnatural ” nor ” contrary to nature,” but entirely ” natural,” i. e., in accordance with nature, befitting nature.8 In all these meanings, the terms Nature and Supernatural involve no opposition. By elimination, therefore, we arrive at the following conclusions: d) “Nature” designates that which (i) intrinsically constitutes the being of a created substance, either as an essential or as an integral note; or (2) spontaneously flows from its essence (e. g., faculties, talents, powers), or at least can flow therefrom through the exertion of one’s own or some one else’s power (technical skill, training); or (3) whatever, though external to a thing, is necessary or suitable for its existence (e. g., food, air), for its development (e. g., instruction, civil society) or for the attainment of its end (e. g., the knowability of God, beatitude). All these factors (i. e., the constitutive elements of a thing’s being, the faculties, powers, and accomplishments flowing from its essence, and lastly such external agencies as are necessary or suitable for its subsistence, development, or the attainment of its final end), in their totality and severally respond to a proximate or remote claim of the thing under consideration. Its essence demands them. The 8 Cfr. Coelestini I Episf. 21, ad Episc. Gall., a, 431: In praevari(atione Adae pmnes homines naturalem possibilitatem et innocentiam perdidisse THE SUPERNATURAL 185 Scholastics embrace these momenta under the term “debitum naturae’9 and define “Nature” or “Natural” as that which is due to a thing. (iVatura sive naturale est omne id, quod alicui rei debetur) Every creature has its own specific claims, corresponding to its peculiar nature, aptitude, and final end. Hence, in determining the full extent of Nature, we must go beyond the individual creature and the various species of being (matter, man, angel), and consider the totality of all beings with all their just claims or natural demands. “Nature” must consequently be defined as the aggregate of all those perfections to which created beings have a claim, each according to its specific essence, and which, therefore, the Creator may not deny them. The sum-total of these perfections is commonly called the Natural Order {or do naturalis). Of course, any superfluity of natural goods which the Creator gives to a creature over and above its strict necessities, is not Supernatural, but part of the natural order. If the soil produces more food than the human race is able to consume, if the atmosphere contains more oxygen than we require to breathe, these gifts are not “graces” in the strict sense of the term.9 9 Cfr. T. Pesch, S. J., Institu- tur und Ubernatur,* in Esser-MausHones Philos. Naturalis, pp. 345 bach, Religion, Christ entum, Kirche, sqq., Friburgi 1880; J. Pohle, * Na- Kempten 191 1, pp. 315-469. 13 186 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 2. Definition of the Supernatural. — The Supernatural, on the other hand* fries beyond or transcends the order of Nature. J It is the contrary of naturae debitum. It is naturae indebitum’va a positive as well as in a negative sense. (It may be defined as a gratuitous gift of God superadded to the nature of a rational being^ or, in the terms of the formal definition abstracted from the condemned propositions of Baius and Quesnel, “Donum Dei naturae indebitum, et superadditum’9 a) In this definition donum Dei, being common to both Nature and the Supernatural, is the proximate genus, while naturae indebitum et superadditum expresses the specific difference. The term superadditum indicates that\the Supernatural supposes, or postulates, Nature, that it inheres therein as something super-added, and elevates it to a specifically higher order.) To emphasize the last-mentioned element as the most important in the whole definition, the superadded higher perfection is further described as naturae indebitum, i. e., grace.10 b) Now, a gift of God may be an indebitum, i. e., a supernatural grace, either with regard to the manner of its production (supernaturale quoad modum, as, for instance, a miraculous cure), or with respect of its very substance {supernaturale quoad substantiam) . There is an essential distinction between these two cate10 Indebitum =s gratuitum. gories of the Supernatural, The supernaturale quoad modum has its seat not in nature, i. e., in the creature itself, but outside of it, viz.: in the divine causality. It is Supernatural only with regard to the manner in which it is communicated to the creature, as when a man is raised from the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, life), is something intrinsically and essentially natural. This species of the Supernatural appertains to the domain of Apologetics. Dogmatic Theology proper is concerned mainly with the supernaturale quoad substantiam, i. e., that which essentially and intrinsically transcends the bounds of Nature. c) The supernaturale quoad substantiam may be subdivided into two well-defined species, according as the supernatural gift which God communicates to the creature transcends the sphere and power of Nature absolutely (simpliciter) or in a relative sense only (secundum quid). The supernaturale simpliciter is the Supernatural in the strict and proper sense of the term (supernaturale stride dictum). The supernaturale secundum quid is also called Preternatural. There is an essential difference between the Preternatural and the Supernatural. The Supernatural involves divine perfections, i. e., such as by nature belong solely to God. The Preternatural communicates only such perfections as, though belonging to a higher order, do not transcend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. If, therefore, God grants freedom from concupiscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, i. e., something which is not due to his nature, and which is consequently Supernatural. However, since such a Supernatural perfectioning of man does not in principle transcend the creatural order, a grace of the kind just mentioned is merely a praeternaturale. It is quite otherwise with the supernaturale stride dictum. The strictly Supernatural absolutely transcends the sphere and power of all real and possible creatures. The possession of such strictly divine prerogatives as the beatific vision or sanctifying grace, therefore, always entails a sort of deification (deificatio, 0«W«) of the rational creature. For the creature to claim such prerogatives as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount to a demand to be made like unto God.

3. Definition and Importance of the Potentia Obedientialis. — The best means of distinguishing properly between Nature and the Supernatural is furnished by the Scholastic concept of the “potentia obedientialis” No satisfactory theory of the Supernatural can be constructed without a proper appreciation of this term. As we have already pointed out, the Supernatural, though it transcends Nature, is designed for and becomes effective only in Nature. By the inherence of the Supernatural in Nature^ature is raised to a higher sphere of being and operation, exceeding all natural limitations and possibilities^ Such an elevation of a creature beyond the limits and powers of Nature cannot be attained by purely moral means, and therefore the realization of the [Supernatural postulates on the part of God a special physical impulse distinct from His preservation of the universe and His general concurrence.] Susceptibility to this specific physical impulse cannot coincide with any of the ordinary active or passive potencies of Nature, else the Supernatural would not really transcend the natural order. On the other hand, since the Supernatural does not hover above or alongside of Nature, but is intended for and becomes effective in Nature, Nature must needs be endowed with some specific passive potency which, while unresponsive to any creatural stimulus, willingly obeys the special impulse exercised by the Creator. This is the potentia obedientialis. The Scholastics define it as a passive potency by which a creature is enabled to receive into itself a supernatural impulse from God.11 This potency may be compared to a bridge connecting Nature with the Supernatural. Not as if Nature itself could by any creatural agency ever become supernatural; but it must contain some faculty which receives the divine im11 * In anima humana,* explains St. Thomas, ” sicut in qualibet creatura, consideratur duplex potentia passiva: una quidem per comparationem ad agens naturale; alia vero per comparationem ad agens primum, quod potest quamlibet creaturam reducere in actum aliquem altiorem actu, in quern reducitur per agens naturale, Et haec consuevit vocari potentia obedientiae in creaturis.” S. Theol., 3a, qu. 11, art. 1. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY pulse and by means of which this impulse effects the supernatural elevation of the recipient.12 B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Supernatural Order We now proceed to consider the substantially Supernatural (supernaturale quoad substantia,™) in its twofold form, viz.: (i) as the Supernatural in the strict sense of the term, and (2) as the Preternatural.18 From the sphere thus marked off must be excluded such supernatural perfections as the Hypostatic Union, the Blessed Eucharist, and the Sacraments, because these exist outside of human nature. They form the subjectmatter of separate dogmatic treatises. We are here concerned with those graces only which effect a specifically higher sphere of being and operation in rational creatures, and which can therefore be objectively realized only in Angels and men. Of the subjoined two theses the first concerns Angels and men alike, while the second has reference to men alone. Thesis I: There are two gifts of God which are Supernatural in the strict sense, and therefore belong to the divine order, namely, beatific vision and the state of grace. o * - - ’ Proof. Beatific vision is the highest gift which God bestows on a rational creature in 12 For further information on this point cfr. Glossner, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik nach den Grundsatzen des hi. Thomas, Vol. II, pp. 197 sqq.; G. B. Tepe, Instit. TheoL, t. II, pp. 512 sqq., Paris 1895. On the whole subject the student may profitably consult v. Tessen-Wesierski, Die Grundlagen des Wunderbeyriffes nach Thomas von Aquin, pp. 48 sqq., Paderborn 1899. 13 Miracles and prophecies belong to the supernaturale quoad modum, and hence do not concern us here. the status termini. It is therefore justly regarded as the standard for gauging all other graces enjoyed by Angels and men. By the state of grace here on earth (in statu viae) we understand the aggregate of those divine gifts which aid man in immediately preparing for, and attainin^to, his supernatural end, i. e.y the beatific vision. Besides sanctifying grace with all its prerogatives, the state oi. grace, therefore, also includes actual grace.] (The supernatural character of the beatific vision as vouchsafed to existing rational creatures in Heaven is a dogma; with regard to purely possible and creatable beings it may be set down as a theological conclusion.14 a) From this teaching the supernatural character of the state of grace in statu viae is a necessary inference. The state of grace on earth is related to the beatific vision in Heaven as a means to an end. Since a means must always be duly proportioned to its end, a supernatural end cannot be attained by purely natural, or even preternatural, means. It is not quite correct, theologically, to distinguish between beatific vision in Heaven and the state of grace on earth as though they were separated by an abyss, and to contemplate them merely in their relation of end and 14 We have demonstrated this in a God: His KnowabiUty, Essence, and previous volume. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Attributes, pp. 86 sqq. means. Glory and grace are far more intimately related. The character of divine Sonship conferred by both constitutes a common note which puts them on the same essential level and separates the state of grace on earth from the beatific vision in Heaven merely after the manner of what is imperfect from what is perfect.15 St. Paul describes the endowment of grace which God grants to man on earth as an heirship of adopted children, while the state of grace which He bestows on man in Heaven resembles an heir’s taking possession of his inheritance.16 Elsewhere17 the same Apostle refers to the state of grace on earth as ” the pledge of our inheritance, unto the redemption of acquisition, unto the praise of his glory.” 18 But if the divine Sonship which we are vouchsafed here below is of the same specific nature as that which God grants to the Elect in Heaven, both states must be as strictly supernatural in their essence as the visio beatifica itself. And what is true of divine Sonship, must be equally true of sanctifying grace and of the theological virtue of charity, which, like divine Sonship, endures unchanged in Heaven, whereas hope becomes possession and faith gives way to intuition through the lumen gloriae.1* The necessity of the lumen gloriae as a means of attaining to the beatific vision of God furnishes another proof for the strictly supernatural character of that vision. b) We do not know with the certainty of faith lSCfr. i Cor. XIII, 9 sqq. 16 Rom. viii, 17 sqq. 17 Eph. I, 14. is i’ppapwv ttjs Kkripovofilas. ” Pignus enitn ponitur,” says St. Augustine, ” quando cum fuerit res ipsa reddita, pignus aufertur; arrha autem de ipsa re datur, quae danda protnittitur, ut res quando redditur, impleatur quod datum est nec mutatur.” (Serm., 156, 15.) 10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 101 sqq. THE SUPERNATURAL that there could not exist a spiritual being (such as a seraph or cherub) to whom the beatific vision, and consequently also the supernatural preparation for it (divine Sonship, charity, sanctifying grace), would be due as a postulate of its nature. Ripalda holds that such a being is possible, and that, if it existed, it would be a substantia intrinsece supernaturalis.20 But this theory implies a contradiction in terms.21 No creature, no matter how exalted, can claim what by its very nature belongs solely to God.22 Christ alone, the only-begotten Son of God, has a strict claim to Divine Sonship and with the Father because of His eternal generation from the Father. He alone can claim the intuitive vision of God and Trinitarian Inexistence28 as a right, — which, of course, mutatis mutandis, also belongs to the other two Persons of the Divine Trinity. No mere creature, actual or possible, can rightfully claim prerogatives of a strictly divine order.24 To hold with Ripalda that it is possible to conceive at least one creature with a natural claim to the above-mentioned prerogatives of grace, would be to deny the divine character of the eternal yiwqcK of the Logos from the Father, to put natural sonship on a par with adoptive sonship, and to confound the and In-existence of the Three Divine Persons with the analogical accidents of deification and spiritual indwelling. It would, in a word, be equivalent to reducing the Supernatural to the level of the purely natural.25 20 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 23. 21 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 86 sqq. 22 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. TheoU, ia, qu. 12, art. 4; Contr. Gent,, III, 52. 23 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 281 sqq. 24 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. TheoU, ia 2ae, qu. 112, art. 1. 25 For a more exhaustive treat194 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY Thesis II: Exemption from concupiscence,, bodily immortality, habitual infused science, and impassibility are prerogatives which are not natural to man; they arp preternatural gifts of divine grace. Proof. The censures which the Church has pronounced against the teachings of Baius compel us to hold as fidei proximum, that the first two of the four prerogatives mentioned, namely, exemption from concupiscence and bodily immortality, are indebita, i. e., pure graces. The other two, viz.: infused science and impassibility, are likewise held by all theological schools to be free and unmerited gifts of God. These prerogatives are called preternatural rather than supernatural, first, because the Angels have a just claim to them in virtue of their angelic nature; and secondly, because by the possession of them human nature, though it does not receive any strictly divine prerogative, is perfected far beyond anything it can rightfully demand. These characteristics exactly verify the concept of ” Preternatural ” which we gave above. As a matter of fact concupiscence is per se only a natural and spontaneous effect of man’s composite nature, and the Creator, as such, is not bound to exercise any special intervention to suppress the strife which results from that nature, especially since concupiscence is not in itself a sin nor yet inevitably leads to sin. In the words of St. Thomas: ” Poterat Deus a principio, quando hominem condidit, etiam alium hominem ex limo terrae formare, quern in conditione naturae suae relinqueret, ut scil. mortalis et passibilis esset et pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem sentiens; in quo nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia ment see Palmieri, De Deo Creante Instit. Theol., t. Ill, pp. 193 sqq„ et Elevante, thes. 37, 39; Tepe, Paris 1896. hoc ex principiis naturae consequitur. Non tamen iste defectus in eo rationem culpae et poenae habuisset, quia non per voluntatem iste defectus causatus esset.” 26 Death being a necessary resultant of the synthesis of body and soul, corporeal immortality, too, must be a preternatural gift of grace. The same is true in an even higher measure of impassibility, because incapacity for physical27 and psychical suffering 28 is a lesser evil than death.29 As regards knowledge, God was not obliged to give man more than the faculty of reasoning, which enables him to attain to a true natural knowledge of his Creator and to acquaint himself with the essential precepts of the moral law. Infused science (scientia infusa, in contradistinction to scientia acquisita), is a free gift of grace.30 Readings: — The opus classicum on the subject is Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, 4 vols. — Schrader, S. J., De Triplici Ordine Naturali, Supernaturali et Praeternaturali, Vindob. 1864. — Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia. — Tournely, De Gratia, qu. 3. — Du Plessis d’Argentre, De Gratia Primi Hominis et Angelorum, — Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861. — v. Schazler, Natur und Vbernatur, Mainz 1865. — Idem, Neue Untersuchungen uber das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1867. — Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Minister 1872. — Kirschkamp, Gnade und Glorie in ihrem inneren Zusammenhange, Wiirzburg 1878. — A. Kranich, Vber die Etnpfanglichkeit der menschlichen Natur fur die Guter der ubernaturlichen Ordnung nach der Lehre 26 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 31, qu. 1, art. 2, ad 3 27 Disease, pain, etc 28 Sadness, disgust, etc 29 Cfr. St Thom., Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 19, qu. 1, art. 4: ” Immortalitas ilia et impassibilitas, quam homo habuit in primo statu, non inerat sibi ex suis principiis naturae, … sed ex beneficio Conditoris; unde naturalis proprie did non potest, nisi forte naturale dicatur omne Mud, quod natura incipiens accepit.’ 80 Cfr. on the whole subject of this thesis A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. Ill, 4th ed.: ” Natur und Vbernatur,’ Freiburg 1907. des hi. Augustin und des hi. Thomas von Aquin, Mainz 1892. — A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. Ill, 4th ed., Freiburg 1907. — *J. B. Terrien, La Grace et la Gloire ou la Filiation Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu, etc., Paris 1897. — A. Rademacher, Die ubernatiirliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie, Freiburg 1903. — W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 283 sqq., London 1897. — Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1903. — Ete Smedt, Notre Vie Surnaturelle, Paris 1910. — Ligeard, La Thiologie Scolastique et la Transcendance du Surnaturel, Paris 1908.

Article 2: Man’s Supernatural Endowment in Paradise

man’s supernatural endowment in paradise Having theoretically defined the extent and character of the supernatural and preternatural prerogatives of grace, we now proceed to demonstrate that our first parents actually enjoyed these prerogatives in Paradise. Without this fundamental truth it is impossible to understand the dogma of original sin. We shall deal with the subject in six connected theses. r Thesis I: Adam, the progenitor of the human /race, was endowed with sanctifying grace. before the Fall. This proposition embodies a formally defined dogma of the Catholic faith.1 Proof. The Biblical argument can best be stated in the form of a syllogism, the major and minor premises j?f which rest on numerous Scriptural texts: — Adam originally possessed that which was restored by Christ; now Christ re1 Condi, Trid., Sess. V, can. 1 et 9* MAN IN PARADISE 197 stored the lost state of justice, i. e.y sanctifying grace;2 consequently Adam originally possessed sanctifying grace. J a) Some theologians have tried to prove this thesis directly from Sacred Scripture; but their demonstrations do not produce anything more than probability. The text upon which they chiefly rely is Eph. IV, 24: ” Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis — Put ye on the new man, who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth.” But it is by no means certain that St. Paul speaks of Adam in this passage. In fact it is far more likely that he did not mean to advert to Adam at all. In the first place, it is entirely foreign to the Apostle’s manner of thinking to set up Adam as an ideal of holiness,8 and, secondly, the phrase novus homo applies far more fittingly to the “second Adam,” (i. e. Christ), though this interpretation, too, is not strictly demanded by the context. Probably St. Paul simply wished to say: ” Be converted, become new creatures through sanctifying grace.” Still less convincing is the argument based on Gen. I, 26: * Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram — Let us make man to our image and likeness.* For though the example of several of the Fathers would justify us in referring this passage to Adam’s supernatural endowment, the literal sense is sufficiently safeguarded if we take it to mean merely that Adam bore the natural likeness of His Creator.4 2 Cf r. Rom. V, 12 sqq.; 1 Cor. XV, 45 sqq. 8Cfr. 1 Cor. XV, 45 sqq. 4 Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 410 sqq. Concerning certain other, equally weak arguments adduced from Sacred Scripture, see Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. Ill, ed. 3a, pp. 88 sq., Friburgi 1908. b) The Fathers conceive the possession of sanctifying grace with its attendant prerogatives as a “deification” of the soul, and consequently count it among the strictly supernatural gifts of grace. Deus hominem creavit accessu ad Deum deificanduni says, e. g.y St. John Damascene, deificatum (foou’/xcvov) vero participatione divinae illuminationis, non vero in essentiam divinam mutatum. 5 The belief of the Fathers may be gathered partly from their formal doctrinal teaching, partly from the way in which they interpreted Holy Scripture. Certain of the Greek Fathers (e. g., SS. Basil and Cyril of Alexandria), think the supernatural sanctification of Adam is intimated in Gen. II, 7. They take spiraculum vitae to mean the grace of as a supernatural vital principle. Others (SS. Irenaeus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) hold that imago Dei (Gen. I, 26) has reference to Adam’s nature, while similitudo Dei describes him as being in the state of sanctifying grace. This is a rather arbitrary interpretation and open to objections from the purely scientific point of view; but the fact that it was adopted by these Fathers sufficiently proves that, as witnesses to Tradition, they firmly believed in the original sanctity of our first parents.6 6 De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12. can be seen from St. Thomas, 0 The teaching of the Schoolmen Summa Theol,h ia, qu. 95, art. 1; MAN IN PARADISE 199 c) The question as to the precise instant when Adam was raised to the state of supernatural grace, has long been in dispute between the Thomists and the Scotists. The Thomists hold that the elevation of man was contemporaneous with his creation, while the Scotists assert that Adam was created in puris naturalibus, and that an interval of time must consequently have elapsed between his creation and his elevation to the state of grace. They contend that his elevation took place at the moment when he was “put into the paradise of pleasure, to dress it and to keep it.” 7 The Scotist view, which was shared by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, and St. Bonaventure, is founded chiefly on the supposed necessity, on the part of Adam, of preparing himself for justification, since he was not a child but a full-grown man. In the early period of Scholastic theology the Franciscan view was the prevailing one.8 St. Thomas demolished its main argument by showing that Adam’s personal preparation for the grace of justification must have been synchronous with the divine act of Creation. * Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus* he says, * nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.* 9 Although the Tridentine Council purposely evaded this controversy by substituting the phrase in iustitia constitutes for in iustitia creatus in the original draft of its canon on justification,10 the Thomistic view has obSt. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, part. V, cap. 1; Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, III, 17. On the curious attitude of Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus; cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 361 sqq.) and Eusebius Amort, see Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp, J94 sq., Freiburg 1878. 7 Gen. II, 15. 8 St. Thomas himself refers to it as ” communior,” (Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent,, II, dist. 4, art. 3.) 9 St. Thomas, S, Theol., 1a, qu. 95, art. 1, ad. 5. 10 Sess. V, can. 1. Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Cone, Trid,, VII, 9. 2oo DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY tained all but universal currency since the fifteenth century.11 Thesis II: Our first parents in Paradise were by a special grace exempt from concupiscence, j ^ j jThis thesis may be qualified technically as “doctrina catholica.” Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches that St. Paul calls concupiscence “sin,” because it originates in and inclines to sin. From this dogmatic definition it follows that man was free from concupiscence until after the Fall. This special prerogative of our first parents in Paradise is called the gift of integrity (donum integritatis), because it effected a harmonious relation between flesh and spirit by completely subordinating man’s animal passions to his reason. a) That this harmony was a prerogative of our first parents in Paradise is sufficiently indicated by Holy Scripture. Gen. II, 25: “Erat autem uterque nudus, Adam scil. et uxor eius, et non erubescebant — And they were both naked: to wit, Adam and his wife: and they were not ashamed.” Shame among savages spells want of pride or decency; in children it flows from innocence. Adam and Eve were certainly not shameless, because the Bible tells us that after the Fall 11 For the teaching of the Fath- Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. ers on this disputed point consult III, ed. £a> pp. 94 sqq. MAN IN PARADISE 201 a feeling of disgrace suddenly overwhelmed them. Nor were they wild, uncivilized savages. The Sacred Writer represents them as perfect and highy developed human beings. Hence the fact of their not being ashamed must have been due to a state of childlike innocence, in which the evil impulses of sensuality were kept under perfect control. There is no other satisfactory explanation. It has been suggested that our first parents were blind and could not see each other. But the phrase upon which this interpretation is based, viz.: “And the eyes of them both were opened,” 12 plainly refers to their spiritual vision. St. Irenaeus’s theory that Adam and Eve were infants,18 is refuted by the fact that God commanded them to “increase and multiply.” 14 That our first parents enjoyed complete immunity from concupiscence follows with still greater cogency from St. Paul’s referring to the carnal law which works in our members as “sin.” 15 This carnal law, or concupiscence, is not a sin in itself, but, in the Tridentine phrase, 12 Gen. Ill, 7. 18 Adv. Haer., Ill, 22, 4: * Non intellectum habebant filiorum generandorum, oportebat enim illos primo adolescere, dein sic multiplicari.* 14 Gen. I, 28. Cfr. also Gen. II, 23 sq.: ” And Adam said: This now is bone of my bones, and flesh 14 of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh.* is Peccatum, cLfiaprla. Rom. VII, 16 sqq. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY originates in and inclines [man] to sin.” 16 Concupiscence cannot have existed prior to the sin of Adam, because an effect cannot precede its cause, and consequently our first parents in Paradise were exempt from concupiscence. b) The Fathers were so firmly persuaded of the natural integrity of our first parents in Paradise that some of them (e. g., Athanasius,17 Gregory of Nyssa,18 and John Damascene)19 derived marriage from original sin. This was, of course, an unjustifiable exaggeration. Sexual propagation does not exclude natural integrity, and there can scarcely be a doubt that marriage would have been instituted even if man had remained in the state of innocence.20 It was such considerations as these, no doubt, that prompted St. Augustine to retract21 his earlier dictum that, had the human race preserved its primitive innocence and grace, propagation would have been asexual. The primitive Tradition was most clearly brought out in the controversy with the Pelagians, who maintained that concupiscence was a vigor rather than a defectus naturae. This view was energetically combated by St. Augustine in his work De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia.22 In Contra Iulianum, by the same author, freedom from concupiscence is explained to be a gift of grace. The supernatural character of the prerogatives 16 Cone. Trid., Sess. V, can. 5. 17 In Ps., 50, 7. 18 De Opif. Horn., c. 17. l» De Fide Orth., II, 30. 20 For a detailed discussion of this point consult St. Thomas, S. TheoL, 1 a, qu. 95, 98 sq. 21 Retract., I, 19. 22 Cfr. also his Contr. Julian,, IV, 16, 8a: ” Quid est gust at 0 cibo prohibito nuditas indicata nisi peccato nudatum, quod gratia contegebatt Gratia quippe Dei magna ibi erat, ubi terrenum et animale corpus bestialem libidinem non habebat. Qui ergo vestitus gratia non habebat in nudo corpore, quod puderet, spoliatus gratid sen sit, quod operire deberet” MAN IN PARAPISE 203 enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise is emphasized also by some of the other Fathers.23 c) From the purely theological point of view it will be well to explain that man has a twofold appetite, viz., the sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivus) and the will (appetitus rationalis). Each of these faculties has its own circle of good by which it is attracted, and its own sphere of evil by which it is repelled. The sensitive appetite can seek only sensitive things, whereas the will is able to strive after intellectual goods as well (e. g., virtue, honor). The sensitive appetite is inordinate when it rebels against reason, and in every such case the will can attain the higher spiritual good only by dint of vigorous resistance. Unfortunately the appetitus rationalis (or will) is also affected by an immanent tendency to reject that which is truly good in favor of what is good only in appearance (sin). Rom. VII, 17 sqq.: ” Nunc autem iam non ego operor Mud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum [i. e., concupiscentia]… . Si autem quod nolo, Mud facio, iam non ego operor Mud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum… . Video autem aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis — Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. Now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. … I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members.” This inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil, which is called concupiscence, exerts itself most violently in the pars concupiscibilis of the lower soul life {libido, 23 Cfr. Casini, Quid est Homo? art. 4, ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862. gula). But in a wider sense the inordinate affections of the pars irascibilis (as anger, jealousy, pugnacity) likewise pertain to concupiscence. In our first parents all these passions were kept in due subjection by virtue of the donum integritatis.24 Theologians differ as to how man in Paradise was enabled to keep his passions under the absolute control of reason, Durandus held that God infused a preternatural habitus into the sensitive element of human nature; Scotus, that such an habitus was infused into the will; Cajetan, that God established the proper equilibrium between man’s higher and lower nature simply by strengthening his intellect. The problem is not as simple as it appears. The variety of the psychological factors involved, and the wide scope which must be assigned to the will, seem to postulate a rather complicated endowment which enriched the various higher and lower faculties of the soul with habits and enabled these habits to co-operate harmoniously.25 The problem may be simplified by assuming that exercised a special external governance by carefully removing all occasions apt to provoke an outbreak of man’s animal passions, and in case of actual danger simply withholding the necessary concursus. On the other hand we must be careful not to exaggerate the donum integritatis, else the Fall of our first parents would appear inexplicable, nay impossible. The question whether by virtue of the gift of natural integrity Adam and Eve were able to commit venial sin, has been answered affirmatively by 24Cfr. Gal. V, 17. 25 Cfr. Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, III, 12; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XX, 20; XIV, 26; St. Thomas, S. Theoh, ia, qu. 97, art. 4; Mangenot, art. * Arbres de la Vie, etc. in Vigouroux’s Dietionnaire de la Bible, Vol. I, cols. 895 sqq., Paris 1895. MAN IN PARADISE 205 Scotus and Gabriel Biel, against Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Bonaventure, and we are inclined to adopt the Scotist view. For, as Schell correctly remarks: ” Adam, as he was actually constituted, must have been liable to err in non-essentials, seeing that he was able to go astray in matters of decisive moment.,, 26 Thesis III: Our first parents before the Fall were endowed with bodily immortality. This proposition is strictly of faith.27 Proof. By immortality we here understand neither the natural immortality of the soul,28 nor the glorious immortality to be enjoyed by the Elect after the resurrection of the flesh, but an intermediate prerogative peculiar to man’s original state of justice in Paradise.29 In that state, according to St. Augustine,30 man was immortal, not because he could not die (non posse mori), but simply because it was not necessary that he should die (posse non mori). This Paradisaical immortality must have been a preternatural grace, because it constituted no strict postulate of human nature.31 The Scriptural argument for our thesis rests on the story of the Fall as recorded in Genesis. Under penalty of death God had forbidden 26 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 303. 27 Cone. Trid., Sess. V, can. 1. 28 Supra, pp. 151 sqq. 29 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., ia, qu. 97, art. 1. 301?* Gen. ad Lit., VI, 25* 3& 31 Cfr. S. Thorn., S. Theol., ia, qu. 97, art. 2: * Vis ilia praeservandi corpus a corruptione non erat animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae.* 2o6 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY our first parents to eat of the tree of knowledge. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. 32 After the Fall He pronounced sentence as follows: “Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return.” 33 From all of which it is quite evident that, had Adam never sinned, he would not have been under the necessity of dying. Cfr. Wisd. II, 23 sq.: “Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem 34 et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit ilium. Invidid autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem terrarum — God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him. But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world.” St. Paul represents the death of Adam and all his descendants as a divinely inflicted punishment for sin. Rom. V, U: “Per unum hominem peccatum in hanc mundum intravit et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit — As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men.” The Fathers unanimously echo the teaching of Scripture on this point. What part the ” tree of knowledge ” (D^rry?) played in the preservation of life is not apparent. From the 82 The Hebrew text has: jyiDfl 83 Gen. Ill, 19. nlO, literally: “Thou wilt have **** to die.” (Gen. II, 17.) MAN IN PARADISE 207 words of Jehovah quoted in Gen. Ill, 22 sq., we know that to eat of its fruit was a necessary condition of immortality: ” Now, therefore, lest perhaps he [Adam] put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever, … the Lord sent him out of the paradise of pleasure.” This passage has led some of the Fathers to regard the tree of life as ^apfuucov t^s aOavavia*. Others explain it allegorically.85 / Thesis IV: Our first parents were also endowed “with an infused knowledge of natural and supernatural truth. c Proof. Sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, and immortality of the body were a heritage of Paradise, and as such destined to descend to all of Adam’s children. \ Besides these our first parents possessed as aTfourth strictly personal prerogative, an unusual measure of natural and supernatural knowledge. • a) While the Bible nowhere explicitly refers to Adam’s natural knowledge as infused (scientia infusa), we have sufficient Scriptural warrant for holding that it could not have been acquired by ordinary human means. It must have been infused knowledge which enabled Adam immediately after his creation to call all the beasts of the earth and the fowls of the air by their proper names 86 and intuitively to understand the nature and mission of Eve.37 St. Augustine observes that Adam ” universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit, quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae 35 Cfr. Suarez, De Op. Sex Dier., se Gen. II, 19 sqq. Ill, 14 sq. 37 Gen. II, 23. 2o8 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY in saecularibus etiam libris legimus. Nam ipse Pythagoras … dixisse fertur, ilium fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primis indidit rebus.* 38 A further confirmation of our thesis may be found in Ecclus. XVII, 5 sq.: * Disciplina intellectus replevit illos, creavit [i. e. infudit] Ulis scientiam spiritus, sensu implevit cor illorum, et mala et bona ostendit Ulis — He filled them with the knowledge of understanding, he created in [i. e., infused into] them the science of the spirit, he filled their heart with wisdom, and shewed them both good and evil.” What we can learn only by dint of painstaking application, Adam and Eve knew by virtue of infused knowledge; which is not, of course, equivalent to saying that their knowledge was substantially different from ours.39 That the progenitors of the human race should be endowed with infused knowledge was meet and congruous for three reasons, to wit: (1) The Creator could not in justice abandon grown-up men to complete ignorance in matters of religion and morality; (2) Adam and Eve had no parents or teachers to give them the necessary instruction; and (3) As the head of the human race, Adam was destined to be its natural guide and teacher.40 b)>The knowledge of our first parents, must have extended to the domain of the Supernatural^ Above all they must have been cognizant of their final destiny. This follows from the fact of their elevation to the 88 Op, Imperf, contr. Iulian., V, x. 89 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. TheoL, ia, qu. 94, art. 3, ad 1: ” Primus homo habuit scientiam omnium rerum per species a Deo infusas, nec tamen scientia ilia fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra, sicut nec oculi, quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis, quos natura produxit.* 40 Cfr. St. Thomas, 5*. Theol., ia, qu. 94, art. 3. MAN IN PARADISE 209 state of grace,41 which can be preserved only by means of external revelation and internal acts of faith, hope, and charity. Our first parents, be it remembered, were adults, not children. r / As regards the precise character of their supernatural knowledge, they must have had supernatural faith, because without faith “it is impossible to please God.” 42 ^ St. Bonaventure was hardly justified in denying43 that Adam and Eve in Paradise had faith, on the ground that ” faith cometh by hearing.” 44 Until he attains to the beatific vision of God, man must necessarily walk in the twilight of faith, which, in the words of the Apostle,45 ” is the substance of things to be hoped for.” ^The extent of Adam’s supernatural knowledge is a problern^open to debater This much, however, is certain: I He must have known, as he was bound to believe in, the existence of God and eternal retribution in the life beyond, because Sacred Scripture teaches that an explicit knowledge of these two truths is necessary for salvation (necessitate medii).** In addition to this knowledge Adam probably had 3. belief in the Blessed Trinity and the future Incarnation of the Logos.47 c) Any attempt to ascertain the extent of Adam’s natural knowledge would lead us from solid ground into the domain of more or less hazardous speculation. The Schoolmen, as a rule, were inclined to exaggerate the intellectual powers of our progenitor. To reduce speculation to reasonable bounds, St. Thomas Aquinas laid 41 Cfr. First Thesis, supra, p. 196. 42Heb. XI, 6. 43 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, disp. 23, art. 2, qu. 3. 44 Rom. X, 17. 45 * Est fides sperandarum substantia rerum.* Heb. XI, 1. 46Heb. XI, 6: “Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them that seek him.” 47 Cfr. Suarez, De Op. Sex Dierum, III, 18. 2io DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY down two hard and fast rules. The first is: Adam depended on phantasms for his intellectual concepts; whence it follows: (a) That, unlike the human soul of Christ, he was not endowed with beatific vision here on earth,48 (ft) that he could have no intuitive but only an abstractive knowledge of the nature of the Angels,49 and (y) that he had no intuitive knowledge of his own soul. The second rule laid down by St. Thomas is: In the domain of nature Adam had a perfect infused knowledge only with regard to such things as were indispensable to enable himself and his descendants to live in conformity with the laws of reason. This does not mean that he was not compelled to learn and to inquire, or that he was unable to progress in matters of science and culture. There is no reason whatever for assuming that Adam was acquainted with the Copernican world-view, the stellar parallaxes, spectrum analysis, electricity, X-rays, or the infinitesimal calculus. The progenitor of the human race was well able to dispense with a knowledge of such abstruse scientific matters as these. Besides, had he possessed such knowledge, tradition would surely have preserved fragments of it. The typical exemplar of Adam’s natural attainments, therefore, is not the human knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, whom Holy Scripture calls “the second Adam,” but the wisdom of Solomon. It is worthy of note, in this connexion, that the Scholastics were not ill persuaded that Adam was wiser than Solomon.50 Another question has been raised, viz.: Was Adam gifted with infallibility in his capacity as teacher and 48 Cfr. S. Theol., ia, qu. 94, art. 49 Ibid., art. 2. so Cfr. Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierutn, III, 9, 29. On the human knowledge of Christ, we must refer the student to the dogmatic treatise on the Incarnation. MAN IN PARADISE 2if guide of the human race? On this point, too, it is impossible to form a certain conclusion. St. Thomas sets up some strong arguments to show that Adam was infallible: ” Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius… . Unde non poterat esse, quod innocentia manente intellectus hotmnis alicui falsa acquiescent quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat, ita in intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi” 51 Considering that when ordinary mortals go astray, it is usually due to the fact that the will is too weak to resist and control passion and prejudice, it is highly probable, to say the least, that our first parents in Paradise, keen-witted, unprejudiced, and dispassionate as they were, gave their assent only to what was evidently true, and cautiously felt their way whenever the evidence was insufficient or unconvincing. d) We now come to another difficult problem, to wit: How did speech originate? The Bible says: ” Omne enim, quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est nomen eius — For whatsoever Adam called any living creature, the same is its name.”62 This text would seem to indicate the existence of a primitive language. The naming of the different creatures may be explained either naturally or preternaturally. In the last-mentioned hypothesis Adam must have received language ready made by a miraculous infusion from God. Those who prefer the natural explanation hold that the first human idiom was evolved by virtue of a native impulse. Both explanations have found ardent defenders si S. Theol., la, qu. 94, art. 4. 52 Gen. II, 19. among theologians, philosophers, and exegetes. Until quite recently it was pretty generally held that Adam received the Hebrew language directly from God as a ready-made and perfect medium of speech.63 This belief was shared by a nineteenth-century exegete of the unquestioned ability of Fr. Kaulen, who was impressed in favor of Hebrew by the following facts: (i) In no other language is there such an intimate relation between nouns and their objects; (2) the peculiar Hebrew use of three consonants is based upon a variation of the third letter and closely resembles logical definition by proximate genus and specific difference. These important phenomena are especially interesting from the viewpoint of the philosophy of language. Yet the theory can hardly be upheld. Comparative Philology shows that ancient Hebrew is the product of a well-defined process of evolution, and therefore cannot be the original language of the human race. Onomatopoeia is common to all civilized languages.54 The discovery that the inflected languages (Semitic and Aryan) are derived from the agglutinative (Turanian group), and these in turn from the isolating tongues,66 has led philologians to surmise that the primitive idiom of the human race consisted exclusively of simple, uninflected root-words. On philological grounds, not to speak of others, it seems reasonable to assume that the first man possessed a 58 Cfr. Ben. Pererius, S. J., Comment, in Gen,, II, 20 (Romae 1 591): Lingua vero, quam a primo habuit Adam [a Deo} et secundum quam imposuit animalibus nomina, concessu omnium hebraea fuit. 64 This feature has, however, been greatly exaggerated. Max Muller holds that the efficiency of the onomatopoeic (and the inter jectional) principles is extremely limited, many apparent instances of onomatopoeia not being really so. Cfr. M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 4th ed., p. 456, London 1900. 55 An isolating language is one of simple, uninflected root-words. Chinese has never developed beyond this stage. MAN IN PARADISE 213 highly developed intellect and created his own language by forming monosyllabic root-words. This theory gains additional probability from the fact that the original Semitic root-formations closely correspond to the process of intellectual conception and bear all the earmarks of human invention. The names which Adam gave to various creatures, and which can still be ascertained from a study of ancient Semitic roots, are in each case based on some characteristic note representing a universal concept abstracted from a phantasm. Thus the word “moon,” mensis, Greek fity, Gothic mena, Sanskrit mas and mdsa, is derived from MA, i. e., ” to measure,” from which root was formed MAN, L e., ” to think,” which in its turn furnished the etymon of such words as mens, man, Sanskrit mdna.™ Strangely enough, in rejecting the antiquated notions of the Hebraists, modern Comparative Philology has unconsciously reverted to the scientific view-point of the Fathers, who regarded primitive speech as a purely human invention. St. Augustine, for example, extols the transcendent genius of Adam as revealed in naming the different creatures passing before his eyes, and lays down the general proposition: ” Illud quod est in nobis rationale, … vidit esse imponenda rebus vocabula, i. e. significantes quosdam sonos… . Sed audiri verba absentium non poterant: ergo ilia ratio peperit litteras, notatis omnibus oris ac linguae sonis aique discrete” 57 St. Gregory of Nyssa, who discusses the probable origin of language at some length,58 vigorously defends the opinion of his teacher, St. Basil, that language is a human invention. Against the objections of Eunomius he lays down the thesis that, endowed as they were by na56 Cfr. C. Gutberlet, Psychologie, 57 De Ordxne, II, 12, 35. 3rd ed., p. 133, Munster 1896. 58 Contr. Eunom., 1. 12. ture with both reflexion and the power of making signs, men could not but learn to communicate their ideas to one another.59 This opinion, which is the most ancient, is probably also the correct one, because it conforms to the sane and sound principle that secondary causes must be credited with all the power they are able to exert60 Thesis V: Bound up with the prerogatives already mentioned was the impassibility of our first parents in Paradise. This proposition embodies a common teaching of Catholic theologians. Proof. The impassibility with which man will be endowed after the resurrection of the flesh must be conceived as non posse pati, i. e., as incapability of suffering. The impassibility of our first parents in Paradise, on the other hand, consisted in posse non pati, i. e., in the non-necessity 59 Cfr. Maher, Psychology, p. 455. 60 Cfr. Max Muller, Lectures on the Science of Language, 2 vols., London z88o. “Apart from the question of the original fund of root-sounds/’ says Fr. Maher, /. c, p. 457, n., ” which is equally a difficulty to all purely rational theories — Miiller’s general doctrine seems plausible. The fierce conflict, however, which still prevails on most fundamental questions of the science of Comparative Philology, makes one feel that beyond the limited region of common agreement even the most attractive hypotheses are extremely hazardous… . Opposed equally to Max Muller and Schleicher is the chief American philologist, Professor Whitney. With him language, which separates man from the brute, is essentially a voluntary invention, an ’ institution ’ like government, and ’ is in all its parts arbitrary and conventional.’ (Life and Growth of Language, p. 282.) Steinthal’s teaching increases the novelty; and Heyse, who stands to Hegel as Schleicher to Darwin, evolved a mystical creed on the subject, in unison with the spirit of his master’s philosophy.” An account of the various theories is given in Sayce’s Introduction to the Science of Languages, Vol. I, c. z, London 1875. On the dogmatic aspect of the question the reader may profitably consult Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. Ill, 3rd ed., pp. 112 sqq. MAN IN PARADISE 215 of suffering. They irretrievably forfeited this prerogative for themselves and their descendants by sin. The Biblical argument for our thesis is based upon the fact that Paradise was a “garden of pleasure.” 61 Whether we interpret this term literally, as most exegetes do, or metaphorically after the example of Philo, Origen, and others, it is certain that our first parents in the JSarden were free from pain and suffering. (They led a ^Jife of unalloyed pleasure and pure delight; (^The pains of parturition an

sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur exirinsecus. Summa in came sanitas, in anima tota tranquilities… . Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum… . Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non somnus premebat invitum.” 63 The “golden age” so enthusiastically celebrated in the folklore of many nations represents but a faint recollection of the state of our first parents in the Garden of Pleasure.64 Thesis VI: The five prerogatives enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise were organically interrelated so that the preternatural graces served as a complement to the supernatural state of grace, and the preservation of the former was causally dependent on the retention of the latter. Theologians therefore justly characterize this primitive state as ” the state of original justice and sanctity.” This thesis embodies a doctrine common to all theological schools. Proof. Sanctifying grace and its preternatural concomitants were not necessarily interdependent, else they could not exist separately in the present state of repaired nature. Their harmonious combination in Paradise was a free institution of the Creator. Sacred Scripture tells us that the loss of sanctifying grace en63 Civit. Dei, XIV, 26. 64 Cfr. St Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 102. MAN IN PARADISE 217 tailed the forfeit of the preternatural gifts enjoyed by our first parents in the Garden. After the Fall, concupiscence, until then properly subdued, suddenly became rebellious,65 death assumed sway over the human race,66 and all manner of suffering followed.67 By the Redemption the race recovered its lost supernatural destiny; but the bond that originally connected sanctifying grace with the preternatural gifts enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise was never restored. Catholic theologians are not, however, agreed as to the precise meaning of the term original justice (iustitia originalis) *8 The majority take it to signify not the state of integral nature, as such, nor yet mere sanctifying grace, but the aggregate of all those organically correlated prerogatives which constituted the state of our first parents in Paradise. With the exception of infused science, this state of original justice was not a purely personal privilege, but a natural endowment which Adam was to transmit to all his descendants. This distinction explains why the sin of our first parents is transmitted to all men by propagation. Readings: — St. Thomas, S. Theol., ia, qu. 94-102, and the commentators. — Bellarmine, De Gratia Primi Hominis. — Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, 1. Ill, c. 1 sqq. — *Casini, Quid est Homo? ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862. — Lohan, Das Paradies nach der Lehre der katholischen Kirche, Mainz 1874. — Fr. Delitzsch, Wo lag das Paradies t Leipzig 1881. — Oswald, Religiose Urgeschichte der Menschheit, 2nd ed„ Paderborn 1887. — A. Urbas, Die Geo65 Gen. Ill, 7. 68Cfr. Bellarmine, De Gratia 66 Gen. Ill, 19. Primi Hominis, cap. 3. 67 Gen. Ill, 16, et passim. 15 logie und das Parodies, Laibach 1889. — W. Engelkemper, Die Parodies esUusse, Minister 1901. — S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, p. 373 sqq., London 1895. — W. Humphrey, S. J., “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 338 sqq., London 1897. — F. Vigouroux, art “Paradis Terrestre” in the Dictionnaire de ia Bible, Vol IV.

Article 3: Various Heresies vs. the Dogmatic Teaching of the Church in Regard to the State of Original Justice

VARIOUS HERESIES VS. THE DOGMATIC TEACHING OF THE CHURCH IN REGARD TO THE STATE OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE The doctrine set forth in the preceding Article has in process of time been impugned by three great heresies; by Pelagianism in the early days of Christianity, by Protestantism at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and in modern times by Jansenism.

1. Pelagianism. — Pelagianism, which flourished in the fifth century, held that the state of our first parents in Paradise was not one of supernatural grace, but essentially and purely a natural state. a) In consequence of this fundamental fallacy the Pelagians denied the necessity and gratuity of actual grace, nay the very existence of original sin. They admitted that Adam possessed sanctifying grace, with its claim to the beatific vision of God, and that he enjoyed freedom from concupiscence, but insisted that man can merit Heaven and attain to absolute sinlessness by his own free volition, unaided and without transcending PELAGIANISM 219 his natural faculties. Concupiscence, according to the Pelagians, is not a punishment for sin, nor yet, properly speaking, an inherent defect of human nature, it is simply a vigor naturae, the ordinate or inordinate use of which depends entirely on man’s free will. To bolster the fiction that our first parents in Paradise were, in no essential respect superior to their descendants, the Pelagians disparaged Adam’s bodily immortality and impassibility, holding that the only deterioration which mankind suffered in consequence of sin consists in this that Adam’s descendants have his evil example and other incitements to do wrong. Hence the Pelagian maxim: * Peccatum imitatione, non propagatione,* that is, original sin is not really a sin of nature, but merely a sin of imitation. Aside from it, the condition of Adam’s descendants is identical with that of their progenitor in Paradise. b) Against this arbitrary confusion of na-t ture with the Supernatural the Church has again \ and again insisted that the sin of Adam resulted \ in a real deterioration of human nature by rob- \ bing it of sanctifying grace with its accompany- \ ing prerogatives. That these prerogatives were y supernatural was not at first expressly emphasized, but taught rather by implication. The second council of Mileve, which was confirmed by a plenary council held at Carthage, A. D. 418, and by Pope Zosimus in his Tractoria, defined: ” Quicumque dixerit, Adam primum hominem mortalem factum, ita ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est, de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, 22o DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY sed necessitate naturae, anathema sit” 1 This definition embraces the following truths: (i) Adam enjoyed immortality of the body; (2) he lost this immortality through sin; (3) this loss was a punishment of sin. In 431, Pope Celestine I wrote to the Bishops of Gaul against the Semi-Pelagians: “In praevaricatione Adae omnes homines naturalem 2 possibilitatem et innocentiam perdidisse, et neminem de prof undo illius ruinae per liberum arbitrium posse consurgere, nisi eum gratia Dei miser antis erexerit — By the fall of Adam all men lost their natural power and innocence, and no one can rise from the depth of that ruination by [his own] free-will, except the grace of a merciful God raise him up.” 8 Another important dogmatic pronouncement is contained in the fifteenth and nineteenth canons of the Second Council of Orange, A. D. 529. Canon 15 says: ” Ab eo, quod formavit Deus, mutatus est Adam, sed in peius per iniquitatem suam. Ab eo, quod operata est iniquitas, mutatur fidelis, sed in melius per gratiam Christi — Adam was changed from that state in which God created him, but he was changed for the worse by his own iniquity. The faithful Christian is changed from the state brought about by sin, but he is changed for the better through the grace of Christ.,, Canon 19: ” Natura humana, etiamsi in ilia integritate [i. e. sanctitate], in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo seipsam, Creator e suo non adiuvante, servaret. Unde cum sine gratia Dei salutem non possit custodire, quam accepit, quomodo sine Dei gratia poterit reparare, quod 1 Canon i, quoted in Denzinger- 8 Denzinger-Bannwart, EnchiridiBann wart’s Enchiridion, n. xoi. on, n. 130. 2 See supra, pp. 184 sq. PROTESTANTISM 221 perdiditf — Human nature, even if it had remained in the state of integrity [i. e. holiness] in which it was created by God, could in no wise have preserved [this prerogative] without the divine assistance. Hence, if it was unable without the grace of God to keep the salvation which it had received, how should it have been able without the assistance of that grace to regain that which it had lost?“4 That the lost prerogatives were supernatural can be inferred from these definitions by the following process of reasoning: What is due to human nature on account of its creation, its conservation, and the divine concursus, ex vi notionis can never be lost. Now the Church teaches that by original sin Adam and his progeny lost sanctifying grace, together with its concomitant prerogatives. Therefore the lost endowment was not due to human nature, but a gratuitous favor, in other words, it was a pure grace. Sanctifying grace, in particular, was essentially identical with that prerogative which mankind regained through the Redemption. But this latter favor is restored only per gratiam Christi, to employ the Council’s own words, and therefore must be supernatural in character.

2. Protestantism. — In the sixteenth century erroneous notions on the subject of the original state of the human race were propagated by the so-called Protestant reformers, who, failing to draw the proper distinction between nature and the Supernatural, heretically affirmed that, besides his preternatural prerogatives man by sin also 4 Syn, Arausic. II, can. 15 et 19. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nn. 1 88, 192. lost certain essential properties of human nature itself, such as the moral freedom of the will. a) Practically this basic error culminated in the doctrine of man’s justification by faith alone (sola fide), without co-operation on his part. (Jhough Pelagianism and Protestantism agree in acknowledging that man enjoyed an ideal state in Paradise, they are yet diametrically opposed to each other/^Mjbr while Pelagianism conceives original justice as a purely natural state, ” orthodox ” Protestantism admits that it contained a divine element, but falsely asserts that this element formed part and parcel of the very nature of man7\ This identification of the divine with the human, 01 nature with the Supernatural is decidedly Pantheistic, and we need not wonder, therefore, that many later Protestant theologians (e. g., Schleiermacher) became true-blue Pantheists.5 / of Trent was to guard the dogmas of original ’ sin and justification, that holy ecumenical synod left no doubt as to what is the orthodox teaching of the Catholic Church concerning the primitive The Tridentine Fathers implicitly condemned Pelagianism when they defined that Adam was created * in holiness and justice,* but “immediately lost” this state of grace, and thereby * suffered deterioration both in body and soul.* “Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam, quum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua consti5 Cfr. Oswald, Religiose Urgeschichte, p. 45, Paderborn 1887. purpose of the Council JANSENISM 223 tutus9 fuerat, amisisse … totumque Adam per Mam praevaricationis offensam secundum corpus et animam in detenus commutatum fuisse, anathema sit”1 This deterioration of body and soul involved the loss of holiness and justice, and also of the gift of integrity8 and the immortality of the body.0 The two last-mentioned prerogatives were supplanted by ” death and bodily punishments.” 10 Since no one can ” lose ” what he does hot possess, our first parents in Paradise must have actually enjoyed sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, immortality of the body, and impassibility*. ]That these prerogatives were supernatural is not expressly defined by the Tridentine Council.

3. Jansenism. — The Jansenists applied Protestant principles to the domain of grace, which was their chief field of operation, and tried by various subterfuges to evade the dogmatic decrees of Trent. a) Perhaps no other heresy has so deeply wounded the Church as, Jansenism, despite its oft-repeated pretence of loyalty. -The chief protagonists of this sect were Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel. One of their palmary teachings was that the state of primitive justice was strictly due to man, something “connatural to him,” a debitum naturae which the Creator owed in justice to mankind. This assertion clearly involves a denial of the supernatural character of grace, though Baius tried to veil this inevitable conclusion by contending that to grant eNot creatus; see supra, p. 199. »L. c., can. 1: “Adam • • . 7 Cone. Trid., Sess. V, c. 1. incurrisse mortem, quant antea Mi 8 Cfr. Cone. Trident., Sess, V, comminatus fuerat Deus.” canon 5: ” Coneupiscentia … ex 10 L. c., can. 2: mortem et peccato est. poenas corporis.” r Google grace and glory to a sinner might be called gratia secundum quid. Other Jansenists asserted that sanctifying grace was due to human nature as such, not to its ” works.” But it is quite obvious that what is debitum naturae cannot at the same time be indebitum naturae, i. e., a grace. b) The Holy See upheld the true faith against Jansenism in a long series of struggles, which culminated in the explicit dangerous heresy. The most important ecclesiastical pronouncements against Jansenism are: (a) The condemnation, by Pius V (A. D. 1567), of seventy-nine propositions extracted from the writings of Baius; (b) the rejection by Innocent X (A. D. 1653) of five theses formulated by Jansenius himself; (c) the censures uttered by Clement XI in the Bull ” Unigenitus” (A.D. 1713), against one hundred and one propositions advocated by Quesnel; and (d) the reprobation of the Jansenistic decrees of the pseudo-synod of Pistoia by £ius VI in his Bull ” Auctorem fidei” (A. D. 1794). in studying the question of man’s original state of justicfcrthe errors of Baius and Quesnel prove indirectly helpful, inasmuch as their contradictories, though not formally defined articles of_faith, clearly embody the teaching of the Church.11 j The definition of the Supernatural which we have formulated on a previous page is confirmed by the Church’s official twenty-fourth proposition of Baius, to wit: ” A vanis et otiosis hominibus secundum insipientiam philosophorum excogitata est sententia, homi* 11 Supra, p. 194. JANSENISM 225 nem ab initio sic constitution, ut per dona naturae superaddita fuerit largitate conditoris sublimatus et in Filium Dei adoptatus” The supernatural character of sanctifying grace may be inferred from the twenty-first proposition championed by Baius, viz.: “Humane naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium divinae naturae debita fuit integritati primae conditionis, et proinde naturalis dicenda est, et non supernaturalis,” and likewise from the rejection of the thirty-fifth of the propositions extracted from the works of Quesnel, to wit: “Gratia Adami est sequela creationis, et erat debita naturae sanae et integrae.” 12 That Adam’s original immunity from concupiscence was a supernatural grace follows also from the of Baius’s twenty-sixth proposition: ” Integritas primae creationis non fuit indebita humanae naturae exaltatio, sed naturalis eius conditio/* The Church’s teaching on the subject of the bodily immortality of our first parents may be inferred from the reprobation of proposition number seventy-eight, extracted from the writings of Baius: (< Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis conditio” 13 To sum up the argument: It is a Catholic doctrine, directly deducible from revelation (fidei proximum), that sanctifying grace, exemption from concupiscence, and immortality of the body, all of which Adam and Eve enjoyed in Paradise, were supernatural gifts. That the impassibility and infused knowledge enjoyed by our first parents were also supernatural prerogatives is not directly taught by the Church. The supernatural character 12 Cfr. also proposition XVI of the Synod of Pistoia, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 1516. is Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1026 and 1078. Cfr. also proposition XVII of the Pistoian Synod, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1517. of the beatific vision, however, so far as it is granted to existing rational creatures, is an express article of faith.14 Readings: — Petavius, De Pelagiana et Semipelagiana Haeresi. — Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali (Append, adv. Baium et Baianos). — *F. Worter, Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1874. — A. Krampf, Der Urzustand des Menschen nach der Lehre des hi. Gregor von Nyssa, Wiirzburg 1889. — A. Hoch, Lehre des Johannes Cassianus von der Natur und Gnade, Freiburg 1895. — F. Klasen, Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882. — Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., §§ 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895. — S. Dechamps, De Haeresi Janseniana ab Apostolica Sede Merito Praescripta, Paris 1654. — A. Paquier, Le Jansinisme, Etude Doctrinale d’apres les Sources, Paris 1909. — A. Vandenpeerenboom, Cornelius Jansenius, Septiitne £veque d’Ypres, sa Mort, son Testament, ses Hpitaphes, Bruges 1882. — B. Jungmann, S. J., Dissertations Selectae in Hist. Eccles., Vol. VII, Diss. XL, Ratisbon 1887. — Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, Paris 1909. — J. Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopedia, art. ” Pelagius and Pelagianism,” Vol. XI. — J. Forget, ibid., art “Jansenius and Jansenism,” Vol. VIII.

Article 4: The Different States of Man, and the State of Pure Nature in Particular

THE DIFFERENT STATES OF MAN, AND THE STATE OF PURE NATURE IN PARTICULAR I. The Different States of Man. — A sharp distinction must be drawn between historic and purely possible states. a) A historic state is one in which the human race some time or other actually existed, or now exists. Such states are: (i) the state of 14 See supra, pp. 190 sqq. f HE DIFFERENT STATES OF MAN 22/ original justice in Paradise (status iustitiae originalis), of which we have already treated; (2) the state of fallen nature (status naturae lapsae), Into which the human race was precipitated by the sin of Adam.1 This state consisted in the loss of all supernatural and preternatural prerogatives which our first parents enjoyed in the Garden, and soon gave way to (3) the state of repaired nature (status naturae reparatae), in which God, in consideration of the merits of Jesus Christ, restored sanctifying grace, though without the preternatural prerogatives of integrity, impassibility, and bodily immortality which had accompanied it in Paradise. The state of repaired nature is the historic state par excellence, because it has been the condition of mankind since the promise of Redemption. b) Those states in which man might, but in matter of fact never did exist, are called possible. We may, in the first place, conceive of a state of natural integrity (status naturae integrae) in the narrower sense, i. e., one with a purely natural end,1 yet endowed with such preternatural prerogatives as, e. g., freedom from concupiscence. According as we combine the preternatural prerogatives (freedom from concupiscence, bodily immortality, impassibility, and infused knowledge) into one harmonious 1 This would exclude beatific vision and sanctifying grace. 22% DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY whole, or imagine any one of them separately realized to the exclusion of all others, we may subdivide the state of natural integrity into four different states, all of them devoid of strictly supernatural grace. It would serve no useful purpose to enter into a speculative discussion of these states here. Lastly, by eliminating man’s supernatural destiny together with sanctifying grace and all preternatural prerogatives, we arrive at what is termed the state of pure nature (status naturae purae).

2. Possibility of the State of Pure Nature.— The concept of the status naturae purae involves only such notes as belong to the essence of human nature and are due to it by virtue of creation, preservation, concurrence, and the general providence of God.2 Among the things that are due to man, as man, (aside from his physical endowment which is included in the definition of animal rationale), is the ethical faculty of knowing God as his natural end and of discovering and observing the moral law of nature. [That is, man must be able, by leading a naturally good life, to attain to his natural destiny, which would consist not in the beatific vision, but in an abstractive knowledge of God apt to render the creature naturally happy.. To these positive notes must be added a nega2 See supra, pp. 181 sqq. tive one, viz.: the exclusion of all such prerogatives as are either strictly supernatural (e. g., grace, actual and habitual), or at least preternatural.3 A recent writer observes that “this state [of pure nature] is conceived as substantially identical with the state in which man actually exists, minus the character of guilt and punishment which mark the absence of the higher prerogatives, and minus the grace which is operative in all men unto salvation.” 4 In this hypothetic state of pure nature, therefore, man would be subject to the same evils from which he suffers at present, viz.: concupiscence, ignorance, and death with its attendant sufferings. There is reason to doubt, however, whether the state of pure nature, thus conceived, would in every detail be essentially like the present state of original sin. Original sin, with the consequences which it entails, impairs the purity of nature to a considerable extent. It is not likely that in the state of pure nature idolatry and bestiality would have wrought such havoc as they actually did and do in consequence of the Fall, especially if we consider that original sin has immensely increased the ravages of these two arch-enemies of humankind. Abstracting from the guilt of sin and the punishment due to it, the state of pure nature may consequently be conceived as somewhat more perfect than the state of original sin. It is permissible, too, with Cardinal Franzelin5 and other eminent theologians, to postulate certain natural 8 See supra, pp. 190 sq. 5 De Tradit, et Script., pp. 635 4 Schell, Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 293 sqq., Rome 1882. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY aids as substitutes for the missing supernatural assistance in the battle against concupiscence. We may conceive these adiutoria Dei naturalia as due to man in the pure state of nature, but they would not, of course, partake of the essence of strictly supernatural grace.* Though it would not essentially coincide in every detail with the state of original sin, this hypothetical state of pure nature is per se possible. To say that it is impossible would be tantamount to asserting that God was bound to endow man with supernatural graces and prerogatives. This was precisely the false teaching of Baius.7 Deus non potuisset reads the fifty-fifth of his condemned propositions, “ab initio^talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur” iThe Catholic doctrine is that, had He so chosen, God could have created man in the state in which he is now born, minus original sinJ The so-called Augustinians and some Thomists8 thought that would be sufficiently safeguarded against the errors of Baius by holding that God could have established the state of pure nature de potentia absoluta, though not de potentia ordinata. But this is not a safe position to take. What God may not do by virtue of His wisdom, sanctity, and benevolence (potentia ordinata), He cannot do by virtue « This theory is defended against 7 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, En> Becanus (Summa Theol. ScholasU, chiridion, n. 1055. p. II, tr. 4) by Schiffini, De Gratia 8 Augustinians — Berti, Norisius, Divina, pp. 71 sqq., 85 sqq., Fri- Bellelli; Thomists — Contenson, Serburgi igox. ry, De Lemos. of His omnipotence (potentia absolutd), which is invariably directed in its operations by the other divine attributes. If God were constrained by some one or other of His attributes 9 to endow man with supernatural gifts, these gifts would forthwith cease to be graces, because they would correspond to a legitimate demand of nature. The theologians with whom we are here dealing declare, in opposition to Baius, that these prerogatives are supernatural graces; but in this they are guilty of inconsistency, because they confound nature with the Supernatural, and fail to distinguish between the characteristics of both.10 Readings: — Berti, Augustinianum Systetna Vindicat., diss. 2. — ♦Card. Norisius, V indie. Augustin.,c. 3, Batav. 1673. — Kuhn, Die christliche Lehre von der gottKchen Gnade, § 16, Tubingen 1868. — G. Vandenesch, Doctrina Divi Thomae Aquinatis de Concupiscentia, Bonn. 1870. — Mohler, Symbolism, pp. 23 sqq., Robertson’s translation, 5th ed., London 1906. — Suarez, Proleg. 4 ad Tract, de Gratia.— Goudin, Tract. Theol., t. IT, qu. 2, art. 1.— F. X. Linsenmann, Michael Bajus, Tubingen 1867. — J. F. Sollier, art “Baius” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II.— Kroll, “The Causes of the Jansenist Heresy ” in the Am. Cath. Quarterly Review, 1885, pp. 577 sqq.— W. Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” PP. 338 sqq., London 1897. 0 Ex decentia Creatoris et leg 10 Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo CreanU iustisrimae providentiae, as the Au- et Elevante, thes. 47, Rome 1878. gustinians put it.