Part II — Theological Knowledge Considered in Itself, or Subjectively

Theological knowledge should be considered under a twofold aspect: as an act of Faith, and as theological science. Faith assents to revealed truths on the authority of God who reveals them, whereas theological science, under the guidance of Faith, submits them to examination and discussion in order to gain a clearer and deeper insight into them.

Chapter VI — Faith

§ 31. Etymology of the Various Words Used for Faith — The True Notion of Faith

I. The English word “Faith” derives from the Latin fides, akin to the Greek pistis; “Belief” is akin to the German Glauben; “Creed” and “Credibility” derive from the Latin credere. Both fides and credere convey the fundamental sense of trusting (German trauen) — credere is related to the Greek kratein, to grasp firmly and hold. The noun fides also carries the meaning of trust, confidence, and fidelity; the notion of confidence appears in its derived forms (fido, fidentia, fiducia), and the notion of fidelity, or firm adherence, in fidelis, fidelitas, and fidus.

Pistis, so frequent in Holy Scripture, comes from peithein, whose root originally meant to bind, fasten, hold fast, and which later came to mean, more specifically, binding by speech — that is, to convince or persuade. We can thus see how pistis carries all the meanings of fides. It should be noted, however, that when used to describe some relation between God and man, pistis is used in a passive or middle sense (peithesthai, to be bound, convinced, or persuaded, and to allow oneself to be so bound), and this usage runs throughout Scripture. Pistis accordingly involves, first, on the part of the believer, a willing listening and submission to the commanding call of God, by whom the hearer allows himself to be bound; and second, a cleaving to God, to whom the hearer binds himself by accepting His good gift and entering into a covenant (foedus) with Him. Both fidelity and confidence are thus included, in a form peculiar to religious pistis — a docile and confident submission to divine guidance. The two elements of pistis, obedience and fidelity, appear plainly in the corresponding contrary notions: apeitheia (inobedientia, disobedience) and apistia (perfidia, faithlessness, or diffidentia, distrust).

The German Glauben shares its root with lieben, loben, geloben — to love, to praise, to promise — from a root meaning “to wish to find good, to approve”; it accordingly carries the radical sense of willingly accepting, holding fast, and approving.

It is plain that all these words, by both etymology and theological usage, do not refer exclusively to acts or habits of the intellect. They often express affections and dispositions of the will, especially obedience and hope, grounded in or aiming toward some act of knowledge; but, as a rule, they express acts of the intellect precisely insofar as these depend on, or connect with, acts of the will. In Scripture, pistis and pisteuein, applied to God, mean purely and simply to cling and hold fast to God, and so all the acts this clinging involves, singly or together, depending on context. Applied to acts of knowledge, these expressions designate only those bearing some analogy to acts of the will — to admit, hold, cling to, approve, consent. The sense in which “holding something for true” is called fides or pistis is accordingly manifold: sometimes the words designate generically every “holding for true,” every conviction whatever, functioning almost as technical terms for conviction as such (like the German Ueberzeugung); at other times “to believe” is used loosely to mean simply “think” or “suppose,” expressing a more or less arbitrary assent resting on imperfect evidence.

II. The specific sense of “Faith,” fides, pistis, that concerns us here is “assent on authority” — the acceptance of a proposition not because we ourselves perceive its truth, but because another tells us it is true. The notion of Faith implies that this assent is itself considered something good and desirable. “Assent on authority” results from our esteem for the witness’s mental and moral qualifications, and is accordingly accompanied by a willing acknowledgment of a kind of perfection in him, and by a respectful, confiding submission to the authority that perfection confers. Faith is thus not simply an act of the intellect, but an act commanded and brought about by the will acting upon the intellect: the intellect’s assent to what is true is determined by the will’s consent to what is good — a consent implying both approbation of the intellect’s assent and a willing acknowledgment of the speaker’s authority.

III. The will’s role in this kind of Faith resembles deference to authority generally — submitting to a legitimate order or call to perform some action, where the one who gives the order is, in a real sense, the author of the action rather than the one who actually performs it (whence the very word “authority”). In ordinary cases we are invited, rather than strictly commanded, to assent on another’s authority — we may doubt his knowledge or veracity, and even absent such doubt, he generally has no power or right over us. But when the speaker is the Supreme Lord, Infinite Wisdom and Infinite Truth, He is entitled to exact the complete consent of our will, and to set before us His own knowledge not merely as a basis but as a rule of conviction. The act of Faith differs from most other acts of submission to authority in one crucial respect: the authority that exacts it must also make it possible, and must co-operate in its very production — accomplished by the Divine Author constituting Himself the guarantee of the truth of what He communicates. The Speaker, in virtue of the moral perfection of His will, guarantees that He communicates only what He knows to be true; and, by virtue of the perfection of His intellect, all danger of error is excluded, offering the hearer’s mind a foundation for certitude surer than his own personal knowledge could ever be.

IV. The manner in which authority asserts itself to, and is received by, a believer varies with the nature of the authority and of the communication made. The nearest human approach to divine authority and divine Faith is found in the relation between parents and their children: parents possess a natural superiority and dominion over their offspring, as the authors of their existence, so that their authority, unlike that of anyone else, is in itself, apart from any external legitimation, sufficient to command their children’s assent; and the respect and reverence owed to parents leads a child to simply take for granted their knowledge and veracity. The relation between God and man is a kind of spiritual paternity (cf. Heb. 12:9), by virtue of which we are entitled to address Him as “Our Father.” Human parents, though their children reasonably presume their knowledge and veracity, may nonetheless deceive, or be themselves deceived — but our Heavenly Father is Infinite Wisdom and Truth itself.

§ 32. Nature of Theological Faith

I. Theological Faith is assent given to the Word of God in a manner befitting its excellence and power. It is also called Divine Faith, as opposed to merely human faith founded on human authority; Supernatural Faith, since it leads to supernatural salvation and has God for its Author and Generator; Christian Faith, since its subject-matter is the Revelation made by Christ, interwoven with the whole Christian economy of salvation; and Catholic Faith, since it is assent to the doctrines the Catholic Church proposes. These four names are not strict synonyms, but each designates the same act under a different aspect.

II. The nature of Theological Faith has been clearly defined by the Vatican Council: “seeing that man wholly dependeth upon God as his Creator and Lord, and seeing that created reason is entirely subject to Uncreated Truth, we are bound to submit by faith our intellect and will to God the revealer. But this faith, which is the beginning of man’s salvation, the Church confesseth to be a supernatural virtue, whereby, with the help of God’s grace, we believe what he revealeth, not because we perceive its intrinsic truth by the natural light of our reason, but on account of the authority of God the revealer, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. For faith, according to the Apostle, is ‘the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not’” (sess. iii, c. 3; Heb. 11:1).

This definition means: (1) that Theological Faith is faith in the strictest sense — assent on authority, involving an act of the intellect as well as an act of the will; (2) that it is faith in an eminent degree, since it implies unlimited submission to God’s sovereign authority and absolute confidence in His veracity, making it an act of religious worship and a theological virtue; and (3) that it is influenced not only externally, by divine authority, but internally, by divine grace, and is thus properly supernatural. These three characteristics distinguish Theological Faith both from the natural knowledge with which Rationalists confuse it, and from every rational, irrational, or merely instinctive-emotional form of “faith.”

The classical text of Heb. 11:1, cited by the Council, describes Faith as the act of spiritually seizing and holding fast to things beyond the reach of our intellect — things whose vision is the very object of our hope, the essence of our future happiness. It tells us that Faith is a conviction pointing toward, and leading to, the future vision, even anticipating its fruition. It implies, then, that Faith, like the vision it anticipates, is a supernatural participation in God’s own knowledge, and a likening of our knowledge to His, since our Faith shares its subject-matter with divine knowledge, and resembles it, too, in its inner perfection. Literally: the “substance” (hypostasis) “of things to be hoped for” is a giving in hand, as it were, a pledge and security for future goods, a kind of anticipated possession of them; “the evidence” (elenchos) “of things that appear not” is an evident demonstration, a clear showing, hence a perfect certitude concerning things invisible. These expressions apply, without figure of speech, to the habit of Faith; to the individual act of Faith they apply only figuratively, as the result of that giving in hand and clear manifestation. This relation between our Faith and the Beatific Vision brings out, as clearly as the Council’s own definition, the difference between Theological Faith and every other kind of faith or knowledge.

III. We are now able to trace the genesis of Theological Faith. The believer, moved by grace, submits to God’s authority and trusts His veracity, striving to conform his own mental judgment to God’s, connecting his convictions as closely as possible with God’s own infallible knowledge. Grace perfects this connection so fully that a most intimate union and relationship is established between the believer’s knowledge and the Divine knowledge itself — the excellence and virtue of the latter thus communicated to the former, moulding it into an introduction to, and participation in, eternal life.

IV. A few remarks on theological usage of the term “Faith.” Fides signifies either the act itself (credere, fides qua creditur), or the principle of the act (gratia fidei, the grace or “light” of faith), or its subject-matter (fides quae creditur), especially the collected body of creeds and definitions. A distinction is sometimes drawn between Explicit and Implicit Faith, based on the degree of distinctness with which the act of Faith apprehends its object; also between Formal Faith, presupposing explicit knowledge of the motive and an express act of the will, and Virtual Faith, a habit either infused or resulting from repeated acts of Formal Faith, producing acts of Faith almost instinctively without distinct consciousness of the underlying Formal Faith. The expression credere Deum signifies belief in God as the subject-matter of the act (“I believe that God exists”); credere Deo means belief on God’s authority (“I believe what God says”); credere in Deum implies both together (“I believe in God, on God’s own authority”).

§ 33. The Formal Object or Motive of Faith

I. To the question “why do we believe?” — the motive of our Faith — many answers may be given. Some motives resemble those that move us to any other free act of the will, gathered under the heading of what is “fitting and useful”: Faith contributes to our moral perfection and leads to eternal salvation; it ennobles the soul and satisfies our moral need for submission to, and union with, God; it enriches and elevates our mental knowledge, increasing its store and strengthening its certitude. As a rule, however, when we speak of the motive of Faith, we mean specifically that by which the act of Faith is actually produced. In Theological Faith, this is the Word of God Himself — whence the very name “theological,” pertaining immediately to God. We believe a proposed truth because it is the Word of God, a word founded on Divine Authority and so entitled to the homage of our intellect and will alike.

II. Divine Authority influences Faith in a twofold way: as a call to Faith, and as testimony to Faith’s truth. As a call, Divine Authority expresses the divine will and power to which man is bound to submit; as testimony, it acts as Supreme Truth itself, guaranteeing the truth of what is believed and supplying a perfect foundation for certitude. In both respects Divine Authority rests on God’s own essence, by virtue of which He is the Highest Being, the Uncreated Principle of all things, the Possessor of all truth, the Source of all goodness — hence the classical formula, “God is the motive of Faith inasmuch as He is the First Truth.” God is First Truth in a threefold sense: in being (in essendo), through the infinite perfection of His Being; in knowledge (in cognoscendo), through His infinite knowledge; and in speech (in dicendo), since, being infinitely holy, He cannot deceive. Divine Authority, as motive of Faith, acts upon the will; the will, moved by respect and confidence, in turn acts upon the intellect, urging it to elicit an act of Faith in what Infallible Truth proposes. As in every act of faith, of whatever kind, the believer bases his assent on the witness’s knowledge and veracity, so in Divine Faith the will urges the intellect to base its assent on the infallible knowledge and veracity of the great First Truth — the motive of Faith is impressed by the will upon the intellect as a light that illuminates and manifests the truth of the Word proposed, itself then acting on the intellect directly, not merely through the will. God, as First Being and First Truth — together with the actual contents of Revelation — is thus, at once, both the motive of Faith and the end toward which the will moves the intellect.

§ 34. The Subject-Matter of Faith

I. A proposition or fact becomes the subject-matter of Faith when God reveals it and commands belief in it on His own authority; where both conditions are met, Faith finds in God both its “substance” and its “evidence” (Heb. 11:1), and every such truth must be believed with Divine Faith properly so called. In the following cases, however, it is doubtful whether, or how far, a truth can be believed with strictly Divine Faith.

1. Truths revealed only mediately and virtually — that is, evidently inferred from truths directly and immediately revealed — belong more properly to Theological Knowledge than to Divine Faith as such. If God intended to reveal them, and they were known to the first promulgators of Revelation, some theologians (Reding, for instance) hold they may still be believed with Divine Faith; most theologians (Suárez, Lugo, Kleutgen), however, hold that Divine Faith is possible in their case only once they are authoritatively proposed by the Church — since the Church’s proposal, in that case, takes the place of God’s own immediate proposal, functioning as an extensive interpretation of the Divine Word.
2. Truths only indirectly belonging to the domain of Revelation (§ 5, II above) are primarily the subject-matter of human knowledge, becoming subject-matter of Faith only once the Church has authoritatively proposed them for belief; in such cases, God Himself gives testimony through the Church, acting as His plenipotentiary and ambassador. The resulting assent resembles Theological Faith in springing from respect for God’s knowledge, veracity, and authority, and in being infallible — yet, since it rests not directly on God’s own knowledge but on the knowledge possessed by the Church, there remains an essential difference between it and Theological Faith proper. This lesser assent, called Ecclesiastical Faith, is less perfect than Divine Faith, but, by its religious and infallible character, remains far above any purely human faith. Some theologians, Muzzarelli among them, hold that such truths are, in fact, subject-matter of Divine Faith, on the ground of the Church’s own divinely promised infallibility — claiming Divine Faith especially for matters connected with morals and for the canonization of Saints, since an error in either would tell against the divinely revealed sanctity of the Church, canonization being founded, moreover, on miracles God has worked to prove a Saint’s holiness. In reply, it may be observed that the connection of moral matters with the Church’s sanctity founds Faith in them on God’s knowledge only indirectly; and that miracles worked through the intercession of holy persons are not themselves direct revelations, but only indications of the Divine Will that the Church interprets — so that Faith founded on them remains, properly, Ecclesiastical rather than Divine Faith.

II. Foremost among the qualities required of Faith’s subject-matter is truth: whatever is proposed for belief must, in itself, be true. Faith, however, does not suppose in the believer a direct knowledge of the truths believed, still less an illumination of mind resembling the Beatific Vision — on the contrary, being “the evidence of things that appear not,” Faith implies that its subject-matter is inaccessible to the mind’s natural eye, even when revealed; it is Faith’s own peculiar excellence that it makes the unseen as certain to our minds as the seen (Heb. 11:27). Trusting in God’s knowledge and veracity, Faith glories in truths above reason and delights in mystery, transcending all human faith and science by embracing objects far beyond the human mind’s natural reach. Yet, though “things that appear not” are Faith’s proper subject-matter, absolute invisibility is not strictly required — the relatively invisible may also become its object (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 1, aa. 3–4, on whether the object of faith can be something visible, or something already scientifically known).

III. In keeping with its being “the substance of things to be hoped for,” and with its Author’s own intention, Faith aims at giving us knowledge of the things touching our future supernatural happiness. God Himself, then, in His invisible Essence — as He is, and as He will reveal Himself to the blessed in the Beatific Vision — and God’s own Nature, as the principle that causes our supernatural perfection and beatitude by communicating itself to us, are the chief subjects of Faith. Here again we see how far Faith’s subject-matter transcends all human knowledge, since no natural faculty can reach the heights or fathom the depths of the Divine Essence and its relations to the human soul (cf. 1 Cor. 2). Indeed, the whole supernatural economy of salvation is subordinated to belief in God as the final object of our eternal beatitude.

IV. Faith is founded on God’s knowledge and veracity; it has God and His Divine Nature for its subject-matter; and it tends toward Beatific Union with Him. Seeing, in a certain sense, all things in and through God, it not only reduces its own tenets to a unity in God, but apprehends, in and through God, all created truth as well, judging every created thing with reference to God as its ultimate End and immutable Ruler. Faith is, in this sense, what modern philosophers call a “transcendental knowledge” — adhering to God in all humility, it accomplishes what philosophers have vainly attempted through the exaggeration of the mind’s own natural powers (cf. Matt. 11:25).

§ 35. The Motives of Credibility

I. To elicit an act of Divine Faith in some revealed truth, the fact that it has genuinely been revealed must itself be perfectly certain to us — without this prior certitude, we could not reasonably assent to it on God’s authority. Innocent XI accordingly condemned the proposition: “the supernatural assent of Faith necessary for salvation is compatible with merely probable knowledge of Revelation, nay even with doubt whether God has spoken” (prop. 21). No certitude is perfect unless grounded on reasonable motives — we cannot, therefore, certainly accept any proposition as the Word of God without Motives of Credibility, marks and criteria clearly showing that the proposition really is God’s Word.

The Motives of Credibility must not be confused with the Motives of Faith. The former concern the fact that some particular doctrine was originally revealed by God; the latter, the general necessity of believing whatever God has revealed. Both together ground the reasonableness of our Faith. This becomes clear once we see that the assent given in an act of Faith is inferential: “whatever God reveals is true; God has revealed, for instance, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity; therefore the mystery is true.” The Motives of Faith are the reasons for assenting to the major premise; the Motives of Credibility are the reasons for assenting to the minor.¹ The Motives of Faith — God’s own knowledge and veracity — are so evident that no one can seriously call them into question; the Motives of Credibility, by contrast — the proofs that some given doctrine is of divine origin — are by no means self-evident, and are precisely the object of unbelievers’ fiercest attacks. It is for this reason that discussions of Faith’s reasonableness lay their chief stress on the Motives of Credibility.

II. The chief errors regarding the Motives of Credibility are: (1) Rationalism, denying any possibility of reasonable certainty regarding matters said to be revealed; (2) Protestantism, at least in some of its forms, substituting inward feelings and consolations for external criteria; and (3) a tendency among some Catholic theologians themselves to assign too prominent a place to such inward feelings. Against these errors, the Vatican Council defined the Catholic doctrine on the certitude of the fact of Revelation, and declared, in particular, how the Church’s own proposal of doctrines as revealed constitutes a legitimate promulgation of the Divine Word: “in order that the submission of our faith might be in accordance with reason, God hath willed to give us, together with the internal assistance of the Holy Ghost, external proofs of his revelation, namely, divine facts, and above all miracles and prophecies, which, while they clearly manifest God’s almighty power and infinite knowledge, are most certain divine signs of revelation adapted to the understanding of all men. Wherefore Moses, and the prophets, and especially Christ our Lord himself, wrought and uttered many and most manifest miracles and prophecies; and touching the apostles we read, ‘they going forth preached the word everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with the signs that followed’ (Mark 16:20). And again it is written, ‘we have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place’ (2 Pet. 1:19). But in order that we may fulfil the duty of embracing the true faith, and of persevering therein constantly, God, by means of his only begotten Son, hath instituted the Church, and hath endowed her with plain marks whereby she may be recognized by all men as the guardian and mistress of the revealed word. For to the Catholic Church alone belong all the wonders which have been divinely arranged for the evident credibility of the Christian faith. Moreover, the Church herself, by her wonderful propagation, exalted sanctity, and unbounded fertility in all that is good, by her Catholic unity and invincible stability, is both an enduring motive of credibility and an unimpeachable testimony of her divine mission” (sess. iii, c. 3).

The Catholic Church thus teaches: (1) that our Faith requires rational certitude of the fact of Revelation in order to be itself rational; (2) that this certitude does not rest exclusively, or even chiefly, on internal experience, but on external, manifest facts; (3) that these external, manifest facts, accompanying the proposal of Revelation, can produce perfect certitude of the fact of Revelation in every mind; and (4) that these facts do not merely accompany Revelation’s original proposal, receding into merely past history, but are perpetuated, through the Church’s own unity and stability, alongside the promulgation of the Divine Word itself, remaining at all times manifest to every genuine inquirer.

III. The following points explain and confirm this doctrine.

1. It is evident, first, that our Faith cannot be a “reasonable worship” unless sound reasons, distinct from Revelation itself and reached through our own inquiry, persuade us that the doctrines proposed for belief really are the Word of God. Belief without any reason at all is manifestly irrational; but belief resting exclusively on revealed reasons is equally irrational, since it falls into a vicious circle. We do not, however, maintain that the resulting assent must be purely rational in character.
2. It is not necessary, on the teaching of most theologians, nor is it implied by the Vatican Council’s own wording, that certitude regarding the fact of Revelation be, in every single case, absolutely perfect; it suffices that the certitude appear satisfactory to the believer and exclude every real doubt from his mind — a subjective, relative certitude suffices, especially for children and the uneducated, provided those on whose human testimony they rely themselves possess a perfect, objective certitude (cf. Bishop Lefranc de Pompignan’s controversy with a Calvinist, “Sur la Foi des Enfants et des Adultes Ignorants”).
3. Among the signs of a doctrine’s divine origin, the believer’s own inner experiences must be counted — the effects of grace on the soul are especially significant. Nevertheless, such inner experiences cannot be either the exclusive or even the primary criteria of divine origin, since they are subjective, restricted to the person feeling them, liable to illusion, and can be felt only after the fact of the doctrine’s revelation has already been apprehended by other means. Faith is proposed by public authority and exacts public, universal obedience — it must therefore rest on public, plain signs of its divine origin.
4. Among the external signs of Revelation, purely human testimony has a place only insofar as it bears witness, for those who cannot personally apprehend them, to the divine facts connected with Revelation. The proper criterion of a verbal communication’s divine origin, as we might expect from the nature of the case, and as the Church herself teaches, consists in external, supernatural, divine facts or effects, which God intimately connects with the proposal of His Revelation, and by which He signifies His will that we should believe that He has spoken.
5. Since God has ordained that His Word be proposed to the faithful through the ministry of authentic witnesses, the first point to establish is these witnesses’ own divine mission. Although it is conceivable, in theory, that only the earliest promulgators of the Faith had their mission attested by divine signs, this fact then simply handed down to us like any other historical event — God has, in fact, ordained that the signs and criteria of His doctrine’s divine origin should uninterruptedly accompany its preaching across the ages, bringing the fact of Revelation home to us in a far more lively, direct, and effective manner. This question carries the greatest weight today, when even Christ’s own divine mission is the object of so many attacks: once the Church’s own divine mission is denied, and with it the existence of any continual, living testimony, Faith in Christ’s divine mission comes to rest on merely historical evidence, and so becomes prey to historical criticism. Without a continuous divine approbation, moreover, Christ’s mission becomes so isolated a fact that its full significance can hardly be grasped. Some Catholic theologians, in their zeal to defend Christianity and the Church on purely historical grounds alone, have not given sufficient prominence to the constant signs of divine approbation accompanying the Church’s preaching in every age — the Vatican Council’s own definition was thus most opportune. It is now of Faith that the Church herself is “an enduring motive of credibility and an unimpeachable testimony of her divine mission”: her wonderful propagation, notwithstanding the greatest moral and physical difficulties, in her early years and to the present day; her eminent sanctity, manifest in her Saints and their miracles; her inexhaustible fecundity in every good work; her unity of Faith, discipline, and worship; her invincible constancy in resisting every attack, from within and without, for more than eighteen centuries — all these together are manifest signs that she is not the work of man, but the work of God.
6. The certitude of the fact of Revelation must match the firmness Faith itself requires. All theologians accordingly teach that the demonstration of this fact from visible signs — prophecies and miracles — must be evident enough to generate a certitude excluding every doubt and fear of error, sufficient to place a reasonable man under genuine obligation to adhere to it. This does not mean the evidence must be of so perfect a kind as to render denial absolutely impossible — the proofs of Revelation may admit of unreasonable dissent, as daily experience shows plainly enough. Our judgment on the credibility of Revelation — “it is worthy of belief that God has revealed these things; they must, therefore, be believed” — is formed with reference to God’s veracity and authority, the signs and wonders appearing as indications of God’s command to believe, and as pledges of His own veracity. The moral dispositions of the inquirer plainly exercise the greatest influence on this judgment: one with a genuine love of truth, deep reverence for God’s authority and holiness, and firm confidence in His wisdom and providence, easily sees how incompatible it would be with God’s supreme perfection to give such positive indications of a revelation’s existence, were no revelation in fact given — he faces, in effect, the dilemma “either God is a deceiver, or He has given mankind a revelation,” and his good dispositions urge him, without hesitation, toward the latter alternative. One who dislikes or has no interest in the truth, by contrast, wanting in submission and confidence toward God, will strive to persuade himself that the signs either do not come from God or were never meant to prove a revelation at all — it is possible, in other words, to refuse assent to the fact of Revelation only by rebelling against Divine Authority and treating God as a deceiver, and herein lies the true enormity of the sin of infidelity. Hence St. Paul writes of those “having faith and a good conscience, which some rejecting have made shipwreck concerning the faith” (1 Tim. 1:19).
7. The prophecies, miracles, and other signs by which we establish the credibility of Revelation must not be confused with the Motive of Faith itself, which is God’s own authority and veracity. The Motives of Credibility do not, of themselves, produce the certitude of Faith — they merely dispose, lead, and urge the mind toward submission to the Divine Authority of which they are signs. This is precisely why Innocent XI condemned the proposition that “the will cannot make the assent of Faith more firm in itself than is demanded by the weight of reasons inducing us to believe” — the “weight of reasons” here meaning the Motives of Credibility, whose rational certainty is neither the measure of the confidence with which the will clings to the contents of Revelation, nor of the firmness with which the intellect, moved by the will, adheres to them.
8. To elicit an act of Faith we must know not only the fact of Revelation, but its actual contents — not merely that a revelation has been made, but what has been revealed. These contents are either communicated directly by God, or proposed through His infallible Church; in the former case, Faith remains possible even without the Church’s own proposal, but the ordinary way God makes Faith accessible to mankind is precisely through the Church’s authoritative teaching. The purpose of that teaching is not simply to convey revealed truth to our minds, as any book might do, but to make possible the “faith which cometh by hearing” on which St. Paul insists. By submitting to the Church’s own testimony and authority, our Mother, we render that “obedience of Faith” which flows from reverence for our Heavenly Father, and which belongs to the very essence of Faith — it is, admittedly, harder, being more against our natural pride, to submit to the Church than to submit directly to God, but in doing so we act in Faith’s own truest spirit. The Church’s authoritative teaching, it should be added, does not supply an entirely independent motive of Faith, still less the highest motive, or even a part of it — it functions, rather, as an instrument or vehicle of the real motive, setting the contents of Revelation before us as worthy of belief, proposing points of doctrine as a living, ever-present witness, and demanding our assent to them on God’s own authority.