The Rule of Faith: General Councils, Roman Congregations, Dogmatic Censures, and the Development of Dogma

§ 28. General Councils

I. The Pope, speaking ex cathedra, is infallible independently of the consent of the subordinate members of the Teaching Body. The whole body of Bishops, apart from the Pope, cannot on its own pronounce an infallible judgment; but the Pope can assemble the Bishops and constitute them a tribunal representing the Teaching Body more fully than the Pope acting alone — their judgments, given jointly with his, form the most complete expression of the Teaching Body as such. This assembly is called a Universal or Ecumenical Council. It is not an independent tribunal superior to the Pope: it must be convened by him, or at least with his consent and co-operation; all the Bishops of the Church must be commanded, or at least invited, to attend; a considerable number must actually be present, in person or by deputy; and the assembled prelates must conduct their deliberations, and act, under the direction of the Pope or his legates. Some councils styled “ecumenical” do not, strictly, fulfil every one of these conditions — the First and Second Councils of Constantinople are well-known instances — but such councils were not originally considered ecumenical in the full sense, only numerously attended, or elevated later through patriarchal ambition; it was only in the sixth century, some time after the Creed of the First Council of Constantinople had been adopted at Chalcedon, that this Council was placed on a level with Nicaea, Ephesus, and Chalcedon (see Hefele, I, p. 41; II, § 100).

It may seem strange that none of the early Western councils, though presided over by the Roman Pontiff and accepted by the whole Church, received the title “Ecumenical” — but this is easily explained: the Western councils represented only the Roman patriarchate, so their authority was identical with that of the Holy See itself. Moreover, before the Great Schism, a General Council was understood as a co-operation of East with West — the other patriarchates together with the patriarchate of Rome. Eastern Bishops attended in person, while the Pope and the Western Church sent deputies, so that a council, though meeting in the East, was truly composed of representatives of the whole Church. Later councils held in the West conform more closely to the theological notion already given, since the entire episcopate was convened in one place by express command, not mere invitation, and the assembled Bishops acted on the strength of their own divine mission, without special distinction favouring patriarchs, metropolitans, or other dignitaries.

II. Councils, in defining a dogma, perform a double function: they act as witnesses, and as judges. The Pope’s own co-operation is especially required in his capacity as supreme judge; care must be taken not to overstress the witnessing function alone, lest the true importance of papal co-operation be minimized and the very notion of a council distorted. It is true that many statements of the fourth-century Fathers concerning the Council of Nicaea seem to stress almost exclusively its function as witness — but Nicaea was the first General Council, and under the circumstances then prevailing, an appeal to the solemn testimony of so many Bishops was simply the best available argument against the heretics of the day. Subsequent councils, especially Ephesus and Chalcedon, followed a rather different course, laying greater stress on the judicial function, and correspondingly on the influence of the Roman Pontiff and the various grades of hierarchical jurisdiction.

III. The special object of General Councils is to attain, fully and perfectly, ends that particular councils can attain only partially and imperfectly. In relation to the Pope’s own judgment, complete in itself, a General Council serves: (1) to give the Pope the greatest possible assistance in preparing his judgment, through the testimony and scientific knowledge of the assembled bishops; (2) to give the papal definition the greatest possible force and efficacy, through the combined action and sentence of all the judges together; and (3) to help the Pope in the execution and enforcement of his decisions, through the promulgation and subsequent action of the assembled judges themselves. The Council’s co-operation, in short, brings the testimony and judicial power of the whole Church to bear on the Pope’s own decision.

IV. The action of a General Council consists essentially in the co-operation of its members with their Head. To the Pope, accordingly, belongs the authoritative direction of the Council’s whole proceedings — he may, if he chooses, determine what questions shall be treated and how; no decision is legitimate if carried against his will or without his consent, and even a decision accepted by his own legates without his express order is not absolutely binding. On the other hand, no decision becomes unlawful or void merely because the Pope makes extensive use of this right of direction, since any resulting restriction of liberty flows from a legitimate, internal principle of order rather than from illegitimate external pressure — a decision would remain legitimate even where, as in many early councils, and indeed in every council convened simply to promulgate and enforce already-existing papal decisions, the Pope commanded acceptance of his own sentence without further discussion; at most, such pressure might affect the Council’s moral efficacy rather than its legitimacy as such. By contrast, the forcible expulsion of the papal legates from the so-called “Robber Council” (Latrocinium) of Ephesus was rightly considered by Catholics a gross violation of a Council’s true liberty. The sentence of a majority — or even a unanimous sentence — taken apart from the Pope’s own personal action, is not, purely and simply, the sentence of the entire Teaching Body, and therefore lays no claim to infallibility; it would not bind absent Bishops to assent, nor the Pope to confirm it, its only effect being to allow the Pope, should he wish, to say that he confirms the sentence of a council, or that he speaks “with the approval of the Sacred Council” (sacro approbante concilio).

The Vatican Council, even in its Fourth Session, may be cited as an instance of a Council possessing, in an eminent degree, not only every essential element but the further, perfecting elements as well: the number of Bishops present was the greatest on record, both absolutely and relative to the total number of Bishops worldwide; discussion was free, searching, and exhaustive; universal tradition, past and present, was appealed to — not as to the specific doctrine in question, but as to its underlying principle, the duty of obedience to the Holy See and conformity to her Faith; and absolute unanimity prevailed in the final sentence, with an overwhelming majority even at the preparatory stage. The decrees of the General Councils may be found in the great collections of Labbe, Hardouin, Mansi, and Catalani; the more important decrees are given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion.

§ 29. The Roman Congregations — Local or Particular Councils

I. The Roman Congregations are standing committees of Cardinals appointed by the Pope to decide various questions of doctrine and discipline as they arise. The most important are: (1) the Congregation of the Council of Trent; (2) the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars; (3) the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (Propaganda); (4) the Congregation of Sacred Rites; (5) the Congregation of the Index of Prohibited Books; and (6) the Congregation of the Holy Office (the Inquisition) — to which must be added the Penitentiaria, a tribunal for granting absolution from censures and dispensations regarding vows and matrimonial impediments, which also passes judgment on moral cases submitted to it.

These Congregations function chiefly as the general administration, or “police,” of doctrine and discipline: it is their duty to prosecute offences against Faith or morals, to prohibit dangerous writings, and to attach authoritative censures to opinions whose profession is sinful. They do not give decisions without appeal, since finality is inseparable from infallibility; though they act in the Pope’s name, their decrees remain their own, not his, even once he has acknowledged and approved them — though if the Pope himself gives a decision based on a Congregation’s advice, that decision is properly his own, not merely the Congregation’s.

1. The Congregations’ doctrinal decrees, when not fully and formally confirmed by the Pope, are not infallible. They carry, however, so strong a presumption in their favour that even interior submission is owed them, at least for the time being — the Congregations being composed of experienced men of every theological school and tendency, proceeding with the greatest prudence and conscientiousness, and representing the tradition of the Roman Church, which enjoys the Holy Ghost’s especial protection; their decrees, moreover, have rarely needed reform. Hence Pius IX teaches that learned Catholics “must submit to the doctrinal decisions given by the Pontifical Congregations” (Brief Tuas Libenter, 1863).
2. Where the Pope fully and formally confirms a Congregation’s decrees, they become infallible — though it is not always easy to determine whether such perfect confirmation has actually been given; certain formulas, the simple word approbavit, for instance, may signify nothing more than an act of supervision, or an act of the Pope as head of the Congregation rather than as Head of the whole Church.

II. Particular or Local Councils are assemblies of the Bishops of a single province or nation, as distinguished from assemblies of the Bishops of the whole world. A council composed of the Bishops of one province is called a Provincial Council; one composed of Bishops from several provinces, a Plenary or National Council. Every Particular Council must be convened with the Holy See’s approbation; the Bishops act, indeed, in virtue of their own ordinary power, not as papal delegates, yet it is only fitting they should act in union with their Head, and their decrees must in any case be submitted for Rome’s approval, whether Simple or Solemn (approbatio in forma simplici, approbatio in forma solemni). The Simple form, usually granted, is a mere act of supervision, emanating from the Congregation of the Council; the Solemn form amounts to the Holy See’s own formal adoption of the decrees as her own, and is granted only rarely — the provincial councils held against Pelagianism are well-known instances. Without such solemn approval, the decrees of Provincial Councils are not infallible; the presumption of truth in their favour depends partly on the number, ability, and character of the Bishops present, and partly on the nature of the proceedings and the wording of the decrees themselves. The Holy See would not tolerate a peremptory, formal affirmation of some doctrine as Catholic, or condemnation of some doctrine as erroneous, unless that affirmation or condemnation already agreed with Rome’s own teaching — so even a merely simple approval of decrees of this peremptory kind carries a strong presumption of truth; where the decrees are not of this peremptory character, however, but simply exposit doctrine or admonish the faithful, the presumption in their favour is correspondingly weaker (see Bellarmine, De Conciliis; Benedict XIV, De Synodo Dioecesana, XIII, c. 3).

Dogmatic Censures

I. The Vatican Council speaks of the Church’s right of censure in these terms: “moreover, the Church having received, together with the apostolic office of teaching, the command to keep the Deposit of the Faith, hath also the right and the duty of proscribing knowledge falsely so-called, lest any one should be deceived by philosophy or vain deceit. Wherefore all the faithful are forbidden, not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of the Faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, but are also bound to hold them rather as errors having the deceitful semblance of truth” (sess. iii, c. 4; see also Pius IX’s Brief Gravissimas Inter).

II. Dogmatic censures impose, most strictly, the duty of unreserved assent; in matters of Faith and morals they give absolute certainty that the censured doctrines or propositions must be rejected in whatever manner the particular censure attached to them requires. Sometimes the obligation to submit to the Church’s judgment is expressly stated, as in the Bull Unigenitus: “we order all the faithful not to presume to form opinions about these propositions, or to teach or preach them, otherwise than is determined in this our constitution.” In such cases, the infallibility of the censure is already contained in the general infallibility on Faith and Morals belonging to the Teaching Apostolate, since submission to the censure is itself made a moral duty — and no distinction arises here between the binding power of lesser censures and the highest censure of heresy. These censures bind not only through the obedience owed to the Church, but through the certain knowledge they give us of the falsity or untrustworthiness of the censured doctrines; adherence to a censured doctrine is a grave sin, both because of the strictness of the ecclesiastical prohibition, sanctioned as it is by the heaviest penalties, and because nearly all such censures represent the censured act as itself gravely sinful.

The duty to reject a censured doctrine implies the right, indeed the duty, to assert its contradictory as sound — the only sound and legitimate doctrine. The censures themselves rarely state this right and duty in so many words, but the meaning and thrust of each particular censure clearly establishes both: this is beyond question wherever the censure categorically expresses the Church’s certain judgment — “Heresy,” “Error,” “False,” “Blasphemous,” “Impious” — and equally where it expresses only moral certainty — “Akin to Heresy,” “Akin to Error,” “Rash.” Some doubt might arise over lesser censures such as “Wicked,” “Unsound,” “Unsafe,” and mere condemnations without any particular qualification — whether these impose a duty to hold the condemned doctrine’s falsity as at least morally certain, or merely require abstaining from maintaining it. As a rule, however, we ought not rest content with this weaker reading alone.

III. The Church’s judgment is likewise infallible when condemning doctrines or propositions in the specific sense intended by some particular author. This infallibility is already contained within the infallibility of the censure itself where no distinction can be drawn between the words’ meaning and the author’s intended meaning; where such a distinction can be drawn, the infallibility of the judgment on the author’s meaning is at least virtually contained in the infallibility of the censure. Sometimes the Church condemns an author’s propositions in the sense conveyed by their context; sometimes she formulates propositions expressing the author’s meaning in her own words. In the first case, the censure applies to the context as well as to the proposition itself; in the second, there is a twofold censure — one on the propositions as the judge has formulated them, another on the original text as containing the sense of those propositions. In neither case would the censure itself be infallible were it not infallible also in determining the author’s actual sense; for this reason, the Church does not issue a separate judgment establishing that a given text bears a given meaning — she simply attaches her censure to the text as it stands. These distinctions carried great weight in the Jansenist controversy, where the Jansenists admitted that the five propositions censured by Innocent X deserved condemnation, while denying they were actually to be found in their master’s own works.

Development of Dogma

I. The truths God was pleased to reveal to mankind were not all communicated at once. As time passed, the later Patriarchs possessed a larger stock of revealed truth than those before them; the Prophets, a still larger share than the Patriarchs. But once the Church was founded, the stock of Revelation was complete, and no further truths remained to be revealed (§ 6 above). The Church’s infallibility manifestly precludes any real change in dogmas already defined. Yet it is equally clear that the Church has not always possessed the same explicit knowledge of every point of doctrine, or enforced it in precisely the same way, as in the time of the Apostles. In what terms, then, should this difference be properly stated?

II. 1. It is not enough to say the difference between earlier and later documents is merely nominal — that the terminology of the earlier Creeds is simply obscure and vague, while the later ones state the same content clearly and precisely. 2. Nor will the image of a scroll gradually unrolled, or a casket whose contents become gradually known, quite serve either — there is some truth in such comparisons, but they cannot account for all the facts. 3. A better comparison holds that later-defined doctrines are contained in the earlier ones as a syllogism’s conclusion is contained in its premises — admitting, that is, a real, though purely logical, development in the Church’s doctrine. This is St. Augustine’s own argument in the controversy over the re-baptism of heretics, where he distinguishes three stages through which a dogma may pass: implicit belief, controversy, and explicit definition. In the early ages, the validity of heretical Baptism was admitted in practice, simply by the fact that the sacrament was not repeated; once the question was formally raised, however, strong arguments seemed to exist on both sides, and even the most orthodox teachers might, and in fact did, disagree at this stage; finally the matter was settled, and from then on no further discussion of it remained lawful within the Church (De Baptismo, II, 12–14; cf. Franzelin, De Traditione, th. xxiii).

4. But can we go further still, and admit a genuinely organic development? In logical development, every conclusion is already fully contained in the premises, merely drawn out of them; in organic development, by contrast, the results are only potentially present in the germ from which they spring. Organic development involves no alteration or corruption, no mere addition or accretion, but vitality, absorption, assimilation, growth — and, throughout, identity. Take the doctrines already mentioned: Scripture plainly teaches there is only one God, yet speaks of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and speaks of Jesus Christ in terms that require Him to be both God and Man. Only after some centuries were these truths elaborated into the definitions we are now bound to believe. Who can doubt that, across those centuries, the primitive teaching absorbed into itself the appropriate elements of Greek thought, in a process genuinely analogous to the growth of a living organism? This organic view of the Church’s doctrinal development answers conclusively those who demand we produce, from ancient authorities, the exact counterpart of what we now believe and practise — they might as well look, in the acorn, for the branches and leaves of the oak that will one day grow from it.

St. Vincent of Lérins states the principle with unmatched clarity: “shall we then have no advancement of religion in the Church of Christ? Let us have it indeed, and the greatest… but yet in such sort that it be truly an advancement of faith, not a change, seeing that it is the nature of an advancement that in itself each thing severally grow greater, but of a change that something be turned from one thing into another… let the soul’s religion imitate the law of the body, which, as years go on, develops indeed and opens out its due proportions, and yet remains identically what it was… small are a baby’s limbs, a youth’s are larger, yet they are the same… so also the doctrine of the Christian religion must follow those laws of advancement: namely, that with years it be consolidated, with time it be expanded, with age it be exalted, yet remain uncorrupt and untouched, and be full and perfect in all the proportions of each of its parts… that it admit no change besides, sustain no loss of its propriety, no variety of its definition. Wherefore, whatsoever in this Church, God’s husbandry, has by the faith of our fathers been sown, that same must be cultivated by the industry of their children, that same flourish and ripen, that same advance and be perfected” (Commonitorium, nn. 28–29).

III. Revelation does not, however, follow the merely natural laws of development like any other body of thought. Though it is indeed influenced by the natural environment in which it exists, this influence operates always under Divine Providence and the infallible guidance of the Church, and it can never happen that an early dogmatic definition should later be revoked, or reinterpreted in a sense at variance with the meaning the Church originally attached to it. “The doctrine which God has revealed has not been proposed as some philosophical discovery to be perfected by the wit of man, but has been entrusted to Christ’s Spouse as a Divine deposit to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence sacred dogmas must ever be understood in the sense once for all declared by Holy Mother Church, and never must that sense be abandoned under pretext of profounder knowledge” (Vatican Council, sess. iii, c. 4). On the whole subject, see Newman’s great work, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.

§ 30. The Chief Dogmatic Documents — Creeds and Decrees

The most important dogmatic documents are the Creeds, or Symbols of Faith, and the decrees of the Popes and of General and Particular Councils.

I. Creeds.

1. The simplest and oldest, foundational to all the others, is the Apostles’ Creed, which survives in some twelve different forms (given in Denzinger’s Enchiridion; see Dublin Review, Oct. 1888 and July 1889, and Batiffol and Vacant’s “Le Symbole des Apôtres” in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique).
2. The Nicene Creed, published by the Council of Nicaea (A.D. 325), defines the divinity of Christ; it originally ended with the words “and in the Holy Ghost,” the subsequent clauses on the divinity of the Holy Ghost being added before the First Council of Constantinople. In its complete form it is now used at Mass.
3. The Athanasian Creed was probably not composed by St. Athanasius himself, but bears his name for expressing so ably the doctrines he strenuously defended; directed against the heresies of the fourth and fifth centuries, it dates at least to the sixth or seventh century.
4. The Creed of Toledo, published by the Sixth Council of Toledo (A.D. 675), further develops the Athanasian Creed, and is the most complete of the authentic expositions of the Trinity and the Incarnation; following St. Augustine’s teaching so closely, it might almost more fittingly be called “St. Augustine’s Creed” (Denzinger, n. 26).
5. The Creed of Leo IX is a free elaboration of the Nicene Creed, with additions against the Manichaeans and Pelagians (Denzinger, n. 39); it is still used at the consecration of Bishops.
6. The Creed of the Fourth Lateran Council — the famous “Firmiter credimus” of Innocent III (1215), the first decretal in the Corpus Juris Canonici — is substantially similar to the foregoing, but further develops the doctrine of Sacrifice, Baptism, and especially Transubstantiation; the accompanying condemnation of Abbot Joachim completes its dogmatic definition of the Holy Trinity (Denzinger, n. 52; St. Thomas, Expositio Primae et Secundae Decretalis, Opusc. xxiii–xxiv).
7. The formula prescribed by the same Innocent III (1210) for converts from the Waldenses states, more or less fully, the doctrine of the Sacraments, together with various matters of morals and discipline (Denzinger, n. 53).
8. The Confession of Faith made by Michael Palaeologus at the Second Council of Lyons (1274), accepted by Gregory X, is based on the Creed of Leo IX, adding clauses on the Four Last Things (Death, Judgment, Hell, Heaven), the Sacraments, and the Primacy of the Roman Church.

After Trent, three further professions of Faith for converts were issued by the Popes, each beginning with the Nicene Creed and adding suitable extracts from various conciliar decrees:

9. The so-called Tridentine Profession of Faith, drawn up in 1564 by Pius IV for converts from Protestantism, recapitulates the most important decrees of Trent (Denzinger, n. 82).
10. The Profession of Faith prescribed by Gregory XIII for the Greeks contains the principal decrees of the Council of Florence on the Trinity, the Four Last Things, and the Primacy (Denzinger, n. 83).
11. Lastly, the Profession of Faith for the Easterns, prescribed by Urban VIII, is copied from the Decretum pro Jacobitis of the Council of Florence — a summary of the teaching of the first eight ecumenical councils, containing the same extracts from Florence as the preceding Profession, together with many definitions of Trent. Composed on broadly historical lines, it is the most complete of all the Creeds (Denzinger, n. 84).

II. The decrees of the Popes and councils take, at times, a negative and aphoristic form, at other times a positive and developed one. The drafting of these formulas was, as a rule, the work of individual doctors, of particular local churches, or of the Holy See itself; in a few cases they were the fruit of the assembled bishops’ combined labour, the Council of Trent excelling all others in this respect. The various decrees are collected in Denzinger’s Enchiridion.