§3 — The Divine Relations and Divine Personality

§3: The —

THE — i. Definition of the Terms “Hypostasis” and *Person/’ — As the Divine Persons consist in, and are constituted by, *subsistent relations,” we shall have to introduce this division of our treatise with a scientific exposition of the terms hypostasis and person, as distinguished from, and opposed to, nature. a) Though they differ formally, and, when predicated of creatures, even really, the terms “essence,” “substance,” and “nature” are applied synonymously to God. “Tres quidem personae/J says the Fourth Lateran Council, “sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino — Three Persons, it is true, but only one absolutely simple Essence, or Substance, or Nature.” 1 The physical essence of a thing — its metaphysical essence does not concern us here — is the sum total of all those notes by which the thing is what it is. By substance we understand ens in se or, in the words of St. Thomas, “Being, inasmuch as this Being is by itself,” in con1 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428. 220 DEFINITION OF HYPOSTASIS 221 tradistinction to accident, which is that whose being is to be in something else. 2 “Nature ” is the principle of activity of a substance, or its physical essence. We know from Divine Revelation that there is in the Blessed Trinity only one Nature in three Hypostases, or Persons, while in Christ, on the contrary, there are two complete natures in but one Hypostasis, or Person. It follows that, commonly speaking, there is both a logical and a real distinction between Nature and Person. Since Person is generally defined as hypostasis rationalis, we have first to examine the notion of Hypostasis. b) In order to arrive at a correct idea of Hypostasis, it will be advisable to institute a process of logical differentiation, by proceeding from the universal to the particular, and constantly adding new marks, until we attain to a complete definition. An Hypostasis, to begin with, must be an “ens” or being. Every “ens” is either an “ens in se” (substance) or an “ens in alio” (accident). An Hypostasis is manifestly not an accident; therefore it must be a substance. Now, with Aristotle, we distinguish between substantia prima (ovaia irpirrj) and substantia secunda (

tia secunda abstract substance. Common sense tells us that an Hypostasis must be an individual substance. But the term substantia prima is applied not only to complete but also to incomplete substances, such as body and soul, or the human hand or foot, which are individual substances, but clearly not Hypostases. Consequently, the concept of Hypostasis, besides inseitas, must have another essential note, viz.: integrity or completeness of substance. “Hypostasis est substantia prima et integral Since, however, Christ’s humanity is a substantia prima et Integra, that is, a complete human nature, yet no Hypostasis, it is plain that inseitas and integritas do not suffice to constitute the notion of Hypostasis. There is required a further determinant, namely, that it is not a part, and cannot be regarded as a part of any other thing. Hence the famous definition evolved by Tiphanus: Hypostasis est substantia prima, integra, tota in se In plain English: An Hypostasis is an individual substance, separate and distinct from all other substances of the same kind, possessing itself and all the parts, attributes, and energies which are in it.8 a Tiphanus, D* Hypostasi et Per- Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius sono, c. 10. Claudius Tiphanus ologxae Catholicae, Vol. Ill, ed. 3a, was an illustrious Jesuit theologian col. 951, Oeniponte 1907. of the seventeenth century. Cfr. X DEFINITION OF HYPOSTASIS 223 Of these three momenta the first two form the proximate genus, while the third and last constitutes the specific difference. As the proper essence of Hypostasis lies in its specific difference, Christian philosophers have been at great pains to discuss and circumscribe the notion of totietas in se. They emphasize that it excludes every species of composition or union with other beings, and that it consequently signifies incommunicability and independent being (esse per se sen per sextos) * It is, therefore, merely a different way of expressing the definition we have given above, when we say that inseitas, integritas, and perseitas are the essential notes of an Hypostasis. Any substance that has ceased to be tota in se can no longer perform the functions of an Hypostasis. Conversely, as soon as a substance acquires independence or perseitas, it becomes an Hypostasis. As a substance which forms part of another substance becomes an Hypostasis immediately upon being detached from that substance (for example, an amputated limb of the body separated from its soul), so a substance which is tota in se loses its character as an Hypostasis as soon as it becomes a part or quasi-part of something else (as, for instance, the human body in the resurrection of the dead, or the humanity of Christ in the Hypostatic Union). c) If we compare Hypostasis with nature and consider their mutual relations, we find that the Hypostasis possesses the nature, while the nature is possessed by the Hypostasis; in 4 Cfr. Alexander Halensis., In ratum esse, ita quod ’ per se ’ sonat Arist. Metaph., V, 18: Per se privationem associationis. esse idem est, quod solum et sepa 

other words, “the Hypostasis has the nature.” • Hence the axiom: “Hypostasis habet, natura habetur.” An Hypostasis operates through the nature of which it is the bearer and controller, and all attributes and operations of that nature are referred back to the Hypostasis as its subject. Hypostasis, therefore, as subiectum attributions, in the language of the Schoolmen, is the principium quod, while nature is the principium quo. Thus we say of man, who is an Hypostasis, that he eats and drinks, sees and hears, thinks and feels, digests and sleeps; that is, he operates by and in his nature and natural faculties, though the principium quo proximum of all these operations are the five senses, the organs of digestion, reason and will. If we take suppositum as synonymous with Hypostasis, we shall also understand that other Scholastic axiom: * Actiones et passiones sunt suppositorum — Actions belong to their respective supposita.* 6 d) A Person (persona, irpowirov, also Mtnam) is an Hypostasis plus the note “intellectual” or “rational.” “Persona est hypostasis rationalist Person and Hypostasis, therefore, differ materially, but not formally. A crystal is just as truly an Hypostasis as a human being, because it is substantia tota in se. But the possession of reason exalts an Hypostasis in ipsa ratione sCfr. Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual, e Cfr. John Rickaby, General I, 309. Metaphysics, pp. 280 sq. DEFINITION OF HYPOSTASIS 225 hypostaseos, in so far as independence is increased by self-consciousness and the Ego not only is an individualized and incommunicable substance, but is also conscious of this fact. A person, moreover, is sui iuris, and hence both the responsible possessor of his natural faculties and the subject of personal rights that are entitled to respect and protection. It is for this reason that the Schoolmen define an angel as hypostasis cum dignitate Boethius’s famous definition: ” Persona est rationalis naturae individua [i. e., prima et completa] substantia — A person is the individual subject, self, or ego of a rational nature,” 7 can easily be reduced to the shorter one which we gave above, viz.: “Persona est hypostasis rationalis — A person is an Hypostasis endowed with reason.” For by individua substantia the ancients understood precisely the same thing that we mean when we speak of substantia prima, integra et tota in se. The Greek Fathers were adverse to the use of the word irpowirov for persona, because Sabellius had put it to heretical uses. They preferred the generic term virooraavs. Thus St. John Damascene teaches: ” Neither the soul alone nor the body is an Hypostasis, but they are called ewTroo-Tara; that which is perfected and made of both, is the Hypostasis of both. For Woo-raox* properly is and means that which exists by itself, having its own independent being (a0 iavrb iSioowTaTtus) .” (Dialect., c. 44.) 1 De Duab. Nat., i. The Eng- the theological history of the term, lish translation we give is rather see Newman, Avians, ch. V, f i, 3* a paraphrase in modern terms. On

e) If this definition of Person is correct, that invented by Locke and introduced into Catholic theology by Gunther, must be false. Locke holds that personality is constituted by continued consciousness. But if consciousness were the only essential and formal note of personality, it would follow that where there is but one consciousness, there is but one person, whereas a double consciousness would constitute two persons, and so forth. Inasmuch as the Triune God has but one (absolute) consciousness, while Christ the Godman has two, Locke’s theory would destroy both the Trinity and the uni-personality of Christ, which latter is based upon the Hypostatic Union. In other words, this theory entails grave Trinitarian and Christological heresies, and must therefore be false. It is also opposed to experience and the common sense of mankind, which treats a child as yet unconscious of self, or an idiot devoid of consciousness, as persons in the true sense of the word.8 8 For a more detailed refutation of Locke’s error, see Rickaby, General Metaphysics, pp. 284 sqq. Fr. Rickaby says, after trying to ” follow some of the meanderings of his [Locke’s] famous twenty -seventh chapter” [of the Essay on the Human Understanding]: ” The most we can grant to Locke is that continued consciousness is one test of personality; we cannot grant that it is personality. If because of the intimate connexion of thought with personality we permitted Locke to turn thought into personality, how should we resist Cousin, who because personality is asserted specially in the will, says: La volonti c’est la personnel and again, Qu’est ce que le tnoif L’activite volontaire et libre. A long way the best plan is to keep to the theory that the person of man is the composite nature, body and soul, left in its completeness and sui iuris; the soul being substantially unDEFINITION OF HYPOSTASIS 227 The terminology which we have explained above is definitively fixed by ecclesiastical and theological usage. It is the product of a historical development which involved harsh and weary struggles extending over the first four or five centuries of the Christian era,9 and it must not be changed. It took a long time to determine which were the best terms to be employed for designating Nature, Hypostasis, and Person. The Greeks said that there were in the Divine Trinity ovaia koX rptU {movravti* j the Latins, “una natura (substantia, essentia) et tres persome.” Both formulas mean precisely the same thing. St. Athanasius did much towards introducing a uniform terminology when, at the irenic council of Alexandria, A. D. 362, he reconciled the contending factions by showing that while one party took Maram to mean “Substance,” and the other used it in the sense of changeable, though variable in its accidental states, the body being constantly changed as to its constituent particles, yet preserving a certain identity, describable only by reciting what are the facts of waste and repair in an organism.* (Cfr. also Uhlmann, Die Personlichkeit Gottes, pp. 8 sqq., Freiburg 1906.) 9 * The difficulties of forming a theological phraseology for the whole of Christendom were obviously so great that we need not wonder at the reluctance which the first age of Catholic divines showed in attempting it, even apart from the obstacles caused by the distraction and isolation of the churches in times of persecution. Not only had the words to be adjusted and explained which were peculiar to different schools or traditional in different places, but there was the formidable necessity of creating a common measure between two, or rather three languages — Latin, Greek, and Syriac. The intellect had to be satisfied, error had to be successfully excluded, parties the most contrary to each other, and the most obstinate, had to be convinced.” — Newman, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, p. 336, new ed., London 1895. 228 DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOGMA “Person,” both were really agreed as to the underlying doctrine.10

2. The Four Relations in God. — The origin of the Divine Persons from one another forms the basis of a double set of Relations: one between active and passive Generation, and another between active and passive Spiration. Both classes of Relations are real and mutual. This gives us four real Relations (relationes, ox«W) in the Godhead: active and passive Generation (generare, generari), and active and passive Spiration (spirare, spirari). By passive Generation and Spiration we do not, however, understand passio in the sense of the Aristotelian category of ™

immanent terminus. It is an article of faith that these Relations, — i. e., of the Father to the Son (generare), of the Son to the Father (generari), of the Father and the Son to (spirare), and of to the Father and the Son (spirari), are not purely logical or imaginary. Thus we read in the Deer etum pro Iacobitis, promulgated by the Council of Florence, A. D. 1439: “Hinc damnat ecclesia Sabellium personas confundentem et ipsarum distinctionem realem penitus auferentem — Hence the Church condemns Sabellius, who confounds the [Three Divine] Persons and denies that there is any real distinction between them.” 11 The Church has not, however, formally defined that these relations are four in number. It is easy to see that the dogma of the Trinity stands and falls with the reality of the Four Relations just described.12 Since the Father is a different Person from the Son, and the Son a different Person from the Holy Ghost, the relation of the Father to the Son (and vice versa), and the relation of both to (and vice versa), must evidently be quite as real as are the three Divine Persons themselves. If these Relations were merely logical (either rationis ratiocinantis or rationis ratio cinatae), the distinction of Persons in the Godhead would evaporate into a purely logical, or at most a modal trinity, as taught by the Monarchians and 11 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- 12 Cfr. St Thomas, S. TheoL, 1a, dion, n. 705. qu. a8, art z. 230 DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOGMA the Sabellians.18 To say that the are real, therefore, is but a different way of formulating the Trinitarian dogma itself.

3. The Fundamental Law of the Trinity. — The most important corollary that flows from the doctrine of the is the socalled fundamental law of the Trinity. This law was formulated by St. Anselm 14 and solemnly approved by the Council of Florence, A. D. J439- It Is as follows: “In Deo omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio — In God all things are one except where there is opposition of relation.” 15 The Father differs from the Son only because there is a perfect opposition of Relation between active and passive Generation. Where no such perfect relative opposition intervenes, everything in God is one and indistinct. Consequently, all the divine attributes in general are really identical with the divine Essence and with one another, and this is true in a special manner of those attributes which, like justice and mercy, are in logical opposition to one another. This opposition is purely logical. How sharply the oppositio relationis in the Holy Trinity must be defined, appears from the fact that since generare and spirare do not imply a relative but only a dis18 Supra, Ch. II, Sect. x. 15 Decretum pro lacobitis, in DenltDc Process. Spirit us S.t c. a zinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, a88). 705. FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE TRINITY 231 parate opposition, both functions are simultaneously performed by the same Person (t. e., the Father), without His thereby becoming two Hypostases. Though at the same time generator and spirator, He is but one Hypostasis. For the same reason the Son must not be excluded from the act of Spiration, because generari and spirare do not involve a complete relative opposition, such as exists between generare and generari, spirare and spirari. Guided by this important rule, the Latin theologians, with the exception of the Scotists, have always contended against the Greek schismatics, that if the Son were excluded from the function of active Spiration, there would remain no basis for a Hypostatic distinction between the Second Person and the Holy Ghost. For it is only in virtue of the relationis oppositio, or relative opposition between spirare and spirari, that the Son is a different Person from the Holy Ghost.16 It follows that the Logos differs from not because He is begotten by the Father, but because He breathes the Holy Ghost, and is breathed by Him. The councils of Lyons and Florence defined it as an article of faith that active Spiration must be attributed lflCfr. Symbol. Tolet. XI, a. 675: ” Quando Pater est, non ad se, sed ad Filium est; et quod Filius est, non ad se, sed ad Patrem est: similiter et Spiritus non ad se, sed ad Patrem et Filium relative refer* tur.” Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 278. 232 DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOGMA to the Father and the Son per tnodum unius, that is, as one really identical act. This definition is ultimately based upon the axiom of the relationis oppositio. Whatever does not include relative opposition in the Godhead, appertains to the indistinct identity of the Divine Being and Essence. Hence active Spiration must be identical with Paternity and Filiation, or, in other words, Father and Son are necessarily one Spirator, even as the product of their Spiration, the Holy Ghost, is one. This unica spiratio was interpreted by the rule of St. Anselm, which we have called the fundamental law of the Trinity, in the Decretum pro Iacobitis, which emphatically declares that the Father and the Son are one principle of in the same sense in which the Blessed Trinity, as the Creator of the physical universe, is the one sole principle of the creature.17 4. The Three “Relationes Personificae.” — If, as we have said, the Divine Nature subsists in three Hypostases or Persons, only three of the four real Relations existing in the Godhead can be “relatione* personificae ” that is to say, only three constitute Persons. These three are: Paternity (pat emit as, varp6r^)9 Filiation (filiatio, vwm^), and Passive Spiration (prOCeSSW, ciaropevcw). 17 Decretum pro Iacobitis: ” Hoe tres personae sunt unus Deus, et non tres dii, quia trium est una substantia, una essentia, una divinitas … omniaque sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio. • • • Spiritus Sanctus, quidquid est aut habet, habet a Patre simul et Filio. Sed Pater et Filius non duo principia Spiritus Sancti, sed unum principium, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principim creaturae, sed unum principium,*’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 703 »q.) THE RELATIONES PERSONIFICAE 233 a) It is easy to perceive that, concretely, these three Relations are the three Divine Persons themselves: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It follows, — and this is a most important truth, — that the three Divine Persons, as such, are Subsistent Relations; and since there are no accidents in God, they must be conceived as Substantial Relations. Hence the Scholastic axiom: Personae divinae sunt relationes subsistentes et substantiates The concept of Hypostasis or Person is most perfectly realized in Paternity, Filiation, and Passive Spiration, because it is to these “relationes personfficae” in virtue of their exclusive opposition, that the distinctive note of

noting the complete state (in facto esse, forma permanens). Since, however, in our human conception of the Divine Persons, the point of prime importance is not their genesis, but their permanence, theologians are wont to say that the Divine Persons are constituted by their Relations rather than by their origins.18 b) We have still to answer the important question, why, despite the fact of its being a real Relation, the spiratio activa does not produce a separate Divine Hypostasis. If Paternity, Filiation, and passive Spiration are the only “relationes personificae” active Spiration must manifestly be cancelled from the list of “subsistent” relations; because else we should have a quaternity instead of a trinity. Consequently, the Spirator, as such, must be impersonal. The objective theological reason for the impersonal character of the Spirator is the fact that active Spiration is a function common to both Father and Son. In other words, the ” unus Spirator ” presupposes two complete Hypostases, constituted by the relations of Paternity and Filiation. Consequently there is no room left for a fourth person. It follows from what we have said that Spiration in its active sense (spiratio activa) constitutes an essential note of the definition of Paternity and Filiation. In other words, the Father cannot be conceived adequately, is On the question whether and how far we may speak of an ” absolute subsistence/’ but not of an “absolute personality,” in God, see Kleutgen, Theohgie dtr Vorzeit, Vol. I, pp. 363 sqq. Cfr. also Pesch, Praelect. DogmaU, t. II (3rd ed.), PP* 323 sqq., Friburgi 1906; Billuart, De SS. Trinit. Myst., diss. 4, art 3. THE RELATIONES PERSONIFICAE 235 unless He is conceived as Spirator; and the same holds true of the Son. The complete concept of both Father and Son contains spirare as a logical ingredient. There is this difference, however. With the Father spirare takes the form of giving, while with the Son it takes the form of being received: because the Father has the power of Spiration from Himself, whereas the Son possesses it only in virtue of His Generation by the Father.” In defining as an article of faith the unica spiratio by which the Father and the Son produce the Holy Ghost, the Church has therefore erected a strong rampart around the dogma of the Blessed Trinity, effectively preventing its transformation into a quaternity. It is easy to see how the Greek schism, ” the greatest and most enduring of all the schisms that have rent the Church,” affects the dogma of the Blessed Trinity, (a) It denies the immediate and direct union of with the Son, which can consist only in a relation of origin. At the same time it deprives of His attribute of ” own Spirit of the Son.”20 (b) It denies the perfect unity of Father and Son, in virtue of which the Son possesses everything except Paternity (and therefore also the virtus et actus spirandi) in common with the Father, (c) It denies the indivisible unity of the Father, since the character of Spirator no longer appears as contained in and founded on Paternity, but standing independently alongside of it, must, like Paternity, constitute a Person, and so give the Father a double personality.21 10 For a more detailed statement 20 tdiov irvevfia. of this subtle argument the reader 21 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, p. is referred to Ruiz, De Trinit., disp. 825; cfr. Wilhelm-ScannelTs Man17, sect 6*. ual, Vol. I, p. 306. 16