The Attributes of Divine Life: The Divine Will — Its Mode and Objects

Chapter IV: The Attributes of Divine Life — The Divine Will

§1–2: Mode and Objects of the Divine Will

CHAPTER IV THE ATTRIBUTES OF DIVINE LIFE — THE DIVINE WILL That there is a Divine Will is a logical deduction from God’s pure spirituality, the concept of which, besides cognition, includes also volition. It can furthermore be proved from a number of Scriptural passages, such as Matth. XXVI, 39: Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu — Not as I will, but as thou wilt, and Matth. XXVI, 42 (VI, 10): “Fiat voluntas tua (™ OiXrffid aw) — Thy will be done.” The dogma was formally defined by the Vatican Council.1 The objective parallelism existing between the Divine Understanding and the Divine Will justifies a division of the subject-matter of the present chapter into three sections, of which the first inquires into the mode of divine volition, the second into its objects, and the third into its attributes (virtutes). As in connection with the knowledge of God, so here the chief point to be emphasized is the infinite perfection of the Divine Will, at which we arrive partly by the threefold iConc. Vatican., Sess. Ill, cap. 1, De Deo; quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1782. 421 422 THE DIVINE WILL way of affirmative differentiation, negative differentiation, and intensification ; 2 partly by a consideration of the divine attributes of being, more particularly self-existence, simplicity, and immutability. * Supra, pp. 67 §qq. SECTION i THE MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION — NECESSITY AND LIBERTY OF THE DIVINE WILL Analogously to the mode of divine cognition, the mode of divine volition can be established by the aid of certain fundamental or leading principles. Our most important task will be to prove the freedom of the Divine Will, whose basic act is Charity. Thesis I: Like God’s conception of Himself, the love He has for Himself is really identical with His Essence. This thesis embodies an article of faith. I. Proof. As with mortal men, so too with Almighty God, all volition culminates in love. Therefore the basic act of the Divine Will is God’s Love of Himself. Being the supreme and infinite good, God is infinitely lovable. This lovability must be adequately exhausted by an equally infinite act of love. Consequently, God is pure substantial Love. Cfr. I John IV, 8: “God is charity.” Now, since the Supreme Good is nothing but the Divine Essence considered sub ratione bonitatis, Substantial Charity must 423 424 MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION coincide with the Divine Essence.1 Following the analogy of Aristotle’s famous axiom: ion vorpis vo^rea*,” some of the Schoolmen have justly called God dilectio dilectionis. We need hardly point out that the relation between God’s self-comprehension and His self-love is a relation of absolute identity: Infinitum nosse = infinitum velle = infinitum esse.2 2. Several important conclusions flow spontaneously from the truths above stated. Inasmuch as the divine volition is identical with all other divine attributes, and consequently admits of neither composition nor potentiality, the Will of God cannot be conceived as a faculty; it must be purest act. This one substantial act, by virtue of which the loving subject (i. e., God), adequately encompasses and apprehends the loved object (i. e., God) is both immutable and eternal, — not only as considered in itself, but likewise in relation to creatures. A transition from love to hatred, therefore, can not take place in God, but solely in the creature, in so far as it sometimes renders itself deserving of God’s love, and sometimes of His hatred. Ps. XXXII, II : * Consilium Domini in aeternum manet — The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever.* Furthermore, the Divine Will, being absolutely independent because self -existent, does not strive for, or aspire after, any object whatsoever. Hence there exists in God neither desire in the strict sense of that term, nor love of concupiscence. In other words, He is pure Love relCfr. S. Thorn., S, Theol., ia, qu. 19, art. 1 : ” Oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum in eo sit inteUectus, Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita et suum esse est suum velle/’ 2 Cfr. our remarks on the sim* plidty of God, supra, pp. 200 sqq. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 425 posing in Himself, without any admixture of desire. Only in so far as He desires the well-being of His creatures, can we metaphorically ascribe to Him an amor quasi concupiscentiae.3 Lastly, the Divine Will, being infinitely perfect, is susceptible only of such determinations as do not essentially involve an imperfection, such as is implied in some affections (e. g., sadness), and in some virtues (e. g., obedience, contrition). Holy Scripture sometimes attributes such predicates to the Divine Will, but they must be understood as tropes or metaphors, or taken anthropomorphically.4 Our guiding principle must be : Only pure perfections of the will exist in God formaliter; mixed perfections exist in Him merely virtualiter et eminenter. 3. This important axiom affords us a sure criterion for valuing rightly the so-called affections of the divine Will. a) After the analogy of the so-called passions (passiones) of the sensitive appetency, we may distinguish in intelligent creatures (angels and men) eleven affections of the will, viz.: love and hatred, joy (or delight) and sadness, desire and aversion (or abhorrence), hope and despair, courage and fear, and lastly anger.6 In their last analysis they are all reducible to love. Of these eleven affections those only can be formally applied to God which contain no admixture of im3Cfr. S. Thomas, S. Theol, ia, qu. 20, art. 2, ad 3: ” Deus proprie loquendo non amat creatures irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi concupiscentiae, inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas et etiam ad seipsum, non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam 28 bo nit at em et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et nobis et aliis.” 4 Cfr. the note on p. 378. 5 Cfr. Maher, Psychology : Empirical and Rational, 4th ed., pp. 426 sqq. London and New York 1900. 426 MODE OF DIVINE VOLITION perfection. Even the pure perfections must be purged of their ” creatural mode ” by the process of negative differentiation before they can be formally predicated of the Creator. There is some divergency among theologians with regard to the application of certain of these affections to God; but this is due solely to a difference of opinion as to whether or not they are to be regarded as perfectiones sitnplices. The following principles are pretty generally accepted: b) The affections proper before all others to the divine Will are love {amor) and joy (gaudium), for the reason that love really constitutes Its essence,6 and joy is nothing but complacency in the possession of what is good. Of the contrary emotions, hatred (odium) and sadness (tristitia), the last-mentioned being the involuntary sufferance of present evil, are mixed perfections (perfectiones mixtae) and must therefore be formally excluded from the Divine Will, to which we may attribute ” displeasure,” but not sadness in the strict sense of the term. The moral emotion of hatred is either a hatred of abomination (odium abominationis) or a hatred of enmity (odium inimicitiae) , according as it is directed against evil as such, or against persons. It is certain that the Divine Will bears an infinite hatred against the evil of sin, first, because the concept of such hatred implies a pure perfection, and, secondly, because it constitutes an essential element of God’s sanctity. As to whether God hates the person of the sinner, theologians are not agreed. Some take Wisd. XI, 25: ” Diligis omnia, quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti — Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made/’ literally, while others point to such texts as Ps. V, 7: 6 Cf r. 1 John IV, 8.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 427 * Odisti omnes, qui operantur iniquitatetn — Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity,* as opposed to this view. The correct interpretation of these apparently contradictory texts probably is, that God loves the sinner in so far as he is His creature, and hates Him in so far as he transgresses His commands. Nihil prohibet says St. Thomas, ” unum et idem secundum aliquid amari, et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum sunt naturae quaedam, amat; sic enim et sunt et ab ipso sunt. Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt et ab esse deficiunt, et hoc in eis a Deo non est; unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio habentur” 7 The affections of desire (desiderium) and aversion (fuga) may be ranged in the same class with concupiscible love (amor concupiscentiae), because God cannot desire any created good for Himself, nor flee from approaching evil. There is nothing to prevent us from assuming, however, that, (without of course experiencing anything like human emotion), He ardently desires the happiness of His creatures, and has an aversion to that which is apt to hurt or destroy them. Cfr. Ez. XXXIII, 11: “I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live.” On account of the imperfections they imply, the four affections known as hope (spes), courage (audacia), desperation (desperatio) , and fear (timor), must likewise be excluded from the Divine Will. Neither the notion of difficulty implied in the first-mentioned two, nor that of danger connoted by the others, is compatible with God’s omnipotence. As for anger (ira), if we define it as “the determination to avenge wrong from which one has suffered,” there is no room for it in the Divine Will, and the Fathers and theologians 7 S» Thiol, ia, qu. 20, art. 2, ad ?.

are perfectly right in interpreting the respective passages of Holy Scripture anthropomorphically, i. e., as expressing merely God’s will to punish evil.8 Thesis II: By virtue of His infinite love God loves whatever is good; Himself as the supreme good He loves with absolute necessity, whatever is good in His creatures He loves with a free will. This is also de fide. Proof. Both parts of this thesis have been formally defined by the Vatican Council : 9 “Deus … liberrimo consilio utratnque de nihilo condidit creaturam — God … with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing both [the spiritual and the corporeal] creature/’ “Si quis Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tarn necessario creasse, quam necessario amat seipsum … anathema sit — If any one shall say that God created, not by His will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He loves Himself … let him be anathema.” Freedom here means not merely freedom from restraint (libertas a coactione), but more particularly freedom from intrinsic necessity (libertas a necessitate), which is also called freedom of indifference (libertas indifferentiae). 10 8 For a more detailed treatment quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. of this subject, see Suarez, De Deo, 1783* tract 1, lib. Ill, c. 7; Gonet, Clyp. 10 On the liberty of the Divine Thomist., tract. 4, disp. 6; Kleutgen, Will in creating the universe, see De Ipso Deo, pp. 343 sqq. the dogmatic treatise on God as the 9Sess. Ill, cap. J, De Deo; Author of Nature and the Supernatural. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 429 I. God is Substantial Love, and love by its very nature tends to that which is good, in so far as it is good. Hence God must love Himself as the Infinite Good, and must do so from the intrinsic necessity of His nature, not as a matter of moral duty. But what is the relation of the Divine Will to created good? To find the answer to this question we must first draw a distinction. Whatever there is of good besides God, may be considered either as actually existing, or as merely possible, that is, as not yet existing, or as something that will never exist. Once God by an act of His free will has called creatures into being, He cannot but love whatever is good in them with the same love with which He loves Himself as the highest good; for whatever is good besides Himself is so by participation in His Divine Essence. Cfr. Wisd. XI, 25: Diligis omnia, quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum, quae fecisti — Thou lovest all things that are and hatest none of the things which thou hast made. Prov. VIII, 31 : Deliciae meae esse cum Miis hominum — And my delights were to be with the children of men. St. Thomas offers this beautiful argument drawn from unaided human reason: “Quicunque enim amat aliquid secundum se et propter ipsum, amat per consequens omnia, in quibus Mud invenitur: ut qui amat dulcedinem propter ipsam; 430 FREEDOM OF WILL oportet omnia dulcia amet. Quum igitur Deus amet bonitatem suatn propter ipsam, omnia autem quae sunt hanc aliqua ratione participent, ex hoc ipso quod vult et amat se, vult et amat alia — Whoever loves anything in itself and for itself, wills consequently all things in which that thing is found : as he who loves sweetness in itself must love all sweet things. But God wills and loves His own goodness in itself and for itself ; and all other being is a sort of participation by likeness of His being.,, 11 2. In the actual outpouring of Its goodness ad extra (as in the processes of Creation, Redemption, and Sanctification), the Divine Will is absolutely free. Such is the unmistakable teaching of Holy Scripture. Cfr. Ps. CXXXIV, 6 : “Omnia quaecunque voluit Dominus fecit in coelo, in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis — Whatsoever the Lord pleased he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the depths/ ’ St. Paul teaches that redemption, too, and the call of the human race to salvation, are effects of God’s absolutely free will. Cfr. Eph. I, 5-1 1 : “Qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum in ipsum secundum propositum voluntatis suae (*

turn eius quod proposuit in eo, … in quo etiam et nos sorte vocati sumus, praedestinati secundum propositum eius, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae («tA irpodtw tov tcl irdvra evepyovvros Kara rrjv f$ov\rjv tov OeXrjfxaTOS ovtov) — Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ unto himself: according to the purpose of his will: … That he might make known unto us the mystery of his will according to his good pleasure, which he had purposed in him, … in whom we also are called by lot, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will. In the same manner is the outpouring of the charismata, which is ascribed to the Holy Ghost, due to the free will of God. Cf r. i Cor. XII, 1 1 : Haec autem omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult (^aOm /JovActcu) — But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.” Adhering closely to these and similar passages from Holy Scripture, the Fathers unanimously defended the liberty of the Divine Will in its external operations. St. Ambrose, e g., says: ci Apostolus quoque dicit, quia omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis, prout vult, i. e., pro libero vo43* FREEDOM OF WILL luntatis arbitrio, non pro necessitatis obsequio” 12 St. John of Damascus voices the belief of the Greek Fathers when he writes: “The Divine Nature is endowed with will and freedom, upon which there falls neither sin nor change.” 18 Hippolytus expresses himself tersely and accurately as follows “Hdvra irouav cos 0e’Aei, Kadm dt\ei, 3. The revealed doctrine set forth above was condensed by the Scholastics into this axiom: * Divina bonitas [= essentia] est obiectum formate et primarium, bonitas return autem obiectum materiale et secundarium voluntatis divinae.* Indeed, as none but an infinite object (/. e., the Divine Essence itself) can be proportionate to the Divine Will, the formal and primary object of God’s love can be none other than the Divine Essence itself. But God’s love of Himself is no cold, calculating egoism ; it is an intestine vital law, in virtue of which God must love the Infinite Good, that is Himself. As regards the nature of this divine Self-love, being a truly divine love it cannot be amor concupiscentiae in the strict sense, but must be amor complex centiae, and, in its relation to the three Divine Persons, also amor amicitiae. This can be proved a posteriori from the character of love as a theological virtue. For if Christian charity loves the highest, best, and mo?t beautiful Good for His own sake, it does so for tl^e sole reason that it is in its very essence a supernatural participation in God’s divine Self-love. Consequently, a 12 De Fide, II, 6, n. 48. fuller treatment, consult Kleut^en, l&De Ettiab. Christ. Volunt., n. De Ipso Deo, pp. 333 $qq.» and *8. Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. I, pp, *8x liContr. Noel., c 8.— For a sqq., Freiburg 1899,

fortiori, God must love Himself as the Infinite Good for His own sake. This conclusion runs counter to the assertion of Durandus, that the formal object of divine Love is not the bonum infinitum taken concretely, but an abstract bonum in communi, — a teaching which is analogous to another error, viz.: that the formal object of God’s knowledge is not His Essence, or infinite Truth, but being in its abstract sense.16 The second part of the above-quoted axiom (* bonitas rerum autem obiectum materiale et secundarium voluntatis divinae*) flows as a corollary from the first. If God’s own Goodness constitutes the determining and specificatory formal object of the Divine Will, then He cannot love His creatures for their sake, but must love them for His own sake. Hence creatural goodness can be neither the motive nor the final goal of the Divine Will, because in either case the latter would be indigent and perfectible. The final end of the created universe consists solely in the glorification of the Infinite Good. Cfr. Apoc. XXI, 6: “Ego sum a et o>, initium et finis — I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end.” i Cor. VIII, 6: Ex quo omnia et nos in ilium (cfe avrov) — [The Father] , of whom are all things, and we unto him. Prov. XVI, 4: * Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus — The Lord hath made all things for himself.* Cfr. Cone. Vatican., Sess. Ill, De Deo, can. 5; “Si quis mundum ad Dei gloriam esse conditam negaverit, anathema sit — If any one shall deny that the world was made for the glory of God, let hijn be at^thema.” From these considerations it also follows that thfr JDivine Will is free, as §t Thomas shows briefly but conviacingly thus : ” Quum divina bonitas sine aliis esse po$sit, quinimo nac pqr alia ei aliquid ace reseat, nulla inest ex 15 Cfr. Gonct, Clyp. Thomist., tract. 4, disp. 2, art. 1, § 4.

necessitas, ut alia velit ex hoc, quod vult suam bonitatem — Since the divine Goodness can be without other beings,— nay, other beings make no addition to it, — God is under no necessity of willing other things from the fact of His willing His own Goodness.” 16 Consequently, whatever good exists external to God, can be only a secondary and material object of His Divine Will. Thesis III: Although God loves His creatures unequally, each according to the measure of its goodness, He does not love them for their sake, but solely because of His own goodness. Proof. This thesis, which embodies the common teaching of theologians, is a pendant to the one regarding the mode of God’s cognition. God knows all extra-divine things in themselves, but only through the medium of His own Essence. In like manner, though He loves His creatures unequally, according to the degree of their intrinsic goodness, yet His love for them is such that His own goodness (= Essence) is the sole formal motive of His Will. i. In saying that God loves different creatures unequally, we do not wish to imply that there are degrees in the operation of divine Love. This is impossible, because the act of divine Love is immutable, eternal, intensively infinite, and uniform. The expression has reference solely to the objects of divine Love. God cannot but love His creatures unequally, that is according to the degree of goodness which each contains, because it was He as Creator who imparted to them 16 Contr. Gent., I; 81.

varying degrees of goodness by endowing them with varying degrees of being.17 Therefore, to deny that God loves one creature more than another, would be tantamount to asserting that all creatures are equally good, which is repugnant to both right reason and experience. It plainly appears from various texts of the Bible that God makes a distinction in loving His creatures: that He loves those endowed with reason more than those which are destitute of intelligence;18 that He prefers the goods of the supernatural to those of the natural order; that He prefers the just to the sinner ; that He looks with particular favor upon the Blessed Virgin Mary ” full of grace,” and so forth. 2. In spite of all this, however, even the best beloved and most favored of God’s creatures are no more than material objects and mere termini of divine Love, inasmuch as they do not incite or determine the divine Will to love, but merely constitute its aim or object. The controverted question whether God could love His creatures on account of the excellencies they bear within themselves, must therefore be answered in the negative. Assuming that God could love a creature (even one so magnificently endowed by Him as was the Blessed Virgin Mary), because of its immanent creatural beauty, sanctity, or benevolence, — this creatural goodness would eo ipso be absorbed into the formal object of the divine Will, and the latter would in consequence become at least partly dependent in its operation upon something existing outside Itself, which is repugnant to the divine IT Cfr. St. Thomas, 5. Theol., 1a, qu. 20, art. 21 “Amor nosier, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bo nit as eius vel vera vel asstimuta provocat amor em… . Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.’* 18 Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 9: * Numquid de bobus cura est Deot — Doth God take care for oxen?* Cfr. St Thomas, L cu art 4. 436 SANCTITY OF WILL Essence. Therefore, while God loves His creatures in precisely the measure in which each deserves to be loved, according to the degree of its intrinsic amiability, He loves them not for their sake, but for His own sake.19 Thesis IV: As infallibility is the fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of God’s knowledge, so the operation of His Will is governed by sanctity. Proof. To infallibility in the sphere of knowledge corresponds impeccability in the domain of the will. Impeccability is the negative element of holiness. The infallibility of that cognition which is based upon the ultimate causes of things, culminates in divine Wisdom (in the larger sense of the term), which rules and dominates the entire domain of divine knowledge. The impeccability of the will culminates in that sanctity which gives to the life of the divine Will its peculiar stamp. Hence the intrinsic product of God’s notional cognition (i. e., the “Word of God” or “Logos”), is also called sapientia genita, while the intrinsic product of His notional volition (i. e., the Holy Ghost), is described as amor personalis and sanctitas hypostatica.20 It follows that infallibility and ieCfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 19, art. 2: Sic igitur vult Dcus et se et alia; se4 se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem. Idem, ibid,, ad 2: ” Sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult volendo bonitatem suam.*’ This teaching does not exclude either the possibility or the actual existence on the part of God of a love of benevolence and friendship towards His rational creatures; on which point consult Lessius, De Perfect. Div., XIV, 3. 20 For further information on this subject the reader is referred to the dogmatic treatise on the Divine Trinity. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 437 impeccability, considered as modes of the divine Understanding and the divine Will, stand in the same relation to each other as wisdom and holiness. Holiness is the fundamental virtue of God and love is His fundamental affection. But the two are not only related, they are identical in concept, in so far as holiness in its last analysis coincides with the Love which God has for Himself. From this peculiar concatenation of love and holiness in God we must conclude that all the so-called moral attributes or virtues of God spring from His holy Love as their common root, and are completely dominated by it.21 21 Cfr. supra, I3. SECTION 2 THE OBJECTS OF THE DIVINE WILL I. We have shown that God’s Will is a most simple, immutable, eternal act, which cannot be split up or divided. It is manifest, then, that any division we may make must be based upon the objects to which the Will is directed. Aside from God’s necessary will (voluntas necessaria), His free will (voluntas libera) can be conceived either as voluntas beneplaciti or voluntas signi, according as it remains an intrinsic act or is by some sign manifested externally. There are five such signs, which are enumerated in the Scholastic hexameter: Praecipit et prohibet, pcrmittit, consulit, itnplet. It is possible, by misunderstanding one of these signs, to mistake the will of God, as Abraham did when he proceeded to sacrifice his son Isaac, or Jonas in view of the presumptive destruction of Nineveh. An almost equipollent division is that into voluntas arcana and voluntas revelata,’ both of which Calvin so shamefully distorted by declaring the former to be God’s secret will to condemn men, while the latter signified His false and hypocritical determination that they be saved.1 The most common division of the divine Will is 1 Cfr. Calvini Ins tit., I, 18, 4. 438

that into voluntas conditionata and voluntas absoluta, according as It appears bound to the fulfilment of a condition, or not. Closely related to this division is that into voluntas antecedent seu prima and voluntas consequent seu secunda, which has been the provocative of some sharp controversies in regard to predestination. According to Molinism the “antecedent or first will” originates immediately in the love of God (e. g., the will to save) ;* while the ” consequent or second will ” accommodates itself entirely to the behavior of the creatures themselves, and consequently coincides with God’s determination to reward the just and punish the wicked.8 This was no doubt the meaning of St. John Damascene, who first introduced the division of the divine Will into dikrjfia irporqyoviievov rj irpwrov and OeXrjfia iwofievov rj iWcpov. He was followed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who write* in his little work De Veritate: ” Aliquem hominem vult Deus salvari voluntate antecedente ratione humanae naturae, quam ad salutem fecit; sed vult eum damnari voluntate consequente propter peccata quae in eo inveniuntur” ’ 4 It is to be noted, however, that the Thomists, under the leadership of Alvarez,5 interpret this passage in a manner which leads to the theological doctrine of absolute predestination and negative reprobation.6 Lastly, we may divide the divine Will into voluntas efficiens and voluntas permittens, a distinction important for clearing up God’s relation to sin. The will of God is ” efficient ” only in regard to the naturally or super2 i Tim. II, 4. 6 This point will receive a more 8Cfr. Math. XXV, 34 sqq. detailed treatment in the treatise 4De VeriU, qti. 23, art. 2, ad 2. on Grace. hDe Aux. Gratiae, disp. 24.

naturally good or indifferent actions of His creatures, Sin He merely ” permits ” by shielding the freedom of the will, without which there could be neither sin nor virtue. It is for this reason that some theologians 7 correlate the voluntas permittens with divine justice (justitia permissiva) , which not only renders to every one his own, but also leaves every one in possession of his liberty. 2. As regards the special objects of the divine Will, we can distinguish as many decrees of the Will as there are external operations of God, e. g., the will to create, the will to save, etc. They will all be duly considered in their proper places. Here we must confine ourselves to the exposition of certain general principles which govern the divine Will and shadow forth its intrinsic perfection. These principles all appertain to the material and secondary object of divine volition. Thesis I: It is highly probable that God loves the merely possible good with the love of simple complacence. Proof. While some theologians, like Suarez 8 and Cardinal Gotti, willingly admit that God loves the merely possible good, others, like Gonet 9 and Oswald,10 deny this on the ground that the possibles, coinciding as they do with the divine Essence, can have no independent 7 E, g., Scheeben. 9 Clyp. Thomist., disp. 2, art. 4. 8De Attrib. Posit., Ill, 6. 10 Dogmat. TheoL, Vol. I, p. 213. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 441 goodness or amiability of their own. This lastmentioned reason, however, is not well chosen. For, as the divine Intellect perceives the pure possibles in their ideal-eminent being as extradivine truths,11 so the divine Will can love these possibles in the same way, provided only that they possess a certain degree of goodness — which they undoubtedly do; else how should we explain the fact of Creation had not the Creator previously taken delight in contemplating a universe which was merely possible? To this must be added the consideration that the pure possibles, holding as they do middle ground between nothing and that which has actual existence, possess true, even though only ideal, being, — which being as such is not only true, i. e., cognoscible, but likewise good, i. e.y lovable. (“Ens et bonum convertuntur”) Now, God loves whatever is good; therefore He also loves the purely possible. It is indeed inconceivable that God should take no delight in the infinite number of possible things which He comprehensively understands,12 seeing that even the created intellect takes profound pleasure in contemplating the purely ideal order of metaphysical, aesthetic, and mathematical truths. To this not a few Thomists object that Aquinas, following the example of his master Aristotle, 11 Supra, p. 340. 12 Supra, pp. 351 sqq. 29 442 THE OBJECTS OF THE DIVINE WILL seems to deny the existence of goodness in the domain of mathematics.18 Explain this as we will, it is certain that St. Thomas nowhere denies the principle that goodness is a transcendental attribute of being, which, qua being, includes the realm of the purely possible.14 As for purely possible evil, it is most difficult to decide whether the divine Will remains absolutely motionless in the presence of it, or is affected by displeasure.15 Thesis II: Gpd loves all existing creatures with the love of simple complacency; those endowed with intelligence He also loves with the love of benevolence. This thesis embodies a certain truth. The arguments for it will be found in the chapter which treats of the divine attribute of moral goodness or benevolence.16 Thesis III: Regarding God’s relation to evil, we must hold that He can will natural evil, and evil inflicted as a punishment, only per accidens; and that He can never will sin, but merely permits it Proof. Evil is twofold: the moral evil of sin (malum culpae) and physical evil, which latter can be subdivided into natural evil (malum naturae) and the evil of punishment (malum 13 Cfr. S% Theol., ia, qu. 5, art. 3, ad 4. 14 Cfr. De Verit., qu. 21, art. 2. 15 Regarding God’s attitude towards actually existing evil, see infra, third thesis. 16 Supra, pp. 260 sqq. Cfr. also 81, thesis 2. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 443 poenae).17 The will may take one of three attitudes towards evil. It may either will evil as an end in itself (velle malum per se, sen ut finem) ; or it may will evil as a means to an end (velle malum per accidens) ; or it may will evil not at all, but merely permit it (mere permittee malum). Applying this distinction to the divine Will, we can infer the following propositions, which embody both revealed truths and deductions of human reason. 1. The divine Will cannot will evil, either physical or moral, per se for its own sake, or as an end in itself. For God is the Substantial Love of goodness, and His volition is dominated by the attribute of sanctity. But can He will evil as a means to an end, or per accidens? In answering this question we must first eliminate sin, because it is quite manifest that with God no end, no matter how noble or sublime, can possibly justify sin as a means. . For the holiness of God involves an infinite hatred of sin, no matter whether it be considered as an end or as a means to an end. Cfr. Ecclus. XV, 21 : “He hath commanded no man to do wickedly, and he hath given no man license to sin: for he desireth not a multitude of faithless and unprofitable children.* Epistle of St. James I, 17 Cfr. A. B. Sharpe in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, art. * Evil.” 444 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL 13: “Ipse autem neminem tentat — For God … tempteth no man.” The Church has indignantly repudiated the contrary teaching of Calvin as heretical and blasphemous. Now as to physical evil. God can will physical evil only as a means to an end, and only in so far as it can be subordinated to a higher purpose, the attainment of which completely outweighs the evil means. Physical evil, as we have already pointed out, is twofold, penal (punishment for sin) and natural (e. g., pain, illness, death). God owes it to His punitive justice to inflict physical evil upon sinners, for the reason that justice is a greater good than the happiness of the sinner, which punishment destroys. Ecclus. XXXIX, 35: Ignis, grando, fames et mors, omnia haec ad vindictam creata sunt — Fire, hail, famine, and death, all these were created for vengeance. As for natural* evil, the general order of nature is a higher good than, e. g., the life of an individual transgressor, which is sometimes sacrificed to it. It is in this light that the so-called cruelties of nature must be viewed. Cfr. Ecclus. XI, 14: “Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches are from God.” Wisd. I, 13: God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living. God, therefore, cannot will sin (malum culpae), THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 445 either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. He merely permits it with a view of deriving good therefrom. Cfr. Gen. L, 20: “You thought evil against me: but God turned it into good, that he might exalt me, as at present you see, and might save many people.” It is an article of faith that sin can happen only with the permission of God.19 2. These considerations on the relation of God to evil could easily be spun out into a brilliant apology for divine Providence against Deism. They also furnish the outlines for an effective refutation of Pessimism, which exaggerates evil beyond all reasonable bounds.20 a) The existence of physical evil in the universe would be repugnant to the Christian idea of God if it could be shown, first, that the ills in question are absolute, and not merely relative, and, secondly, that God wills them as an end rather than as a means to an end, or merely the sequel of a higher good, by which they are more than counterbalanced. But it is impossible to establish either of these propositions. All physical evils are intrinsically so constituted that they do not disfigure the heart of creation, but only is Cfr. Ecclus. XXXIX, 35. 10 Supra, pp. 251 sqq. Cfr. St. Tnomas, S. Theol., ia, qu. 19, art. 9. Also St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 46: ” Nec dubitandum est, Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri, quaecunque fiunt male. Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit; et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est — Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is evil. For He permits it only in the justice of His judgment. And surely all that is just is good.” Cfr. Jos. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bosen nach der Lehre des hi, Augustinus, Ratisbon 1854. 20 Respecting Deism and Pessimism, consult the dogmatical treatise on ” God, the Author of Nature and the Supernatural,” which will form the third volume of this series. 446 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL certain portions thereof along its outer fringe; they have their seat not in the nobler parts, but in a lower and subordinate realm, where they serve the higher purposes of Creation. Consequently they are not absolute, but merely relative defects. Thus corporeal pain and disease are a necessary concomitant of the sensitive faculties, whose purpose it is as a minor good to serve the higher good of intellectual knowledge ; at the same time they are useful signals of warning, since suffering and disease frequently herald death. Conflagrations and inundations, with all their disastrous consequences, are merely accidental concomitants of essentially benign forces of nature — such as specific gravity and chemical combustion — which, as such, are indispensable to the structure and existence of the physical universe. Nor do malformations, deformities, and abortions in the realm of organic living beings disprove this argument, because they are intended neither by Nature nor by the Author of Nature, but have their origin in accidental obstacles in the way of the formative and constructive powers of Nature, which ever aims at its proper end, but is sometimes disturbed in its course by extrinsic vicissitudes. The so-called cruelties of nature appear to offer a serious difficulty. Especially do the bloody encounters of predatory animals seem incompatible with God’s goodness. Yet Nature with all her cruelties aims at higher ends, viz., the stability of the universe and the harmonious equilibrium of all its parts. The bloodthirsty disposition of certain wild beasts presupposes cunning, artifice, rapacity, and to eliminate it from nature would mean the destruction of many of the finest and most useful species of our fauna. There is ample justification for enquiring how the impertinent critics of His Divine Majesty would recon 

struct the physical universe, had they the power to carry out their crude notions. Would they make all beasts herbivorous, in order to preserve animal life? This would compel men to practice vegetarianism, and perhaps even something more extreme; for do not some of these smart criticules assert that plants, too, have a sentient soul which must not be injured? Thus ultimately both men and beasts would develop into “geophagi/’ drawing their nourishment solely from the mineral kingdom. Meanwhile, what would be the lot of animals ? Would they not multiply beyond all bounds, destroy vegetation, and poison the atmosphere with the stench of their carcasses? No sane observer can fail to perceive that the existing order of the cosmos is the product of a marvellous wisdom, which automatically sustains its equilibrium and subordinates the lower forces of nature to the higher ones, which center in man, the king of the physical universe. For the rest it may be well to call attention to the fact that the ” wasteful cruelty of nature ” is exaggerated by many modern writers, who overlook the circumstance that carnivorous and other brute animals almost invariably, either by the fright they inspire, or by stinging or biting, stupefy or hypnotize their intended victims, thus rendering them incapable of suffering protracted pain.21 But what of human ignorance and poverty ? Are they 21 The wasteful cruelty of nature is thus described by Tennyson: Are God and Nature then at strife, That Nature lends such evil dreams? So careful of the type she seems, So careless of the single life. ” So careful of the type ” ? but no, From scarped cliff and quarried stone She cries, ” A thousand types are gone, I care for nothing, all shall go.” The obvious reply is that this process, of struggle and survival of the few, in fact works for the perfecting of things; and this is a higher end than the momentary happiness of individual beings. — See Butler’s Analogy, Pt. I, ch. V.— 448 GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL not absolute evils, even though the Creator employ them as means to a higher end? We do not think so. Lack of knowledge spurs humanity on to diligent study, prompts the erection of schools and other institutions of learning, and brings about a general improvement of social conditions; while poverty is one of the strongest incentives to work and self-help, to the cultural development of the slumbering energies of the masses, entailing the progress of industry, craftsmanship, and art, inspiring charitable undertakings of every kind. If these factors remained latent, the human race would soon decay. Imagine a world into which all men were born as millionaires or savants! The blessings of hard labor and the law of progressive development would be unknown. Ethnologists point out that the belt of civilization which girdles the globe coincides with the snow zone, and claim that this is due to the circumstance that the everrecurring combat with severe cold compels men to exert themselves to the utmost, thereby keeping the human mind inventive, active, buoyant, and elastic. Nor must we overlook another important consideration. The existence of physical evil is designed to remind man constantly that his final aim and happiness lie beyond this terrestrial sphere, and that he must labor and suffer, battle and endure like one who may not snatch the palm of victory unearned. It is his divinely-appointed lot, amid manifold hindrances, to attain to eternal felicity by dint of his own efforts, journeying through a vale of tears, where all the hardships of a ” There is abundant reason,” says all limited by the nature of power, Hall, ” for doubting the possibility which is meaningless when applied of constituting a world which shall to the impossible.” (F. J. Hall, at once be suited for free and The Being and Attributes of God, progressive creatures and be perfect pp. 163 sq., New York 1909.) in itself. Infinite power is after

laborious pilgrimage weigh upon him. Imagine for a moment that men enjoyed pure happiness here below and lived beyond the reach of physical evil ; would they not, even the best of them, lose sight of their true destiny and miss their highest end? Such a universe, forsooth, though free from poverty, disease, ignorance, and misfortune, could not justly be considered a masterpiece of divine Wisdom, unless indeed men were permanently constituted in a state of paradisaical innocence. In the light of these reflexions we must admit that it would not be incompatible with either the infinite wisdom or the holiness of God, purposely to create a world in which physical evils (which are always relative, never absolute) would either serve as means to higher ends, or occurred accidentally as concomitants of higher goods. In matter of fact, we know from Revelation that God in creating the world intended it to be free from suffering and merely permitted physical evil to supervene as a punishment for sin. It is characteristic of His infinite goodness that He turns into good even those evils which man has incurred through his own fault.22 b) It is more difficult to explain God’s relation to moral evil, in comparison with which physical evil is as nothing, because sin alone is evil in the absolute sense of the term. The mystery of sin lies in this that God permits it despite the fact that it is absolute evil; for it is self-evident that He who is All-Holy cannot will sin either as an end or as a means to an end. In 22 Cfr. St. Aug., Enchir., c. Keppler, Das Problem des Leiden* ii : ” Dens omnipotens … nullo in der Moral, Freiburg 1904; modo sineret malum aliquod esse B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo 398 sqq.; Th. J. Gerrard, The Wayessct omnipotens et bonus, ut bona farer’s Vision, pp. 44 sqq., London facer et etiam de malo” Cfr. P. 1909.

GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL permitting sin God wills that His intelligent creatures, while in the wayfaring state, should be free to decide either for or against Him. The sins they commit He subsequently, by the external governance of His Providence, converts into a source of good which amply compensates for, nay, exceeds the evil that sin necessarily entails.23 There are goods of which, on the one hand, sin is an indispensable condition (such as contrition, penance, redemption, martyrdom), and which, on the other hand, in their tout ensemble outweigh the evil existing in the world to such a degree that some theologians assert that a world full of sins permitted by God is more perfect than would be a world without sin.2* St. Thomas teaches: “Si enim omnia mala impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo; non enim esset vita leonis, si non esset occisio animalium, nec esset patientia martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum.” 25 Hold what we will on the controverted point just mentioned, it is certain that in permitting sin God does not contradict His wisdom, or His goodness, or His sanctity. He does not contradict His wisdom and His goodness; for it would, on the contrary, be most unwise for Him to offer violence to His rational creatures by obstructing the exercise of their free will, especially since He has given them the voice of conscience, which loudly protests against sin. He does not contradict His goodness, but rather proves it by strengthening and testing the virtues of the just by the misdeeds of the wicked. As St. Augustine says: * Prosunt ista mala, quae fideles pie perferunt, vel ad 23 Cfr. Toletus, Comment, in S. TheoL, I, p. 264 (ed. Romae, 1869): * Deus non dicitur velle peccata fieri nec velle non fieri, sed pertnittere fieri,” 24 Cfr. Ruiz, De Provid., disp. 2, sect. 2. 25 S, TheoL, 1a, qu. 22, art. 2, ad 2. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 45* etnendanda peccata vel ad exercendam probandamque iustitiam vel ad demonstrandam vitae huius miseriam, ut ilia, ubi erit beatitudo vera atque perpetua, et desideretur ardentius et instantius inquiratur — Those evils which the faithful endure piously, are profitable either for the correction of sin, or for the exercising and proving of righteousness, or to manifest the misery of this life, in order that the life of perpetual blessedness may be desired more ardently, and sought more earnestly.,, 26 Lastly, in permitting sin God does not contradict His sanctity. He never ceases to forbid sin, to detest it with an infinite hatred, and to punish it with the full severity of His punitive justice. It may be objected: If God has such a hatred of sin, and is constrained to punish it so severely, why did He not leave the present sinful world deep down in the abyss of its original nothingness and in its place create one of which He foresaw that it would never deviate from the path of rectitude and virtue ? By refraining from the creation of sinful beings He could have prevented sin. This objection is as temerarious as it is silly. To carry out the implied suggestion would mean to limit God’s omnipotence by making the Creator dependent upon His creatures, because in that hypothesis He could not create the universe, and would simply cease to be God. Furthermore, those who urge it forget that God is not for the sake of the world, but the world exists for the sake of God. No matter how we poor creatures employ the free will which God has given us, to glorify Him or to dishonor Him, we cannot possibly rob Him of His extrinsic glory. For whoever obstinately rejects God’s mercy and love, will sooner or later be compelled to proclaim His 26 De Trinit., XIII, 16, 20. 45* GOD’S RELATION TO EVIL justice. We are like clay in the hands of a divine artist.27 It is not for the Sovereign Lord; Who is the Supreme Good, to inquire into our preferences. The creature is bound to do the will of the Creator, not the Creator the will of the creature. A human superior, it is true, must prevent sin on the part of his subordinates. He has no right to permit it, because a superior exists for the good of the community which he is called to govern, not vice versa. The case is different with God. He can permit sin without detriment to His holiness, in order that good may come therefrom, because He is Himself the ultimate end of all Creation, and all things have their final goal in Him. It cannot, however, be said that with God the end justifies the means, because in permitting sin God does not choose , a bad means to attain a good end, but with the power of an absolute sovereign disposes of the universe for His own glory. Consequently sin is no argument against Theism, but, on the contrary, a proof for the existence of a supreme and infinitely good God, Who rules the universe wisely and disposes all things so that they ultimately converge in Him. Thesis IV: God has no will with regard to what is intrinsically impossible. This thesis voices the common teaching of theologians of all schools. Proof. Every act of the will tends either to a good end or to a bad. Now, what is impossible (e. g.y a man-ape or a wooden steel-pen), is neither good nor bad. It is not good, because the impossible, being pure nothing, has no be27Cfr. Rom. IX, 20 sqq.

ing, and therefore cannot possess goodness, which is a transcendental attribute of being. It is not bad, because badness or evil, being a negation, can inhere only in a positive entity as in a subject which lacks some perfection it ought to possess. Pure nothingness cannot be the subject of a privation.28 Readings: — Cfr. S. Thomas, S. Theol, ia, qu. 19 sqq., and the Commentators. — Id., Contr. Gent, I, cc. 72-96. — The most complete treatment of the subject will be found in *Ruiz, De Voluntate Divina. — Of the later dogmaticians the student is advised to consult especially Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 96104 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, I, pp. 227 sqq.) ; Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 326 sqq., Ratisbonae 1881 ; L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t II, pp. 228 sqq., Friburgi 1900. — For the philosophical questions involved, see *Jos. Hontheim, Instit. Theodicaeae, pp. 661 sqq., Friburgi 1893. 28 Cfr. S. Thomas, Contr. Gent., I, 84: ”Secundum quod unumquodque se hobet ad esse, ita se habet ad bonitatem. Sed impossibilia sunt quae non possunt esse; ergo non possunt esse bona, ergo nec volita a Deo, qui non vult nisi ea, quae sunt vel possunt esse bona.” Cfr. also what has been said above in connection with divine Omnipotence, pp. 281 sqq.