God's Categorical Attributes: Absolute Substantiality and Omnipotence

Chapter II: God’s Categorical Attributes of Being

§1–2: Absolute Substantiality and Omnipotence

CHAPTER II god’s categorical attributes of being The so-called categories (Karrjyopiat, praedicamenta) differ from the transcendental attributes of being in that they are not univocally predicable of all being, but of certain determined classes of being only. By reducing all concrete beings to their highest genera, Aristotle arrived at the ten so-called categories: substance and the nine accidents (crv^p^KOTa) ; quality quantity (wocw), relation «), place time position or attitude (situs, habitus or external belongings (x«w = potency and faculties), action (vomv)9 and passion (irdaxuv, pati).1 In entering upon the discussion of the remaining attributes of God, we base the theological teaching concerning them upon these summa genera essendi, i. e.9 the two all-embracing classes (substance and accident), to one or other of which all terrestrial things capable of being conceived in thought belong. We do not, of course, mean to apply the predicaments to God in their strict sense — God is beyond and above lCfr. Clarke, Logic, pp. 187 sqq., and the article “Category” in the Catholic Encyclopedia III, 433 sqq. 274 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 275 all categories of being — but we employ them merely as points of departure and development. “Relation” (?><>s «) is omitted here, because it plays its part chiefly in the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, with which we are not specially concerned in this volume.2 “Quality” and “habitus” we have already done with. Hence there remain to be considered only two groups of categories: (1) “Substance” and “action,” which by the method of affirmative differentiation give us the two positive attributes of absolute substantiality and omnipotence; (2) “Quantity,” “passion,” “time,” and “space,” and Ktto&u), which by the method of negative differentiation give us the four negative attributes of incorporeity, unchangeableness, eternity, and omnipresence. Hence we shall divide this chapter into six sections. 2 Pohle’s treatise on the Divine lish as a separate volume in the Trinity will, D. v., appear in Eng- near future. SECTION i GOD S ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIALITY i. Preliminary Observations. — An accident by its very nature inheres in some other being as its subject (esse in alio) ; while substance, on the other hand, essentially connotes inseity (esse in se) ; i. e.} it essentially excludes the notion of a subject in which to inhere. Substance is being, inasmuch as this being is by itself (per se);1 accident is that whose being is to be in something else. 2 Inseity must not be confounded with aseity, and a sharp distinction must be drawn between ens a se and ens in se. It was because he confused these two notions, after the example of Descartes, that Spinoza fell into the error of teaching that there is but “one substance ” with two attributes, viz., spirituality and extension.8 While it is quite true that the ens in se, like the ens a se, is ” an independent being,” they differ l The Schoolmen, in order to accident, which exists in alio, or leave per se applicable to both un- which at least naturally, whatever created and created substance, have may happen preternaturally, has its chosen a se to signify the special being only by inherence in a subcharacter of the former. A sub- ject. Cfr. Rickaby, General Metastance is that which exists per se, physics, p. 253. or which has its own proper be- 2 S. Thorn., De Potentia, a. 7. ing (* id cut ratione sui convenit s Spinoza, Ethic, p. I, def. 3. esse, cui competit esse non in Cfr. Descartes, De Princip., I, 5. alio ) ; and thus it is opposed to 276 THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 277 essentially. For, while the ens a se is independent not only of any subject in which to inhere, but likewise of all extrinsic factors, the ens in se (i. e., substance) has the first-mentioned kind of independence, but not the latter, except when it possesses at the same time aseity. Hence the ens in se, like the ens in alio (i. e., accident), may well be dependent upon an external cause; that is to say, there is nothing in its essence which would prevent it from being an ens ab alia, or a contingent being. The foregoing explanation makes it clear that the quiddity of ” substance ” does not lie primarily in its function of being the subject (Woie6i/i€vov) of accidents. On the contrary, substance is substance because it is formally esse in se, no matter whether there are accidents or not (though, of course, de facto, no created substance can exist without accidents). If we thus eliminate its accessory function of furnishing a subject for accidents, ” substance ” immediately becomes a simple perfection predicable of God ; while u accident, by its very nature, can connote only a mixed perfection, inasmuch as, in the words of St. Anselm, it is manifestly * better not to be an accident than to be an accident.” 4 2. The Dogma. — It is an article of faith that God is a substance: “Una essentia, substantia sen natura simplex omnino — One essence, an absolutely simple substance or nature.” 5 “Una singularis … substantia — One sole … substance.” 6 Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., Gen- K. Ludewig, Die Substanztheori eral Metaphysics, pp. 245 sqq.; oei Cartesius, Fulda 1893. K. Gutberlet, Allg. Metaphysik, 3rd 6 Cone. Lateran. IV, cap. ” Firmied., Chapter III, ft 1, Munster 1897; ter” 9 Cone. Vatican., Sess. Ill, cap. u

a) The Scriptural proof for this dogma is based on God’s aseity, from which His substantiality must of necessity follow, because the ens a se must necessarily also be ens in se; for, if the ens a se ( n)J}l) were a mere accident, it would be intrinsically dependent upon some other being as its subject, and consequently would not be ens a se. In virtue of its self-existence, therefore, the Divine Substance necessarily is substantia a se, and admits of no accidents. It is consequently pure inseity without depending upon accidents for any, even the slightest perfection. In this sense St. Augustine teaches : “Alia quae dicuntur essentiae sive substantiae, capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacunque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid huiusmodi accidere non potest, ideo sola est incommunicabilis substantia — But other things that are called essences or substances admit of accidents, whereby a change, whether great or small, is produced in them. But there can be no accident of this kind in respect of God; and therefore He is the only unchangeable substance or essence/’ 7 This is also the teaching of the Schoolmen. b) Inasmuch, however, as God, being their exemplary and efficient cause, comprises within Himself virtually or eminently all finite substances, we might also designate Him as the universal substance (substantia univer7De TriniU, V, 2, 3. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 279 salis), were it not for the danger of a pantheistic misinterpretation of this term. To preclude any such misunderstanding, theology has recourse to a twofold method. On the one hand it proclaims God as avovvios (not-substance), while on the other it refers to Him as Wcpouo-to? (super-substance). God as ens a se is a substance in a different and higher sense than any creature. Hence owrla as a predicament cannot be applied to Him univocally, but only analogically, and we may truly say that He is not a substance in the sense in which the term is applied to creatures. On the other hand, however, the concept of substance may be attributed to Him in a far deeper and truer meaning than to any creature, because He is 6 wv, while they are m 6v, and from this point of view it is correct to call Him the SuperSubstance, in the sense that He is indeed a true substance, but one which utterly transcends all categories. This is the express teaching of the Fathers and also of Boethius.8 c) From the foregoing exposition flows an important corollary; namely, that the concepts of “super-substance” and non-substance preclude the possibility of any commingling or composition of God’s Essence with the essence of the created universe. The Church, therefore, dealt Pantheism a fatal blow when it defined, through the Council of Chalcedon, that *Christ is in both natures, the divine and the human, 8Cfr. De Trinit., c. 4: *Sub- Thomas in h 3 Sutnma Contra Genstantia in illo non est vere sub- tiles, I, 25 (summarized by Rickaby, stantia, sed ultra substantiam.” Of God and His Creatures, pp. 19 The teaching of the Schoolmen is sq.). most effectively set forth by St.

2So ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIALITY dcrvyx^W, arpiirrm (inconfuse, imtnutabiliter) ” * and through the Vatican Council : [Deus] “praedicandus est re et essentia a mundo distinctus … et super omnia, quae praeter ipsum sunt et concipi possunty ineffabiliter excelsus — [God] is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the world… and ineffably exalted above all things which exist, or are conceivable, except Himself.” 10 In the light of these definitions it is inconceivable that God should become part of some other substance, as the Pantheists allege, or that He should assume the role of “worldsoul.” 11 • Denzinger-Bannwarth, Enchiridion, n. 148. 10 Ibid., n. 1782. 11 It belongs to Christology to show that the ” Hypostatic Union ” does not neutralize this dogma, but rather postulates it. For a more detailed explanation, consult Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, $76; Heinrich, Dogm. TheoL, Vol. Ill, §173; Schwetz, Theol. Dogmat., Vol. I, 1 1 5. They all treat this attribute in connection with divine unity. On the teaching of St Thomas, cfr. L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, U I, pp. 214 sqq. Friburgi 1900. SECTION 2 god’s absolute causality, or omnipotence i. Preliminary Observations. — a) Power or potency (potentia activa, SiW/u*) in its active sense signifies “the ability to make something” (facere, «m«v). Its contradictory is power lessness or impotency (impotentia) . Omnipotence or almightiness, therefore, denotes God’s ability to make all things.1 But this is merely a nominal definition and does not reach the proper essence of Almightiness, because the term “all” is indefinite. Nor can this defect be cured by saying, as do several of the Fathers and not a few theologians, that “God can do whatever He wills”; because this proposition is liable to misinterpretation— namely, that God’s omnipotence does not extend beyond His actual will, while in reality the Divine almightiness embraces also such things as are de facto not willed by God, though He could will them if He would.2 While God’s omnipotence thus has a much wider ex1 Cf r. S. Augustin., - De TriniU vult, nihil ant em vult, quod non IV, 7: Omnipotent est, qui om- potest — God can do many things nia potest. which He does not actually will; 2 Cfr. S. Augustin., Bnchir,, c. but He wills nothing that it is not 95: * Mnlta potest Dens et non in His power to do.* 282 OMNIPOTENCE tension than His actual will, inasmuch as He can do whatever He can will, it is limited, on the other hand, by an insuperable barrier, in that God can neither will nor do that which is intrinsically impossible. When the Calvinist Vorstius undertook to include the impossible within the concept of divine omnipotence, he failed to see that to exclude the impossible does not limit but rather perfects God’s almightiness, as Hugh of St. Victor explains: “Deus omnia potest quae posse potentia est, et ideo vere omnipotens est, quia impotens esse non potest/’ 8 b) Theologians specify five classes of things which God cannot do because they are impossible. We have in the first place to exclude from the concept ” all things ” such contradictions as are involved in a square circle, a created ens a se, a dual God, and the like. All such notions embody mutually exclusive notes, and therefore can denote no other object than “pure nothing,” and it is therefore plain that by their very nature they cannot be included in the concept of almightiness. This concept, consequently, includes only what is intrinsically possible. In the second place there is the impossibility of making past things undone, e. g., to delete the events recorded by history, or to “turn back the wheel of time.” ” Audenter loquar” says St. Jerome,4 “cum omnia possit Deus, suscitare virginem post ruinam non potest — I make bold to affirm that, though God is omnipotent, He cannot restore virginity once it has been destroyed.* For, as Kleutgen poign* D* Sacram,, I, a, 22, 4 Ep. 22 ad EustocK

antly argues, Facta infecta facere perinde est atque facere, ut eadem sint et non sint, quod repugnat — To make a fact undone would be tantamount to making a thing to be and not to be, which is a contradiction. 5 Nor, in the third place, can God commit sin, because to sin implies not facere” but ” deficere” that is, a lack of perfection in action, which would annul His omnipotence.6 Generally speaking, God can do nothing which would contradict His Essence or His attributes; e. g., to change His substance, to die, or .to move from place to place ; for by any such action He would destroy Himself, and therefore also His omnipotence.7 Because of His unchangeableness God cannot revoke what He has once freely decreed, — such decisions, for instance, as to create a visible world, to redeem the human race, to permit Christ to die on the cross, etc. — though it is possible, of course, that some other Economy different from the present might be governed by entirely different divine decrees. The latter, therefore, in the language of the Schoolmen, are possible only potentid absolutd, not potentid ordinaria s. ordinata” c) Omnipotence may consequently be defined as God’s power to do whatever He can will, in as far as it is not repugnant to His Essence. The moot question whether omnipotence as an &De Ipso Deo, p. 384. 6 Cfr. S. Theol., ia, qu. 25, art. 3: * Peccare est posse deficere in agendo, quod repugnat omnipotence.’* 7 Cfr. S. Augustin., Serm. de Symbol, ad Catech., I: * Deus omnipotens, et cum sit omnipotens, mori non potest, falli non potest, mentiri non potest, et quod ait Apostolus, seipsum negare non potest. Et ideo omnipotens est, quia ista non potest — God is omnipotent, and because He is omnipotent, He cannot die, or err, or lie, and, in the words of the Apostle (2 Tim. II, 13), He ‘cannot deny Himself.’ And He is omnipotent precisely for the reason that He cannot do these things.” 8 Cfr. S. Theol., ia, qu. 25, art. 5, ad x. 6284 OMNIPOTENCE attribute is distinct from the intellect and the will of God,0 or whether it coincides with the will (i. e., the practical knowledge of God), is of * no dogmatic importance. We follow Scheeben in conceiving omnipotence as an attribute of being, not of divine life; for it is per se a quiescent attribute. 2. The Dogma of God’s Omnipotence. — That God is almighty is a dogma affirmed by all the creeds. *Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotent tern — I believe in God, the Father almighty/’ says the Apostles’ Creed. The Fourth Council of the Lateran defines: Deus … omnipotens — God … is almighty.” 10 Abelard’s proposition: “Quod ea solummodo possit Deus facere vel dimittere, vel eo tantum modo vel eo tempore, quo facit et non alio/9 was condemned as heretical by Innocent II, A. D. 1 141. 11 a) Omnipotence may be called a standing attribute of God; for the Bible employs the epithet “omnipotens” more than seventy times. The divine might is also the fundamental signification of such names as and especially The way in which Holy Scripture paraphrases this attribute shows how we are to conceive it. Job XLII, 2: Scio, quia omnia potes — I know that thou canst do all things. Mark » Cfr. S. Thom., 1. c. : ” Intel- 10 Cone. Lateran. IV, c. J. Ugentia dirigit, voluntas imperat, po- 11 Denzinger-Bannwartk, Enchiritentia exequitur.” dion, n. 374. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 285 XXXVI, 14: “Father, to thee all things are possible.” Luke I, 37: “No word shall be impossible with God.” Matth. XIX, 26: “With men this is impossible: but with God all things are possible.” Christ Himself tells us that the divine power is not limited to the things that actually exist. “God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham.” 12 Again, “Thinkest thou that I cannot ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels ? ” 18 According to the Scriptures God’s omnipotence is self-existing power (potentia a se) which exceeds every other power. 1 Tim. VI, 15 sq. : Solus potens … qui solus habet immortalitalem That is to say: as God “alone” has immortality, because He alone is self-existing, i. e., has His existence a se; so, too, He alone is almighty, because His might is not derived from any other being, but a se. His power exceeds all other power because of the sublime manner in which it sets itself in motion and operates by a mere command of the Divine Will. God wills, and the thing is; He calls, and things are there.14 A power which, by merely commanding, is able to summon into existence beings both natural and supernatural, must be an infinite power. Therefore miracles, being the faithful exponents of an infinite potency, are called in Holy Scripture ” virtutes ” or ” magnolia Dei.” 15 ^ 12 Matth. Ill, 9. et creata sunt — He spoke, and they is Matth. XXVI, 53. were made: he commanded, and i4Cfr. Ps. CXLVIII, 5: Ipse they were created. dixit et facta sunt, ipse mandavit l AiW/neif ; Hebrew nfTO}.

b) The Tradition concerning this divine attribute dates back, as the “Apostles’ Creed” bears witness, to the Primitive Church. Origen testifies to its Apostolic character when he writes : “We confess that God is incorporeal and almighty and invisible.” 16 St. Augustine proves that the belief in God’s omnipotence was universal in his day.17 St. Chrysostom characterizes this attribute as infinite power, exceeding every other power, when he says : “As a painter who has painted a picture is able to make an unlimited number of copies thereof, so it would have been easy for God to create innumerable worlds.” 18 It is for this reason that omnipotence ranks among the incommunicable attributes of God, in which, even by favor of divine grace, no creature can share.19 3. Omnipotence as Universal Dominion. — Dominion, being ” power over persons and things,” 20 is not identical with potency or might in the sense of ” ability to do something.” Similarly, God’s universal dominion must be distinguished from His omnipotence, as an effect from its cause. God’s universal dominion over His whole creation is based primarily upon His omnipotence as the Creator of all things. The Latin 16 Horn, in Gen., 3. 17 ” Non dico, da mini Christionum, da mini Judaeum, sed da mihi idolorum cult or em, qui non dicat Deum esse omnipotentem — Show me, I do not say a Christian or a Jew, but show me a pagan worshipper of idols who will not admit that God is omnipotent.” Serm. de Temp,, 240, c. 2. 18 In 1 Cor., Horn. 17. loCfr. S. Thorn., Contr. Gent,, II, ax. 20 Potentia « potestas, Kpdfot, THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 287 term ” omnipotens ” 21 emphasizes His creative power, while the Greek term ” iravroKpdrup ” chiefly brings out His universal dominion.22 To this distinction between the two notions corresponds a contradistinction between omnipotence and impotence (impotentia) on the one hand, and the two different species of dominion, viz.: subjection (subiectio) and passive ownership (proprietas) on the other. God’s universal dominion comprises the two parallel elements of jurisdiction (dominium iurisdictionis) and divine proprietorship {dominium proprietatis). Both are important enough to warrant us to devote a page or two to their discussion. a) Jurisdiction comprises five functions: (1) to command; (2) to prohibit; (3) to permit; (4) to punish, and (5) to reward. God is entitled to exercise all of these functions to their fullest extent by the very fact that He is the “Lord” (Dominus, 6 Kvptos, ) and the ” King of kings and Lord of lords” (Rex regum et Dominus dominantium) . The Bible draws a well-defined distinction between absolute sovereignty and omnipotence proper. Ecclus. I, 8: ” Unus est altissimus, creator omnipotens et rex potens et metuendus nimis, sedens super thronum illius et dominans Deus — There is one most high Creator Almighty, and a powerful king, and greatly to be feared, who sitteth upon his throne, and is the God of dominion.* The extent of His sovereignty is brought out in the famous prayer of Esther : 28 * Domine Rex omnipotens, in ditione enim tua cuncta sunt posita et non est, qui possit tuae resistere voluntati — O Lord, Lord, al21 Cfr. Wisd. XVIII, 15: ” fra?- t&vtm Kparwv — He is the alrMvafios.” mighty sovereign of all sovereigns/’ 22 Cfr. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, 28 Esth. XIII, 9. Catech,, 8 : * icavTOKp&Tup ifftlv 4 288 OMNIPOTENCE mighty king, for all things are in thy power, and there is none that can resist thy will;* and still more pointedly in the Apocalypse of St. John: ” Omnem creaturam, quae m coelo est et super terram et sub terra et quae sunt in mart, amnes audivi dicentes: Sedenti in throno et Agno [scil. Christo] benedictio et honor et gloria et potestas (/cparos) in saecula saeculorum — And every creature, which is iif heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them: I heard all saying: To him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb, benediction, and honor, and glory, and power, for ever and ever.” 24 God’s sovereign dominion is unlimited both with regard to place and time. Ps. CXLIV, 13: ” Regnum tuum regnum omnium saeculorum — Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages.” St. Paul25 refers to God as the ” King of ages.” 29 Lessius 27 gives a vivid description of the ” descent of all jurisdiction” (descensus omnis iurisdictionis) from Heaven to earth. All secular sovereignty, as well as all spiritual jurisdiction, descends from God, the universal Lord, to the various rational creatures whom He permits a share in His authority. So that a king in his kingdom, and a president in the republic over which he presides, exercise their powers only by virtue of a certain limited participation in the overlordship of God.28 In the supernatural order the divine sovereignty descends from the Most Holy Trinity upon the sacred humanity of Christ, thence to His immediate representa24Apoc. V, 13. 27 De Perfect. Div.t X, 2. 25 1 Tim. I, 17. 28Cfr. Rom. XIII, 1: 00 ydp 26Ba

tive, the Roman Pontiff, and from him to the bishops and priests.29 b) The second note of universal dominion, the right of ownership (dominium proprietatis) , belongs to God in a manner in which it cannot be claimed by even the most exalted earthly sovereign, because God is the absolute owner not only of the material universe, but also of the spiritual world and the entire human race. Strictly speaking there is no ownership in persons except that vested in God. All men are by nature ” servants of God.” 30 Theologians distinguish a fourfold title of divine ownership: (1) that of creation;81 (2) that of preservation;82 (3) that of redemption, which is the most important of all, and may again be subdivided into the right which the victor in battle has over the vanquished,83 the right of a buyer to that which he has bought,84 the right to indemnification; (4) the title of the final end, which bends all creation under the yoke of the Creator.85 The right by which man claims ownership in things movable and immovable, is a mere emanation from the divine superright, just as all earthly jurisdiction, civil and spiritual, derives from the universal jurisdiction of God. Whence it is 20Cfr. Math. XXVIII, 18: * Data ■ est mihi omnis pot est as in coelo et in terra — All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.* soCfr. Ps. XXIII, 1: “Domini est terra et plenitudo eius, orbis terrarum et universi, qui habitant in eo — The earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof: the world, and all they that dwell therein.” SiCfr. Esth. XIII, 10 sq.: ” Tu fecisti coelum et terratn et quidquid coeli ambit u continetur: Dominus omnium es — Thou hast made heaven and earth, and all things that are under the cope of heaven: Thou art the Lord of all.” 82Cfr. Hebr. I, 3: ” 4p

plain that the idea of ownership developed in the law of the Germanic nations is far more in harmony with the spirit of Divine Revelation than that embodied in the Roman pandects. Readings: — *S. Thorn., S. Theol, ia, qu. 25. — Idem, Contr. Gent, II, 7 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 80 sqq.). — Suarez, De Deo, III, 9. — Petavius, De Deo, V, 6-9. — Lessius, De Perfect. Divm., 1. V. — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. If § 87 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 208 sqq.). — ♦Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 52 sqq. — Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 319 sqq. \