God as Absolute Goodness: Ontological, Ethical, and Moral

Section 4: God as Absolute Goodness

petable? It is not good because it is appetable, but it is appetable because it is good. In order to arrive at an essential definition of goodness, it is first of all necessary to distinguish between absolute goodness (bonum in se s. bonum quod), and relative goodness (bonutn alteri s. bonum cui). Both of these notes combined will give us the adequate definition we are in search of. a) Now, what is absolute goodness? A thing is called absolutely good (bonum quod) when it is exactly what its nature requires it to be, i. e., when it has all the perfections due to, and demanded by, its essence. The notion of bonum quod, therefore, materially coincides with that of perfectum, with the sole difference that the former connotes a relation to some (conscious or unconscious) appetency, which the notion of “perfect ” lacks. Hence we may say that what is perfect in its species is (absolutely) good. If a being lacks some perfection which it ought to possess (as, e. g., a deaf person lacks the sense of hearing), we have the concept of ” evil,” which may consequently be defined as the privation or absence of some perfection required by the nature of a thing.2 If an object lacks even one of those perfections which its nature postulates, it is “bad” or “evil.”3 b) Relative goodness (bonum cui) consists in the communicability of that which is good (perfect) to some other being or beings. As (ontological) truth tends to reveal itself to the intellect, so (ontological) goodness tends to communicate itself to other beings, and thereby to produce more good.4 This communicability formally consists in the adaptability of one object to another, so 2 * Malum est privatio perfec- Integra causa, malum ex quocunque tionis debitae.* defectu” 8 Hence the axiom: “Bonum ex 4* Bonum est diffusivum sui*

that the other has a motive for desiring or striving after the bonum with an ” appetite ” (appetitus), and this may be either conscious or unconscious. It is easy to see how relative goodness, in virtue of its adaptability (conn venientia), at once becomes bonitas finis, and how the latter spontaneously overflows, coloring with its own goodness all the means that lead to the end, and communicating to them the characteristic note of usefulness or utility (bonum utile). The opposite of relative goodness, which we obtain by a process of contrary conversion, is “inadaptability (harmfulness) of one thing to another,” irrespective of whether the harm is caused through the instrumentality of some positive perfection (e. g., capital and labor), or by its absence (e. g., drunkenness in parents and spoilt children). c) By welding the essential marks of absolute and relative goodness into one concept, we obtain the following definition of goodness in general : * That is good which is perfect in itself and adapted to another.* Under either aspect goodness is evidently a transcendental attribute of being.6 For a thing is more or less good according to the measure of being which it contains, e. g., “good” bread, a “good* poem. Even bad things are good under at least one aspect, viz.: in as much as they are. Whence the dictum of St. Augustine: In quantum sumus, boni sumus.” Relatively speaking every being as such is good, i. e., adapted to every other being, because all things are related to one another either as substance to accident, or as a part to the whole, or as an effect to its cause ; or vice versa. Hence all beings are constantly perfecting themselves and each other.6 To a superficial observer it might seem as 6 ” Ens et bonum convertuntur.” 6 Cfr. S. Theol., ia, qu. 5, art. 1-3. if ontological goodness had a wider scope than the concept of being, inasmuch as it can be predicated, e. g., of phantoms, ” air-castles,” etc. But this is a delusion. In matter of fact the goodness of a thing is always and everywhere commensurate with the measure of its being, even if it were only an etis rationis.7 2. The Dogma. — God is ontologically good, both in the absolute and in the relative sense of the term. The dogma of His absolute goodness is clearly contained in that of His divine perfection.8 His relative goodness is implied partly in the condemnation of Dualism,9 partly in the goodness of the created universe.10 a) Considering God’s absolute ontological goodness we find that It is, in the first place, closely bound up with aseity and primal goodness (bonitas a se). While creatures have all their goodness (perfection), as they have their being, by participation (bonum ab alio s. per participationem) , God, and He alone, is originally good in Himself ; or, to express it substantively, He is goodness itself (ipsa bonitas, fj avrayaOorr^) . This can be proved from Holy Scripture. St. Paul teaches:11 * Omnis creatura Dei bona est — Every creature of God is good. Christ, on the other hand,12 emphasizes that 7 Cfr. A. H. Tombach, Unter- dico, cum voco Deum bonum, ac si suchungen iiber das Wesen des album vocarem nigrum.* Gut en. Bonn 1900. 0 Supra, pp. 221 sqq. 8 Cfr. Cone. Vatican., Sess. Ill, 10 Cfr. Cone. Vatican., I. c; Cone, * De Fide,* cap. 1; cfr. Propos. 2% Trident,, Sess. VI, can. 6. Ekkardi damn, a loanne XXII a. 11 1 Tim. IV, 4. 1329: * Deus non est bonus neque 12 Luke XVIII, 19. melior neque optimus; ita male THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 245 nemo bonus nisi solus Deus — None is good but God alone. These two statements can be harmonized only by attributing essential, aseitarian goodness to God alone, and conceiving the goodness predicated of His creatures as derived or participated goodness, which is as nothing in comparison to God’s. It is in this sense that we must interpret Tertullian’s dictum: “Bonus natara Deus solus; qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non institutione [ab alio] habet, sed natura [a se] — God alone is good by nature ; for He, who has that which He is without beginning, has it not by creation, but by nature.” 18 Clement of Alexandria testifies to the belief of the Greeks on this head when he writes: “The essential good is not said to be good on account of its being possessed of virtue, … but on account of its being in itself and by itself good.” 14 P) Since all goodness found in creatures is virtually and eminently contained in the Divine Essence, God is the universal good (bonutn universale) or, more correctly, universal goodness (r\ iravayadorrp) # While created goodness by its very nature can never be more than partial and particular, and is limited to certain definite stages of perfection, God’s goodness comprehends within itself and is infinitely superior to all particular goodness found elsewhere. Cfr. Ex. XXXIII, 19: * Ostendam omne bonutn tibi — I will shew thee all good,* (i. e., Him who contains within Himself everything that is good). St. Ambrose tersely declares: 18 Contr. Marcion., II, 6. ko\ 8t* aitr^v dyafyv eZwu.— n’AXXA t atfrV Jta0* atrijv Paedag., I, 8.

• Deus universitate bonus, homo ex parte1 St. Augustine develops the notion of God’s universal goodness trenchantly as follows: ” Bonum hoc et bonum Mud, … tolle ‘hoc’ et ‘Mud’ et vide ipsum bonum, si potes. Ita Deum videbis non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni… . Quid hoc nisi Deus? Non bonus animus aut bonus angelus aut bonum coeli, sed bonum Bonum — This thing is good and that good, but take away this and that, and regard good itself if thou canst; so wilt thou see God, not good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of all good … and what can this be except God? Not a good mind, or a good angel, or a good of heaven, but goodness itself/’ 16 It is impossible for the mind of man to conceive the universal good more profoundly than St. Augustine does in this luminous passage. y) Lastly, inasmuch as all created goodness has its measure and goal in God alone, while the Divine Good, on the other hand, has its measure and end not above but within itself, the concept of God’s universal goodness naturally expands into v wtpayaBo^ i. e., His goodness transcends all other goodness. It is in this sense that the Church, without regard to the possible existence of rational creatures, refers to God as “the highest, the most beautiful, the best good” (summutn bonum in se). Because God knows and loves Himself as the Su16 In Luc, I, 8. 19 Dg Trinit., VIII, 3, 4 (Haddan’s translation, p. 205).

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 247 ‘preme and Infinite Good, He is infinitely happy in the possession of His own Essence.17 The attribute of mrepayaOorrp implies that the Highest Good is not merely primus inter pares, but that It is transcendental, and, therefore, beyond comparison with other things that are good, and not related to them as a part to the whole, but as 6 &v to m ov.18 b) It remains for us to consider God’s relative goodness. As the primordial, universal, and transcendental good, God possesses in a higher degree than any of His creatures the ability and desire to communicate Himself to others, and to enrich them with perfections drawn from the plenitude of His own essential goodness. Himself overflowing with goodness, He causes His creatures to share it by freely endowing them with being.10 This relative goodness (i. e., communicability) of God, may be traced in a fourfold direction, according as we make the exemplary, the efficient, the final, or the formal cause our point of departure.

Created things are consequently good only in so far as they resemble, and correspond to, the ideal good in God. If the mere possibles (i. e., things which never come into being) can be said to possess a species of goodness distinct from their exemplary cause — which some theologians misdoubt — they can derive that ideal goodness, as they derive their ideal being, solely from God, Who is the plenitude of goodness. P) As creative or efficient cause, God endows His creatures with all their (absolute and relative) goodness at the same time that He gives them being. It is plain that from the hand of the Lord there can come forth nothing but what is good.20 Hence it is more than a mere phrase to say : ” All creatures are an emanation of God’s goodness.,, y) God is the finis absolute ultimus of the whole created universe. He is the end of all things, because He is for all, including His rational creatures, “the highest, the most beautiful, the best good — a good that is worthy of all love and honor for its own sake” (summum bonum nobis). Lessius proves this as follows : ” Quod est summum bonum hominis, necessario est ultimus eius finis. Rursum quod est summum bonum hominis, in eo necesse est consistere eius beatitudinem, quae nihil est aliud quam summi boni possessio. Summum bonum et ultimus finis dicitur et res ipsa, cuius possessione et fruitione beati sumus, et ipsa huius rex possessio et jruitio. Simili modo et beatitudo accipitur et pro ipsa re, cuius SOCfr. Gen. I, 31: “-And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good.” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 249 unione beati efficimur, et pro ipsa unione: ilia a doctoribus vocatur beatitudo objectiva, haec formalis — That which is man’s highest good, must necessarily be also his last end. Again, man’s beatitude, which is nothing but possession of the supreme good, must be identical with the highest good attainable by him. We also call supreme good and last end that particular object by whose possession and fruition we are rendered happy, and the possession and fruition of that object itself. Similarly the word beatitude designates both the object by the possession of which we are made happy, and the state of possession or union itself; the former is called objective beatitude, the latter beatitude in the formal sense.”21 As veracity and faithfulness constitute the formal motive of theological faith and hope, so the summum bonutn is the formal motive of theological love (charity), and at the- same time the foundation and corner-stone of ethics, morality, and asceticism. The terms final end, highest good, and beatitude, are furthermore organically related to a fourth, the glory of God (gloria, glorificatio) , because the attainment of the final end, by the creature that is to be endowed with beatific vision, necessarily tends to the glorification of the summum bonum. Rom. XI, 36: “Ex ipso per ipsum et in ipso (cfe avrov = in ipsum) sunt omnia: ipsi gloria in saecula — For of him, and by him, and in him, are all things : to him be glory for ever.” The Schoolmen teach with St. Thomas that God’s creatures tend to their final end, i. e., seek Him as their highest good, by the very fact that they labor at their own perfection. By seeking their own end they seek God, though not all in the same manner, some being endowed with life, others not; some being irrational, others 21 De Summo Bono, I, I. 17

enjoying the use of reason. Thus all creation tends, either consciously or unconsciously, towards God. While His irrational creatures objectively manifest His glory by their very existence, those that have the use of reason are bound to glorify Him formally by knowing Him, loving Him, and praising Him; and thus, by glorifying God, work out their final destiny. 8) God is not the formal cause of creatural goodness in the strict sense of the term, because essential goodness, with respect to its formal content, is quite as incommunicable as Divine Being itself. Only from the Pantheistic point of view is it possible to confound created goodness with the absolute goodness proper to the Creator, thereby merging the infinite essence in the finite, which reflects its splendor, though inadequately. But when we consider God’s supernatural manifestations and the graces with which He has whelmed mankind, we must conceive Him philosophically as their formal cause, because in the supernatural order God surrenders Himself so completely to His creatures that created goodness becomes merged as it were in His own absolute goodness. By exaggerating this truth Christian mysticism has more than once verged dangerously near the abyss of Pantheism.22 Without in the least identifying the ^creature with God, St. Peter speaks of its formal participation in the divine nature,28 and the Fathers speak of a ” deification ” (tfcwxro, not dirotfcoxro) of the creature. In this class belongs the threefold elevation of man 22 Cfr. S. TheoL, ia, qu. 6, art. 4. 28 Cf r. 2 Petr. I, 4: ” divinae consort es naturae.”

through supernal grace: (1) The Hypostatic Union as the personal communication of the Divine Logos to the humanity of Christ; (2) the state of sanctifying grace as the supernatural transfiguration of the soul, and (3) the beatific vision as the immersion of the soul in the life of truth and love enjoyed by the Most Holy Trinity.24 Readings: — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 84. — Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 29. — Lessius, De Summo Bono, 1. 2; De Perfect Dir., 1. 7. — S. Thorn., 5*. TheoL, ia, qu. 5-6 (Bonjoannes-Lescher, Compendium, pp. 15 sqq.). — L. Janssens, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 253 sqq., Friburgi 1900. — Lepicier, De Deo Uno, t. I, pp. 221 sqq., 242 sqq., Parisiis 1902. — Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 95 sqq.

Article 2: God’s Ethical Goodness, or Sanctity

god’s ethical goodness, or sanctity 1. Preliminary Observations. — Men attribute sanctity (sanctitas) to those persons only who lead a life pleasing to God. The definition of sanctity varies according as we consider either its proximate or its more remote elements. a) To begin with the most common and most palpable notion, sanctity is freedom from sin, coupled with purity of morals.25 Both these notes, the positive and the negative, belong together ; for a being that is merely free from sin, as, e. g., a child that has not yet arrived at the use of reason, cannot be called holy, at least not 24Cfr. 2 Cor. Ill, 18. — Damas- iravdyados Kal vrtpdyados Kal cene sums up the dogmatic teach- 6Xwf &v &ya$6$.* (De Fide Oring of the Church on the on- thod,, IV, 4). tological goodness of God in this 25 * Immunitas a peccato cum puterse sentence: ” *0 dyadbs Kal ritate morum coniuncto.”

252 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY in the full sense of the term, even after it has received the sacrament of Baptism. Akin to, and practically identical with, this definition is the classical one given by Pseudo-Dionysius : ” Sanctitas est ab omni scelere libera et perfecta et prorsus imtnaculata puritas (ayiorrp ficv ovv i

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 253 2. The Dogma. — The Church has condemned as heretical the teaching of Gottschalk, Scotus Eriugena, and Calvin, that God is the author of sin. “Si quis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis, vias suas malas facere, sed mala ita ut bona Deum operari, non permissione tantum, sed etiam proprie et per se, … anathema sit — If any one saith that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly, and of Himself, … let him be anathema.” 80 The essential sanctity of the Most Holy Trinity, i. e.} the Godhead, is also implied in the dogma which defines the personal holiness of the Holy Ghost. Scientific theology develops the dogma of God’s sanctity in a twofold manner, considering it first by itself, and secondly in its relation to created sanctity. a) According to the pseudo-Dionysian definition God’s sanctity is in the first place

254 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY with His Essence. Therefore God’s love of moral goodness is synonymous with infinite hatred of sin (infinitum odium peccati). There are many passages in Holy Writ which prove this. Deut. XXXII, 4, we read: “Deus fidelis et absque ulla iniquitate — God is faithful and without any iniquity.” 81 Ps. V, 5 : “Thou art not a God that wiliest iniquity… . Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity; thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.^ 32 The “mystery of iniquity” (mwtwkw dvo/ua*), of which St. Paul speaks in 2 Thess. II, 7, does not consist in this that God wills iniquity, either as an end or as a means to an end, but rather in that He permits it at all. But although He permits it, He hates sin; and the sole reason why He permits it is that it is objectively better to permit it than to prevent it absolutely, in order that the divine attributes of love, mercy, and justice may have their proper scope. — The other (positive) note of sanctity, viz.: immaculate purity, is frequently mentioned in Sacred Scripture. Thus Ps. CXLIV,. 17: Iustus Dominus in omnibus viis suis et sanctus in omnibus operibus suis — The Lord is just in all His ways, and holy in all His works. Deserving of special mention is the famous “Trisagion,” Is, VI, 3: “Sera* 8iCfr. Rom. IX, 14. 99Cr. Pt. XUV, 81 “mi**iti imHliam 0$ QdUti iniquitatm,” THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 255 phim clamabant alter ad alterum et dicebant: Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus exercituum — The Seraphims … cried one to another, and said: Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God of hosts.” 83 In the Primitive Church the Trisagion was seldom sung except at solemn Mass; since the sixth century it concludes the daily Preface. On Good Friday the choir sings in Greek: ""Ayios 6 0€os, ay to? mtxv/dos, ayios addvaTos, cAcVov ^s — o holy God, holy and strong, holy and immortal, have mercy on us.” P) If sanctity in general is “the ethical equation between the will and the moral law,” the sanctity of God, being essential to Him and deeply rooted in His divine nature, must be substantial. For as the will of God is absolutely one with His Essence, from which flows the lex aeterna, God cannot acquire sanctity;84 He must be holy by His very nature and in His proper Essence.85 Nor is sanctity an ethical perfection superadded to the Divine Essence;86 it is absolutely identical with God’s Substance.87 Therefore God is Sanctity in the same way in which He is Absolute Reason. Holy Scripture adumbrates this aseitarian character of sanctity when it calls God “the alone holy.” Job XV, 15 : ((Ecce inter sanctos eius nemo immutabilis, 88 Cfr. Apoc. IV, 8. 86 Sanctitas accidentalis. USanctitai participata s. ab alio, 8T Sanctitas substantialit, |B $ancHto4 a ## #. fir uitntiam, 256 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY et coeli [angeli] non sunt mundi in conspectu eius — Behold among his saints none is unchangeable, and the heavens [angels] are not pure in his sight.” I Kings II, 2: “Non est sanctus, ut est Dominus — There is none holy as the Lord is.” Consequently God alone is holy as He “alone is good.” 88 y) We penetrate even more deeply into the nature of divine sanctity when we define it as “the essential love that God has for His own goodness.” As identity of being and thought, of cognoscibility and cognition in God entails the highest form of truth-life, i. e., the most complete comprehension of His own Essence {comprehensio sui), so absolute identity of being and willing, His amiability and His love, involves the highest form of volitional life, i. e., substantial, living, subsisting sanctity.89 Hence it is that the intrinsic product of God’s notional understanding is “Hypostatic Wisdom” (i. e.9 the Son of God, or Logos) while the intrinsic product of His notional volition and love is “Hypostatic Love” (i. e., the Holy Ghost). God’s sanctity, conceived as charity, is the mainspring of His volitional life, just as wisdom is the mainspring of His living knowledge. In the 88 Luke XVIII, tg: “None is good but God alone.” Cfr. Ps. XXXVIII, 6. 89 Cfr. the profound dictum of the Pseudo-Dionysius (De Divin. Nomin,, c. 4): * Est Deus amor bonus boni propter bonum CEffrip 6 Gedr Ipwj dyaBbs &ya$ov rd Aya$6v)* THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 257 light of these truths we understand the principle of moral theology, that “Charity is the fulfilment of the whole law,” and that love of God (caritas) must be considered as the “soul” and “queen” of all virtues, and, consequently, as absolute sanctity. This deeper conception of the divine attribute of sanctity as an affective and effective transformation of the infinitely Loving One into the infinitely Lovable Good — rather than as a merely “ethical equation” — is of the highest importance in aiding us to understand the essence of sanctifying grace as well as the Third Person of the Most Holy Trinity.40 b) In its relation to those creatures which are endowed with intellect (angels and men) the sanctity of God, like His relative (ontological) goodness, is fourfold. In the first place, God is the inaccessible ideal and exemplar (causa exemplaris) of all created sanctity, especially in the supernatural life of faith and glory.41 Secondly, He is the fount (causa eKciens) of natural justice and of supernatural sanctity through ” sanctifying grace.” The Sacraments also derive their sanctifying power ex opere operato from God’s sanctity, or, by appropriation, from the Holy Ghost. Thirdly, divine sanctity is the causa finalis of creatural sanctity, inasmuch as the latter constitutes the aptest and most excellent medium of the glorification of God.42 Lastly, the divine sanctity must be called the quasi-formal cause 40Cfr. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I am holy.* Cfr. I Pet. I, 15 sq. I» P« 734« 42 Compare Math. VI, 9: * Sane41 Lev. XI, 44 : ” For I am the tificetur nomen tuum — Hallowed Lord your God; be holy because be thy name,” witfe 1 The** IV, 3:

258 ETHICAL GOODNESS, OR SANCTITY (causa quasi formalis, sed non infortnans) of creatural sanctity, inasmuch as sanctifying grace inheres in the soul as a formal principle, as the Holy Ghost indwells personally in the just.8 3. The Objective Sanctity of God. — The term sanctity is sometimes employed in a non-ethical sense, to denote the dignity, the inviolability, or the sacredness of a person or thing ( augustum, sacrum, oatov). a) This objective sanctity, which is closely related to ontological goodness (bonutn quod), may be attributed both to persons and things. But since it grows in proportion with dignity, it is in the very nature of things greater in persons than in objects (objecta sacra, ooxa). Therefore the Schoolmen were wont to designate the angels as hypostases cum dignitate Creatures endowed with intellect are persons, and therefore sui iuris, inviolable, venerable, and deserving of particular honor. It is for this reason that slavery is so damnable. It is in this sense, too, that the Pope is called ” His Holiness ” ; that an asylum, or the last will of a dying man, is termed ” sacred,” Palestine ” the Holy Land,” and so forth. These persons or objects are sacred or holy in so far as they are honorable, and venerable, and altogether inviolable. b) Manifestly God, Who is “the supreme Good” sans phrase, because of His infinite dignity must be absolutely honorable and venerable, and therefore objec” Haec est autem voluntas Dei, per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus sanctificatio vestra — For this is the est nobis — The charity of God is will of God, your sanctification. poured forth in our hearts, by the 48Cfr. Rom. V, 5: * Caritas Holy Ghost, who is piyen to tit,” P#i 4ifu*Q fit in cordibm nostril

tively sacred or holy, both to Himself and to His creatures. In fact, He is the Absolute Majesty, any violation of which by blasphemy, sacrilege, or formal hatred, is an awful crime. As God, out of respect for Himself, must needs honor His own dignity and majesty (i. e., objective sanctity), so the merest self-respect also compels Him to demand that every rational creature should honor and respect His absolute dignity and majesty by paying Him the highest possible form of worship, viz.: divine adoration (adoratio, latria). Under this aspect God’s objective sanctity may be regarded as the formal motive of the virtus religionist The Bible frequently alludes to this divine attribute, as when, e. g., it refers to God as ” the Holy One of Israel,” that is, He Whom the Israelites must venerate ; or in those texts where the name of God is spoken of as ” holy and terrible.” 46 Creatures derive their objective sanctity from God as their exemplary and efficient cause. The dignity of civil rulers is sacred and inviolable, because civil authority comes from God. The Bible sometimes refers to prophets and kings as ” gods ” on account of the dignity they had received from the Almighty. We often refer to churches, vestments, pictures, relics, rosaries, etc., as sacred (in the objective sense of the term), because, and in so far as, they are consecrated by God and to His use.46 In the same manner among the Israelites the Ark of the Covenant was called ” Sanctum Sanctorum,” the place where Moses beheld the burning bush, ” holy land,” and so forth. 44Mazzella (De Virtutibus In- 45 Cfr. Ps. CX, 9: ” Sanctum et fusts, n. 45, 4th ed.t Rome 1894), terribile nomen eius.” holds a different view. Cfr. S. 40 Consecrare ss sacrum reddere. Thorn., S. Th*oh, a-aae, qu, 81, art.

*6o MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE Readings : — Heinrich, Dogtnat. Theologie, Vol. I, § 201.— Scheeben, Dogtnatik, Vol. I, §§ 99, 104 (summarized in WilhelmScannell’s Manual, pp. 205 sq.).— Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 348 sqq.— Lessius, De Perfect Div., 1. VIII.— J. Stufler, S. J., Die Heiligkeit Gottes und der ewige Tod, Innsbruck 1004. — Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 304 sqq.— Humphrey, ” His Divine Majesty” pp. 98 sqq.

Article 3: God’s Moral Goodness, or Benevolence

god’s moral goodness, or benevolence 1. Definition of Moral Goodness. — As sanctity refers to the bonum quod, so moral goodness, or benevolence, is related to the bonum cut. The basic note of benevolence is a gratuitous love47 which promotes the happiness of others out of sheer kindliness. It follows that benevolence can be attributed only to intelligent, personal beings, whilst the simple bonitas alteri s. relativa is predicable also of irrational things (e. g.j the sun is good for terrestrial life). The contradictory of benevolence is malevolence (malevolentia) , a disposition or inclination to injure others and to deprive them of their belongings. As a moral attribute, i. e. a virtue inherent in the will, God’s benevolence corresponds to His veracity and faithfulness. Like veracity and faithfulness, benevolence cannot be detached from its ontological basis. 7 Amor gratuitus, benevolentia THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 261 2. The Dogma. — The Vatican Council has defined God’s benevolence in these terms: “Hie solus verus Deus bonitate sua … ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis itnpertitur, liberrimo consilio … utramque de nihilo condidit creaturatn… . Universa vero, quae condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponens omnia suaviter — This one only true God, of His own goodness … to manifest His perfection by the blessings which He bestows on creatures, and with absolute freedom of counsel … created out of nothing … both the spiritual and corporal creature… . God protects and governs by His Providence all things which He hath made, ‘reaching from end to end mightily, and ordering all things sweetly/ * 48 a) In extension and essence God’s benevolence may be characterized as the firm will which He has, out of pure but free love to confer natural as well as supernatural benefits upon His creatures, according to the nature and final destiny of each.” Its root lies in His ontological goodness.49 Its motive is God’s generous love for His creatures; whatever contravenes this love, runs counter to His Divine Nature. Hence the « Cone. Vat., Sess. Ill, c. x. (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1783). 49 Ex eo enim says Lcssius, quod res sit perfecta in sua entitate, propendet ad sui communionem, sicut vas perfecte plenum ad effusionem sui liquoris. {De Perf, Divin., VIII, 1.) 26 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE Bible says simply: * Deus caritas est (‘O ®cos dycwny «mV) — God is charity.* 50 St. Ignatius of Antioch had a beautiful motto to this effect: Amor meus crucifixus est (vEpo>9 epjbs caTavpwTat) — My Love is crucified. Pseudo-Dionysius, in calling God benevolent and generous “not deliberately and by choice, but by His very nature,” 61 did not mean to deny the freedom with which He dispenses His favors, but only to emphasize that it is not a matter of free choice with God either to be or not to be love. In virtue of this essential characteristic, Divine Love is creative; for, “Amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus/* 62 b) Considering the attribute of divine benevolence in respect of its comprehension, we must say that it comprises all created beings, rational and irrational. God is “the All-Good One,” His benevolence is universal. To begin with, all irrational creatures constantly receive innumerable favors at His hands. For not only does He give food to the young ravens,68 but He clothes the lilies of the field, and without His will not a sparrow falls from the roof.64 Therefore there exists no more beautiful formula for saying grace at table than Ps. CXLIV, 15 sq. : ” Oculi omnium in te sperant, Domine, et tu das escam illorum in tempore opportuno; aperis tu manum tuam et imples omne animal benedictione — The eyes of all hope in thee, O Lord, and thou givest them meat in due season. Thou openest thy hand, and fillest with blessing every living creature.” It is characteristic of Dante’s profundity of conception that he 50 1 John IV, 16. Dogmatik, Vol. Ill, f 202, and Les51 De Div. Nomin., c. 4. sius, De Perf. Divin,, IX, 3. 62 S. Thorn., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 53 Ps. CXLVI, 9. 20, art. 2.— On the “eight quali- 54 Math. VI, 28, X, 29. ties ” of benevolence, cfr. Scheeben,

closes his Paradiso with the line : ” L’amor che muove il sole e Valtre stelle.” 68 But nothing can equal God’s love for man, both as a species and as an individual. The free creation of the human race and its immediate elevation to the supernatural plane, was the first and fundamental proof of divine benevolence towards man. Cfr. Ps. VIII, 6: ” Minuisti eum paulo minus ab angelis, gloria et honore coronasti eum — Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honor.” Even after man had fallen, God’s benevolence did not fail him. The Lord ” raineth upon the just and the unjust,” 56 and showers blessings upon the idolatrous gentiles, ” benefaciens de coelo, dans pluvias et tempora fructifera, implens cibo et laetitia corda nostra — Doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness.* 57 The acme of His love for humankind is reached in the Incarnation, this mystery of love, in the light of which the * mysterium iniquitatis ” literally pales into insignificance. John III, 16: “For God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son.* In His Son He gave us the most precious thing He had. Rom. VIII, 32 : * He that spared not even his own Son … hath he not also, with him, given us all things?* With kindly care He consults for each and every individual man. Cfr. Is. XLIX, 15 sq. : * Can a woman forget her infant, so as not to have pity on the son of her womb? And if she should forget, yet will not I forget thee. Behold, I have graven thee in my 55 * But yet the will roll’d onward, That moves the sun in heav’n like a wheel and all the stars.* In even motion, by the Love (Cary’s Translation.) impel!’ 66 Math. V, 45. 57 Acts XIV, 16.

264 MORAL GOODNESS, OR BENEVOLENCE hands.” The history of Divine Providence is an eloquent commentary on Wisdom XII, I : ” Quam bonus et suavis est, Domine, spiritus tuus in omnibus — How good and sweet is thy spirit, O Lord, in all things.* Such boundless love should elicit a strong and ardent affection in return. * Let us therefore love God, because God hath first loved us.” 58 Readings : — Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol III, § ao2. — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § o& — *Lessius, De Perfect. Divin., 1. IX.— St. Thomas, Contr. Gent, I, 91 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 67 sq.).— Idem, S. TheoL, ia, qu. 20. 68 1 John IV, 19.

GOD AS ABSOLUTE BEAUTY i. Preliminary Observations. — The nature of beauty has been the subject of much controversy. The safest thing for the theologian to do is to adopt the Patristic, which is also the Scholastic, view, a) The ” Angel of the Schools ” describes the beautiful thus : * Pulchra sunt, quae visa placent — Those things are beautiful which please when seen.* 1 Hence, clearly, aesthetic pleasure or delectation is of the essence of beauty. But this definition is merely ex effectu, as was already observed by St. Augustine: ” Non ideo pulchra sunt quia delectant, sed ideo delectant, quia pulchra sunt — Things are not beautiful because they please, but they please because they are beautiful.” 2 To determine the essence of beauty we must therefore seek out the cause of aesthetic pleasure. This cause, according to St. Augustine, is unity amid variety8 — * Unitas in multiplicitate* but so that unity is the determining element: ” Omnis pulchritudinis forma unitas/’ 4 — Now, if unity is to give pure pleasure to the mind of him who contemplates it, the beautiful object must needs be visible and evident. A hidden or iml S. Theol., ia, qu. 5, art. 4, ad 1. 8 ” Unitas in multiplicitate/’ 2De Vera Relig,, c. 32, n. 59. 4 S. August., Ep. 18 ad Coelestin. 18 265

perceptible unity, could not be productive of aesthetic pleasure. St. Thomas6 resolves the Augustinian concept of beauty into the following three essential elements: completeness of the whole (perfectio rei), harmonious relation of its parts (proportio debita partium), and, shed over all, a certain definiteness, clearness, lustre or splendor (claritas). Claritas renders a beautiful object visible to the mind; the proportio debita partium is the basis of * unity in variety * ; and the perfectio rei is the necessary foundation of both, because that which is imperfect lacks both proportion and clearness.6 b) From what we have said it follows that beauty is essentially related to the intellect and will, and also to truth and goodness. Truth and goodness are linked together by the notion of ens, with which they are both convertible; but they are still more closely bound up with the concept of beauty, because Beauty as it were draws with one hand from the well of truth, and with the other from the fountain of goodness. It holds the middle between truth and goodness. St. Augustine calls it “splendor veri — the brightness of reality,” 7 while St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that between beauty and goodness there is only a logical distinction.8 A beautiful object must above all else be good (i. e., perfect) in order to be able to elicit from the beholder pure love of complacency (amor complacentiae) . But 6 S. TheoL, ia, qu. 39, art. 8. eCfr. John Rickaby, S. J., General Metaphysics (Stony hurst Series), pp. 147 sqq. 7Cfr. Ch. Coppens, S. J.f English Rhetoric, pp. 98 sq., 3rd ed., New York 1887. 8Cfr. S. Theol, i-aae, qu. 17, art. 1, ad 3: ” Pule hr urn est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Quum enim bonum sit, quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est, quod in eo quietetur appetitus. Sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet, quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus… . Et sic patet, quod pulchrum addit supra bonum quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam, ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui, pulchrum autem id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet/’ THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 267 it must also be clear and evident, because if it lacked evidence, the mind could not easily perceive the conformity and grouping of the various parts around the central point of unity. Whence follows the important deduction, that the intellect, and the intellect alone, perceives beauty ; while the will, and the will alone, is the seat of aesthetic pleasure. Beauty, therefore, is a supra-sensual quality; and this holds true not only with regard to spiritual beings, such as God, the angels, and the soul, but also in respect of material objects, such as painting, sculpture, music, etc. The irrational brute may perceive a beautiful object, but it can not perceive its (intelligible) beauty. We may therefore define beauty with Kleutgen9 as “ret bonitas, quatenus haec mente cognita delectat — The goodness of an object, in so far as this, perceived by the mind, affords pleasure/’ c) As beauty and goodness materially coincide, the former must be a transcendental attribute of being like the latter.10 In matter of fact the elements of beauty, i. e., perfection, harmonious proportion, and clearness, or splendor, are proper to all objects in the same manner in which being is proper to them.11 2. Dogmatic Application of These Principles.— Though the Church has never defined it as of faith, yet Sacred Scripture and Tradition make it quite certain that beauty is an attribute of 9 De Ipso Deo, p. 418. 10 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionysius, De Div, Nomin., c. 4: * Eorutn quae sunt, nullum est quin pulchri et boni particeps sit — No thing exists but what partakes of beauty and goodness.* 11 On the subdivisions of beauty, sublimity, elegance, charm, etc., see Jungmann, S. J., Asthetik, 3rd ed., Vol. I, Freiburg 1886; G. Gietraann, S. J., Allgemeine Asthetik, Freiburg 1899; John Rickaby, S. J., General Metaphysics, pp. 147 sqq.; Chas. Coppens, S. J., English Rhetoric, 3rd ed., pp. 98 sqq., New York 1887. God. Perhaps no divine attribute has been so generally neglected by theologians as this, owing probably to the circumstance that in the unsettled state of the science of aesthetics it was not easy to determine whether beauty must be classed as a “pure” or as a “mixed” perfection of the Divine Essence. We claim that it is a pure perfection; that the notion of pulchrum is formally predicate of God; that beauty in its formal sense is proper to God ; that He is primordial beauty, allbeauty, and beautiful in a higher sense than any creature, and that, precisely for this reason, He is the exemplar and the cause of all created beauty. a) Reason tells us that God must be beautiful ; for if He contains within His Essence the elements of beauty (perfection, harmonious proportion, and splendor), the attribute which necessarily results from these elements must also be His. Now, God is infinite perfection ; His infinitely numerous good qualities (not parts) coalesce in His Divine Essence into a most intensive unity; and, finally, He is all light, and pure clarity, and consequently, He must be beautiful. The Book of Wisdom concludes from the beauty manifest in the physical universe that the Creator is transcendently beautiful. Wisdom XIII, 3 sq. : ” Quorum [i. e., ignis, coeli, solis, etc.] si specie [pulchritudine] delectati deos putaverunt, sdant quanto his dominator eorum speciosior [pulchrior] est; speciei enim generator (6 tov koAAow ytveauxpxn*) haec omnia constituit — With whose beauty [viz., that of fire, the sun, etc.], if they, being delighted, took them THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 269 to be gods: let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they: for the first author of beauty made all those things.* Scripture frequently compares the beauty of God to a garment wrapped about the Divine Essence. Cfr. Prov. XXXI, 25: Fortitude et decor indumentum eius — Strength and beauty are her clothing.” Ps. CM, 1 sq. : ” Decorem induisti, amictus lumine sicut vestimento — Thou … art clothed with light as with a garment.” Ecclesiasticus compares ” Eternal Wisdom ” to the splendor of exquisite flowers, and calls it “mother of beautiful love.” In the Canticle of Canticles Divine Beauty appears in the guise of a charming bride-groom.12 With the exception of St Augustine, who has written on the subject with his usual profundity, the Fathers seldom descant on this divine attribute. b) God is not only beautiful, He is the very essence of beauty (pulchritudo a se), just as He is essential truth and goodness. And in the same manner that He is true in virtue of being Himself the Truth, He is beautiful in virtue of being Himself Beauty, because beauty is His own Essence. This proposition is demonstrable as a theological conclusion from the three elements of beauty: perfectio, proportio partium, claritas. God is infinite perfection itself.18 He is the subsisting monas, comprising within Himself all being,14 and He is light and splendor.15 Consequently, He is substantial, subsisting, aseitarian Beauty. This becomes still clearer if we apply to Him St. Augustine’s definition of beauty, viz.: Unity in variety. There can be no greater variety than that implied in God’s infinite perfections; 12 Cfr. Cant. Cantic, I, 15: 13 Supra, pp. 180 sqq. * Ecce tu pulcher es, dilecte mi, et U Supra, pp. 196 iqq. decorus — Behold thou art fair, my 15 Supra, pp. 225 sqq. beloved, and comely.*

nor a more intensive unity than the identity of the Divine Essence with its attributes. Consequently the notion of beauty is realized in God absolutely; and all the more perfectly as the element of multiplicity is not confined to the virtually distinct properties of the Divine Essence, but applies in an even higher degree to the real distinction of the Divine Persons. Absolute unity in real trinity must culminate in absolute beauty.16 Because God is Primordial Beauty, therefore He is All-Beauty, and excels every species of created beauty, as Nazianzen intimates when he says : ” Who is all beauty and far beyond all beauty.” 17 We will not rehearse the utterances of Pseudo-Dionysius, who has written so sublimely on the beauty of God, because we know now that this supposed ” disciple of the Apostles,” whom the Schoolmen held in such high esteem, was not the real Areopagite, but a Christian pupil of the Neo-Platonist philosopher Proclus (+485). The sooner theologians cease quoting Pseudo-Dionysius as an authority, the better. He can at most serve as a witness to Tradition such as it existed in the latter part of the fifth and in the early part of the sixth century.18 c) How is Divine Beauty related to created beauty? Divine Beauty is the ideal and source of all created beauty, both in the spiritual and the material order. 16 Why beauty is especially appropriated to the Logos, is explained by St. Thomas, S. TheoL, i a, qu. 30, art. 8. 17 Or. TheoL, 2. Cfr. Idem, De Virginity cap. 11: No one is so obtuse as to be unable to see that God alone is beauty kclt efrxhv* in the original and exclusive sense.* 18 Cfr. H. Koch, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen sum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen, Mainz 1900. Also the article ” Dionysius, the Pseudo- Areopagite/’ in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, pp. 13 sqq. and Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 535 sqq. Freiburg and St. Louis 1908. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 271 With reference to Wisdom XIII, 3 sqq., St. Hilary teaches: ” De magnitudine enim operum et pulchritudine creaturarum consequenter generationum conditor conspicitur. Magnorum Creator in maximis est, et pulcherrimorum conditor in pulcherrimis.” Augustine confesses: “Nulla extra te pulchra essent, nisi essent abs te — No beautiful objects would exist outside of Thee, had they not received being from Thee,” 19 and deplores his own defection from the Source of Beauty thus: ” Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tarn antiqua et tarn nova… . Et ecce intus eras, et ego {oris, et ibi te quaerebam et in ista formosa, quae fecisti, deformis irruebam — Too late have I loved Thee, O Beauty so ancient, O Beauty so new, too late have I loved Thee! And behold Thou wast within, and I was abroad, and there I sought Thee, and deformed as I was, ran after those beauties which Thou hast made.” 20 Unfortunately for himself, the great Bishop of Hippo had not followed the advice of St. Isidore of Seville,21 who urged that fallen man should use the beauties of creation as a ladder whereby to ascend to Primordial Beauty. God’s beauty is most splendidly reflected, not by the mineral, or the vegetable, or the animal kingdom, nor yet by the fine arts, but by the immortal soul of man, which presents a likeness and an image of Divine Beauty. Origen says: “The human soul is most beautiful; in fact, it possesses a beauty that is truly marvelous; for the Artist Who created it said: Let Us make man according to Our image and likeness. What can be more beautiful than such beauty and similitude?“22 Let it be added, however, that the soul is capable of l» Confess., IV. 10. 22 Horn, in Esech., 7. (Sec S. 20 Confess., X, 27. Thorn., S. TheoL, 1a, qu. 3, art. 1 ax De Summp Bono, I, 4. sqq.)

various degrees of beauty according as it is considered as the natural or the supernatural image of its Creator. The infusion of sanctifying grace, the formation in the soul of the image of Christ, the immersion of the spirit into the beatific light of the Divine Substance— produce in man a degree of beauty which no tongue can utter and no pen is able to describe.28 Therefore ascetic writers justly claim that the attainment of moral perfection is the noblest of all arts, and that no masterpiece of art can be compared to a holy soul. The most beautiful product of Divine Art is the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of God, in whose person innumerable privileges and perfections are harmoniously blended. Jesus Christ Himself (as Aoyo« ivaapKos = the Word made Flesh) would have to be called the apex of creatural beauty, and therefore the most faithful image of Divine Beauty, were it not for the fact that we must admire in Him rather the Hypostatic Union of created with Uncreated Beauty. For in His Divine Nature Christ is Substantial Beauty, while created beauty shines forth in His human nature only.24 Closely related to beauty is the divine attribute of sublimity (sublimit as, /AcyoAwrpcVaa) y which is rooted in God’s infinity, incomprehensibility, and omnipotence. Several of the Psalms describe J:his attribute in language of imposing 23Cfr. Scheeben, Die Herrlichkeiten der gottlichen Gnode, 6th ed. Freiburg 1897. 24 Cfr. Ps, XLIV, 3: ” Speciosus forma prae filiis hominum, diffusa est gratia in labiis tuts — Thou art beautiful above the sons of men: grace is poured abroad in thy lips.* Cfr. Clem. Alex., Strom., II, 5: * Redemptor noster … est vera pulchritudo, nam erat lux vera — Our Saviour … is the true Beauty, because He was the true Light.* On the whole subject, cfr. J. Souben, Les Manifestations du Beau, dans la Nature, Paris 1901, THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 273 grandeur, and the famous *Prayer of Habacuc” has rightly been reckoned among the most precious gems of the world’s literature.25 Readings : — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, § 85 (Wilhelmr Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 206 sqq.). — *Kleutgen, De Ipso Deo, pp. 417 sqq. — Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 30. — Nieremberg, Delia Bellezza di Dio. — Petavius, De Deo, VI, 8. — Thomassin, De Deo, III, 19 sqq. — *Stentrup, De Deo Uno, cap. VII, Oeniponte 1895. — H. Krug, De Pulchritudine Divina, Friburgi 1902.— Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” pp. 113 sqq., London 1897. 25 Habacuc, Cb. III.

CHAPTER II god’s categorical attributes of being The so-called categories (Karrjyopiat, praedicamenta) differ from the transcendental attributes of being in that they are not univocally predicable of all being, but of certain determined classes of being only. By reducing all concrete beings to their highest genera, Aristotle arrived at the ten so-called categories: substance and the nine accidents (crv^p^KOTa) ; quality quantity (wocw), relation «), place time position or attitude (situs, habitus or external belongings (*x«w = potency and faculties), action (vomv)9 and passion (irdaxuv, pati).1 In entering upon the discussion of the remaining attributes of God, we base the theological teaching concerning them upon these summa genera essendi, i. e.9 the two all-embracing classes (substance and accident), to one or other of which all terrestrial things capable of being conceived in thought belong. We do not, of course, mean to apply the predicaments to God in their strict sense — God is beyond and above lCfr. Clarke, Logic, pp. 187 sqq., and the article “Category” in the Catholic Encyclopedia III, 433 sqq. 274