Creation out of Nothing: Explanation of the Dogma

§2: Explanation of the Dogma

SECTION 2 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA The dogma of Creation presents two different aspects, according as we contemplate either the divine act or its creatural terminus. Viewing it in the first-mentioned or active sense, we shall enquire into (i) God’s conception of the universe as the exemplary cause of all things; (2) the relation of Creation to the Blessed Trinity; and (3) God’s freedom of will in creating the world. These points will be severally treated in the first three Articles of the present section. We shall add a fourth Article on creation as co-existent with time, and a fifth on the question whfether or not God can communicate His creative power to creatures.

Article 1: The Divine Idea of the Cosmos as the Exemplary Cause of Creation

THE DIVINE IDEA OF THE COSMOS AS THE EXEMPLARY CAUSE OF CREATION i. The Divine Idea of the Cosmos. — Reason tells us that the Creator must have designed the created universe in accordance with some 32 THE DIVINE IDEA OF THE COSMOS 33 pattern or archetype. As an artist cannot produce a work of art unless he has previously formed some idea of it in his mind, so God must have had a definite conception of the cosmos before He proceeded to mould it. Metaphysicians are agreed that the idea, or causa exemplaris, is a necessary condition for setting to work all those efficient causes which are endowed with understanding and free will. No intelligent cause proceeds blindly or at random. God’s idea of the cosmos may be regarded either subjectively or objectively. Subjectively it is God’s creative Wisdom or practical Knowledge, and as such identical with the Divine Essence itself. Objectively, or with regard to content, it is the ideal representation of whatever is to become actual, or, in the words of St. Thomas, the outward imitability of the Divine Essence considered as purely conceptual.1 This definition makes it quite clear that God’s idea of the cosmos is neither a creature, nor a metaphysical entity existing outside of, or side by side with God,2 nor yet the Divine Essence itself. God’s idea of the cosmos must consequently be the possible essence of the created universe, in so far as that essence is rooted in the Dir vine Substance and conceived by the Divine Intellect from all eternity.3 If we are careful to guard against the Platonic mistake of conceiving the archetypes of things as individual existences extraneous to God, we may safely adopt Clement of Alexandria’s distinction4 1 St. Thorn., S. th., ia, qu. 15, art. 2. 2 Such was the opinion of Plato. 8 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, p. 117. 4 Cfr. Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XI, 25. EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA between an ideal world (kooyaos vorjros) and the really existing world (xoo-fios ai

Gospel, John I, 3 sq. reads as follows: * Et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat* i. e., that which was created sprang from a vital idea in the Godhead, namely, the Logos. St. Augustine beautifully develops this thought in his Homilies on the Gospel of St. John,6 but the punctuation on which it is based has not stood the test of modern criticism. b) The Fathers developed the teaching thus adumbrated in Sacred Scripture, some of them explaining it in consonance with, others in opposition to, the Platonic philosophy.7 It remained for the medieval Schoolmen to give it its final polish. The most brilliant exponent of the doctrine of the Divine Idea is St. Augustine.8 From him the Schoolmen received it and unfolded it dialectically.9

Article 2: Creation in its Relation to the Trinity

CREATION IN ITS RELATION TO THE TRINITY Though the Blessed Trinity creates per modum naturae, that is to say, qua Godhead, Creation is specially appropriated to the Father as the • Tract, in Ioa., I, 17. 7 Among those who opposed the Platonic view were Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Gregory of Nazianzus. 8 He writes: ” Quis audeat dicer e Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidissef Quod si rede did et credi non potest, rest at, ut omnia ratione sint condita, nec eadem ratione homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in mente Creatorist Non enim quidquam extra se positum intuetur, ut secundum id constitueret, quod constituebat; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quodsi hae rerum creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse …, non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt et eiusmodi atque incommutabiles manent, quorum participation fit, ut sit, quidquid est, quoquo modo est.” In Libr. 8s Quaest., qu. 46, 2. 9 Cfr. Ruiz, De Scientia Dei, disp. 82. First of the Three Divine Persons. The fact that the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by philosophical arguments, does not, rightly considered, disprove the teaching of Catholic theologians that all creatures contain some vestige of the Trinity, and that, in addition thereto, the pure spirits, and man who is endowed with reason, “represent the Trinity by way of image.” 1 Thesis I: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost created the universe not as separate Persons, but per modum naturae, i. e., in virtue of the essential Knowledge and Volition common to the whole Trinity. Proof. This thesis, which embodies an article of faith, has been repeatedly defined by the Church.2 The * Decretum pro Iacobitis,* adopted by the Council of Florence, in 1439, says: ” Firmissime credit, profitetur et praedicat [Ecclesia], unutn verum Deum, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium visibilium et invisibilium creator em — The Church most firmly believes, professes, and teaches that the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the Creator of all things visible and invisible.” 8 And a few lines further up: ” Sed Pater et Filius non duo principia Spiritus Sancti, sed unum principium, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum principium— But the Father and the Son [are] not two principles of the Holy Ghost, but one principle; just as the 1 Bonjoannes, Compendium of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, … Translated into English. Revised by Fr. Wilfrid Lescher, O, P., p. 116, London 1906. 2 Cfr. Cone. Lat. IV, Cap. ” Firmiter.” 3 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 706. ” CREATION AND THE TRINITY 37 Father and the Son and [constitute] not three principles of the creature, but one principle.” 4 We will merely outline the Biblical argument for our thesis. Holy Scripture attributes the Creation of the universe sometimes to the Father,5 sometimes to the Son,6 and sometimes to the Holy Ghost.7 The diacritical particles ex, per, and in (c#c, 8u£, cfe) in Rom. XI, 36: Ex Patre per F ilium in Spiritu Sancto — Of the Father, by the Son, in (are all things), do not signify a difference of power, but simply the Trinitarian relation of origin. The meaning is that the Father has the creative power of Himself, the Son by Generation from the Father, and by Spiration from the Father and the Son.8 Certain Patristic writers say that if it were not for the Son, the Father could not create for lack of a creative word. This remark must not be misunderstood. The Fathers who make it merely wish to intimate that, if God were not Tri-une, He would not be God at all, and therefore unable to exercise creative power.9 St. Thomas explains this point as follows: ” Processiones personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas — are the cause of the production of creatures, inasmuch as they include the essential attributes of Understanding and Will.” 10 4 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 704. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 231 sq. 5 Luke X, 21. 6 John I, 3; Col. I, 15 sqq. 7Ps. XXXII, 6. 8 Cfr. St. Basil, De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 5; Humphrey, ” His Divine Majesty,” pp. 224 sq. 9 41 The three Divine Persons are, all of them, required in order to the causality of creation; inasmuch as that God is required, to whom a trinity of persons is essential, so that without this trinity He would not be God.” — (Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 226.) 10 S, th., ia, qu. 45, art. 6. On some very subtle problems involved in this theory see Ruiz, De Trinit,, 38 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA Thesis II: Creation is properly appropriated to God the Father. This thesis may be technically qualified as ” doctrina catholica” Proof. A glance at the so-called Apostles’ Creed11 shows that the Creation of the universe has always been appropriated to the Father. “Credo in unum Deutn, Patrem omnipotentem, factorem coeli et terrae — I believe in one God, the Father almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.” The intrinsic reason for this appropriation is the similarity existing between the creative act and the hypostatic character of the First Person of the Trinity. Creation is the beginning of divine operation, and as such related to the Father in His character of principium sine principio (apxq avapxo

This thesis forms part of the theological teaching common to all schools. Proof. We do not assert that the created universe reflects the Trinity as such. If this were so, the mystery of the Trinity would be demonstrable from the cosmos. As a matter of fact the three Divine Persons do not create qua Triad, but qua Monad, and this is the fundamental reason why the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is incapable of demonstration.14 The meaning of our thesis is that, as productions of the Triune God, creatures reflect the same essential attributes by virtue of which there are two Processions in the Godhead, viz.: understanding and will, knowledge and love. Thus interpreted the thesis offers no difficulties. For it stands to reason, and is further confirmed by the philosophical arguments by which we can prove the existence of God, that the created universe postulates a wise Intellect and a creative Will, and these are precisely the attributes on which the two inner-divine Processions are based. Consequently all creatures contain within themselves certain vestiges 15 of the Trinity. These vestiges are, however, blurred and obscure, so that, if it were not for Revelation, the human intellect could not 14 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. tit., pp. 196 sqq. 15 ” In every effect there is something corresponding to the cause; something which may be said to represent that cause. This representation may be such that the existence of the effect merely indicates the existence of the cause, and such an effect is said to show a vestige of the cause; the proper meaning of the word ’ vestige ’ is •footprint’; and a footprint which shows that a man has passed, but does not tell what manner of man he is, affords an instance of a vestige. When the representation affords some distinct knowledge of the nature of the cause, even if this knowledge be imperfect, the representation is called an image, such is the work of a sculptor or painter.* — Sylvester Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 233 sq., London 1895. Cfr. also Humphrey, His Divine Majesty/’ pp. 227 sqq. EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA arrive at a knowledge of the mystery. It is only after the mystery was supernaturally revealed that the mind of man was able to discover the relation existing between the Trinity and Creation.16 The second part of our thesis, viz.: that every rational creature bears within itself an image of the Trinity, is to be understood with the same limitations. The created intellect being endowed with understanding and free-will, its ” internal word ” (verbum mentis) reflects the Logos, while the immanent love which it entertains for itself emblems the Holy Ghost. Cfr. Gen. I, 26: * Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram — Let us make man to our image and likeness. A still more perfect image of the Trinity is produced in the human soul by sanctifying grace 17 and the beatific vision.18

Article 3: Creation as a Free Divine Act

CREATION AS A FREE DIVINE ACT It belongs to the treatise on the Essence and Attributes of God to prove that the Divine Will is essentially free.1 Here we have merely to show that, in creating the universe, God acted as a free agent, and, more specifically, that He acted libertate contradictionis sive exercitii and libertate specifications, not, however, libertate contrarietatis, which latter term means freedom of choice between good and evil. 16 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trinity, pp. 261 sqq. 17 Filiatio adoptiva, inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti. 18 Cfr. Hurter, Compend., Vol. II, thes. 127; S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 232 sqq., London 1895. We shall recur to certain aspects of this subject in our treatise on Grace. lCfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 430 sqq. CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT Thesis I: Creation was a free act, libertate contradictionis, i. e., God was free either to create or not to create, as He pleased. This proposition is de fide. Proof. The Council of Florence (A. D. 1439) defined: “Deus, quando voluit, bonitate sua universas … condidit creaturas — God in His goodness created all things, when He willed.” The Vatican Council (A. D. 1870), with an eye to the heretical teachings of Hermes and Giinther, further developed this definition as follows: ” [Deus] liberrimo consilio … utramque de nihilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam — God, with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing … both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelical and the mundane.* 2 And in Canon 5 the Council adds: *Si quis … Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate libera, sed tarn necessario creasse, quam necessario amat se ipsurn, … anathema sit — If anyone … shall say that God created, not by His will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the necessity whereby He loves Himself, … let him be anathema.” 3 Holy Scripture teaches this truth in numerous passages, especially in those which accentuate 2 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 3 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1783. on, n. 1805. the fact that God “hath done all things whatsoever he would.” 4 The dogma is enforced as it were by contrast in 2 Mach. VIII, 18: “Nos in omnipotente Domino, qui potest … universum mundum uno nutu delere, coniidimus — We trust in the Almighty Lord, who at a beck can utterly destroy … the whole world.” God cannot destroy at a beck except what He has freely created. We have a still more definite statement of this truth in Apoc. IV, 11: “Tu creasti omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant et creata sunt — Thou hast created all things; and for thy will they were, and have been created.” St. Paul writes: “Operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae — [He] worketh all things according to the counsel of his will.” 5 Where there is “counsel” there must be liberty. The teaching of the Fathers on this point is in perfect consonance with Holy Scripture. St. Irenaeus says: *Ipse omnia liber e fecit et quernadmodum voluit — He made all things freely and according to His will,*6 and Hippolytus: “He created even as He would, for He was God.” 7 St. Ambrose exclaims: *Quid difficile est eiy cui velle fecisse est? — What is difficult for 4E. g., Ps. CXIII, 3: Deus autem nosier in coelo; omnia quaecunque voluit, fecit.” sEph. I, xx. t Adv. Haer.t III, 8, 3. 7 Contr. Noet.t 10. CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT 43 Him to whom to will means to do?“8 We close the Patristic argument with a brief quotation from the works of St. Augustine: “He made [the universe] with an absolutely free will.” 9 Reason argues thus: If God had not been free in creating the universe, He must have acted under compulsion either from without (coactio), or from within (necessitas ab intrinseco). God cannot have acted under external compulsion, because no higher Being existed which could have exercised such compulsion. Nor can He have been actuated by immanent necessity, because in this hypothesis He would not be infinitely perfect, nor self-sufficient, nor absolutely independent (ens a se). Consequently, God was free either to create or not, according to His good pleasure. Thesis II: The divine act of Creation was free, libertate specificationis; that is, God was free to create either this present universe or any other. ’ This thesis may be technically qualified as doctrina catholica. Proof. The Provincial Council of Cologne (A. D. i860)10 defines: “Quemadmodum penes Deum erat, mundum creare aut non creare, ita penes ipsum etiam erat, hunc creare mundum aut alium — As it lay in the power of God to create or not to create a world, so it also lay in His Bin Hexoetn., II, 2. 10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 9D< Civ. Deit II, 24. Trinity, p. 262, power either to create this particular world, or a different one.” 11 a) The Scriptural argument for this thesis is based upon the sovereignty whereby God ordains all things according to His good pleasure. Ps. CXXXIV, 6: “Omnia, quaecunque voluit, Dominus fecit in coelo, in terra, in mari et in omnibus abyssis — Whatsoever the Lord pleased he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and in all the deeps.” Theodoret comments upon this text as follows: “The Lord created all things whatsoever He pleased, as Holy Scripture testifies. He did not, however, will all that it lay in His power to do, but only what seemed to Him to be sufficient. For it would have been easy for Him to create ten or twenty thousand worlds.” u For the rest, it is easy to see, even without the aid of Revelation, that, had God had no other choice than to create or not to create the present cosmos, there would be but one possible world — a view repugnant to the attribute of divine omnipotence, which halts only at contradiction; incompatible also with divine wisdom and perfection, for it is peculiar to wisdom to select and 11 Synod. Colon., i860, tit. 3, cap. 360 sqq., Oeniponte 1903. Cfr. also 12. Fortescue, The Orthodox Eastern 12 De Curand. Graecor. Affect., Church, pp. 56, 58, 70, London 4. On Theodoret of Cyrus cfr. 1907; Bardenhewer-Shahan, PatrolHurter, Nomenclator Literarius ogy, pp. 370 sqq. Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. I, coll. CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT vary creatable forms with the utmost freedom; while God would not be infinitely perfect if His Essence could be the exemplar of but one creatable world. b) Absolute Optimism is incompatible with Catholic teaching. This philosophical system, excogitated by Leibniz,18 holds that the Divine Intellect, in contemplating an infinite number of possible worlds, was constrained by the divine wisdom and goodness to select, and that the divine power was forced to create, that which was absolutely the best, i. e., the world in which the greatest number of realities harmoniously co-exist.14 The idea of an ” absolutely best world ” involves an intrinsic contradiction, because in the domain of finite objects there can be no summum bonum or absolute optimum. The Leibnizian conceit is also disproved by experience, which shows that the universe is seriously disfigured by evil. No sane person will deny that a world in which there was no sin, and no misery caused by sin (such as pain and death, sickness and poverty), would be a far “better” world than the one in which we now live. But even if such a thing as an absolutely ” best ” world were conceivable, the Creator would be under no compulsion to produce it. For no matter whether He makes things great or small, perfect or imperfect, God is sufficient unto Himself, and nowise depends on His creatures. In the words of St. Augustine: ” Deus nulla necessilBTheodic., part. n. 14 Cfr. Tennemann’s Manual of the History of Philosophy, ed. Johnson-Morell (Bohn’s Philological Library), pp. 340 sqq., London 1878. ” Leibniz’s … ThSodicSe was composed for the purpose of refuting Bayle, who had tried to show that reason and faith are incompatible. The work is devoted, in a large measure, to the discussion of the problem of evil and to the defence of optimism.” — Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 511. 4fi EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA tate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sold bonitate fecit, quod factum est — God made the world not because He was compelled to make it, or because He needed it for any advantage of His own, but out of sheer goodness.” 15 It is to be remarked, however, that not all forms of Optimism are irrational and repugnant. The relative Optimism advocated by Ruiz and Palmieri, and even by some of the Fathers of the Church,16 is supported by solid arguments and carefully safeguards the liberty of the Creator. The present universe may be regarded as the best in a relative sense, i. e., in so far as it is perfectly consonant to the divine idea, adequately serves the purpose for which it was created, and embraces all possible species of natural17 and supernatural perfection.18 Thesis III: The divine act of Creation was not, however, a free act libertate contrarietatis; that is to say, God was not free to create a bad world; He could create none but a good world. Proof. By a bad world we understand, not one in which there is physical evil (disease, pain, is De Civit. Dei, XI, 24. Among those who have effectively refuted absolute Optimism we may mention: Jos. Hontheim, Instit. Theodic, pp. 622 sqq.; Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacram., I, qu. 2, cap. 22, cited by Kilgenstein, Die Gotteslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor, pp. 212 sqq., Wiirzburg 1897. 16 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. ArbiU, III, 5; St. Chrysost., Horn, in 1 Cor., 12; St. John Damasc, De Fide Orth., II, 29. 17 Matter, plants, brute animals, men, and angels. 18 Grace, glory, hypostatic union. For further information on the whole subject the student is referred to Palmieri, De Deo Creante, thes. 12, Romae 1878; Stentrup, De Deo Uno, pp. 650 sqq., Oeniponte 1878; Humphrey, “His Divine Majesty/’ pp. 247 sqq., London 1897. Prominent among the more recent defenders of absolute Optimism is G. W. Allen, The Mission of Evil. Being a Suggestion towards a Philosophy of Absolute Optimism, London 1900. CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT death), but one replete with sin. Evil in its primary and proper sense is sin. But God, who is absolutely holy, cannot be the author of sin. In this sense our thesis is an article of faith, defined as such by the Fourth Lateran Council, and also by the Councils of Florence 19 and Trent. The Tridentine canon says: “Si quis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis, vias suas malas facere, sed mala ita ut bona Deum operari, non permissive tantum, sed etiam proprie et per se, anathema sit — If any one say that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God worketh evil in the same manner that He worketh good, not by permitting it, but properly speaking and per se, let him be anathema/’ 20 Of the Fathers we will only cite Augustine, who says: “Naturas igitur Deus omnes fecit, non solum in virtute et iustitia mansuras, sed etiam peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent ornaturae universum, sive peccare sive non peccare voluissent — God therefore created all beings, not only those which were to persevere in virtue and justice, but those also which were to sin; and He created them not in order that they should sin, but that they should be an ornament to the universe, regardless of whether they would will to sin or not.” 21 l» Supra j p. 28. ability. Essence, and Attributes, pp. 20 Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 6. 253 sqq. and 449 sqq. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Know- 21 De Lib. Arb.t III, xx. This dogma is denied by Pessimism, which has justly been called ” an error that is contemporaneous with philosophic thought.” Its traces appear in every stage of history.22, Arthur Schopenhauer may be regarded as its chief and most consistent exponent. He holds that the existing universe is the worst imaginable; that it is, in fact, a veritable hell in which “man is the devil of his fellows,” and that its only natural end and object apparently is, to be whelmed in utter destruction.28 Such a theory is plainly repugnant to faith and reason. We will not deny that the problem of evil, which has baffled so many thinkers since the days of the Gnostics and Manichaeans, is one of the most difficult in philosophy.24 But the Pessimism of Schopenhauer is opposed to common sense, which tells us that evil does not preponderate in the world; that side by side with physical and moral evil there exists an immense amount of good; that even where it takes the form of sin, evil is oftentimes the source of good which would otherwise remain undone; and, lastly, that a fair equalization and the restoration of the right order, which is partially disturbed here on earth, can only be expected in the world beyond. If we duly consider all these things we shall be persuaded that relative Optimism will ultimately prevail. The most satisfactory solution of ” the riddle of the painful earth ” 22Cfr. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 275 sqq. 28 Cfr. Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 589 sq. For a good critical exposition of Schopenhauer’s system see Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 283 sqq. 24 ” What place the principle of evil occupies in the constitution of things: how it came to exist: and how it may best be treated and its consequences avoided in practice — such questions as these really lie at the root of all philosophizing, whether speculative or didactic, ancient or modern; and it is mostly as a practical way of possible escape from some of the most painful and distressing of actual or possible experiences that religion in general has commended itself to the mind of man. — A. B. Sharpe, Evil: Its Nature and Cause, p. 7, London 1907. is that offered by Christianity; in fact, * the existence of evil is a serious difficulty in the way of accepting any nontheistic interpretation of the universe.” 25 According to Catholic teaching man was originally destined for a life of innocence and bliss. He fell from his high estate through his own fault. The Son of God descended from Heaven to redeem the sinful human race, and through His merits this present life of pain and sorrow will be followed by one of unending happiness for those who faithfully obey the divine will. Our Redeemer, who has justly been styled the ” Man of Sorrows,” furnishes a splendid pattern for the heroic endurance of this terrestrial exile, which lasts but a short while and affords us an opportunity to accumulate rich merits for the life beyond. In the cross of Christ lies our salvation and reconciliation; its glory dispels the terrors to which evil has given birth.26

Article 4: Creation in Time

CREATION IN TIME It is an article of faith that the world was created in time, i. e., that “a certain finite number of days has elapsed since the instant when the angels and the material world were brought into being.” 1 But theologians differ with re28 Sharpe, op. ext., p. 4. Its Cause, London 1907; Idem, in 26 Cfr. J. Dippel, Der neuere Pes- the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, simismus, Wurzburg 1884; E. L. article “Evil”; Driscoll, Christian Fischer, Das Problem des Gbels und Philosophy: God, Chapter XV, pp. die Theodicee, Mainz 1883; v. Kep- 297 sqq.; Boedder, Natural Thepier, Das Problem des Leidens in ology, pp. 393 sqq. der Moral, new ed., Freiburg 191 1; 1 Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic A. B. Sharpe, Evil: Its Nature and Theology, Vol. II, p. 249. 5o EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA gard to the question whether God, had He so willed, could have created an eternal world. Thesis I: God created the existing universe not from everlasting, but in time. This is de fide. Proof. In its famous Caput “Firmiter” the Fourth Lateran Council solemnly defined against the Albigenses, that God simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit naturam and the Council of the Vatican repeated this definition word for word: “God created out of nothing, from the very first beginning of time, both the spiritual and the corporeal creature.,, 2 This dogmatic definition is based on solid Scriptural grounds. a) The very first verse of Genesis declares that the world began in time: In principio (nnstena) creavit Deus coelum et terram — In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Some theologians doubt whether these words refer to the beginning of time;8 but it is easy to show that they do. in Biblical usage, signifies either the beginning of time, or a primacy due to dignity, or the cause that produces an effect, or headship in a local sense. In Gen. I, i the context clearly excludes the three last 2 Cone. Vatic, Sess. Ill, c. I. 8 Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II. p. 250. mentioned meanings. Consequently, the term must here denote the beginning of time. Some of the Fathers4 apply “beginning” to the Divine Logos, as principium de principio. But it is highly improbable that Moses had in mind the Logos. Moreover, the Fathers in question did not propound their construction as the primary and only correct one; they merely suggested it as a possible secondary interpretation resulting from a deeper study of the text.5 There are numerous other Scriptural passages which could be adduced in confirmation of our thesis. Cfr., e. g., Ps. CI, 26: Initio tu, Domine, terram fundasti — In the beginning, O Lord, thou foundedst the earth. Ps. LXXXIX, 2: “Priusquatn monies Herent aut formaretur terra et orbis, a saeculo et usque ad saeculum tu es, Deus — Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the world was formed, from eternity and to eternity thou art God.” 6 With the possible exception of Origen, the Fathers unanimously teach that the world is not eternal. Tatian, the Apologist, says: ” Ov8c yap avapxos ff fay, KaOdirtp 6 ®cos — Matter is not beginningless, as God is.” 7 St. Basil, the ablest among the Patristic commentators of the Hexaemeron, declares: ” Because many believed 4 Cfr. Theophil., Ad Autol., II, 10; Clem. Alex., Strom., VI, 7; Basil., Horn, in Hexaem., 1. 5 Cfr. Tertull., Contr. Hermog., c 19. 6 Cfr. also Prov. VIII, 22 sqq.; John XVII, s; Eph. I, 4. 7 Contr, Graec, 5. that the world was eternal, like God, Moses purposely chose these words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” 8 St. Ambrose insists that the world began simultaneously with time. “In principio temporis” he says, ” Deus coelum et terrain fecit; tempus enitn ab hoc mundo, non ante mundum — In the beginning of time God made heaven and earth; for time began simultaneously with, not prior to, the world.” 9 In other words, time began with Creation. Before the Creation of the world there was no real, but only imaginary time.10 Quite appositely, therefore, does St. Augustine observe: ” Procul dubio non est f actus mundus in tempore, sed cum tempore — The world was doubtless not made in time, but with time.” 11 And he brushes aside the ludicrous question: ” What did God do during the time that preceded the Creation ? ” with the remark: ” Non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus — There was no then, because there was no time.” 12 Thesis II: Creation from all eternity seems to involve a contradiction, and hence was probably impossible. Proof. As against the revealed truth that the world had its beginning in time, it is a purely speculative ques8 Horn, in Hexaem., i. 9 Praef. in Hexaem. contr. Peripat. lOCfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 306 sqq. — ” The now of time is the boundary line between the past and the future. As soon, therefore, as the world was created, there existed a boundary line between an imaginary or possible past, and a real future. This was the beginning of real time.” — Humphrey, ” His Divine Majesty,’ p. 257. 11 De Civ. Dei, V, 6.— Creation is said to have taken place in time, in the sense that real time began with creation. Before real time, there was only possible time. This was indefinite, in the possibility of it. Hence we may, with St. Augustine, say that the world was made with time, rather than made in time. Cfr. Humphrey, “His Du vine Majesty,’ p. 257. 12 Confess., XI, 13. tion of decidedly minor importance, whether or not an eternal world is intrinsically possible. Granted that it is possible, we must carefully distinguish between beginning in time and “being a creature.” From the fact that a thing began in time we can rightly conclude to its being a creature, but we could not argue conversely that it must have begun in time because it is a creature; an eternal creature would be as truly a creature as one produced in time. Still some of the Fathers, believing that an eternal world would involve an intrinsic contradiction, boldly concluded from the dependence of the world to its creation in time. It should however, be noted that not a few of the Patristic texts usually cited in this connection do not really bear on the question at issue. They merely affirm that the dualistic assumption of an uncreated eternal hyle involves a contradiction, whereas the question we are now considering is whether or not creation from eternity would entail a contradiction. But there is another group of Patristic dicta which are germane to our topic. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says: ” That which has been brought into being by creation, cannot possibly have existed from all eternity.” 18 This view was adopted by a number of eminent Scholastics, e. g., Albertus Magnus and Richard of St. Victor. St. Bonaventure went so far as to declare: ” To assume that the world is eternal … and [at the same time] to hold that all things were created out of nothing, is so contrary to right reason that I cannot persuade myself that any philosopher, no matter how small his intellectual capacity, ever took this ground.” 14 But St. Bonaventure’s opinion was not shared by all 18 Thes. Assert,, 32. 14 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 1, p. 2, EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA Catholic theologians and philosophers. Those two great antagonists, St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, agreed that the proposition that the world necessarily began in time, cannot be cogently established by philosophic arguments. * Mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur et demonstrative probari non potest/’ says St. Thomas; *That the world is not eternal we hold solely as a matter of faith; reason cannot demonstrate it by stringent arguments/’ 16 The Angelic Doctor carefully reviews the objections raised against this thesis in his work De Aeternitate Mundi.10 Still less is it demonstrable that an eternal creation is necessary.17 Such being the status of the vexed controversy, there is plainly no need for us to embrace either of the contradictory opinions current among Catholic philosophers and theologians. We merely note, in passing, that the authority of the Fathers seems rather to favor the intrinsic impossibility of an eternal creation.18

Article 5: The Incommunicability of God’s Creative Power

OF GOD’S CREATIVE POWER Revelation tells us that no creature ever exercised the creative power. Still the purely speculative question may be asked: Could God, if He would, communicate His creative power to a creature, e. g.f an angel of the highest rank? Of course no angel could wield the cre15 5”. Th,, ia, qu. 46, art. 2. 16 Cfr. the learned monograph of Dr. P. Thomas Esser, O. P., Die Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquino iiber die Moglichkeit einer anfangslosen Schopfung, Munster 1895. 17 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Pot.t qu, 3, art. 17. 18 Cfr. Hontheim, Instit. Theodicaeae, pp. 710 sqq., Friburgi 1893; Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 249 sqq.; Stentrup, Das Dogma von der jseitlichen Weltschopfung, Innsbruck 1870, ative power to the full extent of its infinite perfection, or independently of the preservative and concurring influence of the Divine First Cause. The meaning of our question is: Could any creature, as principal, or at least as an instrumental cause, produce anything (e. g., a blade of grass) out of nothing? A categorical denial of this possibility, it is easy to see, will redound to the glory of the Creator. Thesis I: No mere creature ever created anything out of nothing. This proposition embodies an article of faith. Proof. The Fourth Lateran Council dogmatically declared the Blessed Trinity to be “unum universorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et invisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium — The one principle of all things, the Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal.” 1 This truth can be proved from Sacred Scripture by a twofold method: (1) by showing that Creation is never attributed to any one but God; and (2) by demonstrating that the Bible positively denies that any creature ever exercised creative power. Heb. Ill, 4: Qui autem omnia creavit, Deus est — He that created all things, is God. Apoc. IV, 1 1: “Tu creasti omnia et propter voluntatem tuam erant et creata sunt — Thou hast created all things; and for thy will they were, and have been created.* This 1 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428. truth is enunciated even more solemnly in Is. XLIV, 24: Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, extendens coelos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus mecum — I am the Lord, that make all things, that alone stretch out the heavens, that establish the earth, and there is none with me. And in John I, 3: *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est — All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made.” In the light of these and similar texts the Fathers of the Church did not hesitate to brand as heretical the proposition that the world was made by beings of an inferior order. “Those who allege,” says St. John of Damascus, “that the Angels are the creators of any substance whatever, are mouthpieces of the Devil, who is their councillor; for being themselves creatures, the Angels cannot be creators.” 2 This view is shared by all theological schools. Thesis II: God cannot, even by way of grace, communicate His creative power to any creature. This thesis merely represents a theological conclusion. Proof. The Scholastics generally hold 8 that no creature, how high soever its rank, is able, even with divine assistance, to create anything out of nothing.4 Holy Scripture, Tradition, and ecclesiastical teaching 2 De Fide Orth., II, 3. Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist., I, 8 Against Durandus and Gabriel qu. 4. Biel. Cfr. the latter’s Comment, in 4 Durandus was ill-advised when alike regard the power to create as the true criterion of omnipotence, and consequently as an exclusive and incommunicable divine attribute, which as essentially differentiates God from His creatures as His eternity or immensity. Theologically, therefore, it is quite consistent to conclude from God’s creative power to His omnipotence and, ultimately, to His self-existence. The notion of a ” creating creature,” on the other hand, is as much a contradiction as would be that of a ” created God.” Whenever, in fact, Holy Scripture wishes to exalt God’s omnipotence and to impress His creatures with their own impotence, it usually accentuates His creative power.5 Hence we may properly conclude that creative power is a mode of operation peculiar to God, qua God, distinguishing Him from the creature, qua creature. This is most certainly the opinion of the Fathers, who hold that a ” creatura creatrix ” would involve an intrinsic contradiction. Thus St. Athanasius says: ” All things were made through the Word, who would not have wrought all things, were He Himself a creature. Hence even the angels are unable to create, since they are themselves creatures.” 6 Similarly St. Augustine: ” An angel can no more create a substance than he can create himself.” 7 The Scholastics tried to demonstrate the incommunihe wrote: ” Quamvis nulli creaturae sit communication, quod creet, tamen non apparet aliqua ratio convincens necessario, quod Deus non posset facere aliquam creaturam, quae possit aliquid producere nullo supposito in quo agat — Though it has not been given to any creature to create, yet there appears to be no stringent and necessary reason why God should not be able to make some creature which would 5 possess the power to produce something out of nothing.” L. c, n. 23. 5 See the texts quoted in confirmation of Thesis 1, supra, p. 55. 6 Serm. contr. Arian., ii, n. 21. Newman’s translation; cfr. Select Treatises of St. Athanasius in Controversy with the Arians, Vol. I, p. 277, 9th impression, London 1903. iDe Gen. ad Lit., IX, 15, 28. For other Patristic texts bearing on this topic cfr. Tepe, Instit. cability of God’s creative power by various philosophical arguments. St. Thomas bases his demonstration on the fact that pure being (ens in quantum est ens), which is the terminus of creation, can be produced solely by the causa universalissima.8 Suarez starts from an analysis of the creative act, which of its very nature, he says, cannot be limited to this or that being (e. g., a grain of sand), but embraces all creatable things. A power that is able to create by a mere act of the will — so runs his argument — can meet with no material obstacle, and must therefore extend to all possibles. Now, such a power cannot be conceived except as actually infinite, and therefore cannot belong to any finite creature. Hence God alone can create.9 Thesis III: The Creator cannot employ a creature as an instrumental cause in creating. This thesis may be qualified as highly probable (probabilissima) . Proof. An instrumental cause is far inferior to a principal cause, because it is moved rather than moving (as, for instance, a saw in the hands of a carpenter). The absolute impossibility of God’s employing creatures as instrumental causes in the act of creation is, therefore, not quite so evident as the truth embodied in the preceding thesis. In fact, not a few Scholastics, following the lead of Peter Lombard,10 opposed the thesis we are here upholding. St. Thomas at first followed the ” Master of the Sentences,” but later in life changed Theol., Vol. II, pp. 436 sqq., Paris 1895, and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. Ill, 3rd ed., pp. 12 sqq., Friburgi 1908. *” 8 S. Th., xa, qu. 45, art 5. 9 Suarez, Metaph., disp. 20, sect. 2, n. 11. Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante, thes. 6. 10 Lib. Sent., 5, dist. 4. his opinion and admitted that it is impossible for any creature to create, even though it were only as an instrument in the hands of God: ” Sic igitur impossible est, quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria neque instrumentaliter, sive per ministerium” 11 A transfer of the creative power to an instrumental cause, akin to the transfer of divine power to man in the working of miracles, the forgiving of sins, and at Consecration during Holy Mass, is inconceivable because of the absence of a materia circa quam; for, in the act of creating something out of nothing there is no subject to which the instrumental cause could be applied and on which it could exercise its causality. This consideration removes a difficulty raised by Oswald, viz.: that ” a conversion of one substance into another (transubstantiation) would seem to postulate as great a power as the production of a substance out of sheer nothing.” 12 At the Consecration the priest takes bread and wine as a substratum upon which to exercise his ministerial powers; but Creation is the production of something out of nothing without a pre-existing substratum.13 Readings: — *Palmieri, S> J., De Creatione et Praecipuis Creaturis, 2nd ed., Rome 1910. — Mazzella, De Deo Creante, 4th ed., Rome 1908. — Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. IV, §§ 257263, Mainz 1885. — Oswald, Schopfungslehre, Paderborn 1893. — Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 62-90, Freiburg 11 S, Th., 1a, qu. 45, art. 5. 12 Schopfungslehre, p. 53, Paderborn 1893. 18 Cfr. St. Thorn., Contr. Gent., II, 21 (Rickaby, God and His Creatures, pp. 88 sq., London 1905); Idem, De Pot., qu. 3, art. 4; also Tepe, InstiU TheoL, Vol. II, pp. 451 sq. * The asterisk before an author’s name indicates that his treatment of the question is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is invariably the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his name never means that we consider his work in any way inferior to that of others. There are vast stretches of theology which he scarcely touched. 6o EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 1899.— *G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol, Vol. II, pp. 417 sqq., Paris 1895. — Chr. Pesch, Praelect Dogtnat., t. Ill, ed. 3, Friburgi 1908. — Pesnell, Le Dogme de la Creation et la Science Contentporaine, 2nd ed., Arras 1894. — L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore et de Angelis, Friburgi 1905. — *St. Thorn., 5”. Theol., ia, qu. 44 sqq. — Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum. — Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vols. I and II, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1892-1895. — Vigener, De Ideis Divinis, Monast. 1869. — Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 134, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 356 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899). — *Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Minister 1867. — Stentrup, Das Dogma von der zeitlichen Weltschopfung, Innsbruck 1870. — Kleutgen, Vom zeitlichen Anfang der Welt (Beilagen to the Theologie der Vorzeit, Heft 2), Munster 1870.— Th. Esser, O. P., Die Lehre des hi. Thomas iiber die Moglichkeit einer anfangslosen Schopfung, Munster 1895. — St. Thorn., Opusc. De Aeternitate Mundi. — Billuart, De Opere Sex Dierum, diss. I, art. 6. — J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 179 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1904. — K Gutberlet, Gott und die Schopfung, Ratisbon 1910. — W. Humphrey, ” His Divine Majesty” pp. 205 sqq., London 1897.