Possibility of Supernatural Mysteries from the Standpoints of Agent and Subject; Suitability and Necessity of Revelation

Chapter XII: Possibility of Supernatural Mysteries from the Standpoint of Agent and Subject

I. Statement of Difficulties

An objection is raised by St. Thomas himself, for consideration: “A corporeal sense cannot be so elevated as to understand an incorporeal substance, since this lies above the nature of sense; therefore, since to see God lies above the nature of every created intellect, it is clear that no created intellect, by its own powers, can see the Divine essence.” Scotus urges a further objection along these lines: if the knowledge of the Divine essence lay above the nature of our intellect, the Blessed would never be able to see God at all, since no faculty can be elevated beyond its own specific object — the faculty of sight, for example, cannot be elevated so as to understand; were it otherwise elevated beyond the proper limits of its own essence, the faculty would cease to remain specifically the same. The Modernists object further: if the Supernatural Order is at an infinite distance, both objectively and subjectively, from the faculties and exigencies of our nature, then any elevation to the Supernatural would work against the very inclination of our nature, and would in fact prove destructive of it (cf. E. Le Roy, Revue Biblique, January 1906, p. 21). Supernatural revelation, on this objection, would then consist of wholly unintelligible mysteries, whose expression could only ever be metaphorical and symbolic.¹

II. No Proof Can Be Given Showing the Impossibility of the Revelation of Supernatural Mysteries from the Standpoint of Agent and Subject

Since elevation to the Supernatural Order is an essentially supernatural endowment, the possibility of such elevation cannot, strictly, be proved by reason alone; but neither can its possibility be disproved. To disprove the possibility of Revelation from the standpoint of agent and subject, it would be necessary to show the absurdity of at least one of the four conditions necessary for it:

(A) God, considered from the standpoint of His own intimate life, can act freely ad extra. Nothing can be denied to God — an infinitely perfect Being — except on the ground of some imperfection; but to act freely in regard to things outside His own Divine Nature implies no imperfection whatsoever. God does not act in order to secure some benefit to Himself, but in order to secure benefit for His creature. St. Thomas writes: “The higher a nature is, the more intimate its communication [of itself].” Since God is Pure Act and the Highest Good, it stands in absolute accordance with His own nature that He should communicate some real participation in His intimate life — “Summum Bonum est sui diffusivum,” “the Highest Good is by its nature self-diffusive.”

(B) It cannot be proved that no idea of our mind is capable of expressing, analogically and really — as opposed to merely metaphorically and symbolically — the supernatural mysteries as credible. It has already been shown that human ideas cannot express the mysteries of the intimate life of God as truths fully understood, nor as truths capable of demonstrative proof; but for the purposes of revelation, it is sufficient that they should be expressed analogically and really as truths to be believed, on the testimony of God obscurely revealing them, and not on the strength of any intrinsic evidence available to us. No imperfection follows from attributing to God notions such as Paternity, Filiation, Procession, and Spiration, whereby we receive some obscure instruction regarding the supreme supernatural mystery of the Trinity; the same reasoning applies equally to the notions employed in speaking of the Incarnation, the Redemption, and the Eucharist.

(C) Nor is there any repugnance as regards the supernatural light necessary for us to accept infallibly the mysteries of the intimate life of God. This light is an accident which raises and strengthens the natural human intellect; it does not, and cannot, represent the very essence of God as He is in Himself, but it tends essentially toward God as He is in Himself, and, in this manner, elevates the intellect toward Him.

(D) There exists, finally, an obediential faculty in our nature which cannot be disproved. St. Thomas writes: “A nature wholly material cannot be elevated to anything wholly immaterial. But the intellect, whether human or angelic, being somewhat raised above matter already, can, by Divine grace, be further raised to a yet higher stage. As the human intellect already sees, under concrete accidents, the abstract nature of an object, so it can be raised, by Divine help, to apprehend Subsistent Being itself.”

III. The Existence of an Obediential Capacity Whereby Human Nature May Be Raised to the Supernatural Order Follows from Consideration of the Adequate Object of the Human Intellect

Major: God, even in His intimate life, does not exceed the adequate object of our intellect, which is being in its widest extent, so far as it is analogically knowable.

Minor: But this passive capacity for such further knowledge, considered subjectively, is a genuine capability, distinct from mere active power.

Conclusion: Therefore it is not repugnant that this capacity should be raised to the knowledge of the most perfect intelligible Being.

Explanation of this teaching.

1° What is meant by “obediential capacity”? Subjective capability may be either active or passive. Active capability is exemplified by the will. Passive capability may be either natural or “obediential.” Natural passive capability is that whereby the intellect passively and naturally receives its intelligible species. Obediential capacity, by contrast, may be understood in relation either to (1) a created agent of a superior order — thus wood, but not water, has an obediential capacity in relation to the wood-carver — or to (2) God, whether as Author of nature (from whom man receives the capability of experiencing miraculous power) or as Author of the supernatural life itself. What is capable (which is merely a matter of non-repugnance to being) is to be distinguished, from a subjective standpoint, from what is objectively possible: objective possibility is a non-repugnance to existence.

2° What is the “proper” object of the intellect, as distinct from its “adequate” object? The proper object of the human intellect is intelligible being existing under sensible conditions; our intellectual knowledge, in the ordinary course of things, is abstracted from sensible objects. But is the adequate object of our intellect — as opposed to its merely proper object — precisely coextensive with what is knowable under sensible conditions, or wider still? The adequate object of our intellect is being in its widest extent, so far as it is analogically knowable in the mirror of sensible things. It is genuinely difficult to prove decisively that the adequate object of our intellect extends further still, exceeding even what is knowable in that mirror of sensible and spiritual creatures.

The following syllogism epitomises the teaching of the Thomistic School on this point: to secure genuine knowledge of reality, there is present in human nature an obediential capacity which may exceed the proper object of our intellect, but not its adequate object, taken in its widest extent. Therefore there is within us an obediential capacity for the knowledge of the intimate life of God — that is, of the supernatural mysteries.

Bañez holds that there is in the soul a threefold capacity: (1) specific, by which we know sensible things; (2) generic, by which we know, as we shall after death, purely spiritual natures such as the angelic; and (3) analogical, by virtue of which we may know the supernatural mysteries — and it is precisely in this third capacity that the likeness of our soul to God, Author of the supernatural life, most especially lies.

3° Statement and examination of the various theological schools.

(A) Terminology.

Appetite may be natural (necessary, innate) or elicited (either necessary or free); and elicited appetite may in turn be either efficacious or, when merely conditional, inefficacious.

Appetite is natural when it arises from a natural principle and tends toward an object proportioned to that nature; it is supernatural when it springs from a supernatural principle — Grace, Charity, Hope — and tends toward an object exceeding the proportions of nature. Natural appetite is a natural tendency toward a suitable good, one which anticipates the very apprehension of that good — a plant, for instance, tends toward the sunlight necessary for its wellbeing, without any prior “knowledge” of it. Elicited appetite, by contrast, is that whereby one who has actually apprehended a good moves toward its acquisition. A necessary elicited appetite acts upon the mere apprehension of the good, without deliberation — such appetite is found in irrational animals. A free elicited appetite is that whereby a rational nature, after due deliberation and estimation of the merits of a given benefit, inclines itself toward it. Finally, such reasoned appetite may be efficacious, when the benefit is judged genuinely attainable, or inefficacious, when the benefit is judged to lie beyond attainment — a merely conditional inefficacious appetite is, properly speaking, only a velleity.

4° What, then, does our natural desire to see God imply? This desire has been misinterpreted by certain Modernists. The desire implies, in human nature, a genuine capacity and suitability for the reception of supernatural truth, but it does not imply an exigency, as though the Supernatural were somehow due to nature as its right.

Argument of St. Thomas. “If the human intellect knows the essence of any created effect, and knows of God, its [ultimate] cause, only that He exists… there remains a natural desire to investigate that cause further.” For complete happiness, therefore, it is necessary that the intellect should ultimately reach the very essence of the First Cause.

Error of Baius and the Jansenists. Their contention was that there exists, in human nature, a natural and efficacious desire for the beatific vision, such that this vision would be, in some sense, due to our nature; the beatific vision and Divine grace would consequently become, on this view, effectively natural. Their arguments rested on: (1) the well-known words of St. Augustine, “Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are unquiet until they find their rest in Thee”; and (2) the teaching of St. Thomas just quoted above. But St. Augustine means, in fact, that our nature, once elevated by Divine grace and illuminated by Faith, tends toward God; and St. Thomas does not imply that the desire of seeing the Divine essence is a natural and efficacious desire — he teaches elsewhere that there is no natural and efficacious desire except in regard to a benefit proportioned, and genuinely due, to human nature.

(B) The Augustinian School of the eighteenth century taught that the intuitive vision of God is natural so far as mere appetite is concerned, but remains a supernatural end so far as its actual attainment, and the means of that attainment, are concerned; though the means are supernatural, and strictly not owed to nature, they are nonetheless “due,” in a looser sense, to the goodness of Providence, which does not withhold the means necessary for an end it has itself implanted. It is clear from these statements that the natural and supernatural orders here become confused: God, as Author of nature, has implanted in us an appetite for an end to which, as mere Author of nature, He does not, in fact, wish to lead us.

(C) The Opinion of Scotus. For the intuitive vision of God, there exists within us, on this view, a natural appetite, both innate and inefficacious. But from this it would follow that there exists in human nature a natural, innate appetite for happiness in general — and if the appetite is genuinely innate, it should also be efficacious, since an innate appetite does not arise from prior knowledge, but from nature itself, and thus corresponds directly to the powers and exigencies of that nature.

(D) The Opinion of Cajetan. From mere knowledge of created things there is, on Cajetan’s view, no natural desire to see God; but there is a “connatural” desire to see Him arising from knowledge of the effects of grace and glory — by “connatural” he means conformable to nature, even where supernatural effects are actually experienced. But the desire which proceeds from these supernatural effects of grace must itself be supernatural, not merely “connatural,” as Cajetan supposed. “How great would be the happiness of man,” as Plato himself remarked, “were he able to gaze immediately upon the Highest Good!” (cf. Symposium, c. 29).

(E) The Thomist Teaching. Man naturally desires, by a desire not innate but elicited, conditional, and inefficacious, to see the very essence of God, Author of nature. This desire is: (a) subjectively elicited, not innate, since it springs from knowledge of the effects of the First Cause, and is not a tendency of our nature which anticipates all knowledge. It is conditional: “I would like to see the essence of God, if such a benefit were possible.” It is inefficacious, though free, since the clear vision of God is not, in this present life, the adequate object of the will. (b) Objectively, the vision desired is of the essence of God not precisely as He is Three in Person, but as He is One in nature, Author of the natural order. Natural knowledge of God reveals real difficulties regarding the Divine attributes even as naturally knowable — the compatibility, say, of Divine justice with Divine mercy — and “from this knowledge there arises the natural desire which wishes ever more and more to see the Divine Substance itself” (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, c. 50).

Chapter XIII: Suitability and Necessity of Revelation

Article I: Heterodox Opinions and the Teaching of the Church

1° Rationalists deny the suitability of Revelation on the following grounds. (A) Revelation is superfluous in regard to the natural truths of Religion, since reason alone can discover them; moreover, Revelation would obstruct the progress of Science, by imposing an unchanging doctrine expressed according to the ideas of one particular period. (B) The revelation of supernatural truths implies the abdication of reason, through the obligation of believing unintelligible mysteries. Semi-Rationalists admit the suitability of a revelation of natural truths, but reject the revelation of supernatural mysteries.

2° Traditionalists and Fideists maintain, conversely, that the supernatural revelation of even the natural truths of religion is absolutely necessary, and that this revelation is transmitted by tradition. The following authors developed this idea: Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), a precursor of Traditionalism; the Vicomte de Bonald (1753–1840); Félicité de Lamennais (1782–1854); and, in a milder form, Père Ventura (1792–1861), Bautain, and Bonnetty. But the first principles of reason are naturally known without any need of tradition or revelation, and since human reason, proceeding from these principles, is led of itself to a knowledge of God’s existence, it follows that human reason, without the help of revelation, can readily know at least some natural truths concerning God. Catholic theologians commonly deny the possibility of any genuinely invincible ignorance regarding the primary principles of the Natural Law and the existence of God.

II. The Church’s Doctrine

1° The revelation of the natural truths of Religion is not absolutely necessary — reason alone can, from created things, acquire sure knowledge of the existence of God, and the like.

2° The revelation of the natural truths of Religion is morally necessary, so that all such truths may be known “quickly, with firm certitude, and with no admixture of error.” Moral necessity is a necessity which arises from the ordinary conditions and limitations of human nature, involving great difficulty in the achievement of certain ends. It is clear that, under ordinary conditions of life, men cannot, without revelation, overcome the difficulties in the way of knowing firmly, and without error, the full sum of the truths of Natural Religion. St. Thomas assigns three qualities of sacred knowledge which make Revelation morally necessary in this sense: (1) knowledge quickly acquired; (2) knowledge widely spread; and (3) knowledge firmly held.

Confirmation from the history of philosophy and of nations. (a) Among the philosophers: Heraclitus and Parmenides were materialists; Democritus and Anaxagoras taught degraded conceptions of the first principles of things; even Plato and Aristotle, for all their genius, mingled many errors with the sound conclusions of natural theology. In more modern times, further errors have prevailed — the exaggerated Idealism of Descartes and his school; the Agnosticism of Kant and his followers; the Pantheism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; the Positivism of Comte. (b) Among the nations and their religions generally, without the light of revelation, one finds: (1) a general degradation of the idea of God; (2) a degeneration of true worship into frankly licentious rites; (3) a widespread denial of the immortality of the soul; and (4) crime running rampant.

III. Revelation of the Supernatural Mysteries Is, on a Certain Hypothesis, Strictly Necessary

Necessity proved:

1° It is strictly necessary that an end should be known, in order that human actions might be rightly directed to it. But a properly supernatural end cannot be known at all without revelation; hence it follows that the revelation of this end, and of the means necessary to attain it, is strictly necessary — on the assumption, that is, of the gratuitous direction of man to this supernatural end in the first place.

2° It is only fitting that Revelation should, at first, remain somewhat obscure: were God to reveal His own essential nature to us directly and without obscurity in this life, the worship rendered Him by the creature would no longer be free, and therefore no longer meritorious.

IV. Suitability of the Gratuitous Direction of the Human Race to a Supernatural End

1° From the standpoint of man. An elevation without which our natural desire — conditional and inefficacious though it is — of seeing God as He is in Himself, could never be satisfied. Therefore the elevation of man to a supernatural end is genuinely befitting, and at the same time entirely gratuitous. The elevation is gratuitous because it exceeds every exigency of our nature; yet it is, at the same time, highly befitting, founded not on any prior inclination or natural direction toward a supernatural end, but upon the obediential capacity of human nature itself. After such an elevation has actually occurred, there follows a genuinely positive inclination toward the supernatural end, founded now upon the infused theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity.

2° From the standpoint of God and His infinite goodness. It is befitting to the Highest Good — that is, to God — to communicate to His creatures what is most intimate to Himself. In God, the Divine nature itself is what is most intimate of all. Hence it is befitting that God should give His creature a genuine participation in His own Divine nature, that is, in supernatural grace: “the higher a nature is, the more intimate its communication,” and “Summum Bonum est sui diffusivum” — “the Highest Good is by its very nature self-diffusive.”

V. In a State of Pure Nature, Would the Revelation of the Sum of the Natural Truths of Religion Have Been Morally Necessary?

(a) In a hypothetical state of pure nature, man could have reached his own natural end by knowledge of the principal truths of Natural Religion alone. Human nature, in that state, would have been subject to ignorance and concupiscence, but would not have been “wounded” in its faculties in the specific way that original sin has, in fact, wounded them.

(b) In a state of original integrity, man, though not elevated to supernatural life as such, would still have received from God the full perfection proper to his nature, together with certain modally supernatural privileges — immunity from ignorance, from concupiscence, from death, and from the interior conflict of the passions. In this hypothetical state, there would have existed a modally supernatural revelation regarding the sum of the truths of Natural Religion.

Hence the revelation of the totality of the truths of Natural Religion is morally necessary, not absolutely, in a hypothetical state of pure nature, but specifically in our own actual, present state — that is, on the presumption of man being, in fact, gratuitously directed toward a genuinely supernatural end. Rationalists should remember, throughout, that while supernatural truths remain incomprehensible and undemonstrable, they are for all that neither irrational nor unintelligible: in every genuine statement of supernatural truth, we know, at the very least analogically, what its subject and its predicate actually signify.

Footnotes

1. Cf. Professor Aliotta’s criticism of the views of M. Le Roy, in Science, Religion and Reality, pp. 172–173, 177–178. ↩