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T.J. WalsheApologeticsChapter 7

Divine Revelation; Mystery and Dogma

Chapter VII: Divine Revelation

Article I: Catholic and Non-Catholic Ideas of Revelation

The word “revelation” suggests the removal of a veil from some truth that is hidden; the same idea attaches to the corresponding Greek word apokalypsis (Matt. XVI, 17). We speak of a “natural revelation,” indicated in Rom. I, 19; but revelation, in its strict sense, signifies the manifestation of truth by a Divine intervention outside the order of nature (1 Cor. II, 10). Revelation is supernatural substantially if the truth revealed exceeds, for its very comprehension, the power of any created intelligence — the doctrine of the Trinity, for instance; it is supernatural only modally if the manner of the revelation is supernatural, though the truth revealed might not, in itself, exceed the power of the human mind to discover — the goodness of God, or the immortality of the soul, for example.

Revelation and Inspiration are distinct. Inspiration does not necessarily mean the manifestation of some new truth, but rather indicates a divine impulse to judge and to record infallibly truths already naturally known — St. Matthew, for example, wrote down facts of the life of Christ which he had personally witnessed; but owing to his inspiration, his Gospel, like the other three, can be called Deum auctorem habens, “having God for its author.”

A scientific definition of Divine Revelation may be thus formulated: it is a free and essentially supernatural action of God, whereby God, in order to guide the human race to its supernatural end, manifested to us, through His prophets and, last of all, through Christ, the mysteries and truths of the supernatural order and — with some obscurity, though infallibly — the truths of natural religion also, so that these might be proposed to the whole Church, throughout all time, without any admixture of error.

This definition is based upon the four causes of Revelation:

The true idea of Revelation will be further clarified by a brief review of certain heterodox conceptions of it, which err either per excessum, producing a pseudo-supernaturalism, or per defectum, reducing Revelation to naturalism.

(2) Pseudo-Supernaturalism — as found among certain early Protestants, and among Catholic Traditionalists and Fideists.

So far from exalting Revelation, the pseudo-supernaturalism of the early Protestants degenerated into Rationalism. (a) As regards the exposition of Revelation, they substituted an internal criterion for the infallible teaching of the Church: Luther and his disciples held that the meaning of Scripture is shown to each believer individually by the private inspiration of the Holy Spirit — a doctrine which led directly to private judgment. (b) As regards the nature of Revelation, they held that it is due to human nature, and consequently natural rather than supernatural. A similar error appears among Catholic Traditionalists (such as Bautain), who taught that reason alone can prove neither the existence of God, nor the fact of Revelation.

2. Naturalism. Here there is a twofold following: those who deny the supernatural character of Revelation altogether, and those who essentially lower it.

(A) Absolute Rationalism. Pantheistic Evolution identifies the nature of God with the nature of the created universe. (a) Hegelian teaching regards Revelation as the progressive evolution of our reason and of our natural religious sense, in accordance with the fundamental “law” of the dialectical process — thesis, antithesis, synthesis; Christianity is thus made nothing more than a single stage in that process. To the Rationalist, reason alone is the measure of truth, and dogma, at the most, is only a symbolical expression of some natural truth or mystery; dogmas consequently vary in sense with the progress of science. (b) The Modernists likewise claim the “application of sense”: the formula of the hypostatic union was true, on their account, at the time of the Council of Nicaea, because it corresponded to the philosophic knowledge of that period, but is no longer true, given our new conception of personality. (c) The Semi-Rationalists — such as Hermes, Günther, and Frohschammer — have taught that though the mysteries were originally supernaturally revealed, their existence can, after such revelation, be known by the natural power of the intellect alone, thrown back upon its own criteria.

Against all these, this treatise will show that Christianity is not a “superior form of the natural evolution of the religious sense,” but a religion essentially and truly supernatural.

Article II: Analysis of the Catholic Idea of Revelation

That the term “locution,” taken analogically, is correctly applied to Divine Revelation has been defended by St. Thomas: when we speak, we give utterance not to the thing itself, but to the notion, or interior sign, which we desire to convey. So God, in giving His revelation, does not literally “reveal Himself,” but gives some sign, some spiritual likeness, of Himself; and because of His infinite wisdom, this manifestation of God to men is necessarily and essentially a magisterial act, an exercise of His teaching authority. The Psalmist writes: “I will listen to what the Lord God may say within me” (Ps. LXXXIV, 9). “God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets, last of all in these days has spoken to us by His Son” (Heb. I, 1–2). That Our Blessed Lord spoke magisterially, as Teacher, is evident from the testimony of St. Matthew and St. John: “The people were in admiration at His doctrine, for He was teaching them as one having power, and not as the Scribes and Pharisees” (Matt. VII, 28–29); “You call me Master and Lord, and you say well, for so I am” (John XIII, 13).

The word “locution” applies to Divine Revelation not univocally, but analogically, in the sense known in logic as the analogy of proportionality. Goudin explains that an analogy of proportionality, whether metaphorical or real, exists between things whose common name, though its application differs, nonetheless signifies a similar proportion. We use the expressions “God spoke” and “man spoke,” and there is a genuine similarity of proportion here — a proportion between human speech and its effect, compared with Divine speech and its effect. To illustrate this analogy further: as the sensitive faculty bears a relation to its sensitive object, so, correspondingly, though distinctly, does the intellect bear a relation to its intellectual object. The proportion may, in either case, be real or merely metaphorical: it is real when the attribute indicated by the name (wisdom, say) exists formally and truly in both subjects (“God is wise,” “man is wise”), even though the manner of possessing it differs infinitely — “man’s” wisdom being finite, God’s unbounded; the proportion is merely metaphorical when the attribute assigned to the subject is one suggestive of imperfection (as “the anger of man”). Applying this distinction: the word “locution,” understood as a purely human utterance, is attributed to God only metaphorically; understood in its true, spiritual sense, as a manifestation of thought, it is applied to God analogically, in a real and true sense. The notion of Divine Revelation described throughout the Old and New Testaments is precisely a spiritual communication of God to men, and an exercise of His magisterial power — necessarily magisterial, and not the mere passive impartation of light.

Article III: Different Kinds of Revelation

III. Divine Revelation is given by (1) a direct manifestation of the truth, and (2) the gift of the supernatural light necessary for its recognition. St. Thomas, writing on the art of teaching, holds a middle course between Plato’s system of innate ideas and the empiricism of the sensist school. According to Plato, instruction is a mere revival of knowledge already possessed; according to the empiricists, knowledge is possible only through phenomena and the succession of phenomena. But St. Thomas points out that the art of teaching consists, rather, in showing itself convincingly, by a clear and effective demonstration, and its dependence on principle — much as a physician helps nature to heal itself, so a teacher helps the intellect to see and to regain a truth. Two conditions are needed for the recognition of a truth: either (a) the intellect sees the truth directly in itself, by its own natural light; or (b) it accepts the truth on the authority of one who does see it — but by effective teaching, the truth remains, in some measure, obscure even after the demonstration. And the proposition taught must itself enunciate a true statement, because it needs Revelation for its own certainty; Revelation is thus distinct from mere intellectual illumination. Finally, if the very comprehension of a natural truth requires it, supernatural light will be needed even for the reception of truths divinely proposed for our acceptance.

Revelation may, moreover, be classified in several distinct ways: (1) it may be supernatural in substance (as the doctrine of the Trinity) or merely in the mode of its manifestation; (2) it may be given through the senses, the imagination, or the intellect; (3) it may be active — the illuminating influence of the Holy Spirit — or passive — the perception of the Divine illumination; (4) it may be immediate or mediate, immediate to the prophets, mediate to others through the prophets; and (5) it may be public or private, that is, given for the general benefit of the Church, or for the benefit of one or a few individuals only.

Chapter VIII: Mystery and Dogma

Article I: Catholic and Heterodox Views

A Mystery, strictly interpreted, is a truth which no created intellect, whether human or angelic, can comprehend — the truth is beyond the comprehension of any created teacher; the statements to be believed are, as it were, an intellectual humility, above (not against) reason. A mystery, therefore, has three characteristics: (1) It requires Revelation for its own knowledge. (2) The divine origin of the Revelation making it known must itself be clearly manifested. (3) It remains obscure even after the revelation.

A dogma is a statement, contained either explicitly or implicitly in Scripture or Tradition as divinely revealed, and promulgated by the Church, either by a special decree or by her universal and ordinary magisterium.

Heterodox Ideas of Mystery and Dogma. (A) The Rationalists reject supernatural mysteries outright, or reduce them to natural truths cognoscible by reason. Kant explained the doctrine of the Trinity as indicating three attributes of God which can be known by reason alone; Hegel explained the same mystery as three aspects of an evolutionary process — thesis, antithesis, synthesis. (B) The Modernists likewise claim the “application of sense”: the formula of the hypostatic union, they say, was true at the time of the Council of Nicaea, because true to the philosophic knowledge of that period, but is no longer true, on account of a new conception of personality. (C) The Semi-Rationalists — Hermes, Günther, Frohschammer — have taught that mysteries, though originally supernaturally revealed, may afterward be proved by reason. The Vatican Council has condemned this last error, and has also condemned the parallel error that the doctrine of the Trinity can be proved by reason, whether before or after revelation.

Article II: Theological Explanation of Mystery and Dogma

I. A “mystery,” taken in a wide sense, may be defined as anything hidden from our knowledge, but worthy of being known — even to the extent that it can be known — without recourse to any supernatural revelation. But a genuine supernatural mystery cannot be known at all, so far as its very existence is concerned, without a supernatural revelation. Note the following division: things hidden as to their essence, physically (e.g., the nature of matter), metaphysically (e.g., the nature of a transient act), or intellectually (e.g., the secrets of hearts).

II. The Intelligibility of Mysteries and Their Interconnexion. Relative to the human intellect, we may distinguish: (a) natural truths, hidden but possible to know — such as gravitation, energy, electricity, nutrition, free will, and the like; (b) truths absolutely hidden as to their essence, for any created intellect, but whose compatibility — for instance, of the various attributes of God naturally known — remains at least discoverable; (c) truths which, understood in a wide sense, are Divine decrees — the government of the Church under one supreme pastor, for example — which become intelligible only after revelation; and (d) truths which, in the strict sense, remain obscure even after revelation — the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the like.

The late Professor Huxley wrote: “The mysteries of the Church are child’s play compared with the mysteries of nature. The doctrine of the Trinity is not more puzzling than the necessary antinomies of physical speculation.” It is worth noting how ubiquitous such natural mysteries, beyond human comprehension, actually are — in the physical order (the nature of matter, of energy, of electricity, of gravitation); in the biological order (the processes of assimilation and reproduction); and in the psychological order (the nature of sensation, of free will).

(A) Supernatural mysteries are incomprehensible and undemonstrable, but analogical knowledge of them is nevertheless possible. (1) Mysteries are not, for all that, unintelligible. Things are “incomprehensible” when they are not fully comprehended — the attribute of Divine omnipotence, for instance. Things are “undemonstrable” when they cannot be deduced either from evident principles (demonstration a priori) or from facts of experience (demonstration a posteriori); what is merely probable cannot itself be proved, yet remains fully intelligible. What is truly “unintelligible,” by contrast, is opposed to reason either because it is evidently absurd, or because it has, quite simply, no meaning. Supernatural mysteries are incomprehensible and undemonstrable, but they are not, in this technical sense, unintelligible: a statement of them possesses an intelligible subject and predicate, though the precise connexion between the two remains, of itself, unevident.

(2) Mysteries are intelligible analogically. Divine Revelation makes use of humanly acquired ideas which express directly something created, and analogically something uncreated: the idea of “paternity” applied to God the Father, or “natural filiation” applied to the eternal filiation of the Second Person of the Trinity, and so with the other analogical ideas — spiration, word, person, generation, love — applied to the mystery of the Trinity. This analogy of proportion is not merely metaphorical (as, say, “the wisdom of the universe” is metaphorical). As a man may judge that something is a symphony from a purely material apprehension of sound, without any grasp of it from the standpoint of harmony, so a man may believe a supernatural truth without fully entering into its intimate significance.

(3) The intelligibility of the Trinity, for instance, cannot come about apart from the Divine gift of grace and inspiration itself: without this gift, the Supernatural, precisely because supernatural, cannot become intelligible to us in the way its own inner mysteries demand — the following interconnexion, for example, may be noted: the Trinity, seen as our participation in the intimate life of God, is subordinated to, and inter-connected with, other truths to be revealed later, such as the Incarnation and the Redemption.

Development of doctrine has taken place, historically, in a threefold way. (1) By definite and clear statement of truths which had previously been taught only incidentally, or in mere practice — under this head falls, for instance, the Church’s decision regarding the validity of baptism conferred by heretics. (2) By explicit scientific statement of a truth previously held only implicitly, or in a popular way: the doctrine of the Trinity was explicitly held from the very beginning, though the technical science of theology stressed the consubstantiality of the Three Persons only later. (3) By explicit statement of what was only implicitly contained in an earlier formula: the “fulness of grace,” for example, implicitly includes the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, which was not explicitly defined until 1854.

Before the coming of Christ, the doctrine of Faith, substantially the same throughout, was more explicitly manifested by a series of successive revelations. St. Thomas tells us that certain primary truths were revealed which implicitly contained others to be revealed later — “God exists,” “God is a rewarder of them that seek Him,” and the like, implicitly containing the Incarnation, the Redemption, the Trinity. The Faith was always specifically the same, since the truths explicitly believed later were believed implicitly from the beginning.1

After the time of Christ and the Apostles, Revelation, being now complete, could neither be increased nor diminished; so-called “private revelations” do not belong to the Church’s infallible deposit of doctrine. Throughout the ages the Church has proposed for the belief of the faithful only those truths already revealed in Scripture or Tradition; as occasion required, she has given more explicit formulation to particular doctrines. Thus the Church teaches “new” doctrines, but not “novelties.” The original formula describing the Incarnation was simply, “the Word was made flesh”; a fuller, more consubstantial formula came later — “the Word, consubstantial with the Father, was made man.” So too the formula originally describing the sinlessness of the Blessed Virgin was simply gratia plena, “full of grace”; it was declared, later, to include also the grace of her Immaculate Conception.

Footnotes

  1. Faith under the Old Testament was substantially the same as Faith under the New, because under both Testaments the primary formal object of Faith (the intimate life of God) and the formal motive of Faith (the authority of God revealing) were identical (cf. IIa IIae, q. 1, a. 7). St. Thomas writes: “Quaecumque posteriores crediderunt continebantur in fide praecedentium Patrum, licet implicite” — “whatever the later [believers] believed was contained in the faith of the earlier Fathers, though implicitly.” Two examples clarify the sense in which such truths are “implicitly” contained. First: the notion of being actually and implicitly contains the less general notions of the modalities of being, and contains nothing outside being, since outside being there is simply nothing — being is not a genus, for a genus contains only virtually, not actually implicitly, the specific differences extrinsic to it (as rationality is extrinsic to mere animality); similarly, the intimate life of God actually and implicitly contains the supernatural mysteries subsequently revealed — the Incarnation, the Redemption — which are not, in this sense, extrinsic to that intimate life. Second: a doctrine may be known at first only confusedly, and later distinctly; here the “development” of the doctrine occurs not by the addition of genuinely new ideas, but by a clearer apprehension of the original idea — it is in this sense that the “fulness of grace” of the Blessed Virgin implicitly contains the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. After the death of the Apostles the deposit of Faith was closed, and no doctrine beyond what is implicitly contained within that deposit has been, or can be, proposed by the Church. ↩