Confession — Proof from Sacred Scripture

Chapter 2: Confession

1. Confession (confessio) is the sorrowful declaration of sins made to a priest, with the purpose of obtaining forgiveness through the power of the keys. The term is sometimes, by synecdoche, applied to the Sacrament of Penance as a whole.

Sacramental confession consists of five separate and distinct parts:

(1) An accusation made by the sinner himself, inspired by genuine sorrow, and hence not a merely historical recital or boastful vaunting after the manner of Jean Jacques Rousseau. By the manifestation of sorrow, contrition, which is in itself invisible, becomes visible and thereby capable of being the quasi-matter of a Sacrament.

(2) A declaration of one’s own sins, more specifically of all the mortal sins committed since Baptism or the last valid confession. By this requirement confession excludes original sin and the sins of others.

(3) The penitent’s self-accusation must be made to a priest, i.e., one constituted in authority and endowed with the requisite jurisdiction. A layman, or a priest lacking the necessary faculties, cannot give absolution.

(4) Confession is made in order to obtain forgiveness, not to procure the punishment of the sinner, as in a secular court or before the Inquisition.

(5) The power of the keys is expressly mentioned to show that the sacramental absolution is a genuine judicial act.

2. Confession may be either actual or virtual. It is actual if it contains a formal self-accusation on the part of the penitent. It is virtual if the penitent has at least the desire of confessing his sins if possible.

Actual confession (confessio actualis) may be either general or particular.

In common parlance a general confession means one in which the penitent repeats either all or some of his former confessions. Here, however, we mean simply a declaration of guilt in general terms, as e.g. in the Confiteor. Such a general accusation is sufficient only in cases of necessity, in war, at the hour of death, etc., where other external signs, such as beating one’s breast, would also suffice.

A particular confession may be either complete or incomplete. It is incomplete (confessio distincta secundum quid) if it includes some but not all of the mortal sins of which the penitent is conscious. Such an incomplete confession is admissible when the penitent is either physically or morally incapacitated for making a complete declaration, or when he is justified in concealing a sin. (This subject belongs to moral theology.) In all other cases the conscious omission of even one mortal sin is sacrilegious and renders the Sacrament invalid.

The ideal and most common form of confession is that called confessio distincta simpliciter sive integra, i.e., a complete, sincere, and clear avowal, made after a careful examination of conscience, of all the mortal sins of which one is conscious, together with their number, specific nature, and necessary circumstances. The completeness demanded is, of course, merely formal. Whenever possible, a complete confession is necessary for the validity of absolution. The examination of conscience that must precede confession belongs to the domain of moral theology.

The division of confession into public (confessio publica) and private (confessio auricularis) is of no dogmatic importance, as both species are sacramental when followed by the priestly absolution. Public confession, too, may be a judicial act, though in the nature of things privacy best conforms to the character of the penitential tribunal, and the penitent has a right to demand that his sins be kept secret (seal of the confessional, sigillum confessionis). It is no doubt owing to this desire for privacy that auricular confession was practiced from the earliest days of Christianity.

Public confession must not be confounded with public penance (Poenitentia publica), which under the ancient discipline was imposed for public — according to Morinus, Juenin, and Natalis Alexander also for secret — crimes, and with which we have dealt at some length in the first part of this treatise.

3. The Church’s dogmatic teaching on the subject of confession is fully set forth in the decrees of Trent,¹ where confession is declared to be divinely instituted and necessary for salvation both as a means and by way of precept (necessitate medii et praecepti).

Sacramental confession is nothing else than the actual submission on the part of the penitent of himself and his sins to the power of the keys, and consequently, to say that the power of the keys is divinely instituted and necessary for salvation² is to affirm the same of confession. However, as complete confession may be dispensed with in urgent cases, confession is not necessary in the same sense as contrition, which, the Council of Trent says, “was at all times necessary for obtaining the forgiveness of sins.”³

We now proceed to demonstrate the divine institution and necessity of confession per modum unius from Sacred Scripture and Tradition.

Section 1: The Divine Institution and Necessity of Confession Proved from Sacred Scripture

1. Doubtful Texts. Sacramental confession is nowhere expressly mentioned in Holy Scripture, and hence none of the texts frequently quoted in this connection is strictly conclusive.

There is, for instance, 1 John I, 9: “If we confess our sins, he [God] is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins.” In view of St. John’s account of the institution of the power of the keys, as given in the twentieth chapter of his Gospel,⁴ it is quite natural to conclude that the above-quoted text from his first Epistle applies to sacramental confession. It may, but need not necessarily, be so interpreted. The sacred writer may conceivably have had in mind a mere avowal of sins before God.

Another text that seems to refer to sacramental confession is 1 Cor. XI, 28: “But let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of the bread, and drink of the cup.” For the unworthy to “prove himself” no doubt means to purify his conscience. But St. Paul does not expressly say that this must be done by sacramental confession. Quite a number of Fathers and theologians appeal to this text.⁵

Acts XIX, 18: “And many of them that believed came confessing and declaring their deeds.” Here there is question of particular confession, but we do not know whether “they that believed” were catechumens or baptized Christians; nor is there anything in the sacred text to tell us whether their confession was sacramental, though we may with probability assume that it was.

The only Scriptural text that supplies some kind of argument for the existence of sacramental confession is Jas. V, 16: “Confess therefore your sins one to another, and pray for one another, that you may be saved.” Two verses farther up St. James speaks of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, in which sins are remitted by virtue of the prayer uttered by the priest,⁶ and hence it is highly probable that the Greek term for “confess” in Chapter V, verse 16, signifies the Sacrament of Penance. The phrase “one to another” proves nothing against this interpretation, for Sacred Scripture frequently employs this expression to denote a relation not strictly reciprocal, as, e.g., Eph. V, 21: “Subiecti invicem in timore Christi” (“Being subject one to another, in the fear of Christ”).⁷

Abbot Werner (d. 1126) aptly comments on our text as follows: “What does the phrase ‘one to another’ mean? Not that everyone confess to anyone, but one to another, i.e., one man to another, the sheep to their shepherds, subjects to their superiors, those who have sinned to those who have the power to forgive sins.”⁸ Nevertheless it must in all frankness be admitted that this interpretation of James V, 14 sq. is not absolutely certain; if it were, the Tridentine Council would no doubt have utilized this text.

Must it be admitted, then, as Duns Scotus claims, that the divine institution and necessity of confession cannot be stringently proved from Scripture? It cannot be proved directly; but an indirect argument may be construed upon the basis of what the Bible teaches in regard to the power of the keys.

2. Indirect Argument from Sacred Scripture. The middle term of this argument is the Biblical dogma of the necessity of the power of the keys⁹ and the judicial form in which that power is exercised.¹⁰

a) We have shown in the first part of this treatise that according to Holy Scripture the power of the keys is necessary to obtain remission of sins. It follows that every penitent sinner must submit himself to the Church and that his grievous sins remain unforgiven in the eyes of God so long as he neglects to appear before the ecclesiastical tribunal (retentio extraiudicialis) or if that tribunal refuses to absolve him (retentio iudicialis). We have also shown that the power of the keys is exercised in judicial form. It follows that all mortal sins brought before the ecclesiastical forum are either authoritatively forgiven or authoritatively retained by virtue of a judicial sentence, in rendering which the judge is guided objectively by the law of Christ and subjectively by the disposition of the penitent. On the basis of these two truths we argue as follows:

b) Our Lord Jesus Christ is a wise and just lawgiver who must demand that the power of forgiving or retaining sins be exercised not arbitrarily but according to objective norms and in a just manner. Now this is impossible without an accurate knowledge, on the part of the judge, of the exact number, the nature, and the specific circumstances of the sins upon which he is asked to pronounce sentence. This information, in the nature of things, can be supplied only by the penitent, who is defendant, prosecutor, and witness all in one person. Consequently, the penitent himself must reveal to the priest all his mortal sins, together with their number, nature, and necessary circumstances — in other words, he must “go to confession.”

The major premise of this syllogism requires no proof. A judge who would proceed arbitrarily would not be applying the law but committing a wrong.

The minor can be proved by a twofold argument.

(1) It is of the very nature of judicial power, and especially of judicial remission, that the matter to be decided come within the official cognizance of the judge. In the tribunal of Penance the matter to be adjudged are the grievous sins from which the penitent asks to be absolved. These must be separately adjudged and remitted. Therefore every grievous sin must be separately confessed. And as specific differences complicate a case, the judge must be informed of the exact nature of each sin, and the circumstances necessary to form a just conception of its gravity. This information can come from the penitent only, and therefore the penitent must (if possible) make a complete avowal of his sins (confessio distincta simpliciter sive integra).

To this consideration may be added another. In the existing order of salvation mortal sin can be forgiven only by the infusion of sanctifying grace. Sanctifying grace cannot exist in the soul unless the latter is free from mortal sin. Hence, either all mortal sins are forgiven together, or none is forgiven, and whoever wishes to be absolved must confess all his mortal sins (at least in voto), as it is impossible to obtain forgiveness for one without obtaining forgiveness for all.

(2) It is likewise of the very nature of judicial power that it can bind as well as loose. In the case of Penance this means that the priest can retain as well as forgive the penitent’s sins. This retaining power may be exercised both with regard to guilt and with regard to punishment. In regard to guilt, the judge must know, in the first place and above all, whether the penitent is worthy of absolution, that is to say, whether he has the required disposition (is sorry for his sins, willing to avoid proximate occasions, ready to make restitution of ill-gotten goods, etc.). While it is possible for the confessor in some cases to obtain such knowledge without confession, this is not the rule, because the confessor, not the penitent, is the competent judge of the latter’s state of conscience and without a close insight into the number and gravity of the sins submitted he cannot decide whether to give or to withhold absolution.¹¹ Consequently the confessor has the right and the duty to demand an accurate and circumstantial description of the penitent’s state of conscience, i.e., a complete confession of his sins. But the office of the penitential judge does not end here. Even if the penitent has the right disposition, the priest may not absolve him without at the same time enjoining an appropriate penance. This again cannot be justly determined without a complete knowledge of the facts, because a penance must correspond to the number and gravity of the sins for which it is imposed.

“It is manifest,” says the Council of Trent, “that priests could not have exercised this judgment without knowledge of the cause; neither indeed could they have observed equity in enjoining punishments, if the faithful should have declared their sins in general only, and not rather specifically, and one by one.”¹²

The necessity of confession, as just explained, is a necessity both of means and of precept, and therefore confession is a divine institution. By commissioning His Apostles and their successors to judge the sins of the faithful, our Divine Saviour eo ipso instituted confession, without which the exercise of this judicial power would be impossible.

c) What we have said of the necessity of confession applies to all who are able to obey the divine command. But what about those who are either physically or morally unable to confess their sins? To these exceptional cases the same rule applies that has been stated in connection with Baptism. If a man is unable to make a complete confession, an incomplete one will suffice, and if he cannot make any at all, the desire (votum confessionis) may supply the act. Untoward circumstances of a transient nature, however, do not remove the obligation, and whoever finds himself subsequently able to confess the sins from which he has been absolved without a complete confession, is bound to do so as soon as he can. Thus is the necessitas medii of confession duly safeguarded.

Note, however, that the Sacrament of Penance cannot be administered where there is no external sign of any kind to indicate that the sinner has at least a desire to confess his sins.¹³

Footnotes

1. Sess. XIV, cap. 5; can. 6–8. ↩

2. See above, on the Necessity of the Power of the Keys. ↩

3. Sess. XIV, cap. 4: “Fuit autem quovis tempore, ad impetrandam veniam peccatorum hic contritionis motus necessarius.” ↩

4. John XX, 22 sqq. ↩

5. Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. XIII, cap. 7. ↩

6. Jas. V, 14 sq. ↩

7. “Subiecti invicem (allēlois) in timore Christi.” ↩

8. “Quid est alterutrum? Non uniuscuiusque unicuique, sed alterutrum, hoc est inter vos homines hominibus, oves pastoribus, subiecti praelatis, hi qui peccata habent, his qui peccata dimittere potestatem habent.” (Migne, P.L., CXVII, 882). ↩

9. See above, on the Necessity of the Power of the Keys. ↩

10. See above, on the Judicial Character of the Power to Forgive Sins. ↩

11. Cfr. St. Jerome, In Matth., 16, 19: “Quum peccatorum audierit varietates, scit qui ligandus sit quive solvendus.” ↩

12. Sess. XIV, cap. 5: “Constat enim, sacerdotes iudicium hoc incognitā causa exercere non potuisse neque aequitatem quidem illos in poenis iniungendis servare potuisse, si in genere dumtaxat et non potius in specie ac sigillatim sua ipsi peccata declarassent.” ↩

13. See above, on the Matter of the Sacrament. The Scriptural argument for confession is well developed by Palmieri, De Poenit., thes. 33. ↩