Part II: Penance as a Sacrament

We have shown that the Catholic Church has the power to forgive sins. It remains to prove that in exercising this power she confers a Sacrament.

Penance is a Sacrament because it was instituted by Jesus Christ as a visible sign communicating invisible grace. The visible sign is contained partly in certain acts performed by the penitent and partly in the form of Penance, which is that of a judicial tribunal pronouncing sentence on a self-accusing criminal. That this visible sign confers invisible grace follows from the efficacy of the priestly absolution, which is unconditionally valid before God and in the court of conscience.

That Penance is a Sacrament has been solemnly defined by the Council of Trent: “If anyone saith that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a Sacrament, instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling the faithful unto God, as often as they fall into sin after Baptism, let him be anathema.”¹

The many intrinsic and extrinsic relations of Penance have given rise to a variety of names. Thus the Fathers often refer to it as “laborious Baptism” (baptismus laboriosus). Tertullian and St. Jerome call it “a second plank after shipwreck” (secunda post naufragium tabula). By synecdoche the Sacrament is frequently referred to as confession, penance, or absolution. From its effects it is known as reconciliation, peace, communion; from a ceremony anciently in use and still traceable in the motion made by the priest when he gives absolution, it was also at one time called “imposition of the hand.”²

We shall treat, first, of the matter and form of the Sacrament (Chapter 1, Sections 1 and 2); second, of its efficacy (Chapter 2); and third, of the persons engaged in its administration (Chapters 3 and 4).

The necessity of the Sacrament of Penance coincides with the necessity of confession — one of the three acts of the penitent to which we shall devote the third and last part of this volume. In dealing with confession we shall also demonstrate the divine institution of Penance as a Sacrament.

Chapter 1: Matter and Form

Section 1: The Matter

As we have shown in a previous volume of this series,³ no Sacrament can exist without matter. The Tridentine Council, in treating of the Sacrament of Penance, takes this truth for granted.⁴

The matter of a Sacrament need not be a material substance, such as water, oil, bread, or wine; it may be something intangible, though in some manner subject to sense perception, related to the form of the Sacrament in the same way in which the ablution is related to the baptismal formula in Baptism.

Theologians are not agreed as to what constitutes the matter of the Sacrament of Penance. The majority, including the Thomists, hold that it consists in the three acts required of the penitent, viz.: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. The Scotists regard these three acts merely as necessary “dispositions” of the soul and maintain that the visible sign of the Sacrament lies in the priestly absolution, which, therefore, according to them, under different aspects, is both the matter and the form of Penance.

1. The Thomistic Theory. St. Thomas teaches: “The proximate matter of this Sacrament are the acts of the penitent.”⁵ He compares the matter of Penance with that of matrimony. In neither Sacrament, he says, have we a material object, but sensible actions take the place of ordinary matter.⁶

This view is followed by all Thomists (Gonet, Billuart, et al.) and by most of the great Jesuit theologians (Cardinals Bellarmine and Toletus, Suarez, De Lugo, Chr. Pesch, Tepe). It has even been adopted by some Scotists, notably Mastrius and Brancatus de Laurea. The arguments adduced in its support are very strong indeed.

a) Following the example of Pope Eugene IV,⁷ whose teaching is almost literally couched in the language of St. Thomas,⁸ the Tridentine Council defined: (1) that “the acts of the penitent himself, to wit, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are as it were the matter (quasi materia) of this Sacrament”;⁹ (2) that “the form of the Sacrament of Penance, wherein its force principally consists, is placed in those words of the minister, ‘I absolve thee,’ etc.,”¹⁰ i.e., in the absolution.

By quasi materia the Council can hardly have meant matter in a purely figurative sense, for the Roman Catechism, which officially interprets the teaching of Trent, says: “Nor are these acts called by the holy Synod ‘the matter as it were’ because they have not the nature of true matter, but because they are not matter of such sort as may be applied externally, like water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation.”¹¹

As the form of the Sacrament consists principally (praecipue) in the absolution, the sacramental efficacy of Penance must partly lie in something different from the absolution. This being the case, the absolution cannot be the sole matter of the Sacrament, as Scotus teaches. Now, outside of the absolution there is nothing in the Sacrament that could be designated as its matter except the three acts performed by the penitent, i.e., contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Consequently these three acts must be the essential matter of the Sacrament.

b) The Tridentine Council not only says that the three acts of the penitent are the quasi materia of the Sacrament, but calls them “parts of penance” and adds that “they are, by God’s institution, required in the penitent for the integrity of the Sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins.”¹² Now, if these acts of the penitent are parts of the Sacrament, required to produce its effects, they must be more than mere “dispositions.” No one would think of calling faith the quasi-matter or an integral part of Baptism because it is a necessary disposition in the recipient. Hence the three acts of the penitent must be regarded as essential parts of the Sacrament of Penance. They are as necessary for the integrity of the Sacrament as, say, body and soul for the integrity of human nature. And since they are not the form of the Sacrament, either whole or in part, they must be its matter.

c) The Sacrament of Penance is essentially a tribunal of justice and the priestly absolution has all the characteristics of a judicial sentence.¹³ Such a sentence presupposes a formal accusation and the hearing of witnesses, in order that the judge may have the material necessary for forming an opinion. In the tribunal of Penance, plaintiff, defendant, and witnesses are all one, and hence at least confession, as the suppositum or substratum of absolution, enters into the essence of the Sacrament. Now confession is more than a mere recital of one’s sins. It is a contrite and humble declaration of guilt, coupled with a firm purpose to sin no more. Hence contrition and the determination to make amends must as it were vivify the act of confession as the soul vivifies the body. This is what the Scholastics mean when they speak of confessio dolorosa. Contrition, confession, and the purpose of amendment are, therefore, more than mere “dispositions” for the worthy reception of Penance. They are integral parts of the Sacrament, and consequently its matter.¹⁴

2. The Scotistic Theory. Scotus says: “These three [viz., contrition, confession, and satisfaction] are in no wise parts of the Sacrament, because the Sacrament of Penance is the absolution given in certain specified terms. But contrition is no part of the latter; … neither is confession … nor satisfaction… . Yet these three are required for the Sacrament of Penance, either before or after, in order that it may be worthily received.”¹⁵ According to this theory the whole Sacrament, both as to matter and form, consists in the absolution, and the three acts performed by the penitent merely prepare him for its reception.

But how can the priestly absolution be both matter and form of the Sacrament? The Scotists answer: as an external rite, i.e., as words pronounced, absolution is the matter of Penance; as the bearer of an intrinsic meaning, it is the form.¹⁶ This view, defended by such eminent pre-Tridentine theologians as St. Bonaventure¹⁷ and Capreolus, found supporters even after the Council of Trent in Andrew Vega, Maldonatus, and A. Ballerini.¹⁸ These later writers do not, of course, object to having the three acts of the penitent called “parts” of Penance and the quasi-matter of the Sacrament; they merely maintain that these acts are unable to effect the sacramental grace ex opere operato. They defend their contention as follows:

a) The very definition of a Sacrament implies that the external sign (matter and form conjointly) not only signifies grace, but actually produces it.¹⁹ Now, with regard to the Sacrament of Penance, two things are certain: first, that it is the priestly absolution alone which signifies the remission of sins; secondly, that the priest, not the penitent, is the minister of the Sacrament.

If the absolution alone signifies the remission of sins, the three acts of the penitent contribute nothing to the production of the sacramental effect, but are merely a conditio sine qua non thereof. They do not signify, and therefore cannot produce the sacramental grace nor coöperate in its production.

The minister of the Sacrament of Penance is the priest, not the penitent. If the penitent supplied an essential part of the matter, he would coöperate in the production of the sacramental effect, i.e., help to absolve himself, which would be manifestly absurd.²⁰

b) But what is the meaning of such phrases as “quasi materia” and “partes poenitentiae,” applied to the acts of the penitent by the Tridentine Council? The Scotists say that these expressions are equivocal and do not constitute an argument against their thesis. It cannot be proved, they say, that the Council, in employing the term “quasi materia,” or even “materia,” meant to designate the sacramental “materia ex qua.”

It must be admitted that the word “materia” is employed by Catholic theologians in a variety of meanings. In connection with Penance it may mean either the true and proper materia ex qua, or the remote materia circa quam (sin), or, figuratively, the dispositive acts of the penitent, which belong to the category of material causes in the wider sense of that term. Moreover, the addition of the word “quasi” to “materia” would seem to show that the Council did not mean to designate the materia ex qua in the strict and proper sense of the word. Nor does the employment of the term “partes” prove anything against the Scotistic contention. The Council nowhere says that the acts of the penitent are parts of the Sacrament. It merely says they are “parts of penance,” which the Scotists do not deny. But even if the Council had designated these acts as “partes sacramenti,” it would not follow that they are essential parts of the Sacrament as such. Merely integral parts do not enter into the essence of a thing, and the choice of the phrase “actus poenitentis ad integritatem sacramenti requiruntur” shows that the Council did not wish to assert that contrition, confession, and satisfaction belong to the essence of the Sacrament in the sense of a materia ex qua.

c) Under the present discipline absolution may and should be given conditionally to an unconscious person who is in immediate danger of death, even if he manifests no sign of contrition or desire to receive the Sacrament. The Church presumes that he has the required disposition.²¹

In De Lugo’s time no one was absolved unless he asked for the priestly absolution,²² or at least showed a desire to receive it. This rule was based upon the principle that there can be no administration of the Sacrament if the essential matter be lacking. Where no water is available, for example, even the worthiest applicant cannot be baptized, no matter how urgent the necessity. If it were true that contrite confession forms the materia ex qua of Penance, the modern practice would be frivolous, because the priestly absolution, being merely the form, can no more constitute the Sacrament of Penance without its requisite matter — which an unconscious penitent in articulo mortis obviously cannot supply — than the baptismal formula could effect Baptism without water. The case appears different if viewed from the Scotistic point of view. Assuming that both the matter and the form of Penance are contained in the absolution, the Sacrament can be validly administered whenever there is an interior desire for confession on the part of the sinner. This argument was so effectively developed by Ballerini that Palmieri expressed the wish that the whole controversy might be once for all officially decided.²³

3. Critical Appreciation of the Two Theories.

a) Weighing the two theories against each other we find that neither can claim theological certainty. Hence the advocates of either must be allowed to develop their arguments without interference.

Even such decided antagonists of the Scotistic theory as Suarez and De Lugo admit that it has at least an extrinsic probability based upon authority. The Council of Trent purposely evaded this controversy and chose its expressions so that they cannot be interpreted as a condemnation of the Scotist position.²⁴

b) A careful examination of the arguments adduced in favor of the two theories shows that the Thomists have the stronger case.

The Catechism of the Council of Trent and the Roman Ritual unequivocally endorse the teaching of St. Thomas, which is also decidedly favored by the Tridentine decisions, not to speak of the famous Decretum pro Armenis (Florence, 1439), composed by the Angelic Doctor himself. The strongest argument that can be alleged in support of the Scotistic contention is the custom, now over two hundred years old, of giving absolution conditionally to the dying when they are unable to signify a desire to receive the Sacrament of Penance. But this argument is taken from moral rather than from dogmatic theology, and must not be overrated. The value of conditional absolution in articulo mortis is as doubtful to-day as it was at the time of De Lugo, and it is always safer in cases of urgent necessity to administer Extreme Unction after giving absolution. Secondly, it is not easy to see what advantage Scotism gains over Thomism by refusing to admit that the three acts of the penitent are the matter of the Sacrament. The Scotists admit that these acts are indispensable conditions of validity. They, or at least some of them, concede that a judicial sentence without a preceding accusation would be a contradiction, and therefore insist on the necessity of a contrite confession in some form or other for the validity of absolution.²⁵ But a contrite confession, in concreto, is identical with the three acts demanded by the Thomists.

From which it follows that the Thomistic doctrine is more solidly established than that of the Scotists, and hence we need not wonder that the latter has gradually lost ground.²⁶

Footnotes

1. Sess. XIV, can. 1: “Si quis dixerit, in catholica Ecclesia poenitentiam non esse vere et proprie sacramentum pro fidelibus, quoties post baptismum in peccata labuntur, … anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 911). Cfr. Decretum pro Armenis (Denz.-Bannwart, n. 699). ↩

2. On this rite see Palmieri, De Poenitentia, pp. 159 sq., Rome 1879. ↩

3. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. I, pp. 59 sqq. ↩

4. Sess. XIV, cap. 2. ↩

5. Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 84, art. 2: “Materia proxima huius sacramenti sunt actus poenitentis.” ↩

6. Suppl., qu. 1, art. 1: “In omnibus sacramentis quae habent effectum correspondentem humanis actibus, ipsi actus humani sensibiles sunt loco materiae, ut accidit in poenitentia et matrimonio.” ↩

7. See the Decretum pro Armenis, issued A.D. 1439. ↩

8. Opusc., V, De Articulis Fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis. ↩

9. Sess. XIV, cap. 3: “Sunt autem quasi materia huius sacramenti ipsius poenitentis actus, nempe contritio, confessio, satisfactio.” ↩

10. Ibid.: ”… formam sacramenti poenitentiae, in qua praecipue ipsius vis sita est, in illis ministri verbis positam esse: Ego te absolvo, etc.” ↩

11. Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, n. 13: “Neque vero hi actus quasi materia a Synodo appellantur, quia verae materiae rationem non habeant, sed quia eius generis materia non sunt, quae extrinsecus adhibeatur, ut aqua in baptismo et chrisma in confirmatione.” ↩

12. Sess. XIV, cap. 3: “[actus], quatenus in poenitente ad integritatem sacramenti plenamque et perfectam peccatorum remissionem requiruntur, hac ratione poenitentiae partes dicuntur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 896). — Sess. XIV, can. 4: “Si quis negaverit, ad integram et perfectam peccatorum remissionem requiri tres actus in poenitente quasi materiam sacramenti poenitentiae, vid. contritionem, confessionem et satisfactionem, quae res partes poenitentiae dicuntur, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 914). ↩

13. See the discussion of the judicial character of the power to forgive sins, above. ↩

14. Cfr. Billuart, De Poenitentia, diss. 1, art. 2; De Augustinis, De Re Sacramentaria, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 222 sqq. ↩

15. Comment. in Sent., IV, dist. 16, qu. 1, n. 7: “Ista tria [scil. contritio, confessio, satisfactio] nullo modo sunt partes eius [i.e. sacramenti], quia poenitentiae sacramentum est illa absolutio facta certis verbis. Huius autem nulla pars est contritio … neque confessio … neque satisfactio… . Haec tamen tria ad sacramentum poenitentiae ad hoc, ut digne recipiatur, requiruntur vel praevia vel sequentia.” ↩

16. Cfr. Maldonatus, De Poenitentia, P. 3, qu. 3, thes. 7: “Absolutio, quatenus est externa quaedam caerimonia, est materia; quatenus habet vim significandi, est forma.” ↩

17. Comment. in Sent., IV, dist. 27. ↩

18. Opus Morale, ed. Palmieri, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 2 sqq., Prati 1898. ↩

19. V. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. I, pp. 8 sqq. ↩

20. For an answer to these objections see Palmieri, l.c., pp. 152 sqq. ↩

21. Cfr. St. Alphonsus de’ Liguori, Theol. Moralis, De Poenit., n. 482 sq. ↩

22. De Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 17, sect. 3, n. 19: ”… non posse conferri absolutionem sacramentalem, nisi ex parte poenitentis praecedat saltem petitio seu desiderium confitendi.” ↩

23. Opus Morale, Vol. V, 3rd ed., p. 213: “Res eo adducta est, ut facile cuilibet desiderium suboriatur alicuius authenticae declarationis.” ↩

24. Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Conc. Trid., XII, c. 10; Eusebius Amort, De Poenitentia, disp. 2, qu. 2. ↩

25. Thus Scotus, Andrew Vega, Riqueus, Henno, Bosco, all cited by Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. IV, pp. 412 sqq., Paris 1896. ↩

26. On this controversy the student may profitably consult Palmieri, De Poenitentia, thes. 14. ↩