Part III, Chapter I §1: The Notion of Sacrifice

Part III: The Holy Eucharist as a Sacrifice, or the Mass

The Holy Eucharist as a Sacrifice opens up new points of view. Sacrament and Sacrifice are such thoroughly different things that some theologians treat the Mass separately in an entirely different connection.

The Mass is indeed something essentially different from the Eucharist as a Sacrament. Wiclif, Luther, and other heretics retained the latter but repudiated the former. A Sacrament serves primarily for the sanctification of souls, whereas a Sacrifice has for its object to glorify God by adoration, thanksgiving, prayer, and expiation. The recipient of the one is man, of the other, God. Moreover, the two have distinct modes of being. The Eucharistic Sacrament is a permanent thing (res permanens); the Mass is a transient act (actio transiens). Finally, the Sacrifice of the Mass requires the consecration of two distinct elements (bread and wine), whereas the Sacrament of the Eucharist may be effected (though only per accidens) by the consecration of one element only.

The word “Missa” is most probably a late Latin form of missio, as oblata from oblatio, collecta from collectio, etc.¹ Missio may refer either to the divine mission of the Logos for the reconciliation of mankind, or, by synecdoche, to the “dismissal” of the catechumens in the primitive Church,² which has left its traces in the “Ite missa est.” The term Missa for the Sacrifice of the Altar probably came into common use in the Latin Church as early as the sixth or seventh century. In the East they have retained the older technical term “Liturgy.”³

The teaching of the Church on the Sacrifice of the Mass, as defined by the Council of Trent, may be treated in three chapters: I. The Existence of the Mass; II. The Nature of the Mass; III. The Causality of the Mass.

Chapter I: The Existence of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass

Before proving that the Mass exists and is a true sacrifice, we must explain the notion of sacrifice.

§1. The Notion of Sacrifice Explained

Article 1: Definition of Sacrifice

1. Figurative Sacrifices

A “sacrifice,” generally speaking, is the offering of a gift to God (oblatio Deo facta). In this sense the term may be applied to anything that is offered to the Deity: prayer, obedience, mortification, a good intention, alms, etc. It is in this general sense that Holy Scripture says: “He that doth mercy, offereth sacrifice.”⁴

The Protestant Reformers distorted the Bible when, on the strength of such a figurative use of the term, they contended that the Mass is superfluous. Calvin, however, was honest enough to admit: “I do not understand by what reasoning those are impelled who extend the word sacrifice to all religious ceremonies and actions.”⁵ In matter of fact it is not at all difficult to show that Holy Scripture employs the term not only in a figurative but also in its strict sense. Metaphors like a “sacrifice of jubilation,”⁶ “the calves of our lips,”⁷ a “sacrifice of praise”⁸ — expressions which apply sacrificial terms to simple prayer — would be meaningless were there not, or had there not been, a true and real sacrifice (hostia, θυσία). This appears all the more clearly from such comparisons as: “Let my prayer be directed as incense in thy sight,”⁹ and such antitheses as: “Obedience is better than sacrifices;”¹⁰ “If thou hadst desired sacrifice, I would indeed have given it: with burnt offerings thou wilt not be delighted: a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit;”¹¹ “I desired mercy and not sacrifice.”¹² It will be noticed that these texts advert to the sacrificial intent which is essential to every true sacrifice, and without which no sacrifice has value in the eyes of God. This ethical aspect of sacrifice is strongly emphasized by St. Augustine when he says: “A true sacrifice is every good work which is performed in order that we may be in God by a holy association.”¹³ According to St. Thomas the sacrificial intent, as embodied in the spirit of prayer, is the essential thing.¹⁴

In a true sacrifice the sacrificial intent naturally does not embody itself in the rite, which can be performed mechanically, but in the purpose, which lifts the external offering into the spiritual sphere and therefore requires an act of the intellect and the will.

2. Sacrifices in the True and Proper Sense of the Term

The definition of sacrifice (oblatio, προσφορά) cannot be gained by a priori reasoning; it must be ascertained from the comparative history of religions, and, principally, from Divine Revelation. A careful study of these sources shows that four constituent elements enter into the notion of sacrifice: (a) a sacrificial gift (res oblata); (b) a sacrificing minister (minister legitimus); (c) a sacrificial action (actio sacrifica); (d) a sacrificial end or object (finis sacrificii).

a) The necessity of a sacrificial gift is apparent from the fact that there can be no offering without something that is offered (res oblata). In a true sacrifice, as opposed to figurative sacrifices, the gift must be a physical substance, that is to say, it must be something material and visible (e.g. an animal, incense), which is withdrawn from profane use and dedicated in a special manner to God. Cfr. Heb. VIII, 3: “Every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices: wherefore it is necessary that he also should have something to offer.”¹⁵ But this is not sufficient. The tithe, the first-fruits, the votive gifts left at miraculous shrines, etc., are physical substances offered to God with a religious intent, but they are not sacrifices. Something more is required.

b) The second requisite is the sacrificing minister (minister legitimus sacrificii), who is usually called priest (sacerdos, ἱερεύς). He must be a qualified person of the male sex. It is of the very notion of public sacrifice that it is offered in the name of the whole community, and no man can act as the representative of a community (family, tribe) unless he has been duly commissioned or called. Whatever may have been the condition of affairs in the state of the law of nature, it is certain that since the Mosaic legislation the exercise of sacrificial functions has been limited to certain authorized persons. The priests of the Old Law were the members of the tribe of Levi. Cfr. Heb. V, 4: “Neither doth any man take the honor to himself, but he that is called by God, as Aaron was.”¹⁶ When King Ozias presumed to offer sacrifices, the Levites reproved him and he was struck with leprosy.¹⁷ Christ Himself, the eternal and sole High Priest, did not exercise the sacerdotal ministry by an arrogation of authority, but in virtue of a divine call.¹⁸ He has commanded that the priests who represent Him should receive power and authority to offer up the Sacrifice of the New Law through the Sacrament of Holy Orders. Hence it is an axiom in the Catholic Church that there can be no priest without a sacrifice, and no priesthood without the Sacrament of Holy Orders. The Church is not empowered to institute sacrifices. All she has been commissioned to do is to renew and apply the bloody Sacrifice of the Cross in an unbloody manner to the end of time.

A sacrifice must be offered up at a fixed place, called an altar (ara, altare). Such places are found early and in great number among the nations of antiquity. The question suggests itself, in view of what we have said, whether a visible gift, offered on a fixed altar by a regularly ordained priest, would be a true sacrifice. If God had instituted a sacrifice under this form, it would undoubtedly be a true sacrifice. Viewed in the light of Revelation, however, we find that such an offering would lack an essential constituent of a true sacrifice, viz.: the sacrificial act.

c) In the sacrificial act (actio sacrifica, actio sacrificii) a sacrifice reaches its outward culmination. Its essence consists in the external offering of the sacrificial gift, which, in turn, must be in some manner transformed, if not completely destroyed. The form of a sacrifice, therefore, lies not in the transformation (immutatio) or destruction (destructio) of the sacrificial gift, but in its sacrificial offering, no matter how it may be transformed.

α) The sacrificial oblation, consequently, is the physical form, whereas the transformation of the gift is merely the materia proxima of the sacrifice. The former is the end and object, the latter a mere means to that end. The correctness of this view can be proved by a threefold argument. (1) Sacrificium comes from sacrum facere. In its active sense it is synonymous with offerre (to offer). Hence to offer is not the same as to transform (immutare) or to destroy (destruere).¹⁹ (2) This conclusion is borne out by a study of the Mosaic rite. Under the law of Moses the victim was slain by laymen and temple servants, while the oblation of the blood (aspersio sanguinis) was a function reserved to the lawfully appointed priests. It follows that the slaying of the victim appertains merely to the matter of the sacrifice, whereas the oblation, which consists in the sprinkling of the blood, constitutes its essential form.²⁰ (3) The real form of the Sacrifice of the Cross did not consist in the slaying of Christ by His barbarous executioners, nor in an imaginary self-destruction of the Divine Victim, but in His voluntary surrender of His Blood, shed by the hands of others, and in His offering His life for the sins of the world. Consequently, the oblation constitutes the essence of a sacrifice, whereas the destruction of the victim does not.²¹

β) These arguments do not, however, decide the deeper question whether or not the transformation or, more particularly, the destruction of the victim enters into the definition of a sacrifice a parte materiae. We have seen in a previous treatise²² that the matter of a thing, both remote and proximate, may be as necessary to constitute its nature as the form.

There can be no doubt that the sacrificial gift must be in some manner transformed either before the sacrificial action or in the process of the same.²³ Is this transformation in the Mass duly accomplished by the Consecration (sacratio, consecratio), which transfers the sacrificial gift from profane use to the exclusive service of God, or must there be, in addition, a real change (mutatio realis)? If there is need of a physical transformation, must it consist in an improvement of the gift (mutatio in melius) or may it consist in a deterioration or the destruction thereof (mutatio in deterius s. destructio)? The answer to these questions cannot be obtained by the a priori method. Had God so willed, a sacrifice could be consummated by the mere consecration or dedication of the sacrificial gift. But we know from Revelation that such was not His will. We know that the essence of sacrifice requires a real transformation of the res oblata. Holy Scripture does not tell us whether this transformation must culminate in destruction. Catholic divines, since Bellarmine and Suarez, hold divergent views on this point. Scheeben²⁴ has pointed out, and Fr. Renz²⁵ proved by a wealth of historical arguments, that the Fathers and the Scholastic theologians of the pre-Tridentine period did not demand the destruction of the victim. However, Bellarmine,²⁶ Vasquez,²⁷ De Lugo,²⁸ and Franzelin²⁹ insist on it. That the idea is recent, does not, of course, prove that it is false. The necessity of defending the Mass against the Protestant Reformers might have led to the discovery of a new element, which had been overlooked by the theologians of an earlier day. If we add to this that the idea of the complete destruction of the sacrificial victim is realized in a truly imposing manner both in the Mosaic rite and in the Sacrifice of the Cross — though indeed only ratione materiae proximae — we shall see how reasonable is the assumption that there must be some kind of destruction (and if it were only a self-abasement, or “kenosis,” as modern writers might say), in the Sacrifice of the Mass.

De Lugo, whose opinion has been popularized by more than one English writer, expressly admits that the destruction of the sacrificial gift need not be physical but that the idea is sufficiently realized in an act which, according to human estimation, amounts to a certain “exinanition” or self-abasement.³⁰ We mention this fact, not to prove the truth of De Lugo’s theory, but merely to show that it is not improbable, much less impossible.

d) The object or end of the sacrifice (finis sacrificii), as significant of its meaning, constitutes its “metaphysical form.” In all religions the essential idea of sacrifice is a complete surrender of the creature to God for the purpose of being united with Him.

α) This surrender (oblatio, προσφορά) can be regarded from a twofold point of view: (1) as an acknowledgment of God’s absolute dominion over man (agnitio supremi dominii) and (2) as man’s absolute subjection of himself under God (absoluta subiectio sub Deo). The former element embodies mainly the juridical, the latter the ethical element of sacrifice, i.e. man’s own sanctification as a means of union with God. The two ideas are correlative and postulate each other. Both are based upon the consideration of God as the First Cause and Last End of the created universe.³¹

Hence the obvious inference that sacrifice is essentially an act of divine worship, as God is both the Creator and the final End of all things. To offer sacrifice to a creature would be idolatry.³² This was understood even by the heathen. St. Augustine remarks: “Who ever thought of offering sacrifice, except to one whom he either knew or thought or imagined to be God?”³³ Now we are also able to understand why the gift offered as a sacrifice must not only be the property of him who offers it, but by a symbolic substitution vicariously represents man whole and entire, with body and soul, being and life, inasmuch as the sacrificing minister is aware of the absolute dependence upon the First Cause and the direction to the Final End of those for whom he offers sacrifice. This is the essential signification of every sacrifice.

β) To the idea of a complete surrender to God as the essential note of sacrifice, there is added, on the part of those who are in a state of sin, the desire for pardon and reconciliation. This idea is based on the knowledge that sin is the greatest impediment to man’s union with God. All the sacrifices of which the Bible tells us, were offered in the state of sin, and consequently had for their object, in part at least, the pardon of sinners and their reconciliation with God. Here, again, the idea of destruction plays an important part, in so far as man, conscious of his guilt and the penalty incurred thereby, prefers to offer such gifts as symbolize his own life, and destroys them by killing or burning. Cfr. Heb. IX, 22: “Without shedding of blood there is no remission.”³⁴

Combining the four constituent ideas thus explained, we may now define a sacrifice as “the external offering of a sensible gift, which is destroyed, or at least submitted to an appropriate transformation, by an authorized minister, in recognition of God’s supreme dominion and in order to appease His anger.” In this definition the phrase “the external offering of a sensible gift” expresses the generic element which a sacrifice has in common with other acts of divine worship. The remainder sets forth the specific difference which distinguishes a sacrifice from all other religious offerings.

Article 2: Different Kinds of Sacrifice

Sacrifices may be divided into four categories according to their object, their origin, their material, and the economy of grace to which they belong.

1. The Object of Sacrifice

The intrinsic and essential object of every sacrifice, as we have seen, is the acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion over His creatures. Besides this there is a secondary object, viz.: the appeasement of His wrath. This secondary object, though in itself purely accidental, has become inseparable from the notion of sacrifice in consequence of the Fall.³⁵

The acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion over His creatures culminates in adoration or worship (adoratio, latria, λατρεία); the effort to appease His wrath, in contrite expiation for the purpose of obtaining pardon of sin (propitiatio). Hence the distinction between sacrifices of praise and sacrifices of propitiation (sacrificia latreutica et propitiatoria). And since man receives from God many benefits, his sacrifices have the additional purpose of thanksgiving and petition (sacrificia eucharistica et impetratoria).

The reason of this fourfold division, according to St. Thomas, is that “man is under obligations to God, in the first place and mainly because of His majesty; secondly because of sins committed; thirdly, because of benefits received, and fourthly, because of benefits still expected.”³⁶ These four objects must not, however, be conceived as separable from one another. There can be no sacrifice of thanksgiving and petition that is not at the same time a sacrifice of praise and propitiation. The specific name of each merely points to the purpose predominating in the mind of the sacrificing minister.

2. Origin of Sacrifice

To be valid, a sacrifice must be legitimately instituted. It is not, however, necessary, that it be instituted exclusively by God.

“Generally speaking,” says St. Thomas, “the obligation of sacrifice is derived from the natural law; and therefore all are agreed on this. But the determination of sacrifices is a matter of human or divine institution, and in this there is a difference of opinion.”³⁷ Vasquez³⁸ maintained against Suarez that under the law of nature sacrifices might conceivably be instituted by private individuals; but this contention was refuted by De Lugo.³⁹ There can hardly be a doubt that the institution of sacrifices, even in the state of nature, is reserved to authority. Upon this fact is based the division of sacrifices into arbitraria, i.e. sacrifices instituted by purely human authority, and legalia, i.e. sacrifices instituted by divine authority. Sacrifices of the first-mentioned kind were probably offered by the Patriarchs during the pre-Mosaic period, when there were as yet no sacrificia legalia and the offering of sacrifice was a duty imposed on the heads of families. By the written law of Moses Yahweh assumed control of the Jewish religion, prescribed the sacrificial rites in detail, and selected the tribe of Levi as the sole representative of the Old Testament priesthood.⁴⁰ Sacrifices offered by others were invalid, and any one not of that tribe who presumed to offer sacrifice, was as “guilty … as if he had shed blood,” and condemned to “perish from the midst of his people.”⁴¹

3. The Material of Sacrifice

In accordance with the material nature of the sacrificial gift, sacrifices are divided into bloody sacrifices (victima, hostia, θῦμα), libations (libamen, σπονδεῖον), and immolations (immolatio).

The material of the bloody sacrifice belonged to the category of domestic animals, which were slaughtered and burnt, either wholly or in part. Libations, consisting of natural liquids such as wine and oil, were poured out before the altar. The material of an immolation (from mola, sacrificial flour) was chosen from solid or liquid articles of human food (incense, salt, etc.), and was always, at least partially, burned. The sacrificial rites differed widely among different nations. The most perfect, in fact the only true bloody sacrifice, in matter as well as form, was that offered on the Cross by our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who was both the sacrificing minister and the sacrificial lamb.

4. Pre-Mosaic, Mosaic, and Christian Sacrifices

The history of sacrifices, in revealed religion, may be divided into three periods: (a) the Pre-Mosaic or Patriarchal (aetas patriarcharum s. legis naturae); (b) the Mosaic (aetas legis scriptae s. mosaica); and (c) the Christian (aetas legis evangelicae s. christiana).

a) The sacrifice of the Patriarchal period, in its earliest stage in Paradise, probably consisted in some ceremonial (latreutical) eating of fruit from the Tree of Life, which was a figure of holy Communion. The priest was Adam, the head of the family, not Eve, who was subject to her husband. After the fall of our first parents the sacrifices they offered to God took on a propitiatory character. The first sacrifice expressly mentioned in the Bible is that of Cain and Abel, consisting of animals and fruits of the field. It is probable that during this early period the sacrificial rite was determined entirely by the Patriarchs, who were the legitimate heads of their tribes, though some theologians hold that certain regulations had been handed down to them from primitive Revelation.

b) The sacrifices of the Mosaic period were partly bloody and partly unbloody. The latter were merely subsidiary food-offerings.⁴² There were three kinds of bloody sacrifices: burnt offerings, peace offerings, and sin offerings. The burnt offering is called holocaust, because in it the whole victim was made to ascend to God through fire in smoke and vapor. The unbloody sacrifices consisted in the burning of vegetable substances (incense, flour, bread with salt) or the pouring out of fluids (wine and oil). Notable among the sacrifices of the Mosaic period were: the sin offering (sacrificium pro peccato, τὸ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, or simply peccatum), the sacrifice of the daily lamb (iuge sacrificium), and that of the paschal lamb (agnus paschalis).⁴³

A most important function of the Mosaic sacrifice was to serve as a type or figure of the Sacrifice of the Cross. The entire Old Testament, as St. Paul tells us, was nothing but “a shadow of the good things to come.”⁴⁴ This is true in a special manner of the sacrificial system of the Jews, as the same Apostle explains.⁴⁵ As the Levitic priesthood was a figure of the one High Priest, Jesus Christ, so the sacrifices of the Mosaic law were a shadow and a type of the one great Sacrifice of the Cross. Being in themselves imperfect and inefficacious, the sacrifices of the Levites could effect a legal “cleansing of the flesh,”⁴⁶ but no remission of sins.⁴⁷ Their very insufficiency made them prophetic types of the perfect sacrifice of the New Law. If sins were forgiven in the Old Testament, it was not by the blood of goats or calves, but by the blood of the promised Redeemer. Hence the variety of the Levitic sacrifices and their constant repetition. They were mere types expressing the constant need of propitiation through the bloody Sacrifice of the Cross.⁴⁸

It would not, however, be correct to say that the sacrifices of the Mosaic law were merely typical, mystic, and relative. They had an absolute signification in themselves in so far as they were true sacrifices, instituted for the purpose of worshipping God, appeasing His anger, giving Him thanks, and petitioning Him for further blessings.⁴⁹

c) Christianity knows but one sacrifice, the bloody sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on the Cross and daily repeated in an unbloody manner on our altars.

The Mass is not an independent sacrifice offered by Christ. Nor is it a complement and consummation of the Sacrifice of the Cross. It is merely the unbloody representation and application of the latter, to be continued to the end of time. Both in regard to the sacrificial gift and the sacrificing minister, the Mass is essentially identical with the Sacrifice of the Cross. The only difference between them lies in the manner of offering, which in the one is bloody and in the other unbloody.⁵⁰

Protestants contend that Christianity has no sacrifices besides the one offered on Calvary. There are many reasons that speak against this contention. In the first place, there can be no true religion without a sacrifice, and hence Christianity, being pre-eminently the religion, must surely have a perennial sacrifice of its own. Again, the sacrifice of the Cross is truly a world-sacrifice and as such does not belong exclusively to the Christian Church. It was the sole legitimate sacrifice also of all religions of antiquity since the Fall. Yet the professors of the Christian faith, in order to be able to satisfy their duty of worshipping God, must have a permanent sacrifice just as well as the Old Testament Jews. This craving of the heart, which has deeply imbedded itself in all religions, is not satisfied by the Sacrifice of the Cross, since that was offered “once for all” and in one place only. The Catholic Church, being “the mystical Christ,” must have a sacrifice of her own, because otherwise she could not fulfil her duty of worshipping God in the most perfect manner possible. Without a sacrifice the Christian cult would be inferior to the Levitic ceremonies of the Old Testament, nay even to the feeble manifestations of natural religion as practiced before the Mosaic era.⁵¹

These considerations, drawn from reason, are confirmed by Divine Revelation, which tells us positively that there is such a sacrifice and that it is to be found in the Mass.

Readings: A. Stöckl, Das Opfer nach seinem Wesen und seiner Geschichte, Mayence 1861. W. Koppler, Priester und Opfergabe, Mayence 1886. M. Becanus, De Triplici Sacrificio Naturae, Legis, Gratiae (Opusc. II), Lyons 1631. G. Pierse, The Mass in the Infant Church, Dublin 1909. W. Humphrey, S.J., The One Mediator, or Sacrifice and Sacraments, pp. 1-41, London. A. Devine, C.P., The Sacraments Explained, 3rd ed., pp. 250 sqq., London 1905.

Footnotes

1. Cfr. Du Cange, Glossar., s.v. “Missa.” It is thus explained by Rupert of Deutz, De Divin. Off., II, 20. ↩

2. Cfr. Isid. Hispal., Etymol., VI, 19, 4: “Missa tempore sacrificii est, quando catechumeni foras mittuntur … et inde Missa, quia sacramentis altaris interesse non possunt, qui nondum regenerati noscuntur.” (Migne, P.L., LXXXII, 252). ↩

3. Cfr. H. Müller, Missa: Ursprung und Bedeutung der Benennung, Aschaffenburg 1873; H. Loewy, Die mystischen Bezeichnungen Jesu Christi als Siloé, Schiloch und Piscis, insbesondere die Bezeichnung der christlichen Opferfeier als Missa, Paderborn 1888; Kellner, Heortology, pp. 430 sqq., London 1908; A. Fortescue, The Mass. A Study of the Roman Liturgy, 2nd ed., London 1913, pp. 399 sqq.; J. C. Hedley, The Holy Eucharist, new impression, London 1907, pp. 175 sqq. ↩

4. Ecclus. XXXV, 4: “Qui facit misericordiam, offert sacrificium.” On the history of the term “sacrifice” in English, see the Oxford New English Dictionary, s.v. ↩

5. Calvin, Instit., IV, 8, §13: “Qui sacrifici vocabulum ad omnes cerimonias et religiosas actiones extendunt, qua ratione id faciant, non video.” ↩

6. “Hostia vociferationis.” (Ps. XXVI, 6). ↩

7. “Vituli labiorum.” (Osee XIV, 3). ↩

8. “Hostia laudis.” (Heb. XIII, 15). ↩

9. Ps. CXL, 2: “Dirigatur oratio mea sicut incensum in conspectu tuo.” ↩

10. 1 Kings XV, 22: “Melior est enim obedientia quam victimae.” ↩

11. Ps. L, 18 sq.: “Si voluisses sacrificium, dedissem utique, holocaustis non delectaberis: sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus.” ↩

12. Osee VI, 6: “Misericordiam volui et non sacrificium.” ↩

13. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, X, 6: “Sacrificium verum est omne opus bonum, quod agitur, ut sancta societate inhaereamus Deo.” ↩

14. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 85, art. 3, ad 2: “Primum quidem est bonum animae quod Deo offertur interiori quodam sacrificio per devotionem et orationem et alios huiusmodi interiores actus; et hoc est principale sacrificium.” ↩

15. Heb. VIII, 3: “Omnis enim pontifex ad offerendum munera et hostias constituitur; unde necesse est hunc habere aliquid quod offerat.” ↩

16. Heb. V, 4: “Nec quisquam sumit sibi honorem [i.e. sacerdotii], sed qui vocatur a Deo tamquam Aaron.” (Cfr. Numb. III sqq.). ↩

17. 2 Par. XXVI, 18 sqq. ↩

18. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, pp. 127 sqq. ↩

19. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 22, art. 2: “Sacrificia proprie dicuntur, quando circa res Deo oblatas aliquid fit, sicut quod animalia occidebantur et comburebantur, quod panis frangitur et comeditur et benedicitur. Et hoc ipsum nomen sonat; nam sacrificium dicitur ex hoc quod homo facit aliquid sacrum.” Hence the etymological equation θύω = fio (suffio); in Sanscrit; yag = to offer, whence are derived yagita = sacrifice, and yagya = sacred (in the sense of ἅγιος). ↩

20. Cfr. Suarez, De Eucharistia, disp. 73, sect. 5. See also P. Scholz, Die hl. Altertümer des Volkes Israel, Vol. II, pp. 134 sqq., Ratisbon 1868. ↩

21. Cfr. Heb. IX, 14: “Per Spiritum Sanctum semetipsum obtulit (ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν) immaculatum Deo.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, pp. 111 sqq. “Hostia quippe occiditur, ut offeratur,” says St. Gregory the Great (Hom. in Ezech., X, 19). ↩

22. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. I, pp. 59 sqq., 107 sqq. ↩

23. Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 22, art. 2 (quoted above, note 19). ↩

24. Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 400 sqq., Freiburg 1882. ↩

25. Fr. Renz, Geschichte des Messopferbegriffes, 2 vols., Freising 1901-03. ↩

26. Bellarmine, De Eucharistia, V, 2. ↩

27. Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol., III, disp. 220, c. 2. ↩

28. De Lugo, De Eucharistia, disp. 19, sect. 5. ↩

29. Franzelin, De Eucharistia, P. II, thes. 16. ↩

30. De Lugo, De Eucharistia, disp. 19, sect. 5, n. 65: ”… ita ut ex vi sacrificationis hostia, prout est in termino illius actionis, habeat statum decliviorem et saltem humano modo deficiat.” ↩

31. Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 85, art. 2: “Oblatio sacrificii fit ad aliquid significandum. … Anima autem se offert Deo in sacrificium sicut principio suae creationis et sicut fini suae beatificationis.” ↩

32. Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 102, art. 3: “Et quia pertinet ad rectam ordinationem mentis in Deum, ut mens humana non recognoscat alium primum auctorem rerum nisi solum Deum, neque in aliquo alio finem suum constituat, propter hoc prohibebatur in lege offerri sacrificium alicui alteri nisi Deo secundum illud (Ex. XXII, 20): ‘Qui immolat diis, occidetur, praeterquam Domino soli.’” ↩

33. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, X, 4: “Quis sacrificandum censuit nisi ei, quem deum aut scivit aut putavit aut finxit?” ↩

34. Heb. IX, 22: “Sine sanguinis effusione non fit remissio.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, pp. 112 sqq.; Outram, De Sacrificiis, London 1672; J. Pohle, s.v. “Sacrifice,” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII. On the sacrifices of the pagans see Lasaulx, Die Sühnopfer der Griechen und Römer und ihr Verhältnis zu dem einen auf Golgotha, Würzburg 1841; Schanz, s.v. “Opfer” in the Kirchenlexikon, 2nd ed., Vol. IX. On the controversy regarding the concept of sacrifice in the primitive Church, cfr. the Katholik, of Mayence, 1908, I, pp. 434 sqq., II, 463 sqq.; 1909, I, pp. 125 sqq.; the Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, of Innsbruck, 1908, pp. 307 sqq.; Wieland, Die Schrift “Mensa und Confessio” and P. E. Dorsch, S.J., Munich 1908. On the idea of sacrifice in the Fathers, see G. Pierse, The Mass in the Infant Church, pp. 37 sqq. ↩

35. Cfr. Heb. X, 2 sqq. ↩

36. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 102, art. 3, ad 10: “Est ratio huius ordinis, quia maxime obligatur homo Deo propter eius maiestatem, secundo propter offensam commissam, tertio propter eius beneficia iam suscepta, quarto propter beneficia sperata.” ↩

37. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 85, art. 1, ad 1: “Obligatio sacrificii in communi est de lege naturali, et ideo in hoc omnes conveniunt. Sed determinatio sacrificiorum est ex institutione humana vel divina, et ideo in hoc differunt.” ↩

38. Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol., III, disp. 220, c. 1-2. ↩

39. De Lugo, De Eucharistia, disp. 19, sect. 1, n. 10 sqq. ↩

40. Cfr. Numb. III sqq.; Deut. XVIII. ↩

41. Cfr. Lev. XVII, 2 sqq. ↩

42. Cfr. Thalhofer, Die unblutigen Opfer des mosaischen Kultus, Ratisbon 1848. ↩

43. De Lugo (De Euch., disp. 19, sect. 1, n. 9) denied that the “panes propositionis” were a true sacrifice; but this assertion is untenable. Cfr. Scholz, Die hl. Altertümer des Volkes Israel, Vol. II, Ratisbon 1868. ↩

44. Heb. X, 1: “Umbra … futurorum bonorum (σκιὰ … τῶν μελλόντων).” ↩

45. Heb. VIII-X. ↩

46. “Emundatio carnis, τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότης.” ↩

47. “Remissio, ἄφεσις.” ↩

48. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, p. 117 sq. ↩

49. Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 102, art. 3: “Caerimoniae Veteris Legis duplicem causam habebant: unam scil. literalem, secundum quod ordinabantur ad cultum Dei, aliam vero figuralem sive mysticam, secundum quod ordinabantur ad figurandum Christum.” ↩

50. See below, Ch. II, §1. ↩

51. Cfr. N. Gihr, The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, pp. 79 sqq. ↩